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Abstract 
Introduction 
The issue of raising corporate governance standards and practices in India, 
comparable to that of advanced nations is of utmost importance in order to compete 
for global funds and to safeguard domestic customer against misappropriations, which 
arises due to concentrated and dominant shareholding in Indian corporate. The United 
Kingdom is a pioneer in corporate governance principles and guidelines, and it is said 
that nothing can be written on the matter of corporate governance without referring to 
the Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom which set the wheels of corporate 
governance rolling throughout the globe. Sir Adrian Cadbury of United Kingdom is 
regarded as a living legend on the matter of corporate governance. UK corporate 
governance principles and practice has been widely regarded as benchmaric by several 
nations. Through series of committees and revisions from the days of Cadbury, United 
Kingdom has developed a sound system of corporate governance which has enabled 
its executive to tightrope their corporate behavior, better investor protection, wide 
dispersal of shareholdings and distribution of the profits to her large population. This 
research is based on the presumption that comparing UK systems and practices with 
ours, and analyzing the reasons thereof, will highlight areas of weaknesses in our 
system which needs redressal in our corporate governance. 
Research Gap 
Comparative studies on corporate governance in Indian context vis-a-vis any other 
benchmarked country or for the matter any coimtry are not available. There is, 
therefore, an acute scarcity of literatures comparing our corporate governance system 
with advanced countries, with an aim to enhance our system and take a quantum jump 
on the matter of corporate governance. The present research fulfills the gap. Keeping 
in view the importance and relevance of better corporate governance ,these studies 
may considered very useful in identifying the system gap and shortcomings on short 
notice, and that is why there is now a increasing trend globally to undertake such 
efforts. On the global level too, though there are comparative studies between two 
countries but they are not empirical in nature and comparisons are confined to 
respective codes provisions and are based mainly on theoretical comparisons. This 
research is also aimed to fill the gap on the global level as empirical studies 
comparing the corporate governance practices are scarcely available. Keeping in view 
the importance and usefulness of such empirical study the present research is likely to 
open the floodgate of a series of such empirical research on larger scale and 
dimensions on global scale which will further the interest of convergence in corporate 
governance. The present research has the potential of becoming the trend setter for 
such type of studies on bigger dimensions and domains. 
Contents of the Thesis 
The Thesis comprises of seven chapters followed by Bibliography and Appendices. 
The first chapter introduces general business, the gradual evolution to its present 
corporate gigantic form, its significance in the present day context, agency problems 
and the genesis of corporate governance, various definitions of corporate governance, 
initiatives undertaken in Indian and United Kingdom towards betterment of corporate 
governance and the milestones covered by each country toward efforts of its 
betterment in historical context. The second chapter presents the review of literature. 
The methodology of the research has been presented in the third chapter. Fourth 
chapter deals in the statistical analysis and furnishes the results. Fifth chapter covers 
'results and discussions' and contextualizes the same with literatures and studies. 
Summary, conclusion, suggestions, limitations, policy implications and direction for 
future research have been dealt with in the sixth chapter. The last chapter {chapter 
seven), based on present research and deriving a lesson fi-om the UK corporate 
governance practices, proposes a model by the researcher to strengthen the institution 
of independent directors in India. At the end is the Bibliography. Annexure have been 
placed at its last, which contains the final list of companies subjected to detailed 
analytical studies and the arrival of the list from the top 500 companies of each 
country. 
Methodology of Research 
Research proposition 
The present research is aimed at the proposition that Indian Corporate governance are 
working at sub-optimal level and there is enough scope to enhance the same when our 
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system are compared and analyzed with world benchmark system and the area of 
weaknesses identified based on the study. The present comparative study of corporate 
governance practices with UK aims to fulfill the research proposition and seeks to 
bring out area of significant difference based on critical parameters of corporate 
governance, analyze the problem and provide suggestions to improve Indian 
Corporate Governance. 
Research Objective 
The primary objective of the comparative study of corporate governance practices of 
the two coimtries is to find out through empirical analysis how enlisted Indian public 
limited companies corporate governance practices differ from their UK counterparts 
based on analysis of significant deviations on important parameters of Corporate 
Governance, their probable cause and recommend suggestions to improve corporate 
governance of Indian corporate. Secondary objective is to find out, based on annual 
reports theoretical studies, areas or parameters of good governance which UK 
corporate practices and the same are not in existence in case of India so that the same 
could be recommended for incorporation. 
Formulatioii of Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been formulated for realizing the objectives of the 
study. Null Hypotheses for the research are presented below: 
Hoi: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman being non-executive in their companies. 
Ho2: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of separation of roles of governance and management functions i.e., 
separate chairman and chief executive officer. 
Ho3: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of board members in their companies. 
Ho4: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Ho5: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non- Executive Directors (Non-independent) m their 
corporate Boards. 
Ho6: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Executive Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Ho7: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of nimiber of board meetings they conduct in a year. 
Ho8: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Nomination Committee in their Boards. 
Ho9: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in Remuneration Committee. 
Ho 10: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in Remimeration Committee. 
Hoi 1: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of nimiber of Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent) in 
Remuneration committee. 
Ho 12: There is no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of 
number of Executive Directors in Remuneration Conmiittee. 
Hoi3: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Remimeration Committee Meetings they hold in a year. 
Hoi4: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Remimeration Committee. 
Hoi5: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in their Remuneration Committee. 
Hoi6: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in Audit Committee. 
Hoi 7: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in Audit Conunittees. 
Hoi 8: There is no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of 
number of Non- Executive Directors (Non-independent) in Audit 
Committee. 
Hol9: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in Audit Committee. 
Ho20: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Audit Committee Meetings they conduct in a year. 
Ho21: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in Audit Committee. 
Ho22: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Lead Independent Director in their corporate Board. 
Ho23: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of mean strength of companies having provisions for Induction and 
Professional Development for their Directors. 
Ho24: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of female Non-Executive Directors in their companies. 
Ho25: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of female Independent Directors in their companies. 
Ho26: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of keeping provisions for performance evaluation for their directors in 
their companies. 
Ho27: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
mater of average presence of Audit Committee. 
Ho28: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of average presence of promoter as Chairman. 
Ho29: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of total strength of Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent & 
Independent) in their corporate Boards. 
Research Design 
Descriptive research design has been resorted to. In the initial stage however the 
research carried out is that of exploratory in nature as the nature of the problem 
required identifying and formulating of the important and critical parameters and 
formulation of working hypothesis for more precise empirical investigation and also 
to meet secondary objectives. The major study in the initial stage was on the 
discovery of ideas and insights as such it required flexibility for considering different 
aspects of the problem so as to necessitate change in research procedure for gathering 
relevant data. 
Research Scope 
The scoj)e of the study has been delimited and confined to business forms having 
more relevance in terms of investor protection. The listed form of business 
organizations, therefore, has been the focus of attention. Among the listed firms the 
top and largest non-financial companies have been studied as these companies 
provides the major goods and services, and are at the forefront of economic operation 
and influences large section of population because of their larger market 
capitalization. Delimitation has also been done on the matter of niunber of parameters 
to be studied. To accomplish the research objective, the current research identifies a 
set of common parameters (29 in nos.), for their comparative analytical study, and to 
assess current state of existence in Indian companies' vis-a-vis UK companies. 
Sampling Framework 
Top 500 companies from both countries have been chosen as the population from 
which required samples has been taken for further analysis. The top 500 listed 
companies for each coimtry has been arranged based on market capitalization and 
alternate companies, 250 in numbers, for each country, has been selected for their 
fiirther detailed studies of corporate governance practices. Arrangement based on mkt. 
cap and alternate selection based on systematic random sampling ensured that one out 
of the two companies of same class entered into the samples and the sampling bias 
minimized. The type of sampling utilized, therefore, is systematic sampling. 
On investigation of 250 companies, each of both countries, it is foimd that companies 
so chosen after systematic sampling includes such companies as Banks, Insurance, 
Govt, companies. Trusts, Mutual Funds, AIM listed companies, smaller listed 
companies(lJK), equity and non-equity investment instruments, PSUs etc. These 
companies belong to different class of companies so far as their governance practices 
are concerned and they are also to comply their respective statutes in addition to the 
codes of corporate governance. All such companies are excluded from the current 
research purview. Final samples after delimitation and exclusion of companies stand 
as below: 
In case of United Kingdom-117 Nos., In case of India - 186 Nos. 
Total nos. of companies taking together India and United Kingdom- 303 Nos. 
Type of data and collection 
The present study relies on secondary data hand picked data from Annual Reports of 
companies of India and UK. Data fix)m Annual Reports of companies for the financial 
year 2008, which is the most recent data available, has been used. In case of India the 
data used are from the Annual reports for the year 2007-08. 
Annual Reports 
Annual reports of companies are the widely accepted document for a company and 
are considered appropriate for collection of wide range of data. There are two major 
advantages in scrutinizing companies' annual reports for the data. First, annual 
accoimts and reports are accredited documents that proclaim a company's jBnancial 
situation and corporate information. The data gathered from annual reports is, 
therefore, supposed to be authoritative and credible as compared to single-respondent 
survey data. The second advantage of relying on the annual reports is that all public 
companies are required to file these reports. By going to the annual reports instead of 
using a survey methodology we generate a sample with far more response and one 
that is far more representative. "Examination of annual reports, rather than relying on 
retrospective single-respondent survey data allows us to improve both the quality and 
quantity of data available for analysis. (Rayton & Cheng, 2004). Moreover the 
utilization of annual reports of data is more economic with lesser involvement of time 
which is a desirable feature in any research design as research design is the 
arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to 
combine relevance with economy. 
Data Analysis 
The data of Indian and United Kingdom companies has been entered into a computer 
database and then analyzed using the statistical package for the Social Science (SPSS) 
and MS Excel. The matter of significant deviation/non-deviation has been tested 
empirically through the strong and reliable t-test for two independent samples for 
comparing means. The extent of deviation of each factors have been explained using 
the descriptive statistics of Mean Values so obtained after t-test on SPSS system. The 
established significance level for rejecting all Null Hypotheses is 0.05. 
Table containing empirical results 
Out of the 29 hypotheses 24 were rejected and 5 were not rejected. The simmiary of 
results, obtained from the empirical analysis, is tabulated below. The results fiimished 
also points towards extent of large and significant difference (up to 0.01 significance 
level) in most of the cases. 
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Hypotheses that were accepted: 
List of 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Ho3 
Ho4 
Hol5 
H0I6 
Ho27 
Statement: 
There is no 
significant 
difference 
between India 
and UK on the 
matter 
of. 
... size of 
Board 
...strength of 
independent 
directors in 
their Board. 
....presence of 
chairman in 
their 
Remuneration 
Committee 
...strength of 
memt>ers in the 
Audit 
Committee 
...mean 
presence of 
Audit 
Committee 
Means 
India 
9.4892 
4.7838 
0.3087 
3.7189 
1.000 
UK 
9.1795 
4.6068 
0.3761 
3.6239 
1.000 
t-value 
(unequal 
variance) 
1.052 
0.921 
-1.144 
0.901 
— 
P 
value 
(two 
tailed) 
0.294 
0.358 
0.254 
0.369 
— 
p value 
higher or 
lower than 
0.05 
(significance 
at 5% level) 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
— 
Result 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Hypotheses that were rejected 
List of 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Hoi 
Statement: 
There is no 
significant 
difference 
between India 
and UK on the 
matter of. 
...Chairman 
being Non-
Executive. 
Means 
India 
0.6216 
UK 
0.8793 
t-value 
(unequal 
variance) 
-5.493 
P 
value 
(two 
tailed) 
0.000 
p value 
higher or 
lower than 
0.05(95% 
confidence 
level) 
<0.05 
Result 
Null 
rejected 
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Ho2 
Ho5 
Ho6 
Ho7 
Ho8 
Ho9 
HolO 
Holl 
Hol2 
Hol3 
...separation of 
roles, i.e., 
Chairman & 
CEO separate 
... strength of 
Non Executive 
Directors (NI) 
in their 
companies 
Board. 
... strength of 
Executive 
Directors in 
their Board. 
... .frequencies 
of Board 
Meetings 
...presence of 
Nomination 
Committee in 
their Board. 
...size of 
remuneration 
committee. 
....strength of 
Independent 
Directors in the 
Remuneration 
Committee 
....strength of 
Non-Executive 
Directors (NI) 
in 
Remuneration 
Committee 
... .strength of 
Executive 
Directors in 
their 
Remuneration 
Committee 
...frequencies 
of 
Remuneration 
0.6613 
2.2378 
2.4892 
6.3441 
0.0645 
3.3716 
2.6216 
0.6216 
0.1342 
1.9007 
0.9658 
1.1880 
0.3879 
8.6897 
0.9915 
3.9316 
3.5043 
0.4274 
0.0000 
4.4872 
-7.785 
6.861 
18.115 
-7.579 
-46.388 
-5.088 
-7.492 
2.343 
4.317 
-12.157 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.020 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Hol4 
Hol7 
H0I8 
Hol9 
Ho20 
Ho21 
Ho22 
Ho23 
Ho24 
Committee 
Meetings 
...presence of 
Remuneration 
Committee in 
their Corporate 
Boards. 
...strength of 
independent 
directors in the 
audit committee 
...strength of 
Non-Executive 
Directors (NI) 
in Audit 
Committee. 
...strength of 
Executive 
Directors in 
Audit 
Committees. 
...frequencies 
of Audit 
Committee 
Meetings 
.... presence of 
Chairman as 
member of 
Audit 
Committee. 
....mean size, of 
companies 
having Lead 
Independent 
Director in their 
Boards. 
....mean size of 
companies 
having 
provision for 
Induction and 
Professional 
Development 
...size of female 
non-executive 
0.8065 
3.0595 
0.4649 
0.1935 
4.8172 
0.2258 
0.0269 
0.1075 
0.3065 
1.0000 
3.5043 
0.1197 
0.0000 
3.9402 
0.0769 
0.9829 
0.9231 
0.8120 
-6.663 
-4.027 
5.674 
6.663 
6.700 
3.773 
-56.507 
-24.252 
-5.571 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
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Ho25 
Ho26 
Ho28 
Ho29 
directors (NI & 
I) in their 
companies. 
...strength of 
Female 
Independent 
Directors in 
their company's 
Boards. 
...companies 
having 
provisions for 
Performance 
Evaluation for 
their Directors. 
....Promoters 
holding the post 
of chairman. 
...strength of 
total Non-
executive (Non-
independent & 
Independent) 
Directors. 
0.1183 
0.0860 
0.5297 
7.0216 
0.6496 
0.9658 
0.0172 
5.7949 
-7.490 
-33.027 
13.227 
5.219 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Summary of Result 
Chairman Non-executive 
There exists a significant difference between India and UK on the matter of chairman 
being Non-Executive in their companies. On the whole 62.16% of Indian companies 
were found to have Non-Executive Chairman, whereas corresponding figures is 
87.93% in UK. 
Separation of roles for governance and management i.e., Chairman & CEO 
There exist significant differences between India and UK on the matter of separation 
of roles of governance and management.. Whereas only 66.13% of Indian companies 
were found to have separate Chairman and CEO, the UK companies were found to be 
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in much better position with 96.58% of UK companies having separate Chairman & 
CEO. 
Total strength of board members 
There exists no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of total 
strength of board members. Sampling statistic of Mean size of Indian Board is 9.4892 
and that of UK is 9.1795. bidian boards on the whole appear to be slightly larger than 
their UK counterparts. 
Strength of Independent Directors in Boards 
There exists no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of strength 
of Independent Directors in the Board. The mean figure for Independent directors in 
case of Indian board is 4.7838 whereas the same is 4.6068 in case of UK. 
Strength of Non Executive Directors (Non-independent) in Boards 
There exist significant differences between India and UK on the mean populations of 
non-executive directors in their boards. The mean for India is 2.2378, whereas it is 
1.1880 for UK. Indian Boards in general have greater number of non-executive 
directors (Non-independent) compared to UK. 
Number of Executive Directors in Boards 
There exist significant differences between India and UK on the matter of number of 
Executive Directors in the Boards of the two countries. The mean figure in Indian 
case was found to be 2.4892, whereas it is much less, i.e., only 0.3879 in case of UK 
which is almost five times lesser than Indian Boards. 
Number of board meetings in a year 
There exists significant difference between the two coimtries on the matter of number 
of board meeting they conduct in a year with UK much ahead in this statistics. The 
Mean, Median and Mode for board meetings in India are 6.3441, 6 & 5. The 
corresponding figure in case of UK is 8.6897, 8 & 8. Thus UK corporate boards in 
general conduct more number of board meetings than India. 
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Presence of Nomination Committee 
There exist significant differences between India and UK on the matter of number of 
companies having Nomination Conmiittee in their boards. The sampling statistics 
shows only 6.45% of the Indian companies having Nomination Committee in their 
boards as against 99.15% in case of UK companies. Thus UK is much ahead with 
almost all companies having Nomination Committees and reverse is the case with 
India. 
Total strength of members in Remuneration Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of total 
strength of directors in the Remimeration Committee. The sampling statistics 
measures the mean value of 3.3716 for India and 3.9316 for UK. Thus the average 
number of directors in UK remuneration committees is greater than that of Indian 
companies. 
Strength of Independent Directors in Remuneration Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of average 
numbers of Independent Directors in Remuneration Committee. The sampling 
statistics against this variable for Indian companies is 2.6216 and in UK case it is 
3.5043. Thus the presence of Independent members is significantly more in case of 
UK remuneration committee. 
Nos. of Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent) in Remuneration Committee 
There is significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of non-
executive members (NI) in the Remuneration Committee of the board of the two 
countries. The sampling statistics against this variable in Indian Companies is 0.6216 
whereas for the UK companies it is 0.4274. The number of non-executive (NI) 
directors in case of Indian remuneration committees is more than that of the UK 
companies. 
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Number of Executive Directors in Remuneration Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of 
number of executive directors in the Indian and UK remuneration committees. In fact 
as per the empirical result there exist no executive members on the Remimeration 
Committee in case of UK. 
Number of Remuneration Committee meetings in a year 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of mean 
number of Remuneration committee meetings held in a year. The sampling statistics 
in case of India is 1.9007 whereas the same in case of UK is 4.4872. Thus UK 
companies holds almost more than double the number of remuneration committee 
meetings than their Indian corporate. 
Presence of Remuneration Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of 
companies having Remuneration Committee. As per the result it can be observed that 
only 80.65% of the Indian companies have Remuneration Committee in their boards 
as against all (100%) in case of United Kingdom. The research therefore finds that 
20% of the Indian Companies do not have Remimeration Committees at all. 
Chairman presence on Remuneration Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of presence of 
Chairman in the Remuneration Committee of both the countries. The presence of 
Chairman on the Remuneration Conmiittee is more or less the same in both India and 
United Kingdom. In case of UK non-executive independent chairman mans the boards 
whereas in Indian case executive chairman who are non-independent are larger in 
numbers. Thus Chairman presence increases the independence of UK Remuneration 
Committee; in case of India the reverse is true. 
Number of members in Audit Committee 
There exists no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number 
of members in Audit Committee of the Board. The sampling statistics in case of 
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Indian corporate is 3.7189 whereas the same is 3.6239 in case of United Kingdom. 
The average number of members in the Indian Audit Committee is however on higher 
side as compared to UK Audit committee. 
Strength of Independent Directors in Audit Committee 
There exist significant dififerences over the number of Independent Directors in the 
Audit Committee of the two countries. The UK audit committee on an average has 
more independent members than their Indian counterparts and thus it can be assumed 
that the UK Audit Committees on an average are more independent than that of Indian 
Corporate. 
Number of Non-Executive Directors (Non-Independent) in Audit Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of 
Non-Executive Directors (NI) in the Audit Committee. The sampling statistic of 
means against the variable is 0.4649 in case of India and 0.1197 in case of UK which 
is four times lesser than the Indian Audit Committees. Thus Indian Audit Committees 
on an average are manned almost four times larger number of Non-Executive 
Directors (NI). 
Strength of Executive Directors in Audit Committees 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of presence of 
executive directors in Audit Committee. The sampling mean statistic is 0.1935 in case 
of India and 0.0000 in case of UK. Thus it can be observed that there is virtually no 
executive members in the Audit committee of any company of UK under study. 
Whereas Indian companies Audit Committee have the presence of Executive 
members. 
Number of Audit Committee Meetings 
There exist significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of 
Audit Committee Meetings their companies conducts in a year. The sampling statistic 
of mean is 4.8172 in case of Indian companies and 3.9402 in case of UK companies. 
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Thus average number of Audit Committee meeting in case of India is higher than that 
of UK which is a good feature in corporate governance. 
Chairman being the member of Audit Committee 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of presence of 
Chairman in the Audit Committee. The sampling statistics obtained for Indian 
corporate is 0.2258 as against 0.07692 in case of United Kingdom. On an average 
22.58% of the Indian companies have chairman present in the Audit Committee as 
members. Whereas the corresponding figures in case of UK is 7.69%. Given that 
Indian companies have larger number of promoter chairman as well as combined post 
of CEO and Chairman, the chairman in India boards have considerable influence over 
the decision of Audit Committees. Reverse is the case with UK corporate where not 
only 7.69% of the companies have chairman in audit committees but the post of 
chairman and CEO is separate is mostly non-executive and independent at the time of 
joining and nominated by independent nomination committee.. 
Presence of Lead Independent Director 
There exists large and significant difference between India and UK on the matter of 
number of companies having Lead Independent Director. Whereas almost all the UK 
boards have the presence of Lead Independent Director (also called Sr. Independent 
Director) in India case it is virtually non-existent. 
Induction and Professional development 
There exists a very large and significant difference of means for the provision of 
Induction and Professional development in companies for the two countries. . Only 
10.75% of the Indian companies have kept provisions for Induction and Professional 
development for their directors. In comparison 92.31% of UK corporate has kept such 
provisions. 
Strength of female Non-Executive Directors 
There exists significant difference over the strength of Female non-executive directors 
between India and UK. The mean sampling statistics for the strength of female non-
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executive Directors (both independent and non-independent) comes to 0.3065 in 
Indian corporate and 0.8120 in case of UK. Thus UK has more number of companies 
having female directors. 
Strength of Female Independent Directors 
There exists significant difference over the mean of female presence of Independent 
Directors between the two countries. The percentage figure of presence of ID Female 
is even more contrasting than the female NED (Dependent and Independent 
combined). Whereas the female NED(both dependent and independent) percentage in 
the Indian board comes to 3.23% and the corresponding figures in UK case is 8.84%, 
the female ID figures in case of India is 1.2% and 7.07% in case of UK. Comparing 
the countries figure confirms that not only UK has greater numbers of female NED 
but among its female NED larger number constitutes ID. The comparative result from 
the above two hypothesis indicates that the proportion of Independent female 
members in the Indian corporate is lesser than that of UK signifying the greater 
number of female in Indian boards comprising non-executive directors and pointing 
toward greater representation of dominant group representatives. 
Performance Evaluation 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of provision 
for Performance evaluation. The sampling statistics of mean of companies having 
provision for performance evaluation system is 8.602E-02 for Indian companies and 
that of 0.9658 for UK companies. Thus on an average 96.58% of UK companies have 
provisions for performance evaluation system for their board members. Whereas only 
8.60 % of the Indian companies have such provision. 
Audit Committee Presence 
There exist no difference of mean and all the companies of both the country have Audit 
Committee. All companies, of both the country, have Audit committees in their boards which 
suggests the importance of mandatory provisions 
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Promoter being Chairman 
There exists significant difference over the number of companies having chairman as 
promoter. In physical terms only 1.72% of the UK companies have chairman as its 
promoters whereas the corresponding figure in India case is 52.97%. The resuh shows 
the large presence and effect of promoters on company management and governance. 
Total strengtii of Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent & Independent) 
There exists large and significant difference between India and UK on the total 
strength of Non-executive Directors with both Independent and Non-Independent 
Directors included with Indian statistics on the higher side than UK. The result is on 
the part of increased presence of Non-Independent portion of non-executive directors 
who has increased presence because of the dominant and controlling shareholding 
groups in the board. 
Consolidated Result 
The broad comparative figures on practices suggest the followings: 
Board balance: There is large and significant difference between India and UK on 
the matters of presence of non-executive chairman and separation of roles for 
chairman and chief executive officer with result robust up to 1% significance level. 
India is far behind on these matters when compared with benchmark practice of UK. 
Board Structure: Board size of India is comparatively a bit larger than UK but no 
significant difference is observed in the statistical results with mean figures of 9.4892 
in case of India and 9.1795 in case of UK. The Indian board has larger number of 
NED (NI) and Executive Directors than UK which might help board unbalance. There 
is no significant difference between number of Independent members in Indian and 
UK Boards. The mean strength of Independent Directors in case of India is 4.7838 
and 4.6068 in case of UK. Thus Indian boards on an average have more number of 
Independent Directors compared to UK so far as numerical strength is concerned. The 
reality of true independence may however differ on the matter of independence in 
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spirit. The frequency of board meeting in Indian corporate is less than its UK 
counterparts. 
Nomination Committee: On the question of Nomination Committee presence there 
are huge and significant differences between India and UK. Whereas almost UK 
corporate are found to have Nomination Committee, in India case only 6.45% of 
Indian corporate are found to have Nomination Conmiittee. The research does not 
find any rulings on the matters of Nomination Committee in the revised Clause-49, 
either mandatory or non-mandatory. In UK case there is elaborate discussion over 
formation, functioning and maintenance of the Nomination Committee. 
Remuneration Committee: The presence of Remuneration Committee in Indian case 
is significantly lower than UK. Whereas all UK corporate have Remimeration 
Committees, approximately 20% of Indian corporate was not found to have 
Remuneration Committee. The results find lesser strength of members in 
Remuneration Conunittees, greater presence of NED(NI), greater presence of 
Executive Directors (In UK case it is Nil) and lesser presence of Independent 
Directors in Indian Remuneration Committee compared to UK. The frequencies of 
meetings of Remuneration Committee was found to be lesser compared to UK. On the 
question of chairman presence in Remuneration Committee there are no significant 
difference and chairman presence in the committee are found to be equal. The overall 
picture reveals much greater influence of management and controlling or promoter 
group influence and lesser importance and independence of Remuneration 
Committees in case of India. 
Audit Committee: The total strength of Audit Committee in case of India is greater 
compared to UK. However larger numbers of directors in Indian Audit Committee 
constitutes NED (NI) which is almost four times than that of UK and increased 
presence ED.UK corporate does not accommodate any Executive members as the 
statistical results speaks. The strength of Independent Directors in Indian Audit 
Committee was found to be lesser than UK. There were equal presences of Audit 
Committees in both the countries vAlh all corporate of the two countries having Audit 
Committees. However Indian Corporate were found to hold increased number of 
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Audit Committee Meetings compared to UK. Chairman presence in Audit Committee 
was found to be considerable more in Indian Audit Committee. Given the larger 
presence of promoter chairman, increased presence of Executive chairman and lesser 
separation of roles, the influence of controlling groups and management over the 
fimctioning of such critical committee of boards as Audit Committee seems to be 
considerably more compared to UK. 
Board enabling parameters: On the question of provision for 'Induction and 
Professional development' and 'Performance Evaluation System' there are huge 
difference between India and UK with India lagging far behind UK over these board 
enabling parameters. 
Board-Bio-Diversity: There is less presence of female members as directors and even 
lesser with female independent directors in Indian case which also point towards 
greater presence of female kith and kins of controlling groups. 
Suggestions 
1. Nomination Committee: Ahnost all country codes including UK have 
provisions for Nomination Committee which deals with the selection and 
other vital function on behalf of the board. It is strongly recommended that 
the requirement of a Nomination Committee be introduced in the Indian 
Model as early as possible in the mandatory category. The nomination 
committee should evaluate balance of skills, knowledge, and experience on 
the board and utilize this when preparing a candidate profile for new 
appointments. The nomination committee should throw their net as wide as 
possible in the search of suitable candidate. Selection of right and 
functional directors is the need of the hour as the current study with that of 
UK system suggests. 
2. Remuneration Committee: Currently the provision for Remuneration 
conmiittee has been kept in non-mandatory committee. Keeping in view the 
vital functions that it does the Remuneration Committee should be in the 
mandatory clause and not in non-mandatory. 
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3. Lead Independent Director: Keeping in view the role and importance of 
the Lead Independent and for the sake of an unfettered information flow in 
the board of directors the concept of SID, or lead director should be 
introduced at the earliest in the Indian Model which will also bind the 
independent group cohesively and improve the level of governance. In 
absence of Lead Independent Director the entire group of Independent 
Director looks like a scattered group whose voice can be deferred and 
ignored. 
4. Induction and Professional development: We are way behind with that of 
UK model. The requirement of Induction and Professional Development 
should be introduced in the mandatory section of the Indian Model for each 
members especially Independent Directors and rigorously followed. The 
provision should be in the mandatory section instead of non-mandatory. 
5. Performance evaluation: The concepts need to be introduced in our model 
of corporate governance at the earliest: mandatory or non-mandatory. 
6. Meeting without Executive members: All the NEDs should meet at least 
once a year only among themselves without the presence of their executive 
colleagues and it is strongly reconmiended that a provision in the Indian 
Model should be introduced at the earliest. The concept is rationally related 
to the Independence as how NED s functions independently if they could 
not meet separately from the main board. 
7. Nominee Directors should not be counted as Independent Directors as 
recommended by various Indian Committees and scholarly studies. There is 
a gradual trend toward more independence of the board. 
8. Disclosure on Length and time of Board and Committee Meeting: 
Disclosure should be made regarding the Length (or duration) of each board 
meeting conducted. This is a potential important indicator of responsible 
and effective decision making. If board is functioning as effective decision 
makers and not as a rubber stamp (decisions already taken in advance) this 
variable reflects the state of healthiness of the boards. Current disclosure is 
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limited to the number of board meetings held in a year which do not portray 
the actual hours devoted by the boards in governance matter deliberations. 
UK too do not have such disclosure and India can take lead in this regard. 
9. Set-up of self regulatory bodies like 'The Institute of Directors': On the 
pattern of UK such institution is required to be set up to nurture, promote 
and regulate the profession of independent directors. 
10. Different layers for Corporate Governance: While the major principles 
of good governance are of relevance to all companies, it would be a mistake 
to believe that every aspect of the detail of what is promulgated for large 
listed companies is relevant across the corporate spectrum. In order to 
achieve acceptance and eventually enthusiasm for corporate governance the 
principles must be relevant to the size, structure and nature of business 
entity. The present Indian corporate governance standards for compliance 
are uniform for all type and sizes of companies whether it is large listed, 
smaller listed, growing companies or tiny listed companies. Whereas UK 
code provision are at different levels: the strictest for largest companies, 
relaxed standards for smaller companies (companies below FTSE 350), 
exempt for Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies meant for 
growing companies. The system provides the highest benchmark standards 
for others to know and emulate. This type of arrangement in scales and 
scope can be resorted to, i.e., highest standards for largest listed companies, 
relaxed for smaller companies and so on. The top listed companies may be 
mandatorily be complied with all the stringent standards comparable to that 
of UK with conunittee including Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
with highest standards for Independence and for others to act as a guiding 
factors. 
11. Two layered directors' models for Indian Boards: UK corporate is 
constituted mainly on binary formats: the executive directors and the 
Independent Directors. The Indian boards, on the other hands are 
constituted with executive, non-independent non-executive and independent 
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non-executives (Independent directors).The non-independent directors was 
inducted at the time of induction of clause 49 to overcome the shortage of 
independent directors as well as to acconmiodate the interest of promoters 
and other interest groups at that time but with the hope and expectation that 
the same v^ dll be done away with over time. The three directors model still 
persist even today whereas there is increased trends of dual type directors' 
models with no non-executive directors (NI), lesser nimiber of executive 
directors and increased presence of independent directors. The UK is now a 
role model in this regard as the analytical studies over the parameters have 
shown that there is significant deviation with very less presence of 
executive directors, increased presence of independent directors and its 
chairmen not only are non-executive but meets the criteria of independence 
at the time of appointment. Thus UK boards sometimes are even up to 60-
70% independent directors' strength. There should be dual layered 
director's constituents in Indian boards to get increased faith in our system 
throughout the world. 
Independent Director System Enabling Model 
Based on the present comparative study and taking lessons from UK CG system the 
present research provides a model, 'Independent Director System Enabling Model' 
which list critical enablers of Independent Directors system and seeks to emphasize 
the need for their strengthening as a composite whole in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of Indian Board plagued by unbalance as identified in the current 
research. 
Direction for Future Research 
1. Current shareholding in the Indian scenario is concentrated though there is 
attempt to disperse the same. The fiiture research is required in this 
direction as to whether and what extent the shareholding had dispersed in 
the Indian corporate. 
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2. Comparative study on Remuneration aspects has not been considered. 
Keeping in view the difference components mix of remuneration like cash 
compensation, share options, pensionary benefits, deferred schemes etc. 
this requires a separate study. Future comparative research can be 
conducted in this direction. 
3. Non-Executive Directors (NI) generally forms the interest and other 
implanted groups in Indian Boards which impairs the independent 
functioning of the boards and committees and are required to be kept to the 
minimum in strength. The present research finds them in greater numbers 
in boards and sub-committees vis-a-vis that of UK. Future research may be 
conducted on the issue of numbers, nature, composition and trends in NED 
(Nl) in Indian Boards. 
4. Future research can be imdertaken on the other parameters like disclosure 
pattern, appointment of new directors on the board, succession planning of 
the board, role and efficiency of company secretary which is considered a 
key position in UK with lots of responsibility towards transmittal of timely 
information and the like depends. 
5. Future research can be undertaken on Family Managed Corporations and 
Govt, owned business as these form significant proportion of corporate 
business. Non-listed corporations can also be researched upon. 
6. Whereas the CG codes needs to be updated on regular basis and the same 
is observed in case of UK the revision in case of Clause 49 is few and in 
irregular maimer. The main beneficiaries of maintain the status quo 
naturally belongs from promoters, controlling and dominant influential 
groups. The influencing factors in this direction can be researched upon in 
Indian Case. 
7. Independent Directors in required quantity and qualities are often cited as 
the impediments towards manning the board position and for better 
governance. However least has been done to improve the situation 
resulting in infiltration of large numbers of sub-standard independent 
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directors. Future research can be undertaken to find out the efforts 
undertaken on the matter of development of Independent director system, 
infrastructure developed and institutions formed toward betterment of 
Independent Director System. 
8. Independent directors are required to take the thrust and load to keep board 
balance and independent functioning of the board against considerable 
influence from entrenched controlling groups but least seems to have been 
done toward arming them with such enabling system like accurate and 
timely receipt of information, proper induction and continuous 
development, performance evaluation system, lead independent directors, 
insurance protection against legal suites, meeting without management etc 
as portrayed in the "independent director enabling system model' 
furnished in the dissertation. The extent and effectiveness may be 
researched vis-a-vis UK or other advanced nations. 
9. In case of UK, AIM listed companies are exempt from corporate 
governance compliance standards as these markets have been formed for 
small and growing companies. However the present research finds that 
there are sufficient numbers of companies in the top 500 list by market 
capitalization and the same cannot be termed smaller companies by any 
standards. Research can be undertaken in respect of compliance standards 
of these AIM listed companies vis-a-vis larger companies of UK or with 
other countries. 
10. Corporate governance compliance in spirit rather than substance matters 
most. Most of the corporate governance research including the present one 
is based on compliance on paper. Research can be undertaken as how and 
to what extent the same has been complied with the actual spirit of good 
corporate governance. However this is a difficult job. 
11. Provision for internal control is much talked and discussed issue in UK or 
USA. The same seems to be a matter of least importance and mention in 
Indian annual reports. The extent of presence of Internal control system 
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and related issue and their comparative study against advanced nation like 
UK or USA can be undertaken. 
Implication for policy and practices 
Findings of the comparative research with the benchmark practices of UK top 
companies provided a useful direction and brought out several shortcomings on major 
aspects of our system which requires immediate attention of policy makers. 
Department of Company affairs, GOI, SEBI and other regulatory agencies. The study 
can provide guidance to decision makers on the critical issues of corporate 
governance which has hitherto been imknown and the advanced countries like UK has 
been practicing for a long time. The research advises the Govt, and its advisory bodies 
to introduce the factors reconunended in this study and thus help improve corporate 
governance of our country. The amendment and incorporation in the codes of 
corporate governance and companies act is suggested to help improve corporate 
governance in India and boost investor's confidence. 
Limitations 
1. Remuneration aspect has not been taken into consideration in the current 
study. 
2. The present research gives a broad comparative picture of corporate 
governance practices and system prevailing in India and UK. More specific 
research on any particular area is further required to come to any specific 
conclusions. 
3. The findings are based on the data of large listed companies and do not 
consider financials and smaller listed corporate of the two countries and 
AIM listed companies of UK and PSUs of India..Annual reports of some 
companies were not available for downloads and these companies have not 
been considered in the analysis. 
4. Only few critical parameters of good governance have been selected for 
comparison and the selection of the parameters are based on data 
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availability and references available in each of the sampled company's 
annual reports. 
5. The analytical study, comparisons and findings are limited to common data 
availability in the annual reports of the two countries. 
6. Data for one year has been taken for study. 
7. Secondary data handpicked from Annual Reports has been used for the 
analytical purpose. Some data may have the chance of not being picked up. 
8. The current study takes into consideration the corporate governance 
practices of Stock Exchange largest Listed companies and do not include 
smaller companies as well as other business forms. Corporate governance is 
all pervasive and is equally important in Govt. Sector, Financial companies, 
and other business forms. 
9. The present findings on corporate governance are based on the structural 
aspects of boards and sub-committees. The actual compliance in spirit may 
however differ widely from what is seen from the compliance in letter and 
what the figures suggests especially in matters like independence of board 
and sub committees. 
10. The comparative study is based on the forms rather than the substance or in 
spirit or actual state of compliance on the matter of corporate governance. 
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Preface 
The importance of corporate governance can be gauged from the fact that the issue 
has become omnipresent in almost every public platform and now finds place on the 
political agenda in most countries. The current study on corporate governance 
practices between India and UK is most important and relevant as India is now on the 
thresdiold of reaching to the next higher level of economic boost post liberalization. 
Along with it, the Corporate Governance of our country also needs to be upgraded to 
become comparable with advanced nation of the world, in order to compete for global 
equity capital. UK corporate governance systems and practices are second to none and 
are accepted globally as a benchmark. Of late we have faced the most infamous 
scandal in corporate governance from Satyam Computer Services. The importance 
and relevance of comparative corporate governance studies with that of United 
Kingdom, therefore, need no further emphasis. 
The current work starts with the Introduction (chapter-1) which deals with the issue of 
business and its gradual evolution from proprietary to public listed corporation and 
rise of the corporation to the status of global corporation, relevance of modem day 
corporation, inherent weakness of a corporation because of separation of ownership 
and control, genesis of corporate governance, governance vs. management, various 
definitions of corporate governance, evolution of corporate governance in UK and 
thereafter evolution of corporate governance in India with sketches, figures and 
references. 
The second chapter deals with Literature Review to get an extensive knowledge in the 
broader area of corporate governance and bring out related and important works 
carried out in the area with references and find the research gap. 
The third chapter deals with the research methodology to carry forward the research 
and deals with such issues as research objectives, Hypotheses, Research scope, 
sampling in case of UK, sampling in case of India, data collection , data analysis, 
analytical tools along with references. 
The fourth chapter deals with the details of data analysis on SPSS and fiimishes the 
empirical results. For the sake of better visualization con^arative graphs and 
tabulated results have been fiirnished. 
The fifth chapter deals with the results and discussions in details along with 
contextualization of the results achieved. 
The sixth chapter deals with summary, fmdings, conclusions, recommendations and 
includes limitations, directions for future research and policy implications. 
The last chapter (chapter seven), based on present research and deriving a lesson from 
the UK corporate governance practices, proposes a model to strengthen the institution 
of independent directors in India 
Bibliography and thereafter Annexure have been attached at the end. 
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Chapter' 1 
CHAPTER- 1 
Introduction 
The objective of the business is to create wealth for a society, maintain and preserve 
that wealth efficiently and to share the wealth with the stakeholders, especially with 
its common shareholders, while satisfying the society's needs for products and 
services efficiently and at a reasonable cost and price. Public Corporations are the 
means by which aforesaid objectives are best achieved in modern day context. Based 
on the above objectives the importance of corporate governance is beyond limit to a 
society, nation and the world as a whole. The dimensional phenomenon of corporate 
governance is thus global and that is why it has become an oft repeated word now-a-
days. With the globalization the importance of the corporate governance has increased 
manifold as associated with good corporate governance is the financial inflow &om 
around the globe to a country. Every country is, therefore, applying maximum effort 
to improve their corporate governance and therefore codes and guidelines on 
corporate governance are appearing fast often one claiming superiority over the other, 
in order to attract global investors and also retain domestic investors. In the Indian 
context, the corporate governance is all the more important because family and their 
descendants dominate the corporate scene which results in distortion and inequity. 
The changing profile of the equity from the concentrated to widely dispersed one as a 
fallout of liberalization, globalization and privatization makes the study on corporate 
governance in Anglo-Saxon context even more important. As globalization gathers 
momentum countries world over would be struggling against each other to better their 
corporate governance practice to improve the confidence level of investors so that 
both domestic and foreign investors can be attracted to invest capital in their 
corporations. The importance has been foreseen by few enlightened companies, 
irrespective of their country of origin or operation, and has single handedly developed 
their own corporate governance standards to attract and retain investors. The countries 
where corporate governance systems did not existed has started thinking actively for 
the same and we observe now several new entrants all over the world. What was once 
a matter of least importance and an element for reducing agency cost of a corporation, 
fifteen years ago, has now become the most talked and discussed issue of attracting 
capital as much as possible and utilizing them in disciplined, responsible and 
transparent way in the corporate business. We have to refine and upgrade our 
corporate governance to the best possible standards to inspire confidence in investors, 
make up our resource crunch, and boost our economic activities, which in turn will 
deliver us job, employment, wealth and save us from episode like Satyam. The study 
is on the presumption that the present corporate governance system and practices in 
India are operating at sub-optimal levels. There is enough scope to enhance their 
performance and effectiveness. But it can be possible only if the limitations 
underlying the various aspects of our CG are studied against the backdrop of 
benchmarked system of world and the limitations are identified and remedial 
measures taken at the earliest. The United Kingdom is a pioneer in corporate 
governance regulation. As is said nothing can be written on corporate governance 
without referring to Cadbury Committee Report \ ^ c h has started the entire process 
of corporate governance. Ferran (2001) writes, "The UK has led the way in the 
development of successfiil non-statutory voluntary codes and guidance relating to 
corporate affairs. The takeover code and the various corporate governance codes that 
were developed by committees in the 1990s (Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel, Tumbull), 
much of the substance has now been consolidated into the Combined Code, are much 
admired internationally." The current study of corporate governance practices 
between Indian and United Kingdom is, therefore, of great significance especially for 
India, as its ownership pattern is gradually shifting to widely dispersed because of 
market forces and Govt, policy, as many state owned companies are being privatized 
and existing family-owned companies are becoming highly diversified industrial 
groups. UK throughout the periods since Cadbury has developed its CG system and 
practices in such a way that it is now able to tightrope its executives and aligns their 
interest with that of its widely dispersed shareholders. The UK approach has been 
adopted as a benchmark by numerous countries. The study is all the more relevant and 
significant because Anglo-Saxon capital markets today dominates the world and all 
country desires to access the ftinds available through London Stock Exchange(LSE) 
which is not possible till we improve our corporate governance system to a level 
comparable to that of level of United Kingdom to satisfy UK investors. United 
Kingdom will also be beiwfitted from the study so far as assessing the current status 
of CG in India as UK companies will also need to expand their operation in emerging 
and growing markets of India and they will need to have insight of the CG system and 
practices in India. It is in this context that comparative study on actual practices based 
on UK companies carries special importance and relevance. The successful 
companies in the coming years will be those that will embrace the best corporate 
governance practices in the world in order to maximize shareholder value. Those who 
will not care will be left behind. 
1.1: Rise of Business Corporation 
The business has been in existence since civilization because of the human needs for 
products and services. In the initial phase the business entity that existed were, 
however, mainly managed by single individual and were termed as proprietary 
business. As the business units grew larger with the growth of needs, some of these 
proprietary forms of business changed into partnership form to acquire more capital 
and to avail expert input of partners in the business. Partnership form had bigger 
dimensions than a proprietary form. Industrial revolution sparked the process of new 
inventions of modem machines fuelled the growth of the corporation. To cope up with 
the increased demands of complex products and services by modem men and women, 
some of the partnership firms which were capable of further expanding themselves, 
went for expansion and transformed them as what we call now corporations. In such 
corporations a larger number of owners were engaged to bring in required capital. To 
satisfy further the needs of further complex products and services, corporations grew 
stronger and stronger of the new modem age business forms, that were far bigger in 
size than the abovementioned proprietorship and partnership forms. Faced with the 
need for raising further capital to exploit new opportunities in scale and scope, but 
hindered by the owner's wealth constraints and risk aversion, these corporations 
further moved to widely held ownership structures with professional managers. 
Limited liability and longevity were the unique and most attractive features that led to 
its phenomenal growth. There is some conflict on the exact dates of enactment of 
limited liability and the sur&cing of corporations as is in existence in its current form. 
Bansal(1989) throws lights on the origin of these companies in Indian and UK 
context, " The Joint Stock Company was introduced in India through the Indian 
Companies Act, 1850, which was the first piece of company legislation in India and 
patterned on English Companies Act, 1844, which provided mainly for registration of 
joint stock companies. Concept of limited liability in India was introduced in 1857. In 
England, guilds were the earliest form of business associations. Joint Stock 
Companies came much later. The Company of Staple (chartered in 1391), and 
Company of Merchant Adventurers (Chartered in 1407) were the earliest joint stock 
conq)anies to be formed in England. In those days, a company could be formed either 
by means of incorporation, i.e., under common law, or by the authority of Parliament, 
or by the Royal Charter, or by prescription. Accordingly companies could be either 
statutory companies (those formed under an act), or Chartered companies, (those 
formed under a Royal Charter), or by prescription. Since it was not easy to obtain 
either the assent of Parliament or a Royal Charter, a large number of companies in UK 
were formed by means of a deed signed by prospective shareholders. Notwithstanding 
the difference in the method of formation, the pattern of management of all these 
companies was similar.The rise of such corporation can be gauged from the feet that 
in UK there are over 1.8 million active companies and of these 12,400 are public 
limited companies and some 2,700 are listed on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) for new companies not on the official list. In comparison there are around 
550,000 conq)anies in India of v^ich around 72,000 are publicly limited (as of 
January 2000). Nearly 80-85% of the Indian con::5)anies are small scale; femilies 
managed enterprises and are either public Umited companies or private limited 
companies. (Institute of Directors, 2005). As per Lyon & Ivancevich (1976), "In 1811 
the State of New York passed laws that limited a person's responsibility, making sure 
the person could not lose more than the person had invested." The New York Laws 
thus helped make the corporation a popular type of business organization. 
Corporations' laws have been in continuous improvement which has resulted in 
fiirther attractiveness of corporations. The increased demands for more sophisticated 
products, such as computers, aero planes, cars, air conditioners etc have encouraged 
the growth of corporations". The corporation form of business has evolved fiirther and 
now a day it is the dominant form of business organization. Globalization has fuelled 
this business form to expand across countries and we see many multinational 
corporations cutting across the boundaries of nations. Globalization has made 
corporations much stronger. As Mehra (2005) puts it, "Out of the 100 biggest 
economies of the work!, 51 are transnational corporations. These corporations have 
become so powerful that they are circumventing democratically elected governments. 
Such is the pressure of civil society that more often than not market capitalizatbn is 
determined not by the profits announced by the company but by the public 
perceptions of how they discharge their social and environmental obligatu>ns". In 
future sky is the limit for such widely held public listed corporations. In fact these 
types of corporations can be called one of the wonderfiil commercial inventions of the 
modem day. 
1.2: Corporations and their characterbtics 
The corporation, being an artificial person and a creation of law, has legal standing 
independent of its owners. CoUey, et el.(2003) mentbn, "The corporation form of 
business was legally made possible by the US Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
John Marshall in the early nineteenth century. Marshall himself defined a coiporatbn 
in Dartmouth V. Woodward in the foUowing terms: "A corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible and existing only in the contemplatton of the law. Being 
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those qualities which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existeiKe (tte 
most) important are immortality and, if the expressbn may be altowed, individuality, 
propoties by which perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, 
and may act as a single individual" Several features of corporations have made such 
business units very attractive to investors and other stakeholders alike, the most 
important of them include: 
Limited Liability: Unlike in a partnership, stockholders of a corporation hold IM> 
liability for the corporation's debts and obligatwns. As a result their "limited" 
potential losses cannot exceed the amount, which they paid for the stock. Not only 
does this allow corporations to engage in risky enterprises, but limited liability also 
forms the basis for trading in corporate stock. 
Perpetual Lifetime: The assets and structure of the corporatk>n exist beyond the 
lifetime of any of its shareholding, officers or directors. This allows for stability of 
capital, which thus become available for investment in projects of a larger size and 
over a longer term. 
Divisibility of ownership: This permits transfer of ownership interests without 
disrupting the structure of the organizations. 
1.3: Corporation and its importance 
Most large businesses today are corporations. It is said that no invention of the 
industrial age has created as much wealth over the past centuries as has the 
development of limited liability, publicly traded corporations. These businesses 
dominate economic life in virtually every country. Mehra (2005) writes, 'The 
corporate form of business has established its importance and dominance in the 
present day business environment over other form of doing business. The existence of 
a corporation in the present form reflects the mankind belief in the democratic 
structure and institutions: One where the capital resources of common many are 
mobilized and utilized for the purpose of delivering benefits to the millions of owners 
as well as to the benefits of society. Transparency, accountability, fairness and 
responsibility on the part of governance of a corporate are the added features that 
make it a complete economic unit. Segregation of ownership from management has 
paved the way for professionalization and to expand tl^ activities around the globe. 
Because of its phenomenal growth the corporate has surpassed the boundary of 
nations and become global and is fast becoming a uniting factor between nations." 
The influence and importance of corporations can be gauged from the fact that out of 
the largest 100 economic entities in the world 49 are nations and 51 are corporations. 
(Madhav Mehra, 6''' International Conference held in London). In UK almost all 
companies producing goods of utmost sophistication ranging from super conputers, 
nuclear submarines, mobiles and information technology products, defense 
equipments, transport airplanes and aircraft ei^ines, sophistkated military war&re 
equipments for don^stic and global consunqitions, are produced by these corporate, 
apart from products and services for domestic consumptions. In fact sky is the limit 
for a corporate expansion when properly governed and administered. Infosys in our 
country is an example. Globalization has made few corporations even bigger than the 
country in which it operates. Dine (2000) writes, 'The immense power of 
corporations is indicated by a comparison between the economic wealth generated by 
corporations, measured by sales, compared with a country's gross domestic product 
(GDP). On this basis the combined revenues of just General Motors and Ford... 
exceed the combined GDP of all the sub-Saharan Africa and fifty-one of tte largest 
one hundred economies are corporations. Further, the number of transnational 
corporations jumped from 7,000 in 1970 to 40,000 in 1995, and they account for most 
of the world's trade.^. As per Jensen and Meckling (1998), "publicly held business 
corporation is an awesome social invention where millions of individuals voluntarily 
entrust billions of dollars, francs, pesos, etc of personal wealth to the care of 
managers." 
1.4: Major weakness of a corporation and genesis of corporate governance 
A corporation has its inherent weakness that the ownership is different from the 
controller of the corporation. Lyon & Ivancevich (1976) elaborates the weakness of a 
corporation, "The disadvantages of a corporation vis-^-vis proprietary or partnership 
forms are that the proprietor or partners of a business are eager to do their business 
because failing means that they will go out of business. The owners of a corporation, 
however, usually have little interest in the workings of the business. They are mainly 
interested in the dividends they will receive. This lack of interest can cause poor 
corporate management." The numerous owners who contribute to the capital of the 
company are the actual owners of the business. They elect a Board of Directors to 
monitor the functioning of the company on their behalf The Board, in turn, appoints a 
team of managers with a chief executive officer (CEO) at its head who actually handle 
the day-to-day functioning of the company and report periodically to the Board. Thus 
managers are the agents of shareholders and function with t}» objective of 
maximizing shareholders' wealth. The problem lies in the insufficiency of the 
directives between the representatives of the shareholders and managers to gukle the 
latter in minutest details about how, when and what to do with the funds contributed 
by the former. It is not possible for the Board to fully instruct the management on 
desired course of action under every possible situation. The list of possible situation 
and alternatives are infinitely long. Consequently, no codes, directives or written 
charters can be wholesome to guide management about the right course of action in 
every situation. As a result management cannot be held responsible for any violatk>n 
of such directives which either is inadequate or inefficient, in the event it does 
something else then desired by the shareholders/Board, under the given 
circumstances. Financiers of the company capital i.e., shareholders may take the 
liberty to spend the money on behalf of the con^)any but they have least inclination to 
run the business. Neither have they expertise to do so. So these liberties go to the 
mans^ement. The reality is even more tilted in &vor of the management. In real life 
managers enjoy enormous amount of power in joint-stock companies and the common 
shareholders have very little say in the matter as to how his or her money is used in 
the company. In companies with highly dispersed ownership the manager may 
function with negligible accountability. Most shareholders do not care to attend the 
General Body Meeting to elect or change the members of the Board of Directors and 
often grant their "proxies" to the management. Even those who attend the meeting 
find it difficult to have their say in the selection of directors as only the management 
proposes a list of directors for voting. In India, where there are no or very few 
companies having nomination committee, the entire process goes to the entrenched 
controlling groups or their CEO who most often are selected not by its board of 
directors. On his part, the CEO frequently packs the board with his friends and allies 
who rarely differ with him. In India especially often the CEO himself is the chairman 
of the Board of Director as well. Consequently the supervisory roles of the chairman 
are severely coni|>romised and the management, who really has the keys to the 
business, can potentially use the corporate resources to further their own self-interests 
rather than the interest of the shareholders. The consequences is that managers can 
engage in all kinds of behavior that are detrimental to the firm: outright thefr (for 
example setting up a company and using transfer pricing to appropriate funds , the 
kind of which we have observed in the Satyam episode in India), enjoying private 
benefits of control (perks, pet projects, foreign tours, empire building, favoring 
friends and families, transferring his favorites to important and pet projects etc, etc); 
exerting insufficient efforts; taking biased decisions, excessive executive 
compensation, managerial entrenchment (i.e., managers resisting replacement by a 
superior management); sub optimal use of free cash flows, and so on. Berle and 
Means (1932) have elaborated this phenomenon of distance of ownership from 
control in detail in their book on Modem Corporation "The Modem Corporation aiKl 
Private Property" published in 1932. The distance of ownership from management, as 
a result, is fast becoming its curse which is evident from the large numbers of 
corporate scandals unearthed throughout the globe. Good "corporate governance" 
arrangement is projected as substitute and solution but the agency problem is here to 
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stay and corporations will have to find out progressively the most effective solution 
through improved corporate governance arrangements. With the growth of 
corporation and shareholding base, which is desirable for a nation, this problem is 
likely to increase further unless controlled through latest tools and techniques of 
Corporate Governance. 
1.5: Governance versus Management 
Governance and Management are two separate concepts which need to be understood 
in their right perspectives in order to understand corporate governance. 
Governance is about the set of mechanism, structure and arrangement, which ensures 
that decisions about the coiporations are made effectively in the interest of owners. 
Governance mechanism is generally the Board of Directors and its auxiliaries 
Committees which are selected and formed by shareholders who are the owners. Thus 
the views of the Board of Directors are supposed to reflect the views of the owners. 
Management, is on the other hand, is about the structural arrangement, created by the 
Board to ensure that whatever decisions have been made imder the Governance 
systems are implemented to the fliUest extent. Under this arrangement come the CEO 
and his management team which helps and supports him in carrying out the decision 
of the Board. 
Since there is a conflict of interest between mans^ers and actual owners because of 
the inherent agency problem, the governance arrangement ensures that the 
management does carry out the decisions as per the board directives, and that the wish 
and expectations of the shareholders are prevailed. 
The importance of governance can be gauged from the fact that a governance &ilure 
in a companies can lead to almost sure and instantaneous death of a firm as can be 
observed from failures like Enron which was finished in 23 weeks. Barring in 6 weeks 
and Satyam Computer Services, in case of India, in just 15 days. 
Figure-1.1: Governance & Management Distinguished (source - BobTrkker} 
Charkham (2005) writes over the issue of distinguishing Governance and 
management while differentiating between directors and managers, "The companies 
Act do not require directors to be managers; they requires directors to see that the 
business is properly managed, which is quite a different matter. In law there is indeed 
only one class of director and all are equal— or at least nearly equal. Any qualifying 
objective is descriptive but not in law definitional.... Being a director imposes a quite 
different set of responsibilities fi-om those which attend any specific executive 
fimction, a fact which is not always appreciated by directors v^^ are also executive 
'barons' with responsibility for sections of an enterprise. A 'finance director' or 
'marketing director' is simply a director who has re^x>nsibility for specific executive 
functions. Strict logic would render the term 'non-executive directors 
superfluous.'Tricker (1998) throws lights on the issue, "The role of management is to 
run the enterprise and that the board is to see that it is being run well and in the right 
direction...Typically, management operates as a hierarchy. There is an ordering of 
responsibility, with authority delegated downwards tiirough the organization and 
accoimtability upwards to the ultimate boss, on which desk 'the buck stops'. By 
contrast, the board should not operate as a hierarchy. Each member bears the same 
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legal duties and responsibilities and together the members need to work as equals, 
reaching agreement by consensus or, if necessary, by voting." 
1.6: Corporate Governance defined 
Authors have defined corporate governance in several ways and it is hard to get a 
single acceptable definition of corporate Governance. Narrow definition takes care of 
its owners alone which are their equity provider like "corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment". Broad definition involves the relationship of the 
corporation to its stakeholders and society and is defined as the combination of laws, 
regulations, listing rules, and voluntary practices that enable the corporation to attract 
capital, perform efficiently in achieving the corporate and social objective, and reduce 
agency cost. 
Goplasamy (2006) writes, "Corporate Governance, by the very nature of the concept, 
cannot be exactly defined." 
Daines et al. (2008) observes, "Shareholders, regulators, hedge ftuid managers, press 
commentators, board members and policy makers increasingly stress the importance 
of good governance, arguing that it improves firm performance, shareholder wel&re 
and the heahh of the public markets. However, defining good governance and 
distinguishing good governance from bad governance has proved more elusive, 
especially given the great variety of corporate governance mechanisms (and 
combinations) employed by firms." 
One definition may by 'corporate governance is the set of arrangement and all sorts of 
actions which converges the interest of all its constituencies : large shareholders, 
small shareholders, managers and stakeholders, toward achieving the common goal of 
short term as well as long term profitability of the company and increasing the value 
of the firm. 
"If management is about running businesses, governance is about seeing that it is run 
properly. All companies need governing as well as managing" (Bob Tricker, 1984) 
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Shann Tumbull (2000) expresses his views, "There are no agreed definitions or 
boundaries for defining or investigating corporate governance". 
Defined broadly, the term corporate governance includes all types of firms whether 
they are formed under civil or common law, owned by the government, institutions or 
individuals, privately held or publicly traded, profit or not-for-profit firms. 
Shleifer & Vishny (1996), in their survey on corporate governance writes at its start, 
"Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment." 
The most simple and concise definition is fit)m Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992), head of 
the committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the United 
Kingdom who defined corporate governance as: "Corporate Governance is the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled". 
Owen et al. (2006) defined corporate governance as, "the set of control mechanisms 
and institutions which protect the suppliers of coital to a company , particularly 
suppliers of equity capital, the shareholders, who have only residual protection after 
all other claimants have been satisfied." 
As per OECD (1999) Code on Corporate Governance, "it is a set of relationship 
between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Through these relationships it provides a structure for setting the objectives of the 
company, the means for attaining them and monitoring performance. Good corporate 
governance should provide incentives to the board and management to pursue 
objectives which are in the interests of the company and shareholders and it should 
facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently." 
Khan (2005) embraces within the boundary of corporate governance, social 
responsibilities, business ethics, and defines, "In a nutshell, corpoirate governance is a 
set of relationship between company, its Board, its Directors, its management, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance assimilates business 
ethics and social responsibilities as extension of company as part of the system. 
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Corporate Governance aims at fixing liability, fixing responsibility and determining 
accountability of management towards stakeholders in particular and society at large." 
Joshi (2004) refers the views of World Bank in her book, "The World Bank (1999) 
states that from a corporate perspective, corporate governance is about maximizing 
value subject to meeting the conqjany's financial, legal and contractual obligations". 
In India, the Cll (1997) defines, 'corporate governance deals with laws, procedures, 
practices and implicit rules that determine a company's ability to take managerial 
decisions vis-a-vis its claimants- in particular, its shareholders, creditors, customers , 
the State and employees.' 
The Business Roundtable (2002), an association of chief executive officer in USA 
writes, "a good corporate governance structure is a working system for principled 
goal setting, effective decision—making and appropriate monitoring of compliance 
and performance". 
Goplasamy (2006) defines corporate governance both in narrow sense and the broader 
sense. "In a narrow sense, corporate governance involves a set of relationship 
amongst the company's management, its board of directors, shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance is concerned with aligning the interests of 
investors and managers and in ensuring that the firms are run for the benefit of all 
classes of investors. In a broader sense, however, good governance is the extents to 
which companies are run in an open and honest manner, creates overall confidence, 
enhance efHciency of international capital allocation, and contribute ultimately to the 
nations overall wealth and welfare." 
1.7: Evolution of CG in UK 
The seed for impendmg improvement in corporate governance were borne during the 
period 1980 - 1990 when major scandals broke out in UK one after another which 
mainly related to creative accounting procedure and financial reporting irregularities. 
The major scandals surfaced during the period were: Maxwell, Polly Peck 
International, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), British and 
Conunonwealth, the Mirror Group News International, Barings Bank and Coloroll. 
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These successive breakouts led to the formation of Cadbury Committee during the 
month of May, 1991 by the London Stock Exchange, Financial Reporting Council and 
the Accounting fraternity, with an authority and role to review those aspects of 
corporate governance especially related to financial reporting and accountability. The 
formation of Cadbuiy Committee mariced the first ever atten^t by any coimtry to 
conceive these scandals as problems of governance of corporate and the determination 
to strike at its root by diving deep into the system of corporate governance. There are 
reference available (Goobey, 2001), however, of attempt to deal with the problems in 
corporate governance but they were unorganized. Goobey (2001) of Hermes Pensions 
Management Ltd. addresses in his speech, "The formation of the Cadbury was not the 
first flowering of concern about corporate governance. As Jonathan Charkham's work 
testifies, these were apparent before the Polly Peck affair, or the discovery of 
Maxwell's misappropriations. Jonathan Panel Paper was published in March 1989, 
and, to quote a later work of his, 'dwelt at length on the reasons why it is essential that 
any public conq)any board shoukl contain an adequate proportk>n of independent 
directors." Despite the clear and precise mandate to look into the financial aspects. 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, realized the need of overall improvement of the corporate 
governance system of UK and investigated beyond the boundary of the mandate given 
to him to look into details of structural aspects of the corporate governance to 
separation of roles; the establishment, composition, and operation of key board 
committees; the importance of, and contribution that can be made by non-executive 
directors; and the reporting and control mechanisms of a business. The Committee 
submitted its report on December 1992, within a span of just over eighteen months 
from the date of its formation, along with a Code of Best Practice and chose to adopt 
the most novel and flexible design where the company could apply and implement 
these codes at ease and in case it found difficulty it can avoid the particular provisions 
but the reasons of its non-fiimishing the provisions would have to be furnished to let 
its ultimate owner, the shareholder, decide the merit of the company reasons or 
difficulty. With this method of adoption of the code provision, the world came to 
know of the most successful way of adaption of corporate governance code and 
practices and many coimtries even today is preoccupied to adapt the mode and 
practice on the matter of corporate governance. With the advent of the code, UK 
regained the lost prestige, and like the previous position held by the country as 
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exporter of company law, it also became famous for the exporter of corporate 
governance codes. The Code of Best Practices had 19 recommendations which were 
incorporated into the London Stock Exchange. The Cadbury Code was widely 
welcomed with most of the recommendations with the result that there was 
remarkable improvement in UK corporate Governance within a very short period of 
its operation starting from the years ending after 30 June 1993. One key 
recommendation of the Committee however met an oppositk>n which was related to 
reporting on effectiveness of internal control system. Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992) had observed, "Since an effective internal control system is a key dspect of the 
efficient management of a company, we recommend that the directors should make a 
statement in the report and accoimts on the effectiveness of their system of internal 
control and that the auditors should report thereon." The recommendation by 
Cadbury Code for con^liance on effectiveness on company internal control system 
led to the formation of 'Working Group on Internal control' led by Paul Rutteman, to 
find out the form in which the directors to report and the manners of reporting on the 
effectiveness of the company's system of internal control. The Ratteman 
Report(1994) published under the heading 'Internal control and Financial Reporting' 
scaled down the Cadbury proposal on the ground of practicality and recommended for 
conpliance only on the matter of Internal Financial Control instead of entire system 
of Internal Control. The second major milestoi^ in UK corporate Governance 
appeared on the scene when with the initiative of Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), in January 1995, 'Greenbury Committee' was established to report on 
Directors remuneration and prepare a code of such practice to deal with remuneration 
issue and accordingly n^ned 'The study Group on Director's Remuneration'. The 
Study Group delivered its report within a span of six months in the month of July 
1995 titled, 'Directors' Remuneration- Reports of a Study Group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury". The sapproach undertaken by the committee was to recommend 
package to non-executive directors in such a way so as to align the interest of 
directors with that of shareholders and link reward to performances. The committee 
fiimished a Code of Best Practice on Director's remuneration and majority of its 
recommendations were adopted by the London Stock Exchai^e (LSE). Earlier 
guidance on the matter of remuneratwn from ProNed, the ABI, the NAPF, the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, the Institute of 
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Directors and others were replaced by the Greenbury Code. The repercussion of the 
Greenbury Code was that from the period onward (1995) disclosure on Director's 
Remuneration became quite exhaustive in UK conq)any accounts and the 
remuneration segments in the annual reports. The third major initiatives in corporate 
governance in UK came in November 1995, when with the initiatives of the Chairman 
of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Sir Sydnet Lipworth, the Committee on 
corporate governance headed by Sir Ronnie Hampel was established diiring 
November 1995. The committee had the sponsorship of the LSE, the CBI, the lOD, 
the NAPE, the ABI and the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies. The 
seed of the formation of the committee was in their previous two major reports 
(Cadbury & Greenbury) on Corporate Governance of UK. Both the committees had 
recommended that a new committee should be formed after an elapse of time to 
review the implementatbn of their findings. Hampel committee devoted two full 
years to study the CG practices adopted by UK con^anies' vis-a-vis previous codes 
and the report titled 'Committee on Corporate Governance- Final Reports was 
published in January 1998, together with a summary of conclusions and 
recommendations. The Hampel committee endorsed the recommendations of the 
Cadbury and Greenbury committees. Along with it the committee also endorsed the 
original proposal of Cadbury in Internal Control System which had in fact been 
curtailed and restricted to Internal Financial Control by Rutteman Committee. Having 
achieved the mandate for soundness of the UK corporate Governance Codes and its 
provisions, the LSE went ahead to publish the new listing rules which was the 
amalgamation of the three important committee till date: the Cadbury, the Greenbury 
and the Hampel and named 'The Combined Code 1998': the first ever in its series and 
the fourth major milestone towards UK corporate Governance Journey (Figure- 1.2). 
The Combined Code of 1998, the first ever of its kind in the series, was intended to 
produce a set of principles and code embracing Cadbury, Greenbury and the Hanq)el 
committees works, consolidating at one place and hence the term 'Combined' . The 
Combined Code contained both principles and detailed Code provisions. The 1998 
Combined Code was in force from 31 December 1998 until reporting years 
commencing on or after 1 November 2003, when it was superseded by the revised 
Code in 2003. It was appended to Listing Rule 12.43A requirii^ companies to 
provide in their annual reports a narrative statement of how they have appUed the 
16 
Code principles and state that they have con^lied with the Code provisions or, if not, 
why not, and for what period. The Code restored the requirement of Cadbury Code 
again of the need for con^ianies to have the Boards to maintain a sound system of 
internal control. With the restoration into The Combined Code 1998 (D.2.1), "The 
directors should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
group's system of internal control and should report to shareholders that they have 
done so. The review should cover all controls, including financial, operational and 
con^liance controls and risk management" the need was felt again for guidance on 
proper implementation of the same and accordingly the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) established Turnbull Committee, 
chaired by Nigel Turnbull, in the second half of the year 1998. The committee 
delivered its report, the Turnbull Guidance, "Internal Control: Guidance for Directors 
on the Combined Code" published in September 1999. In particular, the report 
provided guidance on principles D.2 of the Code determining the extent of 
compliance with the Code provisions D.2.1 and D.2.2. KPMG Review (1999), p.9. 
The importance of the Turnbull Committee Report has been effectively summed up in 
The KPMG Review, "Turnbull if embraced in the right spirit and with the right 
backing, will be a genuinely a good step forward for corporate governance. It's 
healthy for business and healthy for those investing in business." Yet another 
milestone appeared was achieved when keeping in view the importance of allocation 
of capital in effective manner and its role in productivity in UK, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer commissioned Paul Myners in March 2000 to conduct a review of 
Institutional Investment in the UK to find out whether there were distortions in 
Institutional investment decision making. The committee came out on 6 March 2001 
with its report, 'Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review' (Myners 
Review). The main findings were that many pension flmds trustees lack the necessary 
investment expertise to act as strong and discerning customers of the investment 
consultants and fund managers who sell them services. Myners recommended a set of 
principles on comply and explain basis which the UK Govt, agreed with the 
explanation that the same will help pension industry, consumer, corporate and Govt, 
too. There was also a promise to review after two years the extent to which the 
principles had been effective in bringing about behavioral change. 
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Simultaneously the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 as contained 
in Schedule 7A to the Companies Act 1985, was introduced w.e.f, 31* December 
2002 to enhance transparency is setting director's pay, improve accountability to 
shareholders, provide for a more effective performance linkage and to strengthen the 
powers of shareholders in relation to directors' pay. The regulation required quoted 
companies to prepare a director's remuneration report which complied with the 
Regulations, and to put the Report to a shareholder vote. The regulations increased the 
amount of information shareholders were given on directors' remuneration, certain 
disclosures, as well as performance graphs. The Regulation did not s^ply to 
Alternative Investment Market con^anies. Nor did they apply to companies 
incorporated outside Britain which were listed in London. (Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer). The Regulation had a very significant impact upon attitude and behavior's 
towards and in respect of directors' remuneration. (Deloitte, 2004). Another milestone 
of UK corporate Governance was covered when keeping in view the roles and 
importance of non-executive directors, the UK Govt, decided to assess the various 
issues relating to quality, independence and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
A committee was, therefore, formed under the chairmanship of Sir Derek Higgs to 
undertake a review to assess: population of non-executive directors in the UK, the 
mode of appointment, how the pool might be widened, their independence, 
effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, role of Combined Code, role of boards. 
Institutional Investors, govt, in strengthening non-executive directors. The HIggs 
Review developed the UK framework of corporate governance with such 
recommendations in the area of directors development as requirement of an aimual 
meetings with non-executive directors without management and to report the same in 
the Annual Reports, training and devebpment of individuals for future director roles, 
induction programme for new non-executive directors, performance evaluation, 
expansion on the role of the senior independent director to provide an alternative 
channel to shareholders and lead evaluations on the chairman's performance; added 
emphasis on the process of nominatbns to the board through a transparent and 
rigorous process and evaluation of the performance of the board, its committees and 
individual directors, etc. Further recommendations included stating the number of 
meetings of the board and its main committees in the annual report, together with the 
attendance records of individual directors; a chief executive not to become chairman 
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of the same company. The report was submitted by the committee on 20 January 2003 
and contained a number of proposals to improve corporate governance including 
recommendations for changes to the Combined Code 1998. The Smith Committee 
was later formed by Financial Reporting Council, under the chairmanship of Sir 
Robert Smith, in the month of October 2002, to develop guidance on Audit 
Committees in the Combined Code 1998. This was on the request of UK Govt, to 
FRC, in the backdrop of dramatic failures in the United States in early 2002 on 
account of accounting and auditing failures. The committee submitted its report, 
'Audit Committees, Combined Code Guidance, A report and proposed guidance by an 
FRC-appointed group chaired by Sir Robert Smith' commonly known as 'Smith 
Report, Guidance on Audit Committees'. The report was submitted in December 
2002 and published on January 2003 along with the Higgs Report on the same day. 
The guidance took effect from 1 July 2003. Tyson committee on the Recruitment and 
Development of non-executive directors was commissioned by DTI following the 
publication of Higgs Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors in January 2003 on the backdrop of faulty procedures of selection of non-
executive directors, where it was observed that the standard practices by which non-
executive directors are selected often overlooks talented individuals from a broad 
variety of backgrounds with the skills and experience required for effective board 
performance. Tyson Report (2003) made several recommendations about the 
identification, recruitment, selection and training of non-executive directors. In 
addition, the Review proposed the creation of a group of business leaders and others 
to suggest on how con^)anies should bring greater skills and experience and describe 
the profile of relevant skills and experience from person belonging to non-commercial 
background. Another major milestone came in terms of revision and extension of The 
earlier Combined Code 1998 which included recommendations of the TumbuU 
Report(1999), Smith Report(Jan 2003)& Higgs Report(Jan 2003) and was termed The 
Combined Code 2003. The Combined Code 2003 was published in the month of July 
2003 and superseded the earlier Combined Code issued by the Hampel Committee in 
1998. The LSE amended its listing rules to accommodate The Combined Code 2003 
and became effective from 1 November 2003. One important difference with that of 
its previous version is that The Combined Code 2003 did not included material on the 
disclosure of directors' remuneration because of the reason that "The Director 
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Remuneration Report Regulations 2002" were in force and had superseded the earlier 
Code provisions. The Combined Code provided for a 'formal and rigorous annual 
evaluation of the board's performance, the committees, and the individual director's 
performance and at least half the board in larger listed companies to be independent 
non-executive directors. The Combined Code applied from the reporting years 
commencing on or after 1 November 2003. 'Myners principles for institutional 
investment decision-making: Review of progress' came into the scene tl^reafler to 
honor the govt, commitment of reviewing the extent of earlier Myners principles for 
better investment decision making in pension funds. The pwpet surveyed the progress 
made by the pension scheme and mentioned about the growing acceptance of the 
Myners principles. OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW which came into 
effect on or after April 2005 with the provision for information on the con^any's 
current and prospective performance and strategy provided another boo^ to the CG 
initiatives. Based on the requirement of clarifications on internal control in the 
Combined Code 199S, Tunibull Committee had been established in the year 1998 
to frame guidance and accordingly tte committee had furnished 'Internal Control-
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code' in the year 1999. Five years hence, 
keeping in view the importance of internal control system and risk management, the 
need was felt to review the impact of the cods and to determine further if there was 
need to update the guidance. Accordingly in 2004, the Finaiwial Reporting Council, 
the UK corporate governance responsible body, established the Turnbuli Review 
Group. The group revealed that the original TumbuII guidance has considerably 
improved the internal control and risk management environment in UK thereafter and 
strongly endorsed retention of the flexible, principles-based approach of the original 
guidance and recommended only for a small number of change. The "Internal 
Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code" was published by 
the Financial Reporting Council in October 2005. The next major initiative came in 
the form of The Combined Code 2006 which superseded and replaced the earlier 
Combined Code 2003 and became effective from 1 November 2006. Another 
dimension in UK corporate governance was added when the Combined Code 2006 
was revised and improved to its latest version The Combined Code 2008 which 
applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2008 and is currently in 
vogue in UK. Thus the UK journey which started from the day of formation of the 
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Cadbury Committee has undergone a long path to the current stage of development of 
The Combined Code 2008. The importance of the Codes and guidelines of UK CG 
can be estimated from the fact that about 75% of the well known and fiunous code of 
best practices on corporate comes from UK. In^rtant Codes worldwide as on date 
can be listed as: Cadbury Code(1991), Greenbury Report (1992), Kings Committee 
Report (South Africa)-1994, Vie'not Report (France)(1995), Hampel Committee 
Report (1995), The Combined Code (1998), OECD Principles, Higgs Report(2003), 
Smith Report (2003), Tyson Report on recruitment of NED(2003). The long CG 
journey path of UK detailing committee formation, committee reports on a time scale 
is attached with the chapter (Figure 1.2) for better visibility. 
1.8: Evolution of CG in India 
In India the interest in corporate governance was triggered because of the Cadbury 
Reports (1992) (Som, 2(X)6) and the first initiative came from the Confederation of 
Indian Industries (CII) in the year 1998 when it came out with a voluntary code for 
Indian corporate 'Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code*. With this CII 
became the first business Association to take the initiative in formulating India's first 
endeavor to develop a code for Indian Corporate. The Code was developed under the 
Chairmanship of noted industrialists and past president of CII ,Sri Rahul Bajaj. The 
code focused on listed conq>anies (Sobham & Werner, 2003) which adopted its 
recommendations quickly, and 30 large listed companies, accounting for over 25 per 
cent of India's market capitalization, voluntarily adopted it. The Code contained 
recommendations on the structure and composition of the board and disclosure. The 
Code prepared Indian corporate for initial stage of preparation for more formal CG 
implementation by companies through formal listing obligation. The impact of the CII 
code was observable when in between 1998 and 2000 CII induced over 20 companies 
to disclose much greater information in line with the code. Annual Reports of these 
con:^ )anies reflected greater disclosure, qualitative and quantitative, consequent upon 
CII code voluntary adoption. The impact of the CII code is better described by 
Sobham & Werner (2003) when they describe, "... A more subtle effect of the CII 
initiative was to create a trend among large listed conpanies to look positively 
towards corporate governance, instead of discounting as 'the flavor of the month'. 
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The CII created the initial foundation for later st^e development of corporate 
governance in India. The second major initiative toward good governance initiative 
came from SEBI who on May 7, 1999, constituted a committee, chaired by the noted 
industrialist, Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla. In February 2000, the committee produced 
the Kumar Mangalam Birla Report with mandatory and non-mandatoiy provisions 
as it felt that some of the recommendations are absolutely essential for the framework 
of corporate governance while others could be considered as desirable. By the end of 
2000 SEBI Board accepted the recommendations and adopted it through 'Clause 49' 
of the Stock Exchange listing agreements and asked listed companies to comply the 
same. The companies were required to disclose separately in their annual reports, a 
report on corporate governance detailing compliance with the recommendations. Non-
mandatory recommendations were asked to comply as per company discretion. In 
case of non-compliance the reasons thereof and the extent of their non-conq)liance 
were asked to be highlighted. Thus in regard to non-mandatory clause it followed the 
Combined Code policy of'conq)ly or explain'. SEBI asked all the stock exchanges to 
get the implementation phase wise. Another initiative by Department of Con^any 
Affairs, GOI, took the shape in the form of formation of a Task Force on Corporate 
Excellence, to study and recommend measures to enhance corporate excellence which 
were considered essential with the opening of the Indian economy. The Task force 
highlighted several critical parameters of good governance, many of whom are also 
the subject of the current research. Growing international towards independent non-
executive boards with binary format were highlighted. The issue of such importance 
as creation of pool of independent directors. Lead Independent Directors, Separation 
of roles, the need for Remuneration and Nomination Committee were the area of 
discussion. The Task Force recommended for majority of independent directors, 
separation of position of board chair and managing director, and formation of the 
minimum three essential committees: Audit, Remuneration and Nomination, with 
minimum three members all independent. The recommendation of the Task Force 
though recommendatory in nature, made the initial backgroimd for later committees to 
think upon seriously. The committee noted the growing international trend towards 
independent non-executive boards. The Task Force noted that whereas elsewhere in 
the developed world, non-executive directors, largely by definition were are also 
independent, the Clause 49 made a distinction between independent and non-
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independent non-executive directors. The limited definition and less rigorous 
definition of independence adopted in KMB or in Clause 49 (of person having no 
material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company, its promoters, its 
management, or its subsidiaries ) as the Task force opined, was supposed to tide over 
practical difficulties in transforming overnight company boards into a binary 
executive/independent format. The Task Force highlighted that however there was no 
time frame, neither in KMB Report nor in the Listing Agreement, for review of this 
position. The Task Force further highlighted that a stricter definition at that time 
might have excluded most of the consultants, lawyers and public accountants, 
employees of promoters (including individual, groups, holding companies, and so on), 
besides representatives of other stakeholders like company employees(workers 
representatives), key vendors and customers. The task force while welcoming the 
suggestion of binary formats reasoned its practical difficulties in 'accommodating' 
certam family or group aspirations on the one hand, and on the other the likely paucity 
of competent non-executive directors who can qualify as independent. Later on 
developments on the matter of creation of pool for independent directors remained a 
matter of questbn. The Task Force recommendations were mainly advisory in nature. 
Another initiative in the Indian context on improvement of corporate governance 
came though 'The Consultative Group of Directors of Banks and Financial 
Institution' Ganguly Committee Report which was set up by Reserve Bank of India 
in consultation with IBA under the chairmanship of Dr. A.S. Ganguly, Director, 
Central Board, RBI. The Committee recommended for separation of the post of 
Chairman and Managing Director of large sized Banks, training for directors in the 
area of latest management techniques and in the area of specialized interest. The 
group further came for the need for Nomination Committee for {q)pointment of 
independent/non-executive director of Banks and agreed with the unquestionable role 
of Independent Directors in asking critical questions and seeks satisfactory reply. The 
committee further discussed upon the need of adequate and wholesome information 
flow. Company Secretary role and importance was also highlighted. The Ganguly 
Committee thus stressed upon most of the area of improvement in corporate 
governance currently deemed international practice on corporate governance. The RH 
Patil Advisory Committee was formed by RBI which delivered its Report in the year 
2001.The committee highlighted the weakness of listing instruments in enforcii^ the 
24 
standards and the large number of non-listed conq>anies having outside its gambit and 
recommended inclusion of provisions in Clause 49 (of listing agreement) and in the 
Con^}anies Act and reconunended for additional penal provisions. Among its other 
important recommendations were: Disclosure in the annual reports of all payments 
received by auditors over and above their fees, minimum strei^h of directors of 
companies with net worth of Rs 15 crore and above, and the nominee directors was 
recommended to be not included in the counting against independent directors, 
promoters to disclose direct, indirect and total holdings and any change in their 
controlling stake by 1% and more. In the year 2002 another major initiative on 
corporate governance came up in Indian context when DCA, GOI, set up the Naresh 
Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance (2002), under the 
Chairmanship of Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary, to examine various 
corporate governance issues. The conmiittee was mandated to examine and 
recommend changes, if necessary, in such areas related to audit and role of 
independent Directors and how their independence and effectiveness can be ensured. 
The Naresh Chandra Report (2002) recommended for extension of independence to 
all listed and unlisted conq)anies with a paid-up c£^ital and free reserves of over Rs 
10 crore or a turnover of at least Rs 50 Crore, to have half the board members as 
independent directors, wl^ther or not the board has an executive or non-executive 
chairman. In the area of Audit there were several recommendations to maintain the 
audit integrity. Specifically the report recommended that, along with its subsidiary, 
associates or affiliates, an audit firm should not derive more than 25 percent of the 
business from a single corporate client. The partners and at least 50 percent of the 
audit team working on a company accounts be rotated every five years. CEO and 
CFO were further reconunended for certification of the conpany accounts. Another 
and second major initiatives from SEBI came in the form of Narayan Murthy 
Report on Corporate Governance in February, 2003, which were mandated to review 
matters which enhances transparency and integrity of the market. The major 
mandatory recommendations of the Committee related to financial literacy of 
members of Audit Committee, Audit Report and Audit Qualifications, related party 
transactions, definition of related party, training of board members (non-mandatory). 
Code of conduct for executive management. Whistle-blower policy, performance 
evaluation of boards etc. Against the backdrop of recommendations of N.R. Narayan 
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Murthy Committee Report and Naresh Chandra Committee Report the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India extensively revised the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement 
in October, 2004. The Revised Clause became effective from SI"* December 2005. 
The major changes included widening of definition of independent directors, 
strengthening the responsibility of audit committees, improving quality of financial 
disclosures including those pertaining to related party transactions and proceeds from 
public/rights/preferential issues, requiring boards to adopt code of conduct, CEO/CFO 
certification of financial statements, compensation to non-executive directors and 
non-executive directors not to hold office for more than nine years, improving 
disclosures to statutory authorities, practicing company secretaries recognition along 
with auditors to certify conpliance of conditions of Corporate Governance as 
stipulated in Claude 49, qualification for Audit Committee members and review of 
information, disclosure of accounting treatment, whistle blower policy, certification 
by CEO/CFO and additional disclosure under non-mandatory requirement. Jain 
(2009), Secretary ICSI, posits, "The revised clause 49 of the listing agreements is 
most timely and provides much needed disclosure requirements, widened definition of 
independent directors, periodical review by independent director, whistle blower 
policy, quarterly conq)liance report in the prescribed format and issue of certificate of 
compliance". The Expert Committee on Company Law was constituted on 2°*' 
December, 2004 imder the chairmanship of Dr. J.J. Irani, Director, Tata Sons with the 
task of advising the Government on the proposed revisions to the Con^any Act, 
1956. The objective was the desire on the part of the Government to have a simplified 
compact law that will be able to address the changes taking place in the national and 
international scenario. Chapter IV of the report covered 'Management and 
Governance'. The Irani Committee submitted its report(called Irani Panel Report on 
Company Law) to the Con^any Affairs Minister, Mr. Prem Chand Gupta, on May 
31, 2005, and some of the recommendations of the committee were: A definition of 
independent directors should be incorporated in the Company Law, a minimum of one 
third of the total number of directors as independents should be adequate for a 
con^any having significant public mterest, irrespective of whether the Chairman is 
executive or non-executive, independent or not. Nominee directors appointed by any 
institution or in pursuance of ajjy agreement or Govt, appointees representing Govt, 
shareholding should not be deemed to be ind^ipndent directors, the definition of an 
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independent Director should be provided in law and expanded the definitron of an 
'independent director', a non-executive director to be held liable only in respect of 
any contravention of any provisions of the Act which has taken place with his 
knowledge and where he has not acted diligently, or with his consent or connivance. 
The Indian Corporate Governance initiatives on a Timeline has been shown (figures 
1.3) which when compared with UK journey in historical context reveals that 
although several initiatives are observed in the Indian context to in^rove the 
corporate governance, several of its advisory committee reports and recommendatk>ns 
were advisory in nature and were ignored. The overall impact of this ignorance is seen 
on the matter of corporate governance immaturity and effectiveness vis-&-vis UK, 
unbalance board and Committee structure, immature devebpment of Independent 
Director System and their enabling parameters and the like. 
Structural aspects of The Combined Code and The Revised Clause 49 
Close observation of the structural aspects of the Combined Code (UK) and The 
Revised Clause 49 reveals the respective country area of stress and concern on the 
matter of corporate governance. On the matter of Directors and their development the 
UK Combined Code has maximum number of Code provisions and puts these Code 
provisions at its foremost position in The Combined Code. The Combined Code 
contains rulings on Board (S nos.). Chairman & Executive (2 nos.). Board Balance 
and Independence (3 nos.), appointment to the Board (6 nos.), Information and 
Professional development (3 nos.). Performance Evaluations (1 no), Re-election (2 
nos.) (figure 1.3 & 1.4). Against this Indian Code has Code provision for Board 
con^sition (4 nos.), other provision on board and Committee (3 nos.). There is no 
ruling on role separation, appointment to the board. Information and Professional 
Devebpment (non-mandatory), no code provision on performance evaluation, and nil 
on re-election. Indian Revised Clause however has an edge over the niunber of code 
provisions in its Audit Committee segments where it contains maximum of IS nos. 
against 9 nos. in The Combined Code. The comparative emphasis placed by India and 
UK on the matter of corporate governance is, therefore, observable in her Codes and 
is a pointer of the respective area where there is further need of focused attention for 
the two countries. In this connection figures for structural con^wnents may be 
referred, presented in the chapter. (Figure: 1.4,1.5,1.6 & 1.7). 
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Chapter'2 
CHAPTER-2 
Review of Literature 
Though comparative studies on code provisions between two or more countries have 
been undertaken in the past and few of them finds mention in the present literature review 
not many studies are available based on practices on such scale as the current one. No 
comparative empirical studies between India and UK have been undertaken in the past. 
The literatures reviewed presented herewith consisted of related working papers sourced 
from internet, books on corporate governance that were procured, research journals 
artKles from Ic&i Journals on Corporate Governance, Intematk>nal journals tmm WCFG 
and the like, which were available for downloads, newspaper clippings, business 
magazine articles, working papers fiom corporate governance organizatbns worldwide, 
codes and gukielines, national and international universities research paper collections 
which were available for e-downloading, seminars and woricshops materials received etc. 
All of these have been categorized into different segments as below. 
2.1: Comparative studies in corporate governance 
The literature review under this head includes comparative studies on corporate 
governance between two or more countries with an aim to import good governance 
features between themselves. A comparative study of the regulatory framework of 
corporate governance in family controlled companies between Hong Kong and Thailand 
have been done by Pitiyasak (2003) with an aim to examine whether there are measures 
in relation to corporate governance in family controlled companies that the two countries 
can learn from each other. Even though the legal system in Hong Kong is Common Law 
and that of Civil Law in Thailand, the study identifies common ground for improvement. 
The study concludes that even though the whole system could not be duplicated from 
Hong Kong to solve the problem in Thailand and vice-versa, details in some aspects of 
corporate governance, i.e., the scope of corporate governance, the independent non-
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executive directors, the audit committees, the shareholder remedies, and the remuneration 
committees might be imported from the former to solve certain problems in the latter and 
vice versa. Singapore Code, which was developed from UK combined Code 1998, is 
compared by Teen (2004) with the UK Code (2003) and highlights major differences. 
The study throws light on certain area where Singapore Code of governance could be 
improved. Aguilera (2008) on the other hand examines the five largest and emerging 
Latin American countries of South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela and compares different corporate governance aspects among these countries. 
The study finds high ownership concentration (state/family), small and illiquid stock 
markets and limited option for corporate financing and suggests the need for increasing 
corporate transparency, strengthening the legal system, prevention of shareholder 
expropriation by developing eflFective minority shareholder protection, and greater 
activism from institutkinal investors for higher economic devebpment in these countries. 
U.S. corporate governance practice is compared with foreign firms by Aggarwal, Erel, 
Stulz & Williamson (2007) with the help of constructing a firm-level governance index 
which is directly proportional to the minority shareholder protection, i.e., higher the 
minority protection, higher will be the governance index. A firm-level or internal 
governance mechanism are those that operates within the firm in contrast to country-level 
governance mechanism which depends on country's laws, its culture and norms, and the 
institution which enforce the laws. The study finds that, as against US firms, only 12.68% 
of foreign firms have a higher index which indicates that foreign firms invest less in 
internal governance mechanisms that increases the power of minority sharehoWers, than 
comparable US firms do. The study further finds that minority sharehokiers benefit from 
governance improvement and do so at the expense of controlling sharehokiers. Tan 
(2006) seeks to compare the level of disclosure of Singapore's top 50 Straits Times 
Indexed Companies (STIs) and Government Linked Companies (GLCs) based on score 
card designed according to the Singapore Corporate Governance Code by data from the 
annual reports of companies! The Scorecard consisted of 87 items and is divided into four 
main sectk)ns: board, remuneration, accountability and audit, and communk:atk>n with 
shareholders with one mark given for compliance with each item in the scorecard and 
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difTerent weightage allocated to the four sections. The study finds the general level of 
disclosure to be quite high with 74% of the STls and 77% of the GLCs scoring above 
50%. Levels of disclosure practices of GLC and STIs companies were found to be 
similar. Disclosures were found to be weak in the areas of Board' and 'Remuneration' 
whereas better score was observed in the area of 'Accountability & Audit' and 
'Communication with shareholders'. A firm level comparative study is conducted by 
Shukla (2009) which investigates the adoption of governance practices of the top four 
firms of the Indian Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector: Hindustan Unilever 
Ltd, ITC Ltd, Nestle (India) Ltd, and Tata Tea Ltd, using the case study method, through 
assessing their Annual Reports and empirical analysis. The qualitative analysis is 
followed by a quantitative rating of the corporate governance practrces of these firms. 
Parameters include the mandatory (Statutory) and non-mandatory requirements of clause 
49 of the listing ^reement, as prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Board (SEBI), 
and relative amendments in the Companies Act, 19S6. The analysis indicates that the 
firms comply with the mandatory requirements. However they need to improve their 
practices in adopting the non-mandatory requirements. Among the firms studied, ITC, the 
recipient of the ICSI natbnal awards for excellence in corporate governance, scored the 
highest, followed by Tata Tea, HUL and last at Nestle. Gregory (2002), on behalf of the 
European Commissbn, klentifies and compares corporate governance codes of the fifteen 
EU member states with a view to further the understanding of commonalities and 
difierences in corporate governance practices. The study reveals that vast majority of 
these codes (25) were issued after 1997. The United Kingdom accounts for the largest 
number of codes identified in this study (1 Inos.) - almost one third of the total- and also 
accounts for six of the ten pre-1998 codes identified. The codes klentified for 
comparative study have been issued from a broad array of groups-governmental or quasi-
governmental entities; committees (or commission) organized by governments or by 
stock exchanges; business, industry and academic associations; directors associatk>ns; 
and investor-related groups. Krivogorsky & Dick (2008) compares different regulatbn 
and practices on corporate governance with a view to find uniformity on some comnK)n 
grounds for adoption by member states. The study has been sparked on the backdrop of 
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European Union formation and increased requirement of member countries having 
uniform practices as far as practicable. The study finds that given the distinct business 
culture and law in member countrbs and distinct origins, the codes have remarkable 
similarity especially in terms of their attitudes and expression, about the key roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors, incentive mechanisms and the recommendations 
they make concerning its composition and practices. However it is the legal differences 
which are deeply ingrained in their attitudes and most difficult to change. Shi (2004) 
compares the boards of Chinese boards with that of the US boards taking it as 
benchmark, to bring out deficiencies and render probable recommendatrons to improve 
the governance of Chinese boards. The article concludes that board independence, well 
deflned board structures, duties and accountabilities are essential for enhancing the 
performance of Chinese boards. UK and Switzerland corporate governance regimes are 
compared by Speck & Tanega (2008) with stress on the role of non-executive directors. 
The study fmds that Swiss and the UK corporate governance codes are quite similar, at 
least according to fundamental principles of adhering to self-regulation and a comply-or-
explain approach, and each country having separate codes. Major differences have been 
pointed out in the areas of specific regulatory power, difference in market size for 
professional directors and historical developments. The study recommends few British 
provisk)ns e.g., NEDs meetings at least once a year, provision for Lead Independent 
Director, board independence, for active consideration and their incorporation into Swiss 
system. Sobham & Werner (2002) compares and analyze the state of corporate 
governance in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as the comnran reference, with a 
view to learn practnal experience from other countries and commence a national 
programme to promote good corporate governance in Bangladesh. The study was aimed 
at the assumptions that Bangladesh lagged behind its South Asian neighbors with regard 
to corporate governance standards, and hoped that a comparative study and analysis 
would provide regional examples of initiatives that could be applied in Bangladesh to 
improve the situation. The study has identified areas where reform is needed in 
Bangladesh. Key characteristics of the corporate governance models, prevalent in US and 
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European countries are compared by Mendez (2004). Comparison lias been made on 
ownership and control pattern, economic models, legal systems, board structure, 
shareholders representations, management representation. Independence, compensation, 
accountability structure and practices in US and EU which includes UK. Two theoretical 
studies by Weil, Gotshal and Manges, one on developing and emerging markets, and 
other on developed markets in the year 2000 and 2001 respectively are aimed at 
international comparisons of corporate govemarice guidelines and codes of best practices 
with a view to identify common grounds and trends in convergence in countries with 
diverse backgrounds. 
2.2: Separation of Roles for Governance and Management 
Duality occurs when the same person assumes both the roles of chief executive officer 
and chairman. The potential advantage of having the same person filling both the posts is 
that they shoukl exhibit a greater understanding and knowledge of the company's 
operating environment. However separate post for the chairman and CEO is considered 
better keeping in view mitigating the unfettered control of a combined post. Boards 
dominated by inside directors are more difficult to control and this is the situation when 
duality is applied (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The Cadbury Committee regarded the practk;e 
of duality as undesirable, because it gives one person too much power within the 
decision-making process. There is, however, little evidence to support the stance because 
most studies find no adverse relatbnship between duality and performance. Baliga et al. 
(1996), Dalton et al. (1998) and. Weir and Laing (1999) all found that it had neither any 
effect on performance nor it harms. An U.K. study by Dahya et al. (1996) found that the 
stock market reacted favorably to the separation of the two posts and negatively if they 
were actually combined. In addition, companies that adopted duality, performed worse in 
accounting performance terms, the year after the change. Desender (2007) examines the 
importance of separation of roles on the issue of implementation of Enterprise Resource 
Management (ERM) and reports that CEOs do not favor ERM implementation and are 
able to withstand pressure when they are occupying the seat of chairman. The study finds 
that apart from independence of boards, the separation of roles of chairman and CEO is 
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essential on the matter of critical Enterprise Resource Management which helps reducing 
agency costs and prevents fraudulent reporting. Only board independence will not serve 
the purpose. In the current study researcher observes that the UK boards are more or 
established on separation of roles of chairman and CEO. Based on interviews with past 
chairman of FTSE-350 companies of UK Kirchmaier, T. & Owen, G. (2008) reports that 
with the separation of the post of chairman and CEO, the role of chairman has become 
more challenging because not only he has to bring in required talent mix but also ensures 
that the board works as a team, balancing the two awkward relationships, with the chief 
executive and other with non-executive directors. 
2.3: Independence of Boards and Corporate Governance 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted on whether there is a link between 
independent directors and corporate performance. Mixed results have been observed. 
Gupta (1980) article enimierates eight attributes as constituting the excellence of a board. 
The first and foremost important attributes according to him is independence of the board 
members from control of managerial interests of a person, femily or a group. The paper 
note that the nominee director system adopted in India since 1971 was a measure mainly 
to attack the problem. The author sums up that board independence is central to board 
excellence and other attributes, even if present, acquire a meaning only if independence is 
first ensured. Dahya & McConnell (2005) investigate the relationship between outskie 
directors and corporate performance in the case of UK. The study was carried out during 
the "outside director euphoria" years when following Cadbury Conrunittee 
recommendations in 1992 ahnost 24 countries introduced the concept of outside directors 
presence in board of directors. The study finds a statistKally and economically significant 
improvement in operating performance from 1.95% before the year of introduction to 
7.76% to 9.71% after two years of introduction. Gordon (2006) discusses the issue of rise 
of independent directors from 20% to 75% during the period 1950-2005 and the need for 
their evaluation in terms of overall maximiser of social welfare in terms of greater and 
better monitoring of public goods. The author cites two reasons for their phenomenal rise 
in USA: the shift to sharehokler value as the primary corporate objective and the greater 
42 
infonnativeness of stock prices. Independent directors, in this environment are considered 
more important, because of their lesser commitment to management and its vision and 
c^)ability of looking outside performance signals such as the stock prices. Prasanna 
(2006) analysis conducted through questionnaire to company secretary, highlights various 
issues concerning Independent Directors and tests the hypothesis whether independent 
directors bring brand creditability to the companies and makes the board better governed 
and finds that the independent directors in &ct bring tn-and creditability and better 
governance and contribute to effective board functioning by leading the governance 
committee effectively. Further his survey confirms two major recommendations of the 
Irani Committee that only one-third of the board should be independent, and nominees 
should not be taken as independent directors. The paper highlights the need for a formal 
process of the appointment and periodic evaluation. Pandey (2009) cover p ^ e articles in 
Indian Management, on the eve of Satyam scandals, highlights the issue of board 
independence, need of nomination committee, and excessive power and influence of 
CEO in the present business model of concentrated shareholding models and points out 
the need of reform in India's corporate governance code. The article cites 
Balasubramanian as stating that while USA and UK has dispersed shareholding, with 
biggest shareholding only one or two percent, the Indian and rest of the world case are 
different. Here dominant corporate ownership is of the state, a multinational or a 
promoter femily. Balasubramanian further speaks, "Here, the CEO is often from the 
promoter &mily. In such a situation, whUe the board is supposed to recruit a CEO, it is in 
fact the CEO who hires the board members. That's the fundamental reasons, why too 
many CEOs are not sacked. These decisions are taken at the family or parent company or 
political level and not by the board." Satheeshkumar (2006) article raises the question of 
all important and much talked about independence of board of directors and asks whether 
these independent directors are pillars of corporate governance or pawns of promoters? 
The author argues that companies while selecting independent directors ahvays seeks for 
'best and famous' in their eflfort for image building. Instead they should look for 'right 
and functional' directors. The author also e}q)resses his concerns when companies in their 
quest for hiring CEOs spend much time and effort, whereas the same rigor is rarely seen 
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in recruiting independent directors. The author stresses on the issues of director 
development activities and the need for necessary infrastructure of Independent 
Directors. 'The Independent Directors enabling model' as pointed out in chapter seven 
seems to be justified in this context. Fernandes (2005) research on the effectiveness of 
non-executive directors, in safeguarding the shareholders interests and aligning their 
interest with the management, finds interesting results. The study is with a panel of firms 
listed on Portuguese Stock Exchange and the result obtained is against the usual belief. 
The study report that firm with zero non-executive board members actually have less 
agency problems and have a better alignment of shareholder and managers interests. The 
resuh cast doubt on the role and functions of Independent board members of the board. 
Soosten (2002) research emphasizes the spirit of independence rather the number or 
structures and highlighting the importance of Independence of boards he notes that "it is 
not board structure that is the cause of the shortcomings. The cause is the general lack of 
independence of individual directors and by extension boards of directors taken as a 
whole." The author further mentnns that, "however creating a truly independent board of 
directors will not lead to a higher level of corporate governance unless the directors 
devote sufficient time to delve into the affairs of the corporation". The author further 
notes that "by successfully addressing the core issue of independence it is believed that 
overall board performance will be improved in corporate America." Hopt & Leyens 
(2004) in their descriptive article on recent developments on the board models in Europe 
highlights the structural trends toward nrare independence. While comparing the 
devebpment on the point of independence between UK and French boards, the study 
note that both revised Combined Code of UK and the revised Principles of Corporate 
Governance have strengthened the presence of independent directors on one tier boards in 
Europe for increased monitoring and supervision over management flinctnns.. The 
strengthening of the strategy role of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) by the new 
German Corporate governance Code 2002 means there is attempt to incorporate the 
above key advantage of the one tier model intb German system. Boozang (2007) 
discusses the issue of board independence in non-profit sector where an element of 
independence is trying to be introduced through legislation in the US, on the assumptbn 
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that while for-profit organization independence is essential for improving oversight of 
management on behalf of the shareholders owners, the non-profit boards have multiple 
constituencies and operate with few guiding principles, as how to how to pnotithe 
competing claims for their resources, and its independence is also required. The author 
argues that efficiencies of independence in board performance and their composition is 
yet to be experimented upon and, therefore, the drive for independent directors in the 
nonprofit sector seems directionless. In Indian context Prasanna (2006) lyings to light the 
fact, that with the implementation of the Clause 49 of the listing agreement on corporate 
governance, corporate boards have become more independent, but the empirical analysis 
did not confirm that there is a relation between independent board and value 
maximization.. The research paper investigates with a sample of group "A" companies of 
BSE whether the board independence has any influence in maximizing the firm value. On 
governance in &mily controlled corporation RamMohan (2002) writes," The idea in 
putting independent directors in a majority, of course, is that a non-performing CEO can 
be checked and even removed before matters get out of hand. In India situation b very 
different. In the family-managed business that is the norm, mam^ement has substantial 
shareholding and select directors. It is not enough, therefore, to define indq)endent 
director as those who do not have a material pecuniary relationship with the con^ny in 
question. As long as directors owe their presence on the board to management, their 
independence would be questionable. This is the reason why the CEO is hardly ever 
removed for non-performance. All the tenets of governance amount to nothing where the 
ability and the willingness to penalize non-performance are missing." Another research in 
USA context by Brown Jr. (2008) reports inefTiciency of independent directors system in 
USA and as a consequence activist shareholders exerting pressures to SEC to allow 
shareholders to nominate and elect their own candidate. The paper enumerates several 
possible reasons for inefficient working of Independent Directors, some of which have 
been mentroned as: improper definition of independence, high director's fees which 
might compromise with independence of judgment, definitk)n of independence not taking 
into account the close personal relation developed after joining the board, the directors 
lack of independent source of information and depending more on the CEO for 
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information about the company operations. The author further notes that even if 
definitions of 'independence' are not considered, the systems for electing directors are 
vetted by management and not shareholders. This alone can raise doul^ about they being 
custodian of intefest of management rather than the shareholders. Dey & Chauhan (2009) 
investigates the relationship between board composition, independence and performance 
in four categories of Indian firms namely, PSUs, stand-alone firms, private business 
groups affiliated firms and subsidiary of foreign firms. Ratio of MV to BV of assets has 
been taken as proxy to measure firm-performance. As against normal expectation, board 
independence is insignificant so far as performance in all categories of Indian companies 
are concerned. Nasir and Abdullah (2004) examines the annual reports of healthy and 
distressed financial firms for the years 2000 and 2001 and analyses the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and its different corporate governance variables. Board 
independence was found to have significant influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
2.4: Board of Directors and Corporate Governance 
Board of Directors as an institution has very important role in company governance and 
to a lesser extent on the company mam^ement. Studies in BOD are available which 
focuses mostly on structural framework of a board. Various board related parameters like 
qualities, size, initiatives, responsibilities, age of members, core competence etc., are 
examined by Dhawan (2006) based on primary data collected from 89 large listed firms 
in India with the help of personally administered questionnaire. The study finds that the 
board size increases with the turnover but only up to a certain level, beyond which the 
increasing turnover doesn't influence it. The effective integration of the skills and 
knowledge base of the board is more important than the size. The study notes the 
importance of agenda of the meeting, information and details of the meetings in advance. 
Core competence of the directors, strategic thinking, leadership quality, honesty and 
integrity are considered most desirable in the board of directors. Liljeblad and Svensson 
(2001) explores and analyze the role of BOD in active ownership and examines how 
companies active on the Swedish risk capital market, looks upon the concept of active 
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ownership, and how this active ownership is exercised in practice. The study conies to the 
conclusion that the most powerful and used control mechanism is the Board of Directors. 
It is through this body that the investing companies practiced most of their active 
ownership. Further the investing companies, active on the risk capital market, consider 
most important aim of active ownership to be profit maximization. Fuller & Jensen 
(2003) maintains that boards have failed to ililfill their role as the top-level corporate 
control mechanism as judged in the context of wave of corporate scandals. The authors 
suggest fundamental change in the approach taken by board. The board must hold the 
top-level control rights in the organization, including the rights to initiate and implement 
certain decisions such as, the right to hire, evaluate, compensate, and fire the top 
management team, board members and the company's auditors rather leaving these to 
CEO. The Board should focus on changing the structural, social, psychobgical, and 
power environment of the board, fh>m CEO to the board itself and he too stresses on 
separation of the post of chairman and CEO. The authors report that CEO does most of 
the recruiting for the board. Further suggestion is to change the phik>sophical mindset of 
the board from one of careful review and compliance to one of insatiable curiosity and 
clarity. Finally the paper suggest that boards must take seriously their responsibility to 
ensure the integrity of the organization in all matters and advises board members to be 
willing to incur costs if necessary to do so. Nanda (1983), in his Ph.D. dissertation study 
analyses the structural and functk)nal aspects of the board of directors in the Indian 
Corporate sector. The author finds that companies with a higher percentage of whole time 
directors in their boards tend to be better performer, measured in terms of return on 
investment and share price index. The board size tends to be determined by company size 
rather than age of the company. Directors of public sector enterprises are better qualified 
than their counterparts in the private sector. Muhinatbnal companies in the private sector 
tend to have most fi-equent board meetings and public and joint sector enterprises tend to 
have longer meetings. Dey & Chauhan (2009) investigates the relationship between board 
composition and performance in four categories of Indian firms namely, PSUs, stand-
alone firms, private business groups affiliated firms and subsidiary of foreign firms. Ratio 
of MV to BV of assets has been taken as proxy to measure firm-performance. The study 
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finds that larger boards are less efTective in Indian firms, except in case of PSUs and 
board size does not have any affect on the firm performance in Indian PSUs. 
2.5: Board bio-diversity and Corporate Governance 
The literatures dealing with female directors are not many and lot more research is 
needed in this area. Special traits in a female director are examined by Prasad (2006) and 
observe, "Recent research shows that women tend to have more values which contribute 
to good governance. A higher proportion of females as compared to males believe that a 
corrupt act cannot be justified. Women in business are not so prone to pay bribes, since 
they are averse to risks and are ethical by nature. They are good listeners and 
motivators." In USA context Branson D.M. (2006) studies the population of women 
directors in US boards. It states that with the rise of women graduate Irom Law and 
MBA, there should have been a steady rise of population of female CEO in boardroom, 
but Fortune 500 data speaks that their number remained statk or growing very sk)wly 
while the number of 'trophy directors', (those with 4 or more directorship) has increased 
rapidly. The paper ends with suggestbns for women and the company wishing to 
facilitate entry of more women from the pool of directors. 
2.6: Different Countries CG structures and practices 
This section of literature review surveys the state of existence of corporate governance in 
different countries worldwide. In Indian context Chakraborty, Megginson & Yadav 
(2007) examines the corporate governance status, which the results finds, is of highest 
levels on papers while differing on reality and mentions about the prevalence of 
widespread corruption, over-burdened courts, concentrated ownership, prevalence of 
family business groups, control by pyramiding structure and tunneling of funds, highest 
non-performing assets with banks etc. The paper however apprises that most of these 
problems are not new for India but is prevalent in other Asian countries too. The recent 
initiatives and the companies like Infosys are future hope so far as corporate governance 
in India is concerned. Chakrabarti (2005) findings are in agreement and reports that while 
India has one of the best corporate governance laws it is plagued by poor implementation. 
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Concentrated ownership of shares, pyramiding and tunneling of funds among group 
companies mark the Indian Corporate landscape. Good practice of corporate governance 
is only restricted to few top companies and more needs to be done to ensure adequate 
corporate governance in the average Indian Company. The primary issues, the author 
points out, are in the mater of enforcement which is often obstructed by the forces of 
corruption and self interest. The author takes a look at the several measures taken since 
CII Code, SEBI implementing the recommendations of Biria Committee through the 
enactment of Clause 49 of the listing agreements, Narayan Murthy recommendatbns and 
ending on an optimistic note on the matter of several developments initiated by and being 
pushed by industry organizations and chamber of commerce. Another research in Indian 
context by Goswami (2000) brings to light that corporate governance in India largely 
came into prominence in the year 1993 due to three episode after liberalization: a major 
securities scam that was uncovered in April 1992, a sudden growth of cases where 
multinational companies started consolidating their ownership by issuing preferential 
equity allotments to their controlling group at steep discounts to their market price, and 
disappearing companies of 1993-94. The author forecasts that in the coming year there 
will be flurry of activities in India in CG because of the force of competition, great 
churning taking place in corporate India, phenomenal growth in market capitalization, 
impact of well focused and well researched foreign portfolio investors, entry of foreign 
pensk)n ftinds, stronger financial press, ftill capital account convertibility, rise of 
companies like Infosys, ICICI with cross listing. Entry of pension fiind like CalPERS, 
Hermes or TIAA-CREF, which ho Us on their portfolk) for much longer time than Mutual 
Funds. All these devek)pments are bound to increase CG standards in India. McGee 
(2008) examines the application of some of the principles of corporate governance as 
identified by the OECD, Workl Bank and IMF, in Asian countries of India, Malaysia, 
Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. The principles covered 
includes: basic sharehokler rights, participation rights, shareholders' AGM rights, 
disproportionate control disclosure, market for corporate control, equal treatment of 
shareholders, prohibitbn of Insider trading, disck>sure of interests, respect for 
shareholder rights, redressal for vblation of rights, performance enhancement, access to 
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information, disclosure standards, accounting & audit standards, independent audits, &ir 
and timely dissemination, acts with due diligence and care, treating all shareholders 
fairly, ensuring compliance with law, the board fulfillment of certain key functions, the 
board exercising objective judgment, and access to information. Among the Asian 
countries India scored highest, with Vietnam the lowest. The author mentions that 
although India is notorious for its bureaucracy and corruption, its corporations are 
making progress in the area of corporate governance. Vietnam low score is reasoned 
because of its relatively newer entry into market. According to ChefiFins (2000) Britain 
was once recognized as an exporter of legal concepts and innovatbns. Its reputatk>n has 
been tarnished in recent years. However the work done by Cadbury Committee and 
successors Greenbury and Hampel committee represents a partial reversal of the recent 
trends and Britain is now respected for its corporate govemaiKie codes and enforcement 
through stock exchange market listings has been quite effective and has been influential 
outside Britain. Rayton & Cheng (2004) investigate the development of the UK 
corporate Governance for four year perbd beginning 1998, the starting year for the 
Combined Code. The results demonstrates that there has been a significant influence in 
shaping the corporate governance structures of UK listed corporations in terms of clear 
increase in the number and proportion of non-executive directors on the main board, an 
increase in the nominatk>n committee and a decrease in the combination of roles of 
chairman and CEO. McGee & Preobr^enskaya (2004) deals with the issue of corporate 
governance in Central and Eastern European transitk>n countries like Croatia, Hungary 
and Russia. These countries do not have the institution infrastructure to deal with 
corporate governance issue, the evaluation of which is still taking place. These countries 
are plagued with little or no rights of minority sharehoklers and the vahie of their 
investments gets evaporated as top management plundered their corporatk>n and 
transferred assets to shell corporations they controlled. The author posits that pressure 
fh>m EU and the need for FDI will lead them to improved corporate governance. Ramsay 
& Richard (1997) study seeks to determine the extent to which Australian listed 
companies are discbsing their corporate governance practkes as per ASX listing rule 
4.10.3, by examining the annual reports of 268 listed companies, for one year of 
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information. The authors conclude that extent and quality of disclosure is typically better 
for larger companies than the smaller companies. Jingu (2007) study takes a look of 
Chinese corporate governance and apprises that the China Capital market has not been 
developed due to its historical past and hence limited liability company (LLC) of China is 
underdeveloped. The study points out the initiatives taken to improve corporate 
governance such as promotk)n of group listing, reform of non-tradable shares, 
implementation of new Company Law and the new Security Law, promotion of new 
listing of quality companies and points out that all these initiatives, which are in the 
initial stage, have started yielding results. An another research study on Chinese context 
is carried out by Clarke (2003) which discusses the conflicting features of corporate 
governance in china and the dilemma arising out of conflicting goals it wants its business 
organization (SOEs) to pursue, where it wants to maintain full or controlling interest, in 
order to utilize that control for the purpose of meeting employment goals, politically-
motivated job placement, serve sensitive industries and not solely for the purpose of 
wealth maximization abng with the bringing in efficiencies factor of private enterprise. 
Chinese policymakers however points out that in order to accommodate the special 
circumstances of state-sector, its entire company law meant for enthusing spirits in 
private sector, needs reorientation to the extent that its state sector are forced to follow 
the rules of private-sector enterprises and private sector enterprises having to follow these 
rules which makes sense only for state-invested units. Shahid (2001) assesses the 
corporate governance practices in Egypt, identifies the problem and propose 
recommendatk)ns to enhance corporate governance in Egypt. No codes of best practices 
exists in Egypt and visualizing the need for foreign direct investment, the research 
advises the government to set a "code of best practice for corporate governance in Egypt" 
rather than wait for regulatory or law modificatbns, which will take longer time to 
implement. The paper advises the proposed code to be simple, practical, easily 
implementing and enforceable. It should fit within the country's existing laws and 
institutions and not to be imported fk>m other countries. Schmidt (2003) highlights 
German corporate governance as different from that of the Angk>-Saxon countries 
because the former foresees the possibilities and even the necessities, to integrate lenders 
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and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate 
governance system is generally regarded as an example of an insider-controlled and 
stake-holder system. The study reviews, in the context of past decade wave of 
development, whether the German corporate governance system have changed, why, 
when, and to what extent, and whether the change is structural change capable of 
depriving its former constituencies of insider-controlled system into an outsider-
controlled and shareholder-oriented system. Badulescu & Badulescu (2008) examine the 
issue of corporate governance in the Romanian context. Romania has a non-compulsory 
code of corporate governance code based on 'comply and explain' principles which is 
supposed to enhance the compliance. The paper highlights the weak institutk)nal 
framework, implementation and enforcement of the existing laws and the need for the 
private sector to take the lead and initiatives in promoting public debate on corporate 
governance issues and protectk>n of minority sharehoklers rights. Kim and Kim (2008) 
describe the current state of Korean corporate governance which faced the major 
financial crisis during the year 1997. The family controlled Chaebol firms, with 
concentrated sharehokling and having control rights far more than cash flow rights, and 
consequent abuse, are the major concern in corporate governance there. Except Chaebol 
firms, Korea has significantly improved in such area of corporate governance as more 
effective oversight of the board, emergence of key external monitors and enforcer, 
improved corporate transparency etc. Black, Carvalho and George (2008) investigate 
corporate governance practk:es in Brazilian Private Firms (firms without majority 
ownership by the government or by a foreign company). The study is based on extensive 
survey in the year 200S of governance of 116 Brazilian public firms, including Brazilian 
private firms. The authors find weakness in the area of board independence, lack of 
independent directors, audit committees which are uncommon, financial disclosure with 
little or no cash flow statements or consolidated financial statements. Bianchi & Bianco 
(2006) study provides an in-depth descriptive analysis of the evolutbn of both listed and 
unlisted Italian companies' corporate governance over the perk)d 1900- 2005, with an 
aim of evaluating the effect of recent reform. The study cites legal and economic reform 
in Italy relating to financial markets: passing of a new banking law, increase of roles of 
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institutional investor in financial markets, privatization of stocic maricets, enactment of a 
security law, introduction of a corporate governance code and twice revision of it, 
enactment of a new company taw and strengthening of shareholder protection. Despite 
these reform measures the study fmds limited change in the ownership and control 
structure of unlisted and listed companies. The study further points out limited separation 
of ownership and control in Italy because of the reason of unwillingness on the part of 
Italian owners to release control. Kozarzewski, Lukashova, Lukashova and Mironova 
(2006) discuss the issue of corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan which is a newcomer in 
the area and has adopted continental model of corporate governance. In the continental 
model, functions of control and supervision are strengthened by their separation i.e., 
managing body and supervisory body (Board of directors). The country had no previous 
experience of private property and market and it is still evolving. The factors for 
formatbn of CG system like corporate and antimonopoly law, financial markets and 
shareholder activities have been discussed. The study suggest for upgrading of 
legislation, creation of favorable legal and institutional climate which will lead to 
improvement and attract foreign investn^nt. The authors find the formatk)n and 
stabilization of CG system far from complete. Ho (2003) discusses the issue of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong, which is vital, as it is an international financial centre and 
because of its unique regulatory framework such as relatively few loose regulatbn and 
weak legal protection for investors and concentrated structure, as most listed firms are 
controlled by a single individual or a family. The study reviews the background, practice, 
core problems, effectiveness and prospects of corporate governance, legal and regulatory 
framework, recent regulatory reforms, owner-directors and conflicts with minority 
shareholders and shareholder activism and convergence of CG practkes. Shearman and 
Sterling Ltd (2005) surveys the corporate governance practices of the 100 largest US 
companies, as ranked in Fortune Magazine Fortune SOO list by revenues that have equity 
shares listed shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ for the three 
consecutive years 2003, 2004 and 2005. The survey was done on the following 
parameters: Director Independence, Director Qualifications, Board Leadership, Board 
and Committees Meetings, Corporate Governance related sharehokler proposals. Audit 
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Committee compensation. Audit Committee duties. Code of conduct and attendance 
policy. Poison pills, classified boards, screening of communication with director equity 
compensation, director cash compensation etc. On Independent Directors strength, the 
survey finds that Independent directors continue to comprise 75% or more of the boards 
of 81 top 100 companies. Gilham (2004) presents an updated picture of corporate 
governance in Ghana which is at very low level. Given the continued commitment to 
democratic government and the country being promoted as the "Gateway to West 
Africa", the country aims to attract more fore^n investment to fuel growth in the private 
sector which will create jobs and employment and reduce poverty and therefore the 
improvement in corporate governance system and practices is considered very necessary. 
Simultaneously the improvement is also considered to be required in the state owiKd 
enterprises which are a significant part of the country economy. The author therefore 
stresses the need for improving the corporate governance both in public sector and 
corporate sector. Sourial (2004) examines and presents an overview of corporate 
governance model of the corporate sector and the securities market of eleven countries in 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) markets out of eighteen. The financial sector 
in MENA region countries is dominated by bank and the securities maricets are still 
underdevebped because of their limited role in economic growth and are still emerging. 
The legislative environment governing the regnnal securities markets are influenced by 
French civil code with attempts to converge to the Anglo-Saxon Common Code 
folk>wing the US and UK models in few countries. The paper recommends taking into 
consideration the culture and traditions while undertaking reforms measures to improve 
corporate governance system in a country. Imposing may lead to resistance to reforms 
with possibility of negative effects. Since banks are more developed compared to the 
securities market they are advised to play more active role in corporate governance. Fox 
& Heller (2000) investigates the issue of corporate governance in Russia post 
privatization which was undertaken in haste, ill-conceived and poorly planned, whkh 
ended up its disinvested privatized enterprises allocating its shares primarily to insiders 
and the resultant problem of poor performance after privatization. The authors 
investigates and analyze the problems in details and argue that what happened in Russia 
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could deliver a lesson or two to other transition countries and forcor^kJratteigc'^H'Snce 
theorist in general. Silveira & Saito (2009) examines comprehensively the state of 
existence of corporate governances and compliance among Brazilian companies. The 
Brazil has two main corporate governance codes- those issued by IBGC in 1999 and 
updated twice with latest in 2004 and CVM released in 2002 with no subsequent updates. 
Both codes are totally voluntary and listed companies are not obliged to adopt any of the 
recommendations, nor even to report their level of compliance with both documents. The 
study therefore finds no public disclosure of information on their level of compliance and 
very few companies publicly disclose their level of compliance with any code. The 
authors however find that the two Brazilian codes of best practices have been helpful in 
educating corporate on the issue of need for good corporate governance practice. The 
study mentions the recent formation of three classes of standards of compliance of CG 
codes: level 1, level 2 and Novo Mercado. Novo Mercado has the most stringent level of 
compliance. The author mentions that given the totally voluntary nature of compliance 
(not even the requirement of'comply or explain') and lack of disctosure the evaluation of 
the corporate governance quality of local Brazilian firms is a challenge. Khan & Ullah 
(2006) analyses the awareness situation among management students in Pakistan and to 
assess the scope for future training and its content for developing the corporate 
governance culture in the business organization of Pakistan. The study finds that 
business graduates are aware of general issues of corporate governance under the heading 
management principles and stakeholders' issues and not directly being educated about 
corporate governance issues. The study advises the management schools to incorporate 
corporate governance in their course outlines or offer separate courses on this crucial 
subjects of the economy. Anand, Milne & Purde (2006) investigates empirically the 
extent to which firms adopt recommended but not required corporate governance 
guidelines by examining the governance practices of approximately 200 Canadian firms 
on the TSX/S&P index for five years. The study establishes that firms voluntarily 
implement suggested domestic best practices as well as U.S. mandatory governance 
practices and that this voluntary behavior is increasing over time. These are indicative of 
firm's need or desire to access capital market in the future. The study however finds the 
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presence of a majority shareholder or executive block holder is negatively associated with 
voluntary adoption. 
2.7: Convergence and Corporate Governance 
Convergence can be summed as the voluntary and slow process through which one code 
resh^es and ultimately comes to resemble over the other over a period of time. The 
research result towards convergence in corporate governance is mixed. On the matter of 
convergence Rickford (2006) posits," Corporate Governance systems have converged to 
a certain degree across Europe, the US and UK. However, there is not a unified move 
towards a single set of global corporate governance standards, but rather convergence on 
selected issues and within regional blocs." Whereas forces in favor of convergence is the 
globalization, the need to raise capital intematbnaily, the efforts of intematk)nal bodies 
like World Bank, OECD, European Union, the forces against it are many. Most of the 
forces against convergence are as a result of histornal evolution of the market, conqmny 
laws, ownership patterns, equity market development, listing rules, board structures and 
governance practices, history and culture of specific countries etc. Pinto (2005) studies 
and reports the effect of gbbalization on the convergence in corporate governance and 
notes that it was the globalization that initially fostered the study of comparative studies 
in corporate governance. The comparative studies in turn raise the issue of whether one 
particular model is better in this globalized environment and whether some form of 
convergence will result. Guillen (1999), contrary to the belief on convergence on Angto-
Saxon pattern, discusses and enumerates the reason for non convergence on some 'best 
practice' in cori)orate governance. The three reasons discussed against convergence in 
corporate governance are: legal, institutional and political. As per the author the corporate 
governance is tightly coupled with legal traditions that are unlikely to change in the near 
future. Further, variety of economic, social and political actors involved in corporate 
governance across countries, makes it hard to envisk)n convergence, because they may 
attempt to shape and oppose changes adverse to their interests. Rose (2006) express doubt 
about recommendation based on one-size-fits-all so called "good governance metrics" 
which has itself little evidential support and thus may have harmful affects on corporate 
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governance. These practice and recommendations may pressure companies to adopt 
homogeneous rules which may not be suited to the company's respective requirements. 
Davies(2001) examines the convergence or divergence of functioning of British one-tier 
board and German two-tier Supervisory board and argues that the reform throughout has 
moved the British one-tier board closer to the two-tier model at a functional level. At the 
level of the functions both British Boards and the German Supervisory Boards are 
committed by relevant rules to monitoring the management of the company. The paper 
however argues that divergence at functional level still continues so far as linkages to 
non-shareholder groups are concerned which is not a significant fiinctions of the British 
Boards. German Supervisory boards however discharges an important function in 
providing linkages to stakeholder groups, notably employees, in addition to its 
monitoring role compromising on the eflfectiveness of the board's monitoring role which 
has been accepted by German law and practice. The author however predict that if the 
structure of the shareholding changed in Germany in such a way that large sharehoklers 
were no longer able to fulfill monitoring role, the German Supervisory boards will have 
to take full charge of monitoring functbns instead of linkages. Arcot & Bruno (2005) 
advocates against convergence on a single model of governance as companies are not a 
homogeneous entity. Mere compliance with the provisions of the Code does not 
necessarily result in better performance and there is no single model of governance which 
can be applied to all types of companies. Khanna, Kogan & Paiepu (2001) finds pairs of 
economically interdependent countries-especially if the countries are both economically 
developed- appear to adopt common corporate governance standards. With data on 
governance in 24 developed countries as well as data on laws protecting shareholders and 
creditors in 49 countries, the study search for evidence that globalization is correlated 
with similarity in corporate governance. The study concludes that globalization may have 
influenced adopting few common governance standards but there is little evidence that 
these standards have been implemented. Coffee Jr. (1999) discusses the issue of 
convergence in corporate governance and note that the two contrasting theories of legal 
hypotheses and political theory yield very little predictions about the likelihood that 
globalization will produce significant convergence in corporate governance. The author 
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examines an alternative and more likely route to significant convergence through the 
foreign issuer to the US securities market, and second through intematbnal 
harmonization of securities regulation and disclosure standards. The author opines that 
convergence in corporate governance however will occur not at the level of corporate 
laws but at the level of securities regulations. The issue of global convergence of 
corporate governance and convergence on the pattern of US model is studied by Branson 
(2000). The author points out that despite of several virtues and the goodness in Anglo-
American Model, like truly independent directors who will confront and remove badly 
performing CEO and having an element of lawsuit brought by activist shareholders, there 
seems remote possibility of global convergence on the pattern of Anglo-American Model 
because of many cultural settings which is as varied as post Confucian in Indonesia to 
feudal value system in India. Moreover many societies reject all or most US or 
westernizing influences. Moreover convergence requires 'one size fits all' which seems 
to be a remote possibility. Wojcik (2004) investigates whether in the world of 
globalizatbn and financial integration, corporate governance arrangements become more 
similar across countries, industries, companies or not. Using a dataset on corporate 
governance ratings of 300 largest European companies from 17 countries provided by 
Deminor Rating SA for the year 2000-2003, the author analyze the convergence issue in 
corporate governance and provide evklence for the same. The study finds evidence of 
convergence within individual countries and industries. The paper also demonstrates that 
the diversity among companies within continental Europe is pronounced with systematic 
differences between countries. The issue and need of a uniform European Corporate 
Governance Code (ECGC) whrch is ejq^ected to increase the integratk)n of the European 
economy and increase the confidence level of investors is discussed by Zafirova (2007). 
The paper takes the view that there is a need of ECGC and it can be expected that the 
need will be answered to in the long run, but based on the report of 2002 Comparative 
Study on behalf of the European Commission, the Report of the High-Level Group of 
Company Law Experts, the European Commission, the ECGC should not be adopted at 
present. Goergen (2007) discusses about the inconclusiveness of any one corporate 
governance model and apprehend if there is any optimal model in any country. The study 
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further highlights lack of comprehensive knowledge of any system or for the matter on 
the alternative model so as to surge forward confidentially. The study further mentk>n 
about lots of efforts that have been taken to make capital market-especially those based in 
Europe more shareholder-oriented but there are little known about the benefits and 
shortcomings of alternative system of corporate governance. The study concludes that it 
woukl be too premature to move in any one particular direction or model. Balgobin 
(2008) investigating 47 companies on the stock exchange of Trinidad and Tobago and 
Jamaica also agrees on the matter of convergence and posits that each country and 
industry is different to such an extent that convergence seems to be a remote possibility. 
But international organization like the OECD and international capital market will 
continue to push for standardizatbn and convergence on board specific issue like its 
structure and conduct are now the subject of growing areas in convergence. In a World 
Bank Policy Research Working P^>er, Fremond and Capaul (2002), review the 
experience of the preparation of IS corporate governance country assessments across five 
continents. The assessment focuses on the rights of sharehoMers, the equitable treatment 
of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and duties of the 
board of listed companies. The study finds that none of the assessed countries comply 
with the OECD Principles in all respects. Yet all countries surveyed have undertaken or 
are currently undertakmg reforms to bring their legal and regulatory frameworks in 
compliance with the OECD Principles. 
2.8: Dominant Shareholder and Corporate Governance 
Dominant shareholder or controlling group helps increase monitoring over the managers 
but side by side it also increases the problems of expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Biswas, 2008) by them. Fundamental issue of governance, because of dominant 
shareholder presence, is examined by Becht, Bolton & Roell (2002) and as per them the 
main question is how to regulate large shareholders so as to obtain the right balance 
between managerial discretion and small shareholder protection. The research finds 
however that while large and active shareholders are controlled and regulated to 
guarantee better small investor protectbn, another problem arises caused by increased 
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managerial discretion and associate misuse (free rider problem). The authors' do not find 
any alternative effective measures till date to cope up with the increased abuse by 
managerial interests. Gelter (2008) examines the effect of dominant groups on 
stakeholder interests and argues that stronger shareholder influence, particularly in the 
case of concentrated ownership, implies a greater risk of expropriatk>n of stakehoklers 
such as empk>yees. Laws aimed at protectbn of stakehoklers (such as codeterminatk)n or 
restrictive employment law) are, therefore, more desirable in the presence of stronger 
shareholder influence, particularly under concentrated ownership. To avoki the hokiup 
problem the author recommends shielding managers against shareholder influence. The 
absence of shareholder influence implies that sharehokier-stakeholder conflicts are 
relatively insignificant, while both providers of capital and labor are equally exposed to 
rent seeking by managers. Enriques & Volpin (2007) examines the corporate governance 
issues that arise in firms with dominant shareholders. The investor protection is the main 
issue. The authors describe four legal tools that can be commonly used to protect 
investors which are: strengthening internal governance mechanisms (board of directors, 
regulations mandating greater independence for directors, setting executive 
compensation, etc), empowering sharehokiers (right to sell, sue, and vote), enhancing 
disclosure requirements (rekted party discbsures, self dealing) and tougher public 
enforcements (corporate and securities Law). The effect of large sharehokiers on 
coiporate profitability for a sample of German and UK firm's IPOs for the period 1981 to 
1988 is examined by Goergen (1997). The study bears special importance as the two 
countries are characterized by different levels of ownership concentratk>n and finds that 
the financial performance of firms does not depend on their ownership pattern. The study 
do not finds any linkage between concentrated stock ho Mings and better performance or 
the expropriation of minority sharehokiers. Edmans and Manso (2008) study 
recommends a novel solution of increased dominant group influence and posit that 
because of increased monitoring governance is strongest under a single large bk>ck hokler 
but it is also associated with abuses. They suggest and demonstrate that a multiple block 
holder structure may be optimal for governance. While splitting a block reduces the 
effectiveness of direct intervention ("vorce"), the paper opines that it increases the power 
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of a second governance mechanism- "exit". By trading on private information, block 
holders move the stock price towards fundamental value, and thus cause it to more 
closely reflect the effort exerted by the managers to enhance firm value. In the Indian 
context RamMohan (2002) writes, "the governance problem in India is not the classical 
Berle and Means problem of dispersed shareholders not being able to control 
management. It is the problem of preventing the expropriatk)n of minority shareholders 
by the controlling shareholders." Hillier & McColgan (2004) examines the implications 
of majority ownership by the firm's board of directors for a sample of 73 UK firms in 
which managers have an ownership stake greater than fifty percent. Based on annual 
reports data fi"om the LSE listed companies from 1992-97, univariate and multivariate 
analysis, the study finds that majority owner-managed companies are less likely to 
remove their CEO or other board members following non-performance. These companies 
empk)y fewer non-executives and outskle directors, are less willing to split the roles of 
the Chairman and CEO and as a result are less likely to comply with the model board 
structure outlined in the Cadbury Report. The result indicates that majority owner-
managed companies outperform with more diffusely held ownership. 
2.9: Corporate Governance and Performance 
The research work dealing with the issue of corporate governance and its effects on 
performance are many. However most of the works deals in isolatbn with single 
parameters of corporate governance instead of their composite effects. The results found 
are mixed with different components of CG. Weir, Laing and McKnight (2001) 
investigating through a sample study of 312 UK Companies finds weak links between 
governance mechanisms recommended by Cadbury over performance. The study 
concludes that external control mechanisms are found to be more effective than internal 
ones. Biswas & Bhuiyan (2008) opines that rather than examining the impact of a 
complete set of governance standard on firm performance, the existing studies mostly 
investigate impact of single governance characteristKS on firm performance which fails 
to capture the total effect and therefore brings misleading results. While agreeing on the 
above, Gill and Jha (2008) indicates that it is not possible to argue definitely that 
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corporate governance mechanism always improves firm performance. As per them the 
other two corporate governance mechanisms-board characteristics and ownership 
structure provide inconsistent result about their relationship with the firm performance. 
Both positive and negative relationship between firm performance and certain board 
characteristics like 'board size' and 'board composition' have been observed. On the 
other hand, the relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration is 
either positive or non-existent. As per Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) however the 
improvement in corporate governance are reflected in higher market valuation. Morey et 
al. (2008) results are in agreement that improvement in corporate governance results in 
significantly higher valuations. The study utilizes a unique data set from 
AllianceBernstein which has monthly firm-level corporate governance ratings for 21 
emerging market countries for almost five years. Using the data set the author examines 
firms, on a time-series basis, the effect on market valuatnns vis-a-vis improvement or 
declination of corporate governance. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna (2008) agrees 
with the findings and suggest that better governance seems to correlate with higher firm 
market value for at least bigger firms. It is the disclosure and shareholder rights aspects of 
governance which are most closely associated with increase in firm market value. 
McKnight, Milonas, Travlos & Weir (2009) findings are in consistent with the view that 
the adoption of strong corporate governance system improves corporate performance in 
the UK context. However the findings are mixed with the effect over performance on the 
parameters like number of non-executive directors, executive director in its committees, 
shares owned by directors, size of the firm, separation of titles of the chairman of the 
board and CEO. The study too finds a positive association between corporate 
performance and the adoption of the Cadbury code of best practice. Corporate 
performance is positively associated with the establishment of audit committee and/or 
remuneration committee and is negatively associated with the presence of a key executive 
director on the committees. There is a negative association between corporate 
performance and the proportion of non-executive directors. But the relation is positive 
between corporate performance and the square of the proportion of non-executive 
directors when performance is measured by excess-Q. Brown & Caylor (2004) finds 
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better governed firms to be relatively more profitable, more valuable paying out more 
cash to their shareholders. The study shows that good governance, as measured using 
executive and director compensation, is most highly associated with good performance. 
In contrast good governance as measured using charter/bylaws is most highly associated 
with bad performance. Maher & Anderson (2000) discusses different corporate 
governance mechanism like concentrated ownership, executive remuneration schemes, 
the market for takeovers, cross sharehokling amongst firms employed by various OECD 
countries to overcome the agency problems and examines whether or not they are 
conducive to firm performance and economic growth. Concentrated ownership reduces 
agency problems and provides better monitoring incentives and lead to better 
performance. But it also leads to the extraction of private benefits by controlling block 
holders at the expense of minority shareholders. Dharmapala & Khanna (2008) analyze, 
with the help of prowess database for a large sample of over 4000 Indian firms, from 
1998-2006 effect of the reforms in Clause 49. The analysis results reveals a large and 
statistically significant positive effect (amounting to over 10% of firm value) of the 
Clause 49 reforms. The estimated effect of the initial announcement of Clause 49 in 1999 
was found to be weaker than the effect of the 2004 sanctk>ns, which underscored the 
importance of sanctions. Black & Khanna (2006) examines whether a package of mostly 
mandatory governance reforms affects firms' market value in India in the backdrop of 
introduction of Clause 49 which was introduced initially for larger firms and only after 
several years it was applied to smaller firms. The larger firms were the treatment group 
and smaller firms provide control group. The study for the purpose utilizes Prowess 
database and found that May 1999 announcement by Indian securities regulators of plans 
to adopt what became clause 49 is accompanied by a 4% increase in the price of large 
firms within two day and 10 % over a period of two week. Mid-sized firms had an 
intermediate reaction. Faster growing firms gained more than other firms which is in 
consistent with the notk)n that firms that need external equity capital is benefitted more 
from governance rules. Cross-listed firms gain more than other firms suggesting that 
local regulations can sometime complement the benefits of cross-listing. Padgett & 
Shabbir (2005) investigated the relationship between a firm compliance with its 
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performance measure both in terms of market driven measures and accounting measures 
of firm performance. The study develops an index for FTSE 350 companies based on the 
level of non-compliance with the UK code of corporate governance and then investigates 
whether compliance is related to both markets based as well as accounting measures of 
firm performance. The results obtained leads to conclusion that there is a clear link 
between compliance and the market driven measures for firm performance, i.e., the total 
Shareholder return (TSR). The increasing compliance leads to increasing total 
shareholder return. No such relationship is found, however, between compliance and the 
accounting measures of firm performance, return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). The result, therefore, suggests that although compliance may not improve a 
firm's operating performance, it does improve investors' perception of the governance of 
companies, which ultimately increases the firm value. Zhou (200S) constructs an 
corporate governance index (CGI, 0-100) to measure the overall corporate governance 
performance of 168 largest firm in Hong Kong market based on factors like rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of (minority) sharehoklers, role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency and board responsibility and compositk)n. The study 
concludes that good corporate governance practkes helps to increase firm value which 
the firm can take advantage in terms of lower capital cost from the market. Clacher, 
Doriye & Hillier (2008) finds nwre explicit corporate governance systems as associated 
with increased firm value and performance, as well as lower cost of capital. The study 
utilizes data set from annual reports of FTSE 100 companies between 2003 and 2005 and 
constructs a CGI. Bassen, Prigge &. Zollner (2008) studies relation between performance 
and single components of broad corporate governance aggregates such as governance 
codes and ratings. The study is unique in the sense that most of the available research is 
confined to U.S., Japan and emerging markets whereas this study enlarges it to German 
corporate governance code. The study is based on a sample of 100 large listed German 
stock corporations (GCGC). For the GCGC at large, all performance measures but 
Tobin's q, is insignificantly associated with code compliance. The study further tests 
those eleven recommendatbns with a compliance rate of 90% or less individually. For 
three of them association with all performance measures is insignificant, four are 
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significantly positively and four are significantly negatively connected with at least one 
performance measure. The study advises the quality checking of GCGC and its different 
components based on the analytical analysis of significantly negative associations of 
GCGC with performance. Gill & Jha (2009) surveys the literature on relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and firm performance and identifies three 
prominent corporate governance mechanisms- board, disclosures and ownership 
structure. The authors find that there is no unanimity among the researchers about the 
effect of these mechanisms on corporate performance. Whereas there is unanimity on the 
positive relationship between disclosure and firm performance, it is inconclusive on the 
relationship between board characteristics and ownership structure over firm 
performance. Pant & Pattanayak (2007) examines the effect of insider equity hokling on 
firm value. The analysis finds that the relatbn between insider shareholding and firm 
value is not linear. Tobin's Q frst increases, then declines and finally raises as ownership 
by insiders rises. When the sharehokling of insiders is very k)w, the entrenchment effect 
is non-operational due to less control over the decision making process of the firm. 
However, once they gain controlling power in the firm, they can entrench themselves or 
pursue non-value maximizing activities. With majority ownership (more than 50%) their 
interest is better aligned with the interest of the firm. Kumar (2003) examines empirically 
the relationship between the ownership structure, corporate governance and dividend 
payout using a large panel of Indian Corporate firms over 1994-2000. Using dividend 
payout and detailed ownership structure of more than 2000 Indian corporate BSE listed 
firms over the period 1994-2000 and data from PROWESS maintained by CMIE, the 
result finds support for the potential association between ownership structure and 
dividend payout policy and the relationship differs across different group of owners and 
at different level of shareholding. Bhattacharyya & Rao (2005) empirically examines the 
impact of the SEBl regulation of Corporate Governance on stock market performance in 
terms of beta standard deviatbn and returns, in the pre-regulatk>n time perk>d (1" June 
1998 to 31" May 1999) in comparison to post regulatwn time period (1* June 2001 to 31" 
May 2002). The study finds that the regulation has been effective in providing more and 
timely information to the investors, who in turn could use the informatbn to determine 
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the appropriate risks of the stoclcs; thereby maximizing the shareholders wealth. Market 
risks of securities were reduced thereby reducing the expected cost of capital of 
companies. Adewuyi & Olowookere (2009) investigates the impact of corporate 
governance on firms' productivity performance in Nigeria, which has just released a new 
code for corporate governance, by utilizing the data for 64 non-financial firms listed 
under the first tier securities market of the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2002 
to 2006. The analysis shows that most firms that do well in their governance issues can 
also be associated with higher productivity level. Component of governance such as 
board size and independence vis-^-vis performance are studied by Dey & Chauhan 
(2009) in four categories of Indian firms namely, PSUs, stand-ak)ne firms, private 
business groups affiliated firms and subsidiary of foreign firms. The study finds larger 
boards to be less effective in Indian firms, except in case of PSUs where it has no effect 
on the firm performance. Board independence is also found to be insignificant, so far as 
performance in all categories of Indian companies are concerned, which goes against the 
normal belief and expectation on the matter of board independence. Bebchuk, Cohen & 
Ferrell (2004) examines the relationship between entrenching provisions and firm 
valuatnn. The six entrenchment provisions have been put together and has been termed 
entrenchment index- four constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of sharehoklers 
from having their way (staggered boards, limits to sharehoklers bylaws amendments, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments), and two takeover readiness provisions that boards put in place to be ready 
for a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes). The study finds negative link 
between increase in entrenchment index and firm valuation. The study further finds 
higher levels of the entrenchment index to be associated with large negative abnormal 
returns during the period of 1990-2003. Sapovadia & Rehman (2007) emphasizes about 
the usefulness of good corporate governance which increases value of average 
shareholders and in the long term creating value for society in terms of prosperity for it 
and to the nation. Good corporate governance is an important step in building market 
confidence encouraging more stable, long term domestic and international investment 
flows. Bruno and Classens (2006) investigates the impact of company corporate 
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governance practices on company performance using large samples of 5300 US 
companies and 2400 non-US companies from 22 advanced economies for the period 
2003-05. The study confirms that corporate governance practices play a crucial role in 
efficient company functioning and shareholder protection and therefore positively impact 
valuation. For large company and those companies who needs and relies on external 
financing, the corporate governance is more valuable. Yen (2005) investigates through 
empirical analysis whether the well governed firm yield greater return and that the 
investment in a well governed firm is less risky and concludes that well governed firms 
are riskier than badly governed firms and that a well governed firm do not yieki abnormal 
returns. The findings contrast the popular feelings about good governance. Deb & 
Chaturvedula (2003) investigate the relatbnship between ov^ership structure and value 
in Indian firms and finds that at a certain range of insider ownership Indian managers get 
entrenched and firm value gets affected. Beyond the range convergence of interest 
however occurs and firm value increases. Biswas (2008) while dealing with the issue of 
corporate governance note that the agency problem are the natural outcome of a listed 
corporation and the corporate governance is the most wkiely known mechanism to deal 
with the issue. There are several mechanisms available but none of them can be called the 
most effective while dealing with the issue of agency problem. The author discusses 
several internal and external corporate governance mechanisms such as board of 
directors, board committees, ownership concentration, monitoring by banks, managerial 
compensation, dividend payment, market for corporate control and managerial labour 
market. The author flirther cautk>ns that corporate governance differs in countries and 
depends upon the existing legal structure in a country. Blind adoption of any system 
disregarding the legal structure and practke may not be effective. Black & Khanna 
(2006) finds in Indian context disclosure and shareholder rights aspects of governance to 
be the most closely associated with increases in firm market value. Claessens (2003) 
describes why more attention is being paid to corporate governance and posits that abng 
with the general benefit of growth, employment, poverty, and well-being, the corporate 
governance brings in increased access to financing, higher firm valuation, better 
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operatjona] performance, reduced risk of financial crises, better relation with other 
stakeholders. 
2.10: Audit Committee, Accounting and Corporate Governance 
Most of the research in Indian context on Audit & Accounting observes Indian standards 
to review in the light of new development and international practkes. On global scale 
there is mixed result of Audit Committee structural components over company 
performance. Shankaraiah & Rao (2004) fmd that Indian accounting standards are 
inadequate and are in infancy stage which results in the disclosure being ineffective. With 
ineffective disclosure the country cannot be valued accurately. Infancy stage of 
accounting standards gives rise to personal discretion and advises the gaps between 
Indian and International Accounting Standards to narrow down, the variety of approaches 
in each accounting standards to be kept limited and all accounting standards to be made 
mandatory in order to be trusted by Indian investors on corporate governance. Sapovadia 
(2007) discusses and compares the Accounting Standards (issued by ICAI) of India and 
the corresponding International Accounting standards and also suggests accounting 
standards to be reviewed in the light of new development and international practices and 
to harmonize with international standards and narrow the choice of alternative accounting 
practices to make fair discbsure of accounting and financial information. Bhattacharyya 
(1998) discusses in the Indian context the role and importance of the accounting 
profession which play a critical role in corporate governance through their attesting 
functions and urges ICAI to speed up the process of revising accounting standards along 
with such issues as educating the users of audited statements and strengthen disciplinary 
mechanism. Song & Windram (2000) examines audit committee effectiveness using post 
Cadbury cases by investigating following governance factors: board size, board 
composition and directors' share hokiing. Audit Committee meeting frequency, financial 
literacy and other directorship by audit committee members. The study finds financial 
literacy to be an important determinant of audit committee effectiveness. Low meeting 
fi^ quency and outskie directorship, as the authors suggest, can undermine audit 
committee effectiveness. The study finds a link between board size and financial 
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reporting. Increasing director's shareholding was not suggested as they did not increase 
incentive for effective monitoring of financial reporting. Tumbull (2004:1) argues that 
there are compelling reason to conclude that convergence of audit practices on those 
found currently in the US or UK are not in the best interest of directors or auditors in 
reducing their conflicts or the proprietary rights of shareholder for self governance. The 
establishment of an audit committee with independent directors cannot remove the 
conflicts. By not establishing a shareholder audit committee as provided in the model 
constitution of the UK 1862 Companies Act, author charge that the current audit practices 
based on oversight of audit by Audit committee as provisioned in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
or Combined Code has been muddled. Felo, Krishnamurthy & Solieri (2003) empirically 
examines the relationship between two audit committees' characteristics- the composition 
(expertise and independence) and size of audit committee and the quality of financial 
reporting. The study finds that the percentage of audit conunittee members having 
e^ qsertise in accounting or financial management positively linked to financial reporting 
quality. The study also finds some evidence of a positive relatbnship between the size of 
audit committee and financial reporting quality. The resuh suggests mandating greater 
expertise on audit committee rather than simply requiring one expert on audit conunittee. 
The result also provides weak support for the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee that firms devote significant directorial resources to the audit committee. 
Tumbull (2004:2) takes the view that the audit committees have not worked and cannot 
be relied to protect investors. The study review historical origin of Audit Committee and 
highlights the fundamental flaws in its concept of formation. The author suggests that 
unless the audit committee becomes a separate board elected by investors on a 
democratic rather than a plutocratic basis it cannot act as a protector of investors. 
Krishnan & Visvanathan (2005) examines the Audit committee attributes which are 
relevant in addressing the internal control deficiencies in post SOX period. Pre Sox 
period found audit committee composition to be significantly associated with internal 
control deficiencies. The study finds firms that report internal control deficiencies have 
lesser proportion of 'financial experts" as defined in SOX. Greater audit committee 
activity in terms of the number of meetings rather than composition of the audit 
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committee was suggested to be relevant in timely reporting of internal control 
deficiencies. Zhang, Zhou & Zhou (2006) investigates the determinants of internal 
control weaknesses in the post SOX era by comparing a sample of firms with iitfemal 
control Weaknesses with a matched sample of control firms without internal control 
weaknesses with respect to audit committee quality, auditor independence and the 
disclosure of internal control weaknesses. The study confirms that a relation exist 
between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. 
Firms were more likely to be kientifled with an internal control weakness, if their audit 
committees had lesser financial expertise or more specifically had lesser accounting 
financial expertise, if their auditors were more independent, firms had undergone recent 
auditor changes. Agarwal & Cooper (2007) examine the effect on the auditor and 
management turnover of a company after an accounting scandal. The study utilizes a 
sample of 518 US public companies that announced eaming-decreasing statement during 
the 1997-2002 periods and a matched sample of control firms. The study finds strong 
evklence of greater turnover of CEOs, CFOs, top management than control firms. After 
accounting scandals the firms were found to have evidence of effective functioning of 
internal governance mechanism. Cohen, KrishnaiTK>oTthy & Wright (2007) invest^ates, 
through a semi structured interview of 30 audit managers and partners from three of Big 
four firms as their respondent, the Auditors experience post SOX whkh e^ qsanded the 
Management responsibility. Auditors and Audit conunittees. The authors find Audit 
Conunittees are substantially more active, diligent and knowledgeable and powerful. The 
study further fmds management being continued to be seen as a major corporate 
governance actor and the driving force behind auditor appointments and terminatk>ns. 
The study finds CEO and CFO certification requirement by SOX very influencing on the 
financial reporting process. Dionne & Triki (200S) study researches the effect of the 
board and the audit committee independence and financial knowledge on the firm's risk 
management activity. The work is motivated by the new regulatnn set by the SOX (audit 
committee entirely composed of independent members and at least one member who is 
financially knowledgeable ) and four requirements set by the NYSE (majority of 
independent directors on the board, audit committee with a minimum of three members. 
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each member of the audit committees must have accounting icnowledge). The study finds 
the audit committee size and independence beneficial to shareholders, although 
maintaining a majority of unrelated directors in the board and a director with an 
accounting background on the audit committee may not be necessary. Financially 
educated directors were seemed to encourage corporate hedging while fmancially active 
directors and those with an accounting background played no active role in such policy. 
This suggested that financially active directors and those with an accounting background 
played no active role in such policy. Zaman, M. (2004) seeks to evaluate the nature and 
extent of available empirical evidence of the governance impact of Audit Committees 
(ACs) and their effect on audit functions, financial reporting quality and on corporate 
performance. The author argues that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects 
in support of value of the audit committee toward governance. While some evidence of 
beneficial effects has been established, on many areas the findings thus far are either 
inconclusive or very limited. The study finds greater standardizatbn around such factors 
as AC member independence and expertise. The author however express apprehensions 
over greater standardizations may not deliver guaranteed governance contributbns. 
Shankaraiah, K. & Rao, D.N. (2002) maintains that standards reduce discretion, 
discrepancies and distortions and enhance the degree of transparency in sharing the 
information with the stakeholders. A country cannot hope to tap the GDR market with 
inadequate financial disclosures. Based on data fi'om annual reports for the year 2001-02 
of ten top Oman companies in terms of assets, the study finds that most of the selected 
companies complied with twenty to twenty-five accounting standards with varied 
treatment of the items which jeopardizes the comparability and left the scope of personal 
discretk)n and confusion. The study suggests that the variety of approaches in each 
accounting standards are to be limited and all accounting standards have to be made 
mandatory. Hoitash, Hoitash & Bedard (2005), examines the association of audit fees 
with internal control problems disclosed by public companies under the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act during the initial period of SOX implementatbn. The study found 
that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varied by problem 
severity, when severity was measured either as material weaknesses vs. significant 
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deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also while audit fees increased during the 404 
period, the tests showed relatively less risk adjustment under Section 404 period than 
under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, the author 
found that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continued 
to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems were disclosed under Section 
404. 
2.11: Disclosure and Corporate Governance 
A Company disclosure comprises of risk disclosure, financial disclosure and disclosure 
on its CG structures. All these disclosure improves informatk)n flow between companies 
and their shareholders and reduces information asymmetry. Alam (2007) researches over 
the extent of financial disck>sure of firms with a particular emphasis on devebping 
countries located in the region of South Asia and the Bangladesh has been taken as a 
country of reference. The study takes the help of three level of firms; level-1-listed and 
publicly traded firms, level-2- private limited companies but not listed and government 
entities and level-3- owner managed small and medium level firms. The study finds 
Level-1 companies disclose more as compared to all other types of enterprises and firms. 
The worst situation prevails in the government entities-the public sector enterprises. 
Labelle (2002) study finds that except for size and to a lesser extent ownership structure, 
there is no consistent and significant relations between discbsure quality of governance 
practices and firm performances or other corporate governance variables such as the 
proportion of unrelated director, the CEO's plurality of offices and the level of financing 
activity. Nasir and Abdullah (2004) examines the annual reports of healthy and distressed 
financial firms for the years 2000 and 2001 and analyses the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and its different corporate governance variables. The study finds 
financially distressed firms had lower voluntary disclosure then matched healthy firms. 
Board independence was found to have significant influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Audit committee is not associated with voluntary disclosures. Outskle 
ownership is positively and significantly associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The extent of government-linked enterprises shareholding influences the 
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amount of voluntary disclosure. The extent of executive director's shareholding also has 
a positive influence to the voluntary disclosure level. Non executive directors' interest 
and the separation of CEO roles from board chairman are not associated with voluntary 
disclosures. Webb, Cohen, Nath & Wood (2007) examines a sample of 50 US firms 
excluding financial service company, investment funds and trusts for their disclosure 
patterns for the year 2004, The study observes a high degree of variability in the 
presentations and choice of reporting formats. As compared to larger firms, the smaller 
firms offered fewer disclosures on the matter of independence, board selection procedure 
and oversight of management (including whistle-blowing procedures). Lesser 
Independent boards offered fewer disclosures on independence and management 
oversight matters. Larger firms provided more disclosures on independence, board 
selection procedures, audit committee matters, management control systems, committee 
matters and whistle-blowing procedures. However on the whole larger companies do not 
appeared to disclose greater than smaller firms. Berglof & Pajuste (2005) document the 
extent to which rules and regulation relating to corporate governance disclosure is being 
implemented and enforced in individual corporations in Central and Eastern Europe by 
utilizing annual report data. The study finds that the level of disclosure varies across 
firms and there is a strong country effect in the deviations between the actual and 
required disclosure. Larger firms and firms with less leverage, firms with higher cash 
balance, and with slower growth disclose more. Surprisingly dependence on external 
capital does not encourage firms to disclose more. Lithuanian and Polish companies 
disclose less in their annual reports, while Czech and Estonian companies disclose more 
than is legally required. What is discbsed depends on the legal framework and practice in 
a given country, and does not depend upon firm's financial performance. Nowak, Rott & 
Mahr (2006) examines the effect of announcement of declaring compliance with the 
German Corporate Governance Code 2002 by German listed companies under sectk)n 
161 of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz). The study which is based on the hand 
collected data set from 317 German listed companies' for the year 2002-05 finds the 
result in contrast with the general belief that there will be positive reaction with the 
declaration of conformity with the disctosure arrangement. The study observed that 
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neither higher levels of Code compliance nor inq>rovennents in governance quality have a 
positive impact on stock price performance as compared with low level or even reductbn 
in the levels of compliance. The study, therefore, shows the irrelevance of discbsure in 
German stock market. Sayogo (2006) aims to identify and examine empirically the 
determinants that will influence the utilization of Internet to disclose information through 
internet for a sample of companies listed on J^arta stock exchange for the year 2004. 
The study utilizes statistical tools like multiple regressk>n, chi-square and Kruskal-Wallis 
and finds that the utilizatbn of internet is relevant in enhancing informatk>n transparency. 
Company size, profitability, independent board composition and stock distributk)n were 
found to have relationship with corporate governance disclosure index. Bhuiyan & 
Biswas (2007) examine the actual corporate governance practbe in the listed public 
limited companies among Bangladesh. The study takes a random sample of ISS listed 
Public Limited Companies (PLCs) and consklers 45 disclosure items. The study finds 
significant difference between CGDIs of varbus sectors. Financial sectors have been 
found to make more intensive corporate governance disclosure than non-financial sector. 
Companies, in general, disclose more financial disclosure than non-financial discbsure. 
Multiple regressbns show that corporate governance discbsure index is significantly 
influenced (at 5% level of significance) by bcal ownership, the SEC notificatbn and the 
size of the company. The factors like being financial or non-financial institution, age, 
multinatbnal company, size of the board of directors are not found to have any 
significant impact on corporate governance disclosure. Sharma & Singh (2009) studies 
the voluntary corporate governance practices of the Indian companies which are over and 
above the mandatory requirements as per Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. Based on 
extensive study of the annual reports a voluntary corporate governance discbsure index 
has been prepared consisting of 40 items. The study of voluntary behavior has been 
applied on 50 companies from four industries. The companies were found to folbw less 
than 50% of the items of voluntary corporate governance disclosure index. The study 
note that few of the items of the index like risk management, whistle blowing policy and 
code of conduct for directors and senbr management personnel have become part of the 
revised Clause 49 from 2005-06. The study advises to extend the scope for rest of the 
74 
index so that Indian corporate governance could be raised to world standards. Fong & 
Shek (2009) investigates the relationship between corporate governance disclosure and 
financial performance of both Hong Kong-based and China-based family-controlled 
property development companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The study 
finds positive relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance, especially 
operating profit margin and net profit margin in Hong Kong-based companies. 
Subramanian (2006) examines the differences in the discbsure levels of Indian 
companies by considering management control as a critical factor. The study categorizes 
Indian companies based on management control as PSUs, Private sector companies and 
the subsidiary of Multinational companies (N/TNCs). The study computes disclosure levels 
by Standard and Poor's Transparency and Disclosure index methodok)gies. The result 
indicates no significant difference between the disclosure levels of PSUs and Private 
companies. However the disclosure levels of MNCs in the Financial Transparency and 
Informatk)n Discbsure categories are evidently lower than that of the other companies. 
Stanton, P., & D. Huddar (2003) examines and compares the influence of culture on 
disclosure practices between India and Australia for a sample of 28 companies, 14 nos. 
from each country, from the top SO companies according to market c{q>italizatk>n fix)m 
annual report data for the year 199S-%.Disclosures made in the annual reports were 
analyzed using content analysis, which does not provkle any evidence of the quality of 
these disclosures. Overall, the study found wide differences in social reporting between 
the two countries. There is a lack of uniformity in discbsure by companies, and a bias 
toward positive aspects of a company's social performance. Australia and India scored 
differently on the cultural dimensk)ns of 'individualism' and 'power distance', and the 
modified dimensions of 'professionalism' and 'secrecy'. Australia, with low power 
distance and high individualism categories, was predicted to discbse more information, 
and to do so voluntarily. Professionalism, exemplified by independent attitudes and a 
predisposition to exercise judgments, was another dimension on which Australia was 
ranked highly, with the implication that Australian companies would disclose more social 
information. These predictions were confirmed by the results, India, on the other hand is 
characterized as high power, collective society, heavily influenced by statutory control 
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and secrecy. Indian companies, it was suggested, would disclose little information not 
required by law. This result, also, was confirmed. Bhattacharyya (2004) examines 
financial reporting practices in the context of changes in economic and regulatory 
environment in India and note that with the induction of independent directors, the 
formation of audit committee, flow of international finance into Indian companies, 
amendments incorporated into the Companies Act from 1999 to 2000, inclusion of 
Director Responsibility Statement (DRS) and others will have a positive impact on the 
quality of financial reporting by Indian companies. The author argues that the pre-reform 
era was plagued by poor disclosure of fmancial reporting mainly because of smaller 
public holdings and the situation can be gauged from the fact that until 1999, Companies 
Act made no reference to 'accounting standards' and it was the changing information 
needs of the new generation of investors and international finance provider that 
pressurized the Government to incorporate the need for accounting standards in the 
Companies Act. The literature further attributes the little or no incentive for proper 
transparency and discbsure because the Indian companies are still dominated by 
promoters who make extensive use of cross-holding to retain control. Thus the author 
argue that there will be two class of companies based on financial reporting practices, one 
top-rung companies benchmarking their financial reporting practices with intematbnal 
standards, while a second category whose shares are not frequently traded and will 
attempt to circumvent the new regulations. Increased regulatory activities are therefore 
suggested. The author however cautions that there will be dearth of right individual to 
man the audit committee for which training of potential directors is required to create a 
pool of individuals who will be available to act as independent directors. The Disclosure 
of information also includes timely disclosure of information as the disclosure delayed is 
also meant as having less disck)sure. McGee (2007) investigates the timely disclosure of 
Russian energy sector companies along with non-Russian energy sector companies for 
the same period of time. The timeliness of financial reporting in the Russian energy 
sector was measured by counting the number of days that elapsed between year-end smd 
the date of the independent auditor's report. The study found that Russian companies 
took significantly more time to report financial results than did the non-Russian 
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companies. The author attributes the cause to the culture of former comrhtmtst-eotiTttries 
in not disclosing information. United Nations publication document (2006) on the 
disclosure practices (Financial and Non Financials) intends to assist enterprises in the 
international disclosure practices to be followed irrespective of its legal forms and sizes. 
The documents draws upon recommendations for disclosure from internationally 
recognized documents such as the revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(OECD Principles), the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance Guidelines (CACG Guidelines), 
the pronouncements of the European Association of Securities Dealers (EASD), the EU 
Transparency Directive, the King II Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 
the Report of the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Report), the Combined Code of the UK, the United States Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
and many others. The document signifies the efforts of the world community towards 
convergence of corporate governance disclosure practices and corporate governance 
practices in general. 
2.12: CG Codes: Relevance, Irrelevance, evolution, compliances within and 
beyond 
Codes are voluntary guidelines with different levels of enforcements depending on the 
country where they are issued. Generally codes are developed in order to improve the 
country's corporate governance system to promote investment and growth. The first code 
of good governance came into being in the United States in the late 1970s Thereafter in 
1989 the Hong Kong Stock Exchange became the second issuer. The corporate 
governance codes grew rapidly after Cadbury Codes of best practice in UK in 1992 
which later became the flagship guidelines in corporate governance codes. Cuervo-
Cazurra & Aguilera (2003) .The corporate governance code has been defined as, " a non-
binding set of principles, standards or best practices, issued by a collective body and 
relating to the internal governance of corporations", Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 
(2002). Kumar (2008) analyzes the compliance of Corporate Governance standards 
which is beyond the statutory in the 30 BSE listed firms. The paper looks into details of 
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modern and critical governance parameters and finds that by and large, even big 
companies in India do not consider governance from a strategic point of view when 
analyzed from the listed parameters with the exception of new generation companies and 
of technology sectors. A majority are concerned about conformance and compliance to 
the regulatory framework rather than looking at it from strategic perspectives or with an 
intention to k)ok beyond what is statutory. The paper further finds our mandatory 
requirements not up to the marks as compared to other system. The author further put 
question marks on the corporate governance practices of old and well known reputed 
business groups of India. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna (2006) study 
comprehensively the compliances of broad arrays of parameters of corporate governance 
and identify area where Indian Corporate Governance is relatively strong and weak and 
areas where regulatk>n might be relaxed or strengthened. The study is based on a survey 
of 506 Indian fu-ms with detailed fifteen page corporate governance questk)nnaire 
conducted during early 2006. Overall, the results suggest that compliance with India's 
governance rules amongst the responding firms is fairly good, with room for 
improvement. Better governance is correlated with higher firm market value for at least 
bigger firms. Strengthening in the area of related party transactbn is required. The paper 
further recommends some relaxations for smaller companies. Gupta & Parua (2006) find 
out the degree of compliance of the Clause 49 codes by private sector Indian companies 
listed in BSE with the help of CG report of 2004-05 of 1245 companies. 21 codes (19 
mandatory and 2 non-mandatory) have been selected for the study. The study tested 
compliance rates of individual companies. Thereafter mean compliance rates taking into 
account all the companies and the variation among the companies from the mean 
compliance rate have also been tested. The study finds that the average compliance rates 
of the CG codes is satisfactory. However there is cautious note that the corporate 
governance practnes is far from compliance with the form and it is the spirit of 
compliance which matters. Arcot & Bruno (2005), through hand collecting of 
information from corporate governance reports included in the Annual Reports of 245 
non-financial companies of FTSE 350 index for the perk>d 1998 to 2004, studies whether 
UK companies have genuinely embraced the spirit of the Combined Code which is based 
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on "Comply and Explain". The study finds that on the whole the code seems to be 
working effectively in encouraging compliance from 10% in 1998-99 to 56% in 2003-04. 
On an average 17% of non-compliance goes unanswered. 51% of the explanations 
provided are standards and uninformative which gives a feeling of mechanical "tick-box" 
approach rather than compliance in the spirit of the code. Shabbir (2008) investigates the 
compliance practice among a panel of firms fi'om FTSE 350 companies in UK and more 
specifically the change in their compliance practrce over time. The study finds that firms 
become more compliant when their prior period stock market performance declines and 
become more compliant when their performance improves. The mergers and acquisitions 
tend to decrease compliance whereas reorganization/restructuring tends to increase 
compliance. The author advises investor to look for inconsistency rather than the result of 
one or two year. Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004) examines development, adoptk>n 
and diffusbn of codes for corporate governance codes of 49 countries and apprise that 
these codes serve to compensate for deficiencies in the legal system covering 
shareholders' rights. The study finds size of capital markets, degree of government 
intervention and percentage of foreign investors in the stock market as the predators of 
existence of codes of corporate governance. Country openness has no significant effect. 
Data analysis supports the argument that both efficiency needs and legimitatk>n pressure 
leads to code adoptnn. The empirical results show that countries with strong shareholder 
protection rights tend to be more prone to develop codes possibly for efficiency reasons. 
The study discovers that from 1978 to 1987 only four codes were devebped all in USA, 
Further 1988 is the milestone year after which there is a rapid growth in codes and the 
number of countries issuing codes. Dent Jr. (2005) points out that despite repeated waves 
of reform corporate governance still suffers from the same basic problem identified by 
Berle and Means in the 1930s- the separatk>n of ownership from control. New designs 
and changes are introduced continuously but still no common and stable framework for 
good corporate governance has surfaced. The author offers a means of solving the 
problem by formation of a shareholder committee comprised of a company's largest 
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shareholder who will align the investor's goal with that of management. Coombes & 
Wong (2004) takes a critical took at the pros and cons of corporate governance codes 
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which are voluntary in nature and has become almost universal as 50 countries have CG 
codes as on date. The codes have been found effective but the authors warns of current 
developments over adding of more details or broadening of their scope, overemphasis on 
'complying' rather than 'explaining' and progressive convergence code leading to one-
size-fits all approach may jeopardize their use. Chhaochharia & Laeven (2008) study 
finds that market rewards companies in terms of higher valuations to those companies 
that are prepared to adopt above average governance attributes and beyond those required 
by laws and common corporate practices in their home country. The study further reveals 
that, despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at firm level, there 
are many companies who choose to adopt governance provisions beyond what can be 
considered the norm in the country. Firms that choose not to adopt sound governance 
mechanisms tend to have higher concentrated ownership and sizable free cash flow. 
2.13: Remuneration/compensation and Corporate Governance 
Executive compensation is one area which is being frequently cited as being necessary to 
defend the interests of shareholders. The relation between top executive compensation 
and board composition has been studied empirically by Lambert et. al. (1993) and Boyd 
(1994) who has found a positive relatbn between CEO compensation and percentage of 
board composed of outside directors. Hall & Liebman (1997) have linked the executive 
compensation to firm's performance. Using a 15 year panel data set of CEO's of large 
US firms and using a variety of pay to performance measures and a broad measure of 
CEO compensation that included CEO's stock holdings and stock optk)ns they found a 
very high correlation between CEO compensation and a firm's performance. Hallock 
(1997) by considering interlocking board of directors provided explanation for rise in 
CEO compensation. He found that CEO pay increase when a board contains interlocking 
directors, who are more likely to be influenced by the CEO. He opined that CEO pay 
increase when a board contains interlocking directors, who are more likely to be 
influenced by the CEO. If two CEOs or their subordinates serve on each other' boards 
(they are reciprocally inter kicked), then these CEOs may have both the incentive and the 
opportunity to raise each other's pay. Parthsarthy, Bhattacharjee & Menon (2006) works 
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adds to the empirical literature on the determinants of executive compensation in Indian 
Firms and establishes the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm 
performance and various corporate governance parameters by studying a large sample of 
Indian Companies. The study finds firm size is a significant variable in explaining both 
total CEO pay and the proportion of variable or incentive pay that a CEO receives. The 
CEOs who are promoters or owners receive higher compensation and with a greater 
incentive component when compared to other CEOs. This study also finds evidence for 
the fact that CEOs of PSUs are significantly underpaid when compared to their 
counterparts in other firms. Boumosieh (2006) examines the effect of director 
compensation and board efTectiveness. The major finding of the study is that stock option 
for outside directors improve board decision making because it aligns the interests of 
shareholders and directors. In fact stock option for outside directors become more 
involved in corporate decisions and associates themselves with greater monitoring of 
financial information, increased monitoring of management and riskier investment plan. 
Jensen, Murphy & Wruck (2004) report provide history, analysis and over three dozen 
recommendations for reforming the system surrounding executive compensation. While 
citing the case of legendry General Electrk CEO Jack Welch the paper notes that the 
issue of proper disclosure of remuneration is a key one. Interspersed throughout this 
report are recommendatbns and guidelines for improving both the governance and 
design of executive remuneration policies, processes, and practices. The author has not 
attempted to design an optimal remuneratbn policy since such a policy must be specific 
to each organization taking into account its kibsyncrasies and the specific competitive 
and organizational strategies, culture and the laws and regulatory conditk)ns. Fernandes 
(2005) examines the relationship between board structures especially the non-executive 
directors, remuneration and firm performance in Portuguese settings and the results 
obtained were mixed. No relatbnship between board remuneration and firm performance 
were observed. Firms with more non-executive board members were found to pay higher 
wages to their executives. 
81 
2.14: Literatures on Survey of Corporate Governance 
The literatures on Survey of literatures on corporate governance are growing. Whereas 
much research has been observed in the backdrop of USA, there is little in the Indian 
context. Farinha (2003) surveys the available theoretical and empirical literature on the 
corporate governance and studies the effectiveness of the set of available external and 
internal disciplining mechanism that firm may face in their efforts to reduce the 
underlying agency costs, their limitation and applicability for individual firms. The study 
finds that the residual agency costs are significant and there are internal and external 
mechanisms for their controlling. Internal mechanism includes composition of board of 
directors, insider ownership, large shareholders, compensation packages and financial 
polices in dividends and debts. External disciplining devices include takeover threats, 
managerial labour market, mutual monitoring by managers, reputation, competition in 
product-&ctor markets and financial analysts. These monitoring devices carry benefits 
but cost as well and not unlimited in their effectiveness. Moreover their marginal benefits 
and costs are likely to vary across firms and industries, making it likely that firms may 
choose different mixes according to their own characteristics. Shieifer & Vishny (1996) 
surveys corporate governance system around the workl with emphasis on separation of 
financing and management of firms, importance of legal protection on investors and of 
ownership concentration in corporate governance around the world. The survey finds that 
most of the empirical literatures on corporate governance come from the United States. 
There has been great surge of work on Japan, and to a lesser extent on Germany, Italy 
and Sweden. There is little systematic research on Russia corporate governance except 
recent literatures on experience of privatized firms in Russia. Except for countries 
mentioned, the paper finds extremely little research on corporate governance around the 
world. Two generations of existing international corporate governance research has been 
reviewed by Denis & McConnell (2003). The first generation of research examines 
governance mechanisms that have been studied in the US and one or more non-US 
countries and is broadly related to board compositk>n and owriership structure and 
examines individual countries in depth and establishes that there are important 
differences in governance system across economies. Second generation of research 
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examines many countries in a unified framework and considers the possible impact of 
differing legal systems on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance and 
compares systems across countries. An important insight generated from the second 
generation research is that a country's legal system - in particular, the extent to which it 
protects investor rights- has a fundamental effect on the structure of the markets in that 
country, and on the effectiveness of those governance systems. The study is of the view 
that issues such as board structure, compensation and changes in control have been 
extensively studied in the US but much less have been studied for many other world 
economies. Claessens & Fan (2003) review the literature on corporate governance issues 
in Asia especially related to ownership concentratbn in detail and its probable reasons 
and confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia, allowing controlling 
shareholders to expropriate minority sharehoklers. Low corporate transparency, rent 
seeking and relatbnship based transactions, extensive group structures and 
diversifications, risky financial structures which enhances the agency problems. 
Controlling shareholders bear some of the agency costs in the form of share prke 
discounts and expenditure on monitoring, bonding and reputatbn building. Michaud & 
Magaram (2006) paper is based on research conducted by the author over the 200 papers, 
draft and pre-published papers, posted by SSRN during the year 2004. The authors 
segregates and clubs all the articles in four categories: (l)the role of board in addressing 
the corporate governance crisis (2) the relatk)nship of executive and director 
compensation and corporate governance (3) the effect of governance indices on firm 
performance, and (4) the market for corporate control. Empirical Research were classed 
into Type I papers. Type 11 papers were classed as those who were based on prk)r 
research rather than new empirical research. The study note that while many of the Type-
I (based on empirical research) articles provide answers to individual corporate 
governance factors (or set of factors), they address only partial elements of a multivariate 
equation rather than an organic whole which cannot offer a unified solutk>n and 
strengthen corporate governance. Gillan (2005) provides an overview of recent corporate 
governance research and splits the recent works into two broad classifications- Internal 
Governance and External Governance. Subramanian & Swaminathan (2008) surveys the 
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literature on corporate governance in Indian context and has been classified into five 
categories: corporate governance system in India; ownership/capital structure and 
corporate governance; institutional investors and corporate governance; board 
characteristics and firm performance; and executive compensation. The study finds that 
there is a consensus among researchers on Indian corporate governance model moving 
towards the Anglo American Model. The author finds several research gaps where the 
future research in Indian context can be undertaken such as: CG practice in Banks, PSEs, 
role played by institutional investors, effect of cross directorship on the firm's 
performance etc. 
2.15: Family Managed Companies and Corporate Governance 
Literature on corporate governance practk;es in family businesses (FB) is of particular 
importance and relevance in the Indian context because of dominance of family 
controlled firms forming a majority. Even largest corporate are run like family controlled 
business. But very little empirical research is available on family business corporate 
governance practices in Indian context. Compared to a widely held firm a family 
managed business can be better managed but may not always be better governed. Family 
controlled firm does help to protect shareholders interest against managerial abuse, since 
the controlling owner and the manger are often the same person. However families, like 
managers in a widely held company, can abuse their power and use corporate resources 
to their own advantage. When this happens in a family-controlled firm, things are even 
worse than in a widely held company, because controlling families cannot be ousted 
through a hostile takeover or replaced by the board of directors or by the shareholders' 
meeting. (Enriques & Volpin (2007). The paper by O'Sulivan M., & Koutsoukis A. 
(2008) titled "The Life Cycle of UK Family Businesses' reports about the UK family 
business and discuss the major issue that affect them. The paper apprises that in the UK, 
large-scale family businesses are nwre unusual, though they remain a driver of the 
economy at the smaller-business level. Such businesses are prevalent widely among 
ethnic-minority led class and most of them are situated outside London and concentrated 
in areas like Scotland. Women play an increasingly important role in entrepreneurship 
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and family business in UK. The issues of governance and matters like strategy, 
succession are discussed outside management. The paper argues that prevalence of family 
ownership among listed companies in the UK is a sign of maturity rather than weakness. 
The study of Berghe, Lutgart & Carchon (2002) explores the relationships between 
ownership structure, board and management practices and find out where Flemish family 
businesses differ from non-family businesses (NFB). The study is in Belgian context and 
the authors note that different family ownership structure, different family generations 
influence the governance structure installed. The study conclude that since FB constitute 
a substantia] proportion of business in many countries the corporate governance in family 
business are and should be an important area for future research. Franks, Mayer, Volpin 
& Wagner (2008) analyses, through empirical study, in historical perspectives, how does 
the ownership structure of firms of France, Germany, Italy and the UK differ based on 
comparison of the data for the year 1996 with 2006. The study finds that family firms 
have become significantly less important in France and Germany, while there were little 
changes in Italy and the UK. The results found are consistent with the role of femilies in 
an outsider versus insider system. In the latter the family retains control over generations 
in order to capture private benefits of control. In the former family firms qukkly evolve 
into widely held companies. The study finds that during 1996 the UK resembles an 
outsider system whereas the other three countries resemble an insider system. However, 
over the subsequent decade France and Germany showed significant increases in the 
proportion of widely held companies and a decline in family owned firms. The authors 
attribute this trend in part to those countries evolving into outskier system. Kumar & 
Narayanan (2006) discusses the issues of corporate governance practices in Indian 
family-managed companies while citing the recent episodes in Reliance group over the 
ownership issues between the two brothers. The paper take note that while devebped 
countries like USA, UK have been successful in delineating the ownership from 
management, the scenario in India is not encouraging. The promoters still are actively 
involved in the day to day management for private benefit of control and run the 
enterprise as their private property even when their holding is low in comparison with 
outside holding. Bhattacharyya (2005) discusses the role and responsibility of FMC 
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business and argues that board of directors have a greater roles and responsibility in 
family managed companies than in widely held companies because of the unique 
situations prevailing in there. It has to be sensitive to family aspirations especially of the 
entrepreneurship of the younger managers of the family but at the same time provide 
required checks and balances ensuring that the shareholders wealth is not exposed to 
unwarranted risks. Mendes-da-Silva W. & Grzybovski D. (2005) while analyzing the 
family and Non-family business in the Brazilian settings fmds the existence of significant 
differences in financial performances, the company value and corporate governance 
structures between family and non-family businesses. The study highlights that on an 
average the family businesses are smaller have administrative council comprehended by a 
smaller number of members and whose independence is smaller than the non-family 
businesses. Kim E. (2005) in his study on Chaebol firms (Korean large business groups 
with entrenched family control, diversified business structure and heavy debt-
dependence) findings are in support of the family managed company and finds that the 
there is a positive relatbn between family ownership concentration and productivity 
performance and the relationship is much stronger in case of chaebol firms than to non-
chaebol firms. The finding is in consistent with the hypothesis that ownership 
concentration leads not only to greater convergence of interest between controlling 
shareholders and other shareholders, but also to grater investment in firm-specific 
investment that result in better long-term productivity performance. 
2.16: Corporate Ownership and control 
The dispersal of ownership in USA and UK is unparalleled. The American ownership 
landscape is even more dispersed than its British counterparts. The UK pattern of 
ownership and control is characterized by the dominance of large institutional investors, 
with much greater levels of holdings as compared with Continental Europe. Owen, 
Kirchmaier & Grant (2006). Indian corporate is characterized by high concentrated 
ownership. However ownership pattern is gradually shifling toward widely dispersed 
because of the market forces and Govt, policy as many state owned companies are being 
privatized and existing family-owned companies are becoming highly diversified groups. 
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Cheffin (2000:1) identifies the similarities and differences between the British and 
American system of corporate governance and argue that though institutional investors 
play an important role in both countries, the British equities market is more institutionally 
dominated than its American counterparts and that shareholder concentration is higher in 
Britain compared to USA. Cheffin (2000:2) in an another study argues that a country is 
only likely to devebp a wklely dispersed pattern of share ownership if its legal system 
regulates companies in such a way that outside investors feel 'comfortable' about buying 
shares. The author points out that development in the UK suggests that a highly specific 
set of laws governing companies and financial markets does not have to be in place to 
ensure separation of ownership and control becoming central features of a country's 
corporate governance system as the paper finds that the country legal system did not do a 
great deal to improve the "comfort level' of outside investors. Instead, alternative 
institutional structures did the job. For other country however the paper says that the law 
will matters in its path for ownership dispersion. Franks, J., Mayer C, & Rossi, S. (2005) 
examines the evolution of equity maricets and dispersal of ownership of corporation in 
historical perspectives and reports that the UK had fk)urishing equity markets since 20"^  
century. In spite of weak investor protectbn capital markets flourished there because of 
informal relations of trusts rather than regulation. Formal regulation only emerged in the 
second half of the century. Investor protection was not therefore a necessary conditkin for 
the emergence of active securities markets in the UK in the 20'" century. In &ct it was 
week till 1920 and became strong only later half of the century. From the beginning the 
equity issues were prevalent, takeover were widespread, local market were active and all 
this helped in dispersal of ownership which is seen today in UK. Bainlx-idge (2001) 
investigate the dispersal of ownership in the USA and reports that the corporate 
governance structure of what it is seen today may not be optimal as because it was 
allowed to be evolved within a boundary of set laws and that the laws itself were defined 
on the presumptbn of what Mark Roe termed 'fear of concentrated economk; power'. 
The paper question 'Strong Manager' premises regarding institutbnal investor activism. 
Cheffins (2001) investigates the common linkage in ownership structures of USA and 
UK. The author points out the British path towards dispersal of ownership and control 
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was different from that of American experience and can be called unique in the sense as 
the normal factors required for dominance for the Anglo-American system of ownership 
and control in any country, like company law, fmancial services regulation and political 
ideology have not been the decisive variables in case of UK. Kumar (2005) examines the 
link between capital structure and sharehokling pattern for a panel of more than 2478 
publicly traded Indian Corporate firms over the years 1994-2000 and analyze the firms 
corporate financing behavior in connectk)n with its corporate governance arrangements, 
especially its shareholding pattern. Result showed that the debt structure is non-linearly 
linked to the corporate governance (ownership structure). The study finds that firms with 
weaker corporate governance mechanisms, dispersed sharehokling patterns, in partkular, 
measured by the entrenchment effect of group affiliation, tend to have a higher debt level. 
Firms with higher foreign ownership or with tow institutional ownership tend to have 
lower debt level. No significant relatk)nship between ownership of directors and 
corporate capital structure was observed. Bebchuk (1999) develops a rent-protectbn 
theory of corporate ownership structures and identifies how large private benefits of 
control distort choices of ownership structure. When private benefits of control are large, 
founders of companies that take them to public will be reluctant to leave control up for 
grabs. The result suggests that in countries in which private benefits of control are large, 
publicly traded companies will tend to have a controlling shareholder. Kirchmaier & 
Grant (2006) investigates the ownership and control issue in the context of European 
countries of France, Italy, Germany Spain and UK. The study categorizes the owners of 
these European countries in terms of family, institutbns, etc and shows the importance of 
ownership coalitions to achieve control. The author finds that more than half of all large 
publicly listed companies in continental Europe are still under the legal control of a small 
group of investors. The situation in UK is however different where institutional investors 
are the predominant investor in Britain collectively hokling almost complete control over 
large British firms. Also individual ownership by the various institutions is widely 
dispersed. Spain is the country having close ownership structure with that of UK with 
large Spanish firms having dispersed ownership structure. Family ownership is of 
practically no importance in Spain which are the largest shareholders in only 7 out of top 
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100 firms. France, Italy and Germany still have the family as the largest category of 
block holders and associated control. Berkman, Cole & Fu (2002) examine GOE in the 
Chinese context and finds evidence of improvement where the State transferred its 
control from government agencies to corporatized firms where the State is the 
Controlling shareholder and conclude that corporate governance in state-controlled firms 
can be improved by including private bk)ck holders in the ultimate ownership structure, 
which help align cash-flow rights with control rights. Goergen & Renneboog (2003) 
compares the control structures between Germany and UK listed companies. German 
investors prefer controlling stakes because of poor investor protectk)n and holding large 
controlling stakes is less expensive in Germany relative to UK. To find what causes the 
early change of control of initial shareholders in UK than Germany, the study utilizes 
database of IPOs over the period 1981-1994 for UK and Germany matched sample of 
companies and find that UK companies k>se majority control after 2 years of going public 
whereas the German companies lose majority only after 6 years of going public. Further 
the study finds that for the UK, the probability of a transfer of control to a concentrated 
shareholder increases when a company is risky, small and poorly performing and when 
UK firm is large, fast growing and profitable, it is more likely to be taken over by a 
widely-held firm. When German firms are profitable and risky, control is likely to be 
acquired by a concentrated shareholder, but growth and low profitability increase the 
likelihood of being acquired by a widely-held firm. 
2.17: Public Sector Enterprises and Corporate Governance 
The literature on corporate governance practices of Govt, owned enterprises in Indian 
context and on other countries are very little and more needs to be done in this regard. 
Whereas the essential ingredients of good governance like AGM, press, investment 
analysts constantly analyzing balance sheets and interacting with corporate leaders on 
regular basis is present in private sector and very little is escaped from the attentbns ,the 
real problems lies with PSU's. In PSU's the shareholders are the tax paying public who 
have almost no say in the management or the activities of the PSU's and the PSU boards 
are subservient to the respective ministries and constituted with government nominees 
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with little independent representation (Parekh, 1997). The situations are improving a bit 
where a few of them are being made to corporatize and binded by listing rules, many 
such PSU's and Govt, companies are still out of the ambit of compliance rules of listing 
or for the matter subject to proper clause of governances. lOD (2005) address the issue of 
only limited number of Govt. Companies which comes under the gambit of listing and 
associated control. Reddy(l998) looks into the issues of governance in Public Enterprises 
of India and suggests several remedial measures for empowering the boards of PEs in 
order to compete on equal footing in the open market and play significant role in 
countries economy. The paper speaks on the circumstances which virtually reduces the 
position of functional directors to a high profile employee accountable directly to the 
Chief Executive. The paper advises the GOI to appoint top-ranking professionals instead 
of civil servants in its boards as advised by several of its committees. The paper further 
stresses on the need of performance evaluation, re-nomination, restricting the 
Government Directors on the board to two, autonomy in its operation along with other 
measures. Another work on PSUs governance by Bhattacharyya(2005) discusses on the 
issue of corporate governance of PSU in the context of the Govt, policy of divestments of 
its holding gradually without their privatizing and autonomy to the board of directors of 
those enterprises, CAG practKes of reviewing the work of statutory auditors and suggest 
that Govt, should relinquish controls on PSUs except formulating the strategic and 
objective function, fi'aming vision and mission statements, approving five year business 
plan, avoid excessive representation through Govt, officials in the board of directors and 
instead appoint professionals with competence and business knowledge. In the Indian 
context, the work of Reddy (2001), attempts to devek>p the relevant set of principles for 
government controlled enterprise. Dr. Y.R.K. Reddy, Chairman, Yaga Consulting Pvt. 
Ltd., suggests a document for wkler discussion in the public. The objective of the report 
is to devek)p an approach and the first principles for improving the conditions for good 
corporate governance in public enterprises in India. The report includes special features 
of the state controlled enterprises, typical structure of the board, the process of decision 
making and dynamics of control in central public sector undertakings and the principles 
for good governance for Govt./PSU. Wong(2004) in his article express concern on the 
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matter of corporate governance for state owned enterprises throughout the world and 
enumerates the ills: multiple and conflicting objectives, excessive political interference 
and opacity (lack of transparency in operation). The author suggests remedial measures: 
clear direction, political insulation, and transparency which can lead SOEs to higher level 
of corporate governance and performance. Grantham (2005) discusses an altogether 
different issue of viability of private sector governance structure to public sector entities. 
Enumerating differences on several counts like risk of failure, market for corporate 
control, capital markets etc the author advises that as long as the GOC remains in public 
ownership and subject to politkal control, its governance structures cannot, and perh^s 
should not, replicate those of the private sector. Corporate governance principles are 
applicable for all including Govt, companies and HM Treasury (2005) of UK Govt., on 
the lines of its listed companies, has issued the Code for its Central government 
departments titled 'Corporate Governance in central government departments: Code of 
good practice'. The code covers governance aspects on the board, skills, independent 
non-executives, internal controls and for arm length bodies. For each aspect there are 
Principles and Supporting Provisions like Combined Code for listed companies of UK. 
Such codes on a unified scale seem to be non-existent in Indian context, except an 
attempt by a private company as noted above. 
2.18: Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
These categories of literature review the role and effectiveness of institutional investors 
in different county context. There is a substantial and growing literature on the 
desirability and feasibility of greater activism by institutional investors on the matters of 
corporate governance as the institutbnal investors have the potential to obviate the 
problem of dispersion of shareholder. Hill (1994). Among the institutional investors 
foreign equity ownership has a significantly positive influence on company value in 
India. Sarkar & Sarkar (2004). Mohanty (2003 paper explores the role of institutional 
investors in the corporate governance system of companies in India. The study finds no 
effect of equity investment of the institutk)nal investors on the corporate governance 
records of the companies rather the author notes that devebpmental financial institutions 
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and mutual funds have lent money to companies with better corporate governance 
records. Lin, Khurshed & Wang (2007) investigates how corporate governance 
mechanism such as, director's ownership, board composition and proportion of NED 
sitting on the board affect the investment behavior of Institutional Investors in UK. The 
findings are that institutional shareholding are positively associated with board 
composition, but negatively associated with director's ownership, there is an evidence of 
nonlinear relationship between institutional and director's ownership and that UK 
institutional investors generally prefer smaller firms and firms with smaller boards, lower 
share turnover, and shorter listing history in the London Stock Exchange. This is in 
contrast to the findings of US studies which show that US institutional investors prefer 
large firms and firms with longer listing history and higher trading activity. The result 
also indicates the investment preference of UK institutional investors on the matter of 
internal control. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999) investigate the influence of institutbnal 
investors on the corporate governance in the Indian context. The study identifies no 
positive and significant relationship between institutional investors and company value at 
any level of equity ownership which indicates passivity of their roles in company 
governance. The findings are in sharp contrast to the developed countries UK, USA, 
Germany and Japan where there are strong evidence of the effectiveness of large 
sharehokiers on the corporate governance at firm level whereas the same is missing in 
India who has a hybrid of outsider-dominated market-based system of USA and UK and 
the insider-dominated bank-based systems of Germany and Japan. In India lending 
institutions start monitoring the company effectively only when they have substantial 
equity holdings. The study however finds evidence of effectiveness of foreign equity 
ownership and having a beneficial effect on company value. The roles of Institutbnal 
Investors are limited and practically non-existent in India. Hill (1994) has investigated 
the greater activism of institutional investors in the Australian context. His paper cites 
several instances of high profile aggressive form of activism where the institutional 
investors prevailed and sacked the managing director. The paper examines the funds flow 
and investment by superannuation funds in Australia and change in the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance. Legal obstacles to Institutbnal Investor 
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activism have been discussed in the end. Klausner (2001) cites the two dual and 
conflicting roles played by institutional investors when they are most active on the issue 
of independent boards and board committees, confidential voting, separation of roles of 
CEO and Chairman, while fighting with proxies' battle. At the same time these 
Institutional Investors remain silent or compromise over these issues when they invest 
among the companies and the investing companies goes public with charters containing 
the same takeover defense that these institutions opposed earlier. Geis (2007) examines 
the issue of large independent block hokiings like institutional investors, pensk>n funds, 
Hedge funds and other share bk>ck holders can effectively check against the abusive 
behavior of the management. The study takes the ownership case of SO large public 
companies on the National Stock Exchange of India and shows that at present the strategy 
of independent block hokiing is not feasible at the moment. The author maintains that 
while the idea has some merit, the present ownership structure of Indian corporate, whkh 
largely consists of insiders, the Indian government and independent investors, does not 
permit to get a sound block holding strategy. 
2.19: Internationalization of firms and effect on Corporate Governance 
There is a general feeling that a company when decides to go intematk>nal and cross-list 
in a foreign country exchange there is a general behavior in the decision to improve the 
governance level to the next higher level and to enjoy the benefits of being subjected to 
better regime. The dominant factors in the choices of cross-listing are access to cheaper 
finance and enhance the issuer's visibility. Most of the studies have reported the positive 
effect of foreign equity ownership on company value in India and the presence of foreign 
direct investment have pressurized Indian companies to increase their governance level to 
the international accepted practice. Apart from the foreign equity, cross border mergers 
and acquisitions, cross-listing have increased pressure to improve Indian corporate 
governance practk:e. titcht (2003) reveals that the insiders of the company going 
international behave opportunistically with regard to the cross-listing decision. Instead of 
bonding hypothesis with a view to rent that market superior corporate governance 
system, there is a tendency to avoid the same and the alternative 'avokling' hypothesis is 
93 
observed. The study is in the backdrop of foreign listings on U.S. markets and more 
commonly on US listed ADR and concludes that improvement in issuers' corporate 
governance can be achieved primarily through sustained eflForts by law makers and 
regulators in firms' home countries. How, Khoo, Ng & Verhoeven (2003) however 
observes that there is a weak link between intemationalizatbn and governance structure 
of the firm and finds significant relatk)nship between degree of internationalization and 
the proportk>n of independent non-executive directors with international experience. This 
suggests the importance of international experience of the CEO for companies engaged in 
international activities. The study is in the Australian perspectives. Dahiya & Desgupta 
(2001) maintain that as the Indian corporations are gradually globalizing their funding, a 
transformation is taking place in corporate governance because of the requirement of 
International capital market and with the acceleration of the process of devebpment a 
severe liquidity squeeze has gripped the economy and it has become imperative for the 
corporatbns to seek more cross-border funding. 
2.20: Privatization and Corporate Governance 
The aim of private business is best described by Clark & Demirag (2002) when they 
quote Kapner(2002), "Private business, wouk] be more efficient than the government at 
running businesses and providing services and opening industries to competition, whk:h 
are the ideal way to pass savings on to consumers." Gray (1996) focuses on the goal of 
privatization in transition economies which is not to change the ownership from state to 
market but to expand the market infrastructure and legal norms and supporting 
institutions and good corporate governance. The study cites the different models and pace 
of privatization in transitbn countries settings, from extensive efforts at sales to strategic 
owners (as in Estonia and Hungary), to program based primarily on insider buyouts (as in 
Russia and Slovenia), to innovative mass privatizatbn programs involving the creation of 
large and powerful new financial intermediaries (as in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
and Poland). The author raises apprehension about the final outcome of privatization and 
cautions that the privatizatnn programme however shoukl not be allowed to become the 
period of "primitive capital accumulatk)n." Gupta (2001) investigates whether the 
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performance of Indian government-owned firms whose control rights are not transferred 
(i.e., partial privatization) have been affected by the sale of minority stakes or not. The 
study observes that partially privatized firms and even the sale of minority stakes has a 
positive impact on firm performance and productivity. As the government remains the 
controlling owners in these firms, the study infers that the improvement is attributable to 
the role of the stock market in monitoring managerial performance. Banerjee & Munger 
(2002) analyzes analytically the privatizatk>n process in thirty-five low or middle-income 
devebping countries. Privatization is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The 
study finds that often the privatization policy is a crisis-driven and last ditch effort to turn 
the economy around, rather than a carefully and consklered policy with explicit long term 
goals. The decision to privatize is captured here in three related but distinct dependent 
variables: (1) Timing (2) pace, and (3) intensity. The paper hypothesize that net political 
benefits positively affects the timing, pace, and intensity of privatizatbn. Black, 
Kraakman & Tarassova (1999) discuss the cause and failures of Russian rapid 
privatization programme of State Chvned Enterprises, which had started in the early 
1990s, and gave its control to managers and controlling shareholders (insiders) by 
extensive self dealings which the government did nothing to control. In this self dealing 
transaction between the insider and company, the insiders profited at the company's 
expense and grew reach and powerful. Later privatization auctk>ns increased the self 
dealing process and control of its largest enterprises cheaply went to these crooks, who 
transferred their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired, and used their wealth 
to further corrupt the government and btock reform process that might constrain their 
actk)n. Punitive tax system, official corruption, oi^anized crimes and an unfi-iendly 
bureaucracy further hampered the restructuring process of privatized businesses. 
2.21: Culture and Corporate Governance 
Culture and social are differentiating factors in good and bad governance. Jeffrey 
Sonnenfeld in a Harvard Business Review article titled "What Makes Great Boards 
Great," says that, by definition, guidelines and checklists address structural issues such as 
board compositbn, board size, age of directors, number of meetings, number of meetings 
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without management, existence of committees, powers of various committees, and 
definition of independence. He points out, however, that what determines the quality of 
governance is "not rules and regulations, it's the way people work together." In other 
words, social and cultural issues, not strict adherence to guidelines and checklists, are the 
differentiating factors between good and poor governance. Newquist & Russell (2004). 
The authors further adds, "It's not Rocket Science. Corporate Governance is not a science 
subject to immutable rules. It is a culture of relationships. Whether or not it worics 
depends on how its participants behave and interacts with each other. Good governance 
comes from developing the right relationships among the right people." Breuer & 
Saizmann (2008) examines whether culture has relation with type of corporate 
governance model adopted by a country. With reference to the Schwartz cultural value 
model the study analyze the impact of culture on the development of corporate 
governance systems. The research focuses on corporate control, investors' objectives, 
ownership structure, protectbn of minority shareholders, corporate boards, and hostile 
takeover as main attributes of corporate governance systems, and their developments in 
relatk)n to the Schwartz cultural dimensions of Embeddedness, Autonomy, Hierarchy, 
Egalitarianism, Mastery, and Harmony. The study shows that countries with a strong 
emphasis on the cultural dimensions of Embeddedness, Egalitarianism, and Harmony 
tend to have bank-based corporate governance systems, whereas countries with a strong 
emphasis on the cultural dimensions of Autonomy, Hierarchy and Mastery tend toward a 
market based system. Gorga (2003) discusses how existing values in society might 
prevent the adoption of corporate norms designed to increase overall efficiency. The 
paper uses a case study of recent Brazilian corporate law reform, seeking for stronger 
investor protection and strengthens Brazilian's capital market. 
2.22: Corporate Governance: Important Works 
This section of the literature reviews discusses the important works carried out in the 
broad and varied area of corporate governance. 
Dubey (2000) article reveals the secret of 70 companies that ran away with investor's 
money in the last boom and brings to light the faces, the methods, and the modus 
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operandi of the fraudsters, including promoter involved, and is a blot in the name of 
investors' protection and corporate governance. The anatomy of the most vanishing 
company has been described as below: III equipped, inexperienced promoters invite 
friends and professionals to join as directors of a new company; Company hires unknown 
lead managers, goes public without bank and PI appraisals; Issue is fully subscribed but 
promoter refused to move ahead with the project ; Company moves out of registration 
office, change bank account, professional directors resign; Promoters vanished with issue 
amount; SEBI, stock exchange delists company. The article tabulate the information of 
the 70 companies in terms of company issue opening date, amount. Lead Manager, 
Chairman, MD, Director and their current status. 
Goldman & Filliben (2001) discusses the possible tools and techniques in the growing 
area of technok)gy, mode of raising capital, technology facilitating capital markets, 
electronK commerce, electronic proxies, electronic consents and electronic attendance at 
board meetings which will change the face of business outright. The article further 
mentions the effect of globalizatbn like disintegrating boundaries, European boundaries, 
European Monetary Union, European stock corporatbn will influence the way 
corporation will be managed and governed and further note that corporations that wish to 
compete will need chameleon-like qualities in order to adapt to the ever changing capital 
markets. 
Doidge, Karolyi & Stuiz (2004) develops and tests a model of how country 
characteristics, such as legal protections for minority investors and the level of economic 
and financial development influence firms' costs and benefits in implementing measures 
to improve their own governance and transparency. The most important benefit to a firm 
having good governance is access to capital markets on better terms. A firm located in 
countries having poor financial development will not find enhancing their corporate 
governance standards rewarding as the firm will raise a smaller amount of funds from the 
capital markets. Consequently, in countries with low financial and economic 
development, firms will find it less rewarding to invest in governance. 
Mehra, M. (2005) discusses the role of corporate governance in the present day context 
when he says, "we need to broaden the role of corporate governance. With a fiflh of the 
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world population below the poverty line, the biggest challenge of our times is to make 
markets work for the poor. The best way to achieve it is by bringing transparency in the 
stock markets". The compilation of 6*'' Intematk)nal conference on corporate governance 
under the headings "Making corporate governance work for the poor" sums up the 
proceedings of the 6"' International conference on corporate governance at London and 
attended by 33 countries including India. The compilation contains the "London 
Declaratk>n 2005" which is a 10 steps action plan for better corporate governance with 
the acronym PREEMPTIVE: Participation, Responsibility, Equity, Ethics, Maximize 
corporate value. Performance, Transparency, Independence of the Board, Variety 
improves the crop. Education and Training. 
Porta, Silanes, Shieifer & Vishny (1999) examines investor protections and its various 
dimensions and highlight that strong investor protection is associated with effective 
corporate governance and is reflected in broad financial markets, dispersed ownership of 
shares. Improvement in investor protection requires radical changes in the legal system, 
securities laws, company laws and bankruptcy laws. The study finds that most of the 
obstacles and objections to such reform come from families that control large 
corporatbns and who take it as curtailment of their control and expropriatk>n 
opportunities and have an interest in keeping the system as it is. As the paper says, "What 
the reformers see as protectnn of investors, the founding families call expropriatbn of 
entrepreneurs". So far as securing the finance is concerned these firms and families 
obtain them through ck>se political influence and connections, captive or closely 
connected banks or through internal means. 
Paredes (2005) mentions about two competing models of corporate governance that 
policymakers can choose from. One is market-oriented model, as in USA, that relies on 
relatively little mandatory law to protect shareholders. Instead it depends on a host of 
other formal and informal mechanisms, such as incentive based compensation and 
hostile-takeovers to hold managers and directors accountable. The second approach 
depends on a mandatory model of corporate laws in which the state, as opposed to the 
market place, plays a central role in sharehokler protection by fashbning mandatory rules 
that define shareholders property rights. The author suggest developing countries to adopt 
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a mandatory model of corporate governance as compared to the enabling market-based 
approach as developing countries lack the advanced market essential for a market-based 
governance system to work. 
Pajuste (2002) investigates the factors behind stock market performance measured in 
terms of stock returns and activity in nine Central and Eastern European countries: the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithunia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The author finds many cases where the controlling owners have artificially kept 
down prices in order to abuse minority sharehokiers. The study thus reveals the 
importance of enforcement of law, financial regulations and protection of minority 
shareholders on stock market performance in the given set of countries. 
Oman (2001) paper is based on the findings of the seven country case studies undertaken 
as part of the research programme on corporate governance in developing countries and 
emerging economies by OECD development centre. Countries studied are Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia and South Africa. While emphasizing the 
importance of corporate governance in national devek>pment the paper deals with the 
forces working in favor of improved corporate governance and forces against it. As per 
the author, "forces working in fovor of improved corporate governance in devebping 
countr^s include those operating both on demand and supply side of domestic and 
international portfolio of equity flow to corporations in those countries. The forces 
working against the improved corporate governance are corporate insiders, powerful 
vested groups, oligopolistic coalitk)ns, and in the sphere of domestic politics. They are 
sometimes called as 'distributbnal cartels' because in seeking to maintain control they 
often invest significant corporate controlled as well as government controlled resources". 
Such forces however give lip service to the need for corporate governance. 
CFA (2005) in their manual for investors aims to educate and empower the investor in 
assessing a company's corporate governance policies, understand and analyze how 
corporate governance may affect the value of their investments and thus help them in 
making informed investment decisions. While suggesting issues for investors to consider, 
it alerts investors to the primary corporate governance issues and risk affecting 
companies and some of the factors they should consider. 
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Saricar (2007) deals with the level of shareholder protection for a number of countries 
including India. Based on comprehensive time series data set for corporate governance 
with reference to shareholder protection at the Centre for Business Research, Judge 
Business School, University of Cambridge, over the period 1970-2005 with the help of 
28 broad categories and 60 legal variables on a scale of 0 to 1, the analysis find that 
India's shareholder protection level is very much comparable to that of many OECD 
countries with highest protection in many areas and at worst level In other. The paper 
further concludes that the change of shareholder protection law so far has no relationship 
with stock market development and private capital accumulation. 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) focus on the role of media and argue that media are important 
in shaping corporate policy and its role cannot be ignored in any analysis of a country's 
corporate governance system. The authors further posit that pressure of the press can act 
as compensation in many countries where there is weak infrastructure of corporate 
governance such as inadequate laws and malfunctioning judicial systems. 
Jirapom, Singh & Lee (2008) studies extensively, with the help of 40,000 observations of 
individual directors across more than 1,400 firms, the relation between multiple 
directorship and board committee membership based on director busyness hypothesis and 
reputation hypothesis. The study finds that by and large, individuals holding large 
number of outside directorship serve on fewer board committees. There are reduced 
possibilities of director being in work heavy compensation and audit committees when 
they occupy larger number of board seats. Those directors who also hold equity 
ownership tend to serve on more board committees in order to contribute more. Directors 
on smaller and independent boards serve on more committees. There is a particular class 
of directors e.g., women and ethnic minorities who finds more places in board 
committees. 
Banerjee (2004) argues that Banks are just the organization like any other incorporate 
entities and the primary requirements of corporate governance apply to them. The paper 
looks into the details of corporate governance in banks and the necessity of government 
intervention in banks in Indian scenario. The author focuses on the Indian Public sector 
banks and highlights that NPA is the issue of primary risk in such banks. 
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Filatotchev & Bishop (2001) study examines the complex and dynamic interrelationship 
between executive characteristics, board member selection and IPO performance in UK. 
The authors find the importance of board characteristics and managerial ownership at the 
time of IPO. In particular, a high number of non-executive directors and intensity of their 
extra organizational links reduce the extent of under pricing of the share issue. 
2.23: Pension Funds and Corporate Governance 
The pension fiind system in India is not developed and its contribution towards market 
development is non-existent. Pension funds in UK in comparison are much better 
positioned because of their expression of their voice, because of the legal independence 
of the pension funds and the residual power that they can call an EGM with having 10 per 
cent of the share capital (Goobey, 2006). Vittas & Michelitsch (1995) examines the 
prospects for private pension funds in Central Europe and Russia and their potential long-
term role in corporate governance and argues that no private pension laws have been 
enacted in Poland and Russia. Though Russia has non-state pension funds but they are 
not grown up and they operate in a non-standardized environment. Some of the pension 
funds have the potential of growing and become important Institutional Investors and 
play a critical role in improving corporate governance systems in Russia and modernize 
securities market, foster better accounting and auditing standards and promote more 
disclosure of information. A more robust corporate governance structures can be 
persuaded by these special institutional investors which will also reduce the problem of 
fi-ee riding and enhance the corporate performance monitoring. Watson(2002) of Hermes 
Pension Management Ltd, documents 'Hermes Principles' and explains what they expect 
from the companies in which they invest. Hermes is an important UK fund managers and 
invests in some of the best companies and only in those companies where it finds that the 
principles of the Hermes toward good governance are maintained and followed and 
intervenes actively where it finds that companies are in deviation. The importance of the 
fund managers can be gauged from the fact that several millions people depends on 
Hermes Investment to secure their income in old age. Herms have their own principles 
and opinion on critical matters of governance and the present paper outlines ten such 
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principles. The paper gives a understanding of how a responsible and effective 
institutional investors such as Hermes can impact on company performance by close 
scrutiny of the annual reports and the amount of pressure the exert by their expert 
comment. Becht, Bolton & Roell (2002) writes, "The growth in defined contribution 
pension plans has channeled an increasing fraction of household savings through mutual 
and pension funds and has created a constituencies of investors that is large and powerful 
enough to be able to influence corporate governance. The author further mentions that 
over the 1990s in OECD countries, share of financial assets controlled by institutional 
investors has steadily grown over. Institutional investors in the USA alone command 
slightly more than 50% of the total assets under management and 59.7% of total equity 
investment in the OECD, rising to 60.1% and 76.3%, respectively, when UK Institutions 
are added. A significant proportion is held by pension funds (for USA and UK 35.1% and 
40.1% of total assets respectively). With the increase in life expectancy rate in UK the 
defined benefit pension plan which has to pay promised pensions to its members are in 
stressed condition. The fall in equity value, if any, further complicates the issue. The 
research from Cocco & Volpin (2005) investigates and finds how the investment 
decisions in a defined benefit pension plan are affected by the presence of trustees who 
are also directors of the sponsoring companies, or trustees who are insiders to the 
company. The study finds evidence in support of an agency view where insider-trustee 
acts in the interest of shareholders of the sponsoring company, and not necessarily in the 
interest of the members of the pension plan. 
2.24: Corporate Governance Ratings and Corporate Governance 
There are several corporate governance rating firms who provide company rating based 
on the company corporate governance practices and sometimes they recommend 
shareholders for proxy proposals. The shareholder activism based on the ratings so 
furnished is quite popular. Audit Integrity, RiskMetrics (previously Institutional 
Shareholder Services), GovemanceMetrics International, Corporate Library are some of 
the internationally reputed rating agencies. Though India has few such agencies the 
activism on the scale of the developed countries such as US and UK is not observable. 
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However given the amount of institutional investor's money deployed in the markets and 
the institutional investors using these ratings for deployment of capital the influence of 
these rating is considerable. Daines, Gow, Larcker (2008) investigates the effectiveness 
of corporate governance ratings and the association between these ratings and future firm 
performance and undesirable outcomes such as accounting restatements and shareholder 
litigation. The study utilse the data from four rating providing firms: Audit Integrity 
(AGR), Risk Metrics (CGQ), Governance Metrics International (GMI) and The 
Corporate Library (TCL_Rating) for the year 2005. The study finds little cross-sectional 
correlation among the ratings and suggests that either there were high degree of 
measurement error or ratings are measuring very different corporate governance 
constructs. Further the study finds serious disconnect between the actual predictive 
validity of the ratings and the impact of the rating on actual voting outcome. Balling, 
Holm & Poulsen (2005) investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
ratings and its effectiveness in reducing information asymmetries. The study is in the 
context of Danish data set. The study appraises that the rating process consist of two 
broad general activities: data reduction phase and the weighing, aggregation and 
classificatfon phase. The study finds that it is the selection of relevant attributes and not 
the later process of classification, weighing and aggregation which matters in the quality 
of a rating provider. The authors' further finds that it is on the part of intelligent selection 
of relevant attributes by the rating providing agency that improves the screening of 
companies based on governance quality. The study further finds that asymmetric 
information can be reduced by an intelligent use of the CG ratings. CG ratings impacts on 
dividend payouts has been studied by Mitton (2004), by using firm-specific corporate 
governance ratings developed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Axis (CLSA) for 365 firms 
from 19 emerging markets, and finds that firms with higher corporate governance ratings 
have higher dividend payouts. 
2.25: Scandals, Sarbanes -Oxley Act and Corporate Governance in USA 
The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act during the year 2002 in USA marks one of the 
landmarks in corporate governance history when a nation has imposed legislation for 
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their corporate to comply and practice corporate governance. All such literature related 
with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, before and after the legislation, have been put at one place and 
classified into one category of literatures. These literatures depict the state of reaction for 
or against legislation of corporate governance and render useful information and lessons 
for other country to learn. Ahdieh (2005) posits that the imposition of Sarbanes-OxIey 
Act of 2002 has been the subject of severe criticism and the same have grown over time. 
The real cause with the Act is 'federalization' of corporate law and its imposition of 
public regulation where private incentives and the market forces held sway. The 
regulation of modem public corporation in USA, therefore, faces conflicting goals of 
privatization on the one hand and nationalization on the other. The author offers a new 
model of mixed governance to take care of both public and private dynamics and argues 
that such a scheme of mixed governance might allow the regulation of corporate 
governance to operate more effectively and provide the opportunity of evolving more 
efficiently over time. Romano (2005) takes a critical look at the corporate governance 
mandates adopted by congress in the wake of the Enron scandals and suggests that the 
decisions to mandate was seriously misconceived and the same are not likely to improve 
audit quality or enhance firm performance and thereby benefit investors as congress 
intended. The author narrates the frantic political environment in which SOX (2002) was 
enacted, which was at odd with the literature prescription, and suggests working in the 
direction of educating the media, the public, political leaders, and agency personnel 
regarding the reality that what the congress did was a public policy blunder in enacting 
SOX's and there is a need to rectify the error or at least to make the mandate rescinded or 
made voluntary. Romano (2004) discusses the situation and circumstance prevailing 
before the enactment of SOX in the year 2002. The author mentions that SOX was 
enacted as emergency legislation amidst falling stock market and media frenzy over 
corporate scandals shortly before the mid term congressional elections. Their inclusion 
was election year politics and the scholarly literature recommendations were ignored and 
not enough considered attention was given on the governance provisions. The Paper 
recommends stripping of SOX's mandatory governance provisions and rendered optional. 
Other European Union members have also been advised in the paper to avoid congress 
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policy blunders. Holmstrom & Kaplan (2003) takes a moderate look at the current 
legislative change in USA and seeks to answer such questions in the backdrop of such 
scandals as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, whether USA corporate 
governance system is so bad and whether the resultant legislative change in the form of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and regulatory change in the form of new governance 
guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ will led to improved corporate governance 
system in USA. The author concludes that though parts of the USA corporate governance 
system has failed under the exceptional strains of the 1990. the overall system has 
worked and the US market have performed well both on absolute basis and relative to 
other countries over the past two decades and that change in legislation and regulation 
provisions will led to make the good system better. However there are chances of 
overreaction to extreme events in few cases. Anderson (2008) takes note of the situation 
arising out of imposition of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the resultant exodus of 
companies from US to less rigid governance structures. This has resulted in discussion 
for a less burdensome and principle-based soft law structure as in UK. The paper 
however argues that even if a soft law principles-based regime were adopted into US law 
its longevity would be dubious because of cultural settings in USA which is different 
from UK. The author notes that United States has never allowed corporate luminaries like 
Sir Cadbury to form and reform its law. Congressional committees may seek advice and 
insight from such luminaries, but ultimately the rules and regulations come from 
government, principally state governments, and not from chief executive officers and 
board of directors. Given the long history of aggressive congressional responses to 
corporate misdeeds, the principle based approached would be eradicated at the very first 
instance of any corporate misdeeds. Clark & Demirag (2002) discusses the immediate fall 
out and consequences of failure of Enron corporate governance during the month the 
December 2001. As a result of collapse of the company, the state had to take over many 
of the functions that were previously in the private domain such as assuring supply and 
running the transmission system. The authors note that if the goal of deregulation was to 
reduce state involvement over prices and supply of power, exactly the opposite happened. 
Private regulated utilities became less powerftil then they were before deregulation. The 
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author reveals that Enron had a corporate culture of influencing public policy-makers on 
the deregulation or privatization of the US and world energy sectors, dubious connections 
with policy makers especially in California and other states and had instructions to its 
accounting firms into 'dubious' financial transactions. TurnbuU (2002) posits that failure 
of Enron and the like signifies a crisis in the 'command and control hierarchies- the top 
down corporations with single unitary boards- that have become the dominant model of 
capitalism. It does not matter whether an enterprise is owned by the State-arms-length or 
otherwise- whether it is owned by investors, or whether it operates in the private sector or 
as a charity or non-profit organizations. All such organizations, if they are run as 
command and control hierarchies, will suffer identical problems - the tendency of 
centralized power to corrupt, the difficulty of managing complexity; and the suppression 
of''natural" - human-checks and balances. The author suggests," what we need now are 
organizations which recognize these failings and are designed to overcome these 
complexity down into manageable units, decompose organizational decision making into 
a network of independent control centers and allow the private interests of executives to 
be harnessed to the public good." The author suggests a new model, 'network 
governance' which will replace the Command and Control hierarchies. Coglianese, 
Healey, Keating, & Michael (2004) submit the need and extent of government role in the 
corporation economy in USA on the wake of various abuses and scandals. The paper is of 
utmost importance as it signals a rethinking of policy on whether the corporation should 
be left to be played by self regulatory organizations or there is need of government 
agencies to tightrope their behavior. 
2.26: CEO and Corporate Governance 
CEOs are key players are in a corporate governance. The implementation of almost any 
policy taken by the board depends upon the effectiveness of a Chief Executive Officer. 
The most important responsibility of a board is the right selection for the post. Paredes 
(2004) discuses the issue of CEO overconfidence and resultant bad decision and 
shareholder value loss which are generally not considered compared to conflicts of 
interest, disloyalty and fi^uds which are careftilly monitored. The author theorizes that 
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CEO overconfidence is a product of factors like high compensation, positive feedback, 
recent success which poses the risk of bad decision and suggests appointing a chief 
naysayer for managing CEO overconfidence and ensure that the CEO and the board of 
directors consider themselves opposite. Keeping in view the risk and cost involved in 
CEO bad decisions the author advises future research to be undertaken in the direction of 
effects of overconfidence as against human psychology and the managerial behavior. 
Landier, Sraer & Thesmar (2005) argues that the careful design of the chain of command 
such as placing an independent minded top-ranking executive can impose strong 
discipline on their CEO in spite of the executive being formally under his authority. The 
author argues that such a feature forms part of a robust internal governance and is 
considered good for corporate governance. The paper provides robust empirical evidence 
consistent with the fact that firms with high internal governance are more efficiently run. 
Hermalin (2003) posits that while the statutory authority of the board is relatively broad, 
the available empirical evidence indicates that boards play a significant role in only a few 
corporate decisions, the most common and the most important being all those decisions 
pertaining t6 the selection- internal or external, monitoring, and retention or dismissal of 
the CEO based upon the monitoring. The author posits that it is amount of board 
diligence which affects the decision process, with greater the board diligence, the higher 
the probability of selecting external candidate as CEO. Because the probability of 
dismissal increases with the intensity of board monitoring, greater board diligence leads 
to shorter CEO tenures. The CEO's incentive to increase efforts are greater when there is 
more likelihood that the board will make a decision about retaining him based on its 
inference of his ability. Increase in CEO effort as a consequence of board diligence 
should lead to a trend toward greater CEO compensation. The paper mentions that less 
diligent board will have the stronger demand for the CEOs with the higher estimated 
ability. Such 'star' CEOs command, not surprisingly, a wage premium. Thus the paper 
infers that it could be the less diligent board that hires the more expensive CEOs. 
Trojanowski & Renneboog (2003) find in UK settings that CEO turnover has the 
strongest performance-sensitivity for industry-corrected accounting measures and less 
strong a relation with stock performance measures. This suggests that CEOs are only 
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dismissed at a rather late stage when poor performance is reflected in the accounting 
returns. CEOs remuneration reflects past good accounting performance and stock price 
performance w.r.t. abnormal returns, Tobin's Q and dividend increase. The study finds 
CEO remuneration as sensitive to stock price in firms with strong outside shareholders 
whereas remuneration in insider-dominated firms is sensitive to measures of accounting 
returns only. Neither total ownership concentration nor the presence of large block 
holdings held by outsider shareholders (Institutions, families or individuals, other 
corporations) are related to higher CEO turnover even in the wake of poor performance. 
This implies that there is little evidence of disciplinary monitoring by outsider 
shareholders. Insider with strong voting power successfully resists CEO dismissal, 
irrespective of corporate performance. Insider-dominated underperforming firm has the 
probability of CEO replacement 11.4% whereas it is as high as 21.3% for an outsider-
dominated company. Boards with a high proportion of non-executive directors and with 
separate person fulfilling the tasks of CEO and chairman replace the CEO more 
frequently, but these boards are not more apt to replace underperforming management. 
The Business Roundtable (2002) opines that apart from other, the selection, 
compensation and evaluation of a well qualified and ethical CEO is the single most 
important function of the Board. Senior management, led by the Chief Executive Officer, 
is responsible for running the day-to-day operations of the corporation and properly 
informing the board of the status of such operations. Management responsibilities include 
strategic planning, risk management, and financial reporting. Gibson (2002) investigates 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in terms of CEO turnover and firm 
performance in emerging markets. The developed markets like that of USA and UK are 
most likely to change its CEO on poor performance of the firm indicating the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in developed markets. The result received is that in 
case of emerging markets the firms with large domestic shareholder do not replace their 
CEO indicating that these firms evaluate their CEO not in terms their ability to run the 
firm profitably but on the CEO's ability to maximize the well-being of the large 
shju-eholder. For this subset of firms the corporate governance is ineffective. Faccio and 
Lasfer (1999) test the entrenchment hypothesis which predicts that CEO will create a 
108 
board that is unlikely to monitor and will dominate the board reducing its monitoring 
role. Based on 1650 nos. non-fmancial LSE listed companies hand packed data for the 
period 1996-97 the study finds that for Mow' levels of ownership, managers may initially 
align their interest with those of shareholders. However, when their stakes increase, they 
may be tempted (and, most important, be able) to reduce the monitoring role of the 
board by combining the position of chairman and CEO or appointing an executive 
director as chairman. They will also reduce the proportion of non-executive directors in 
the board or they will operate within an oversized board whose ability to control the 
management will decrease and the communication and co-ordination problem will 
increase. Boumosieh & Reeb (2005) examines the role of insiders on the board of 
directors by examining their impact on CEO governance, alleviating information 
asymmetries, and their counterbalance effect over their CEO. This is against the common 
belief that the presence of insiders signifies greater CEO influence and grip over the 
board functions, as the insiders on the board are puppets of CEO and their action are 
significantly controlled by him and their career depends upon him. The author's finding 
is in quite contrast and suggests that insiders on the board are not necessarily a reflection 
of the CEO power, but instead, may be a way to mitigate CEO influence on the board. In 
firm^ without insiders on the board, the CEO can have an even greater capacity to shape 
the agenda and control the informatk)n available to the board. Thus, the study posits that 
board monitoring may be diminished when corporate insiders are excluded from the 
board of directors. 
2.27: Theoretical Perspectives 
There are two main corporate governance systems: the Anglo-American (labeled as 
outsider, Common-Law, market oriented, shareholder-centered, or liberal model) and the 
Continental European (also labeled as insider. Civil Law, block holders, stakeholder-
centered, coordinated, or "Rhineland" model) models. Bhasa (2004) identifies four 
different governance models in practice, out of which three governance models are 
widely discussed while the model IV is the emerging models which is increasingly 
getting known. The four models discussed are Type-I-Market centric governance model; 
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Type-II-Relationship based governance models, Type-Ill-Transition governance models 
and Type-lV-Emerging governance model. The paper identifies type IV model having the 
best feature in increasing realization by the state of its role in the governance process. 
The author finds that where much has been written about Model I and Model II, not much 
has been written on Model III and Model IV barely finds any mention in literature. 
Aguilera (2004) maintains that the study of corporate governance, that originally 
developed in the context of the agency theory and is based on the premise of shareholder 
maximization, has been enriched by economic sociologists and other social scientists that 
developed two new theoretical and empirical dimensions: The Shareholder View of 
Corporate Governance and The Stakeholder View of Corporate Governance. The 
Shareholder view of corporate governance is conceptualized around the corporate 
governance 'problem' where principals-risk bearing shareholders, interested in 
maximizing their investments-monitor agents- who might be shirking or woricing towards 
enhancing their individual interests. The Stakeholder view of the firm expands the firm's 
boundaries and recognizes its stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers, customers among 
others). According to this view, firms are not always driven solely by shareholder value 
maximization for other reasons like maricet pressure for long term profitability, survival 
of the firm etc. Fama and Jensen (1983:1) in their paper 'Separation of Ownership and 
Control' address the problems of agency, which originates from the issue of 'decision 
agents bearing no wealth effects of their decisions' as a result of separation of ownership 
fi-om control. The authors contend that the issue of separation of decision and risk bearing 
functions survives primarily because of the benefits of specialization of management, 
benefits of risk bearing and common approach to controlling the implied agency problem 
through the means of separating the ratification and monitoring of decisions from the 
initiator and implementer of the decisions. Fama and Jensen (1983:2), in another paper, 
'Agency problems and residual claims', develops a set of propositions that explain the 
special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms (corporations, 
proprietorships, partnerships, mutuals and non-profits) as efficient approaches to 
controlling agency problems. The author views that only those forms of organizations 
will survive, which will be able to serve and satisfy the society needs at the lowest prices 
110 
while covering the cost. Dallago (2002) discusses the three main governance perspectives 
and their usefulness in the case of transformation economics: The Shareholders Value 
Paradigm, The Stakeholders Interest Perspective & the Innovative Firm. The Shareholder 
Value Paradigm concentrates on the separation of ownership and control and contract 
incompleteness. In order that shareholders partake their money and invest in a firm, 
particularly dispersed one, such solution as allocation of control rights to shareholders, 
providing standardized, transparent, free and reliable information and relying on market 
for corporate control are suggested. The presence of limited liability, reality of 
incomplete contracts for all suppliers of inputs to the corporate enterprise renders 
questionable the assumption that shareholders bear all the residual risk. According to the 
Stakeholder Interest Perspective, the firm is a coalitbn of different actor with different 
roles and capabilities such as employees, suppliers, subcontractors, customers, local 
societies and government, the environment who has a particular interest in the firm and 
they expect some kind of return. The stakeholder interest perspective is certainly less 
powerful and less precise than the shareholder value paradigm. The Innovative firm 
approach consider the governance process through which resources are developed as well 
as utilized in the economy, as against the previous two theories which focus on the 
governance structures that facilitates the optimal utilization of existing productive 
resources. Jensen and Meckling (1976) develops a theory of ownership structure of the 
firm integrating elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the 
theory of finance. The author argues that agency costs are as real as any other costs the 
level of which depends, among other things, on statutory and common law and human 
skills in devising contracts. The paper defines the concept of agency costs vis-a-vis 
separation and control issue, investigates the nature of the agency costs caused by 
existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrates who bears the cost and why, and 
investigates the Pareto optimality of their existence. Jensen (2001) discusses the 
unaccountability aspects of stakeholder theory which calls managers to take decisions 
which takes into account the interest of all stakeholders in a firm. The author argues that 
since it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful 
behavior requires a single valued objective function. The author, therefore, argues that in 
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absence of any specification for necessary tradeoffs in stakeholder theory among the 
competing interests, the managers are left unaccountable for their actions. He, therefore, 
develops a model called 'Enlightened value maximization model' which retains much of 
the concept and structure of Stakeholders theory but accepts maximization of the long run 
value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its 
stakeholders. Enlightened stakeholder theory, therefore, specifies long-term value 
maximization or value seeking as the firm's objective and therefore solves the problem 
that arises from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. 
Stout (2003) provides two hypotheses for why shareholders, instead of governing 
themselves, assign the task to a board and tolerate the board. The two hypotheses are: the 
Monitoring Hypotheses and Mediating Hypotheses. Monitoring Hypothesis derive the 
cue from the 'agency costs' associated with the self-interested managers. The Mediating 
Hypotheses takes the view that shareholders also seek to 'tie their own hands' by ceding 
their control to directors as a means of attracting the extra contractual, firm specific 
investment of stakeholder groups such as creditors, executives, and employees. 
2.28: Research Gap 
Comparative studies on corporate governance in Indian context vis-a-vis any other 
benchmarked country or for the matter any country are not available. There is, therefore, 
an acute scarcity of literatures comparing our corporate governance system with 
advanced countries, with an aim to enhance our system and take a qujkntum jump on the 
matter of corporate governance. The present research fiilfills the gap. Keeping in view the 
importance and relevance of better corporate governance ,these studies may considered 
very useful in identifying the system gap and shortcomings on short notice, and that is 
why there is now a increasing trend globally to undertake such efforts. On the global 
level too, though there are comparative studies between two countries but they are not 
empirical in nature and comparisons are confined to respective codes provisions and are 
based mainly on theoretical comparisons. This research is also aimed to fill the gap on 
the global level as empirical studies comparing the corporate governance practices are not 
available. Keeping in view the importance and usefulness of such empirical study the 
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present research is likely to open the floodgate of a series of such empirical research on 
larger scale and dimensbns on global scale which will further the interest of convergence 
in corporate governance. The present research has the potential of becoming the trend 
setter for such type of studies on bigger dimensions and domains. 
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Chapter-3 
CHAPTER-3 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
Corporate Governance issue has become centre stage, post liberalization and 
globalization. In order to attract ever growing need of capital and boost economic 
activities, each country is trying hard to improve their corporate governance practices, 
so as to bring an element of trust between investors and the companies. Associated 
with the trust is the inflow of valuable capital, both domestic and global, which is the 
lifeline of any business. The present study, therefore, derives its objectives against the 
above backdrop. United Kingdom corporate governance practices are considered 
benchmark globally and a study vis-^-vis with the country is of irrmiense importance 
in improving the corporate governance of our country. The Statement of the problem 
reads as, "Corporate Governance Practices: A Comparative study of India and UK". 
As all aspects of corporate governance cannot be covered in a single research, the 
research objective is expected to be fulfilled if major CG factors are identified and 
their level of compliance are assessed for both the countries and based on comparative 
study the strength and weaknesses are identified in our system and suggestions can be 
put forward for remedial measures. Accordingly the objective of the present research 
has been framed as below. 
Research Objective 
The overall objective of the present research is to carry out comparative study of 
corporate governance practices of India and United Kingdom corporate based on 
identified critical parameters of corporate governance and compare their level of 
compliance between the two countries so as to highlights areas of major differences 
and in the process identify weaknesses in our corporate governance practices and 
suggest improvement. 
To accomplish the research objective the current research identifies a set of common 
parameters (29 in nos.) for their comparative analytical study and to assess current 
state of existence in Indian companies' vis-^-vis UK companies. These are the 
priorities areas which appears in priorities areas in the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance of UK. These are: Presence of Non-Executive Chairman, Separation of 
roles of chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Size of Board, Strength of 
Independent Directors in Boards, Strength of Non-Executive Directors (Non-
independent) in Boards, Strength of Executive Directors in Boards, Board Meeting, 
Presence of Nomination Committee in Boards, Size of Remuneration Committee, 
Strength of Independent Directors in Remuneration Committee, Strength of Non-
Executive Directors(Non-Independent) in Remuneration Committee, Strength of 
Executive Directors in Remuneration Committee, Remuneration Committee 
Meetings, Presence of Remuneration Committee, Presence of Chairman in 
Remuneration Committee, Size of Audit Conmiittee, Strength of Independent 
Directors in Audit Committee, Strength of Non- Executive Directors (Non 
Independent) in Audit Committee, Strength of Executive Directors in Audit 
Committee, Audit Committee meetings. Presence of Chairman in Audit Committee, 
Presence of Lead Independent Director, Provision for Induction and Professional 
Development, Strength of Female Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent & 
Independent), Strength of Female Independent directors in Boards, Provision for 
Performance Evaluation, Presence of Audit Committee and Promoters Presence as 
Chairman. 
Formulation of Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are being formulated for realizing the research objectives.. 
Null Hypotheses and Alternate Hypotheses for the research are listed below: 
Hoi: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman being non-executive in their companies. 
Hi: 1: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman being non-executive in their companies. 
Ho2: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of separation of roles of governance and management functions i.e., 
separate chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 
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H|2: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of separation of roles of governance and management functions i.e., 
separate chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 
Ho3: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of board members in their companies. 
H13: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of board members in their companies. 
Ho4; There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Hi4: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Ho5: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non- Executive Directors (Non Independent) in their 
corporate Boards. 
Hi5: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non- Executive Directors (Non Independent) in their 
corporate Boards. 
Ho6: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Executive Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Hi6: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Executive Directors in their corporate Boards. 
Ho7: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of board meetings they conduct in a year. 
Hi7: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of board meetings they conduct in a year. 
Ho8: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Nomination Committee in their Boards. 
Hi 8: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Nomination Committee in their Boards. 
Ho9: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in Remuneration Committee. 
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Hi9: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in Remuneration Committee. 
HolO: There is no significant difference between India and United Kmgdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in the Remuneration Committee. 
Hi 10: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in the Remuneration Committee. 
Hoi 1: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non-Executive Director (Non Independent) in the 
Remuneration committee. 
Hill: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non Executive Director (Non Independent) in the 
Remuneration committee. 
Hoi 2: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in the Remuneration Committee. 
Hi 12: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in the Remuneration Committee, 
Hoi3: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Remuneration Committee Meetings they hold in a year. 
Hi 13: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Remuneration Committee Meetings they hold in a year. 
Hol4: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Remuneration Committee. 
Hi 14: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Remuneration Committee. 
Hoi 5: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in their Remuneration Committee. 
Hi 15: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in their Remuneration Committee. 
Hoi 6: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in the Audit Committee. 
Hi 16: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of members in the Audit Committee. 
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Hoi 7: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in the Audit Committees. 
Hi 17: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of Independent directors in the Audit Committees. 
Hoi8: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non- Executive Directors (Non Independent) in the 
Audit Committee. 
Hi 18: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent) in the 
Audit Committee. 
HQI 9: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in the Audit Committee. 
Hi 19: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in the Audit Committee. 
Ho20: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Audit Committee Meetings they conduct in a year. 
H|20: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Audit Committee Meetings they conduct in a year. 
Ho21: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in the Audit Committee. 
Hi21: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman presence in the Audit Committee. 
Ho22: There is no significant difference between India and United Kmgdom on the 
matter of presence of Lead Independent Director in their corporate Board. 
Hi22: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Lead Independent Director in their corporate Board. 
Ho23: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of mean strength of companies having provisions for Induction and 
Professional Development for their Directors. 
Hi23: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of mean strength of companies having provisions for Induction and 
Professional Development for their Directors. 
138 
Ho24: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of total female Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent 
& Independent) in their companies. 
Hi24: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of total female Non-Executive Directors in their 
companies. 
Ho25: There is no significant difference between India and United Kit^dom on the 
matter of strength of female Independent Directors in their companies. 
Hi25: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of strength of female Independent Directors in their companies. 
Ho26: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of keeping provisions for performance evaluation for their directors in 
their conqianies. 
Hi26: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of keeping provisions for performance evaluation for their directors in 
their companies. 
Ho27: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
mater of average presence of Audit Committee. 
Hi27: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of average presence of Audit Committee. 
Ho28: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of average presence of promoter as Chairman. 
Hi28: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of average presence of promoter as chairman. 
Ho29: There is no significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of total strength of Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent & 
Independent) in their corporate Boards. 
Hi29: There exists significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of total strength of Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent & 
Independent) in their corporate Boards. 
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Research Design 
Descriptive research design was resorted to. In the initial stage the research carried 
out was that of exploratory in nature as the nature of the problem required identifying 
and formulating of the working hypothesis for more precise investigation. The major 
study in the initial stage was on the discovery of ideas and insights. As such it 
required flexibility to provide enough opportunity for considering different aspects of 
the problem so as to necessitate change in research procedure for gathering relevant 
data. Malhotra (2008) writes, "The primary objective of exploratory research is to 
provide insights into, and an understanding of, the problem confronting the 
researcher. Exploratory research is used in cases when you must define the problem 
more precisely, identify relevant course of action, or gain additional insights before an 
approach can be developed. The information needed is only loosely defined at this 
stage, and the research process that is adopted is flexible and unstructured",. 
In later part of the research once the formulation of Hypotheses was over with the 
population well defined, the descriptive research design was resorted to complete the 
research within the leftover extended limited time. Saravanavel(1989) writes, 
"Descriptive research aims (i) to portray accurately the characteristics of a particular 
individual situation, or group (with or without specific initial hypothesis about the 
nature of these characteristics) and (ii) to determine the frequency with which 
something occurs or with which it is associated with something else (usually, but not 
always, with a specific initial hypothesis). Malhotra (2008) writes, "Descriptive 
research is characterized by the prior formulation of specific hypotheses. Thus, the 
information needed is clearly defined. As a result, descriptive research is preplanned 
and structured. A descriptive design requires a clear specification of the who, what, 
when, where, why, and way (the six Ws)." 
Research Scope 
The importance of corporate governance is pervasive for all types of con^anies but 
for obvious reasons it is not possible to cover the entire gamut of companies 
functioning in both the country. Consequently, the scope of the study has to be 
delimited and demarcated and confined to business forms having more relevance in 
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terms of investors' protection. Consequently "Joint stock exchange listed companies" 
of the two countries is the focus of attention as their shares are purchased and sold by 
large investing public and their profit are shared by wider public and any problem in 
corporate governance affects large population along with consequential problems 
throughout the country. 
Sampling Framework 
After taking into consideration several options and issues like Annual Reports 
availability, the research objectives, similar stock Index unavailability between the 
two countries, difficulty in obtaining Annual Reports and data for smaller listed 
companies, lesser significance of smaller and tiny companies in terms of investors 
protection, the limited time availability and the cost etc, it was considered appropriate 
to confine the sampling domain within the largest operating countries from both 
countries. Accordingly top 500 companies from both countries have been chosen as 
the sampling domain from which required samples has been taken for further analysis. 
The top 500 listed companies for each country were arranged based on market 
capitalization and alternate companies, 250 in numbers, for each country, were 
selected for their fiirther detailed studies of corporate governance practices. 
Arrangement based on mkt. cap and alternate selection based on systematic random 
sampling ensured that one out of the two companies of same class entered into our 
samples and the sampling bias minimized. The type of sampling utilized, therefore, is 
systematic sampling. An element of randomness is introduced into this kind of 
sampling by using random numbers to pick up the unit with which to start. Although a 
systematic sample is not a random sample in the strict sense of the term, but it is often 
considered reasonable to treat systematic sample as a random sample. Systematic 
sampling has the extra plus point that it is an improvement over a simple random 
sample as the systematic sample is spread more evenly over the entire population. 
On investigation of the annual reports of 250 companies each, of both countries, it 
was found that companies so chosen after systematic sampling included such 
companies as Banks, Insurance, Govt, companies. Trusts, Mutual Funds, AIM listed 
companies, smaller listed companies as per UK standards (i.e., cos. below FTSE 350), 
Equity and Non-equity investment instruments. These companies belonged to 
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different class of companies so far as their governance practices were concerned and 
they were also required to comply their respective statutes in addition to the codes of 
corporate governance. In case of UK companies below FTSE 350 were regarded as 
smaller companies having less stringent standards. Mutual Fund companies of India 
and AIM listed companies of UK were exempt fi-om compliance of their respective 
corporate governance codes. Govt, listed companies, in case of India, though listed, 
are dictated more by government rules and regulation and respective ministries then 
their board of directors. All such companies were excluded from the current research 
purview. 
Sampling in case of UK 
In UK case a detailed list of companies from the stock exchange has been available 
for the year 2008-09 and the same have been utilized. Delimitation has been done 
according to the plan as mentioned above to come to the sample population. Total 
number of listing on LSE as on 27 February 2009 is 3760 which includes UK and non 
UK listings. After excluding non-UK listings the number of UK listings stands as 
2741. Few companies have more than one listing on the same exchange. After 
excluding more than one listing the final number of UK companies stands as 2170. 
Top 500 companies from the list arranged on market capitalization is selected from 
which 250 alternate samples are obtained. The sample so obtained contains biggest 
companies and includes fmancials/non-fmancials like Banks, Insurance and Equity 
Investment Instruments etc. 
From the list of above fmancials and non financials companies, the fmancials 
companies have been excluded as these are different class than non-financials 
companies and their compliance standards are in addition to the UK compliance 
combined code. Further companies belonging to Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) and smaller companies (below FTSE 350 companies) of United Kingdom have 
been excluded as there is relaxed standard for smaller companies in UK Combined 
Code. AIM companies, meant for small and growing companies, are exempt for 
compliance of any Corporate Governance standards. Few companies' annual reports 
could not be received because of server and other problems. Total number of UK 
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companies for final analysis stands as 117. Sketch depicting the arrival of final sample 
of companies for analytical study is attached at the end of the chapter. 
Sampling in case of India 
Like UK, no current list based on market capitalization is available for the year 2008-
09 though extensive search for the same has been carried out for the same. A list for 
the year 2007-08, for Bombay Stock Exchange, the largest stock exchange is however 
available. Through the available list for the year 2007-08 and current BSE 500 index 
list for the year 2008-09 a list is prepared so as to ensure that no significant top 
Companies are left out and fi-om the prepared list top 500 companies have been 
chosen. A sketch is attached herewith depicting the scheme and arrangement for 
arrival of sample size. Alternate companies fi"om the top 500 list are chosen for 
downloading of Annual Reports. From the chosen 250 companies fiirther delimitation 
has been done to exclude listed PSU and financials and mutual fund companies. The 
final number of Indian companies for the analysis stands as 186. 
Sampling tal(en together India and UK 
Final sample size of UK companies for detailed analysis: 117 
Final sample of Indian companies for detailed analysis: 186. 
Total number of companies for detailed analysis: 117+186= 303 nos. 
Process of data collection 
Data set used for the current study has been compiled by hand-collecting information 
fi-om the relevant corporate governance section of the annual reports and hence 
secondary data has been utilized for the study. Data used are fi-om Annual Reports of 
companies for the financial year 2008 in case of UK companies which is the most 
recent data available has been used for their analysis purpose. In case of India the data 
used are from the Annual reports for the year 2007-08. Annual reports of companies, 
which are the widely accepted document for a company, are considered appropriate 
for collection of wide range of data. There are two major advantages in scrutinizing 
companies' annual reports for the data. First, annual accounts and reports are 
accredited documents that proclaim a company's financial situation and corporate 
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information. The data gathered from annual reports is, therefore, supposed to be 
authoritative and credible as compared to single-respondent survey data. The second 
advantage of relying on the annual reports is that all public companies are required to 
file these reports. By going to the annual reports instead of using a survey 
methodology we generate a sample with far more response and one that is far more 
representative. "Examination of annual reports, rather than relying on retrospective 
single-respondent survey data allows us to improve both the quality and quantity of 
data available for analysis. (Rayton & Cheng, 2004). Moreover the utilization of 
annual reports of data is more economic with lesser involvement of time which is a 
desirable feature in any research design as research design is the arrangement of 
conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine 
relevance with economy. 
Data Analysis 
The data gathered from the annual reports of Indian and United Kingdom companies 
has been entered into a computer database and then analyzed using the statistical 
package for the Social Science (SPSS) and MS Excel. The data analysis consists of 
Descriptive statistics and t-test of means for two independent samples for comparing 
means, which is the most widely used statistical test. "The t-test assesses whether the 
means of two groups are statically different from each other. It is simple, 
straightforward, easy to use, and adaptable to a broad range of situations. This 
analysis is appropriate whenever one want to compare the means of two groups." 
Lowry (1999). Since the two samples for the two countries are independent of each 
other and different in numbers (186 nos. in case of India and 117 nos. in case of UK) 
the t-test for means for two independent samples has been utilized for analysis. "Two 
sample t-tests for a difference in means can be either impaired or paired. The 
unpaired, or "independent samples" t-test is used when two separate independent and 
identically distributed samples are obtained, one from each of the two populations 
being compared. (Wikipedia). The established significance level for rejecting all Null 
Hypothesis is 0.05. 
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Operational Definition 
Corporate Governance can be defined as the arrangement of system, structure and 
process through which a company is run efficiently keeping the interest of its average 
stakeholders while protecting the interest and wishes of its equity owners at its 
foremost. 
Limitations 
The study is restricted to top listed non-financial (manufacturing and service) firms 
and excludes financials companies of both the countries, PSUs in case of India and 
AIM listed companies and Smaller Companies (below FTSE 350) of United 
Kingdom. Only few critical parameters of good governance have been selected for 
comparison and the selection of these parameters are based on data and reference 
availability in each of the sampled company's annual reports. Armual reports of some 
companies were not available for downloads and these companies have not been 
considered in the analysis. Further the comparative study is based on the forms rather 
than the substance .Data for one year has been taken for comparative studies. 
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SAMPLE SIZE OF UK COMPANIES FOR 
EMPIWCAL STUDY 
117 
2S0OD0NUMB£R£C 
Top UK Cofflpanies (SOO) 
Total UK Companies {2170} 
Banks, Insurance, AIM feted. 
Smaller Cos, Equity/Nofvequity 
Investment Instalments, Cos wtxase 
A (?. NA excluded 
ALTERNATE COMPANIES EXaUOED 
COMPANIES HAVING NO MAfiKET 
CAPITAUZATION (2170-2015 = 155) 
^^^^^^^» i^^ft 
Ml Total UK Listing {2471} 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B F ^ ^ ^ 
1 All Listing {3760} on LSE as or 127 FEBRUARY 2009 {3760 1 
MULTIPLE USTING EXaUDtD 
(2471-2160 = 311) 
Non UK listing 
{3760-2469 = 1291} 
Figure 3.1: Arrival of Sample Size in case of UK 
^ > ' 
<1f 146 
SAMPLE SIZE OF INDIAN COMPANIES FOR 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Banks, Insurance, Mutual PSU Cos 
whose A R not avoitable excluded 
ALTERNATE EVEN NUMBERED 
COMPANIES EXCLUDED {250} 
COMPANIES [501 TO REST] 
EXCLUDED (1222-501=7211 
NEW CONSTITUENTS FROM BSE 500 
INDEX 08-09 flOTAl 16 IN NUMBERS) 
COMPANY BELOW 100 Cr AND NOT 
TRADED EXaUOEO (4813-1206=3607} 
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Chapter-^ 
CHAPTER-4 
Statistical analysis of the Hypotheses 
This section presents the results and analysis of statistical tests carried out for the 29 
(twenty nine) numbers research hypotheses. Established significance level for 
rejecting all null hypotheses is 0.05. 
4.1: Statistical analysis for Hypothesis 1 
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Fig. 1: Comparative figures for Mean Size of cos. having presence of Non-Executive 
Chairman 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
0.6216 
0.8793 
0.03575 
United Kingdom 
116 
0.8793 
0.3272 
0.03038 
-5.493 
297.492 
0.000 
-0.2577 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for Size 
of Companies having Non-Executive Chairman 
Hypothesis 1 related to the relationship on mean sizes of companies having 
presence of non-executive chairman in the companies of the two countries. A t-
test was used to determine whether there is significant difference between the 
population means of India and UK on the parameters. The total number of 
observations against Indian companies is 185 and that of British companies is 
115. Since sample size is larger than 30 the nonnormality is not a problem. 
SPSS test showed the Mean scores in Indian case to be 0.6216 and that of UK 
.8793. T-statistics against the variable is -5.493. Negative value signifies that 
the mean value against India is lower than that of United Kingdom. P value 
against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result 
shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is 
robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads "HQI: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of chairman being non-executive in their companies." 
The final result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi 1) 
assumes: "There is significant difference between the population means of 
India and UK on the matter of Chairman being non-executive in their 
companies." Sampling statistics depicts that 87.93% of British companies have 
their Chairman as Non-Executive. Whereas only 62.16% of the Indian 
companies have chairman as Non-Executive. Thus there exists large and 
significant difference between India and United Kingdom on the matter of 
presence of Non-Executive Chairman. 
4.2: Statistical analysis for Hypothesis 2 
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Figure 2: Comparative Figures for Mean Size of Companies having separate roles for 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
0.6613 
0.4745 
0.03480 
United 
Kingdom 
117 
0.9658 
0.1825 
0.01687 
-7.875 
259.32 
0.000 
-0.3045 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for Size 
of Companies having Separate Role for Chairman and CEO 
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Hypothesis 2 related to determination of whether there was significant 
difference between India and UK on the matter of separation of roles of 
Chairman and CEO in their boards .After taking into consideration the data 
availability against this variable, the total number of observations against India 
is 186 and that of UK 117. T-test on SPSS revealed the mean scores against 
this variable in India case to be 0.6613 and that of UK .9658. T-statistics 
against the variable is -7.785. Negative value signifies that the mean value 
against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal 
variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant difference 
of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust and significant even 
up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is 
rejected which reads "Ho2: There is no significant difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of separation of 
roles of governance and management functions i.e., separate chairman & CEO 
in their companies." The final result from the SPSS analysis, therefore, is what 
Alternate Hypothesis (Hi2) assumes: "There exists significant difference 
between the population means of India and UK on the matter separation of 
roles of governance and management functions i.e., separate chairman & CEO 
in their companies." On physical terms and what Figure 1 depicts above, 
96.58% of UK companies have separate Chairman and Chief Executive. 
Whereas only 66.13% of Indian companies have separate Chairman and Chief 
Executive. Thus there exists large and significant difference between India and 
UK on numbers of companies having separate chairman and CEO. 
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4.3: Statistical analysis for Hypothesis 3 
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Figure 3: Comparative Figures for Mean Sizes of Board 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
9.4892 
9 
10 
2.7475 
0.2015 
United Kingdom 
117 
9.1795 
9 
10 
2.3216 
0.2146 
1.052 
276.077 
0.294 
0.3098 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Board Size 
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Hypothesis 3 concerns the relationship between India and UK on the matter of 
comparison of mean size of boards. A t-test was used to determine the 
significant or insignificant difference between the two countries on this 
variable. After taking into consideration the data availability against this 
variable, the total number of observations against India is 186 and that of UK 
117. With sample size larger than 30, according to central limit theorem, non-
normality is not a problem. Equal variances were not assumed given the 
unequal group sizes. The Mean scores against this variable in India case are 
9.4892 and that of UK is 9.1795. T-statistics against the variable is 1.052. 
Positive value signifies that the mean value against India is higher than that of 
United Kingdom. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.294. 
Since p >0.05, the result do not shows significant difference of Means at 95% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is not rejected. The final 
result from the analysis, therefore, is what Null Hypothesis (Ho3) assumes: 
"There is no significant difference between the population means of India and 
United Kingdom on the matter of total strength of board members in their 
companies." Thus there exists no significant difference between India and UK 
on the matter of total strength of Board members in their companies with 
average size ranging between 9-10 in each country. 
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4.4: Analysis for Hypothesis 4 
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Figure 4: Comparative Figures for Mean Strength of Independent Directors in Board 
S.N. 
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4 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
4.7838 
5 
10 
1.7683 
0.1300 
United Kingdom 
117 
4.6068 
4 
8 
1.5310 
0.1415 
0.921 
272.165 
0.358 
0.1769 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Independent Director in Board 
155 
Hypothesis 4 concerns the relationship between India and UK on the matter of 
strength of Independent Directors in their boards. The t-test, which compared 
the two countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to determine the 
significant or insignificant differences against the CG variables. After taking 
into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 185 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against 
this variable in India case are 4.7838 and that of UK is 4.6068. T-statistics 
against the variable is 0.921. Positive value signifies that the mean value 
against India is higher than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal 
variance comes to 0.358. Since p >0.05, the result do not shows significant 
difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, 
therefore, is not rejected. The final result from the SPSS analysis, therefore, is 
what Null Hypothesis (Ho4) assumes: "There is no significant difference 
between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of 
strength of Independent Directors in their corporate Board". Thus there exists 
no significant difference between India and UK on the matter of strength of 
Independent Directors in their Boards. The results received is surprising for 
India having equal footing (4.78 in case of India and 4.60 in case of UK)with 
UK on the matter of strength of independent directors of boards and the 
reputation of UK on this matter which are considered world benchmark. The 
empirical result received has been discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.5: Analysis for Hypothesis 5 
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Fig. 5: Comparative Means Strength of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in Board 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (imequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
2.2378 
2 
2 
1.7624 
0.1296 
United Kingdom 
117 
1.1880 
2 
1 
0.8802 
0.08137 
6.861 
286.952 
0.000 
1.0498 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for Non-
Executive Directors (Non-independent) in Boards 
157 
Hypothesis 5 concerns the relationship between strength of Non-independent 
Non-Executive Directors in Indian and British Boards. The t-test, which 
compared the two countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to 
determine the significant or insignificant differences against the CG variables. 
After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 185 and that of UK 117. The 
Mean scores against this variable in India case is 2.2378 and that of UK is 
1.1880. T-statistics against the variable is 6.861. Positive value signifies that 
the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. Sampling 
statistics finds 22.38% of NED (NI) in India as against only 11.88% in case 
UK. The Indian boards are therefore found to contain twice the number of non-
independent non-executive directors than UK. 
The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho5: There is no 
significant difference between the population means of India and United 
Kingdom companies on the matter of strength of Non Executive Directors in 
their Board." The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate 
Hypothesis (Hi5) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom companies on the matter of 
strength of Non Executive Directors in their Board." 
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4.6: Analysis for Hypothesis H 6 
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Figure 6: Comparative figures for Mean Strength of Executive Directors in Board of 
India and United Kingdom 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
2.4892 
2 
1 
1.4265 
0.1046 
United Kingdom 
116 
0.3879 
0 
0 
0.5401 
0.05014 
18.115 
257.893 
0.000 
2.1013 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Executive Directors in Boards 
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Hypothesis 6 concerns the relationship between the strength of executive 
directors in the boards of the two countries. A t-test of means was performed to 
determine the significant or non-significant relationship between the two 
countries on this variable. Tests of the assumptions for t-test analysis is not 
required and is not a problem considering the sample sizes and systematic 
random sampling. The total number of observations against India is 186 and 
that of UK 116. The Mean scores against this variable in India case is 2.4892 
and that of UK is 0.3879. T-statistics against the variable is 18.115. Positive 
value signifies that the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P 
value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the 
result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The 
result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. 
The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho6: There is no 
significant difference between the population means of India and United 
Kingdom companies on the matter of number of Executive Directors in their 
boards." Sampling statistics reveals 24.89% of Executive Directors in Indian 
Boards as against only 3.88% in case of United Kingdom. Indian Boards, as the 
result speaks, accommodates on an average six times the no. of Executive 
Directors in UK boards. The final result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is what 
Alternate Hypothesis (Hi6) assumes: "There exists significant difference 
between the population means of India and United Kingdom companies on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in their boards." 
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.7: Analysis for Hypothesis H 7 
Figure 7: Comparative figures for Mean of Board Meeting held by Cos. in a year 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
6.3441 
6 
5 
2.5405 
0.1863 
United Kingdom 
116 
8.6897 
8 
8 
2.6619 
0.2471 
-7.579 
235.522 
0.000 
-2.3456 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Size of Board Meeting held per year 
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Hypothesis 7 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter of 
Size of Board Meeting held by the companies of respective countries per year. 
A t-Test was carried out on SPSS for determining the same with mean value. 
After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 186 and that of UK 116. The 
Mean score against this variable in India case is 6.3441 and that of UK is 
8.6897. T-statistics against the variable is -7.579. Negative value signifies that 
the mean value against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho7: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of board meetings they conduct in a year." The final result 
from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi7) assumes: 
"There exists significant difference between the population means of India and 
United Kingdom on the matter of number of board meetings they conduct in a 
year." As per Sampling Statistics, Indian Boards conducts on an average 6.34 
nos. of meeting. Whereas their counterparts of UK conducts 8.69 nos. of 
meetings. Thus Indian Boards, on an average, conducts much lesser number of 
Board Meetings as against UK measured on actual practices of the companies. 
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4.8: Analysis for Hypothesis H 8 
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Figure 8: Comparative figures for Mean size of Companies having presence of 
Nomination Committee 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
0.06452 
0.2463 
0.01806 
United Kingdom 
117 
0.9915 
0.008547 
0.008547 
-46.388 
256.607 
0.000 
-0.9269 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for Size 
of Company having presence of Nomination Committee 
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Hypothesis 8 concerned the relationship between India and United Kingdom on 
the matter of presence of the Nomination Committee. A t-test of means for two 
independent samples was utilized to determine relationship on mean size of 
companies having presence of Nomination Committee. After taking into 
consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 186 and UK 117. The Mean scores in India case is 
0.06452 and that of UK is 0.9915. T-statistics against the variable is -46.388. 
Negative value signifies that the mean value against India is lower than that of 
UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 
0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence 
interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads 
•'Ho8: There is no significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom companies on the issue of presence of Nomination 
Committee in their Board." The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what 
Alternate Hypothesis (Hi8) assumes: "There exists significant difference 
between the population means of Indian and United Kingdom companies on 
the issue of presence of Nomination Committee in their Board." On physical 
terms 99.15% of UK companies have their Sr. Independent Director (or. Lead 
Independent Director) in their board. Whereas only 6.45% of Indian companies 
have their Lead Independent Director. Thus there exists huge difference 
between India and UK practice on this important parameter of Corporate 
Governance with India lagging far behind UK. 
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4.9: Analysis for Hypothesis H 9 
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Figure 9: Comparative figures for Mean Size of Remuneration Committee 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
148 
3.3716 
3 
3 
0.8020 
0.06593 
-5.08 
United Kingdom 
117 
3.9316 
4 
3 
0.9535 
0.08815 
S 
226.218 
0.000 
-0.5600 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for Size 
of Remuneration Committee 
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After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 148 and that of UK 117. The 
Mean score against this variable in India case is 3.3716 and that of UK is 
3.9316. T-statistics against the variable is -5.088. Negative value signifies that 
the mean value against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho9: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of Indian and United Kingdom on the 
issue of strength of members in the Remuneration Committee of their 
companies' boards." The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what 
Alternate Hypothesis (Hi9) assumes: "There exists significant difference 
between the population means of Indian and United Kingdom on the issue of 
strength of members in the Remuneration Committee of their companies' 
boards." The result is based on practices on corporate governance and what 
these companies themselves disclose about the variables in Annual Reports. 
Sampling statistics furnishes average figures of 3.3716 in case of India and 
3.9316 in case of UK. Thus there exists significant difference on the matters of 
size of Remuneration Committee so far as measurements based on actual 
practices of the top corporate of the countries are concerned. 
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4.10: Analysis for Hypothesis H 10 
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Fig. 10: Comparative figvires of means for Strength of Independent Directors in RC 
S.N. 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
148 
2.6216 
3 
3 
0.9288 
0.07635 
United Kingdom 
117 
3.5043 
3 
3 
0.9705 
0.08972 
-7.492 
243.901 
0.000 
-0.8827 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Independent Directors in Remimeration Committee (RC) 
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Hypothesis 10 concerned the comparative relationship between India and 
United Kingdom on the matter of strength of Independent Directors in 
Remuneration Committee. A t-Test of two independent samples was carried 
out to determine the strength of relationship of Means of this variable.After 
taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total 
number of observations against India is 148 and that of UK 117. The Mean 
score against this variable in India case is 2.6216 and that of UK is 3.5043. T-
statistics against the variable is -7.492. Negative value signifies that the mean 
value against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal 
variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant difference 
of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust and significant even 
up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is 
rejected which reads "HQIO: There is no significant difference between the 
population means of Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of number of 
Independent Directors in their Remuneration Committee of the board." The 
final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi 10) 
assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of number of Independent Directors 
in their Remuneration Committee of the board." The Sampling Statistics shows 
number of Independent Directors in Remuneration Committee in Indian case to 
be 2.62 as against 3.50 in case of United Kingdom. The Remuneration 
Committee of Indian corporate thus can be supposed to be lesser Independent 
than that of UK. 
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4.11: Analysis for Hypothesis H 11 
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Figure 11: Comparative figure of Means Strength of NED (NI) in RC 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p-
value 
Mean Difference 
India 
148 
0.6216 
0.7860 
0.06461 
United Kingdom 
117 
0.4274 
0.5620 
0.05195 
2.343 
260.528 
0.020 
0.1943 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in Remuneration Committee 
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Hypothesis 11 concerned the relationship between India and United on the 
matter of strength of Non-independent Non-Executive Directors in 
Remuneration Committees of their respective top corporate practices. A t-test 
of Means, which is a very robust test, was carried out on SPSS for determining 
the test of Significant or non-significant relationship of the variables. After 
taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total 
number of observations against India is 148 and that of UK 117. The Mean 
score against this variable in India case is 0,6216 and that of UK is 0.4274. T-
statistics against the variable is -2.343. Negative value signifies that the mean 
value against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal 
variance comes to 0.020. Since p < 0,05, the result shows significant difference 
of Means at 95% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is 
rejected which reads "HQII: There is no significant difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of number of 
Non-Executive Directors(Non-Independent) in the Remuneration Committee 
of their boards." The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate 
Hypothesis (H|ll) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of number of 
Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent) in the Remuneration Committee 
of their boards." Sampling statistics reveals a large and significant difference 
between the two countries with Indian Remuneration Committee 
accommodating larger numbers of non-independent non-executive members as 
compared to their British counterparts. 
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4.12: Analysis for Hypothesis H 12 
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Fig. 12: Comparative Figures for Mean Strength of Executive Directors in RC 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
g 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
149 
0.1342 
0.3795 
0.03109 
United Kingdom 
117 
0.000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
4.317 
148 
0.000 
0.1342 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Executive Directors (ED) in Remuneration Committee 
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After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 149 and that of UK 117. The 
Mean scores against this variable in India case is 0.1342 and that of UK is 
0.000. T-statistics against the variable is 4.317. Positive value signifies that the 
mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P value against two tailed 
unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant 
difference of Means at 95% confidence mterval. The result is robust and 
significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads "Hol2: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Executive Directors in their Remuneration Committee." 
The final result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(Hil2) assumes: ".There exists significant difference between the population 
means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of number of Executive 
Directors in their Remuneration Committee" 
Sampling statistics against the variable finds no executive members in British 
Remuneration Committee whereas Indian boards were found to accommodate 
Executive members. Keeping in view critical nature of remuneration related 
decisions taken by Remuneration Committee the presence of Executive 
members in Remuneration Committee in Indian Boards points towards 
increased management influence over pay related decisions. 
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4.13: Analysis for Hypothesis H 13 
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Figure 13: Comparative Mean figures for Size of Remuneration Committee Meeting 
SN 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
141 
1.9007 
1 
1 
1.4308 
0.1205 
United Kingdom 
117 
4.4872 
5 
4 
1.8965 
0.1753 
-12.157 
212.224 
0.000 
-2.5865 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Size of Remuneration Committee Meeting 
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Hypothesis 13 concerned testing the parameters of Mean Size of Meeting of 
Remuneration Committee to determine their significant difference or otherwise 
between Indian and UK top corporate practices in this variable. A t-Test of 
means for two independent samples was carried out to find out the relationship. 
After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 141 and that of UK 117. The 
Mean scores against this variable in India case is 1.9007 and that of UK is 
4.4872. T-statistics against the variable is -12.157. Negative value signifies that 
the mean value against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho 13: There is no significant 
I 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Remuneration Committee they holds in a year." The final 
result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi 13) 
assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population means of 
India and United Kingdom on the matter of number of Remuneration 
Committee they holds in a year." Thus there exists large difference between 
India and UK on the matter of number of Remuneration Committee Meetings 
with, as the sampling statistics reveals, India RC conducts twice the lesser 
number of meetings when compared with British Remuneration Committee. 
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4.14: Analysis for Hypothesis H 14 
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Fig. 14: Comparative figure for Mean size of cos. having presence of RC 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
0.8065 
0.3961 
0.02905 
United 
Kingdom 
117 
1.000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-6.663 
185.000 
0.000 
-0.1935 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Size of Companies having presence of Remuneration Committee 
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Hypothesis 14 concerned the relationship between average size of companies 
having presence of Remuneration Committee in India and UK. A t-test was 
performed on SPSS to come to empirical conclusions. After taking into 
consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against 
this variable in India case is 0.8065 and that of UK is 1.000. T-statistics against 
the variable is -6.663. Negative value signifies that the mean value against 
India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance 
comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant difference of 
Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust and significant even up 
to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is 
rejected which reads "Hol4: There is no significant difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of presence of 
Remuneration Committee." 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(Hi 14) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population 
means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of presence of 
Remuneration Committee." 
The Sampling statistics finds only 80.65% of Indian corporate to possess the 
Remuneration Committee whereas all UK (100%) corporate were found to 
possess Remuneration Committee. 
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4.15: Analysis for Hypothesis H 15 
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Figure 15: Comparative figures of Mean Size of Companies having Chairman 
present in Remuneration Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
149 
0.3087 
0.4635 
0.03797 
-1.1 
United Kingdom 
117 
0.3761 
0.4865 
0.04498 
144 
243.392 
0.254 
-0.06734 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Size of Cos. having Chairman present in Remuneration Committee 
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Hypothesis 15 concerned the relationship between the two countries on the 
matter of mean size of companies having presence of chairman in 
Remuneration Committee. A t-test of means for two independent samples was 
carried out to find out the strength of relationship on this variable. After taking 
into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 149 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against 
this variable in India case is 0.3087 and that of UK is .3761. T-statistics against 
the variable is -1.144. Negative value signifies that the mean value against 
India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance 
comes to 0.254. Since p > 0.05, the result do not shows significant difference of 
Means at 95% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is not 
rejected. The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Null Hypothesis 
(Ho 15) assumes: "There is no significant difference between the population 
means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of Chairman presence on 
their Remuneration Committee." On physical terms and what Figure 15 depicts 
above, 37.61% of UK companies have chairman in the Remuneration 
Committee. Whereas only 30.87% of Indian companies have chairman in their 
Remuneration Committee. India can be considered to be more or less on equal 
footing on this variable with UK. However considering the nature of 
appointments of Chairman which are more ED in India than the UK where 
almost have NED the overall effect of presence of Chairman can be just the 
opposite. The result has been further discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.16: Analysis for Hypothesis 16 
Figure 16: Comparative figures for Mean strength of Audit Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
3.7189 
3 
3 
0.9307 
0.06843 
United Kingdom 
117 
3.6239 
3 
3 
0.8683 
0.08027 
0.901 
259.462 
0.369 
0.09499 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
Strength of Audit Committee 
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Hypothesis 16 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter 
of strength of Audit Committees between India and UK. The t-test, which 
compared the two countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to 
determine the significant or insignificant differences against the CG variables. 
After taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the 
total number of observations against India is 185 and that of UK 117. The 
Mean score against this variable in India case is 3.7189 and that of UK is 
3.6239. T-statistics against the variable is 0.901. Negative value signifies that 
the mean value against India is lower than that of UK, P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.369. Since p >0.05, the result do not shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is not rejected. 
The final result fi*om the analysis, therefore, is what Null Hypothesis (Ho 16) 
assumes: "There is no significant difference between the population means of 
India and United Kingdom on the matters of number of members in the Audit 
Committee of their Board." 
The statistical results therefore find India and UK on equal footing on the 
matter of strength of Audit Committees with India having an edge over UK so 
far as strength of members in Audit Committees is concerned. 
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4.17: Analysis for Hypothesis H-17 
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Figure 17: Comparative figures for Mean strength of Independent Directors in Audit 
Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
3.0595 
3 
3 
.9508 
0.06991 
United Kingdom 
117 
3.5043 
3 
3 
.9250 
0.08551 
-4.027 
251.916 
0.000 
-.4448 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two Independent Samples for 
strength of Independent Directors in Audit Committee 
181 
Hypothesis 17 concerned the strength of Independent members in Audit 
Conmiittee which is very vital for board functioning as crucial decisions are 
taken in Audit Committees. The t-test, which compared the two countries with 
respect to their mean scores, was used to determine the significant or 
insignificant differences against the CG variables. After taking into 
consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 185 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against 
this variable in India case are 3.0595 and that of UK is 3.5043. T-statistics 
against the variable is -4.027. Negative value signifies that the mean value 
against India is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal 
variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant difference 
of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust and significant even 
up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is 
rejected which reads "Hol7: There is no significant difference between the 
population means of Indian and United Kingdom on the strength of Audit 
Committee in their companies." 
The final result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(Hil7) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population 
means of Indian and United Kingdom on the strength of Audit Committee in 
their companies." Indian Boards as the empirical analysis and results furnished 
were found to be contain lesser number of Independent directors than that of 
UK Audit Committees. 
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4.18: Analysis for Hypothesis H 18 
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Figure 18: Comparative figures for Mean strength of NED (NI) in Audit Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
.4649 
.6595 
0.04849 
United Kingdom 
117 
.1197 
.3975 
0.03674 
5.674 
299.397 
0.000 
.3452 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics and Test result for two Independent Samples for 
strength of NED (Non-independent) in Audit Committee 
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Hypothesis 18 concerned the relationships between India and UK on the matter 
of numbers of non-independent non-executive directors in Audit Committee. 
The t-test, which compared the two countries with respect to their mean scores, 
was used to determine the significant or insignificant differences against the 
CG variables. After taking into consideration the data availability against this 
variable, the total number of observations against India is 185 and that of UK 
117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case is 0.4649 and that of 
UK is 0.1197. T-statistics against the variable is 5.674. Positive value signifies 
that the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the resuh shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads "Hol8: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the 
matter of number of Non-Executive Directors in the Audit Committee of their 
companies" 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(Hi 18) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population 
means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of number of Non-Executive 
Directors in the Audit Committee of their companies. As per the statistical 
figures Indian Audit Committees are found to contain four times higher number 
of NED (Non-independent) than that of United Kingdom. 
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4.19: Analysis for Hypothesis 19 
Fig. 19: Comparative Mean Strength of Executive Directors in Audit Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
.1935 
.3961 
0.02905 
United Kingdom 
117 
.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
6.663 
185.000 
0.000 
.1935 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for 
Executive Director Strength in Audit Committee 
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Hypothesis 19 concerned the numbers of Executive Directors present in the 
Audit Committee between India and UK. The t-test, which compared the two 
countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to determine the 
significant or insignificant differences against the CG variables. After taking 
into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against 
this variable in India case is 0.1935 and that of UK is 0.000. T-statistics against 
the variable is 6.663. Negative value signifies that the mean value against India 
is lower than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 
0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% 
confidence interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 
99% confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which 
reads "Hol9: There is no significant difference between the population means 
of India and United Kingdom on the matter of strength of Executive Directors 
in the Audit Committees of their companies." The fmal result from the 
analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi 19) assumes: "There exists 
significant difference between the population means of India and United 
Kingdom on the matter of strength of Executive Directors in the Audit 
Committees of their companies." As per the sampling statistics and statistical 
figures furnished above, the findings are that whereas Indian Audit Conmiittees 
were found to accommodate Executive Members in their Audit Committee, 
there were no Executive members in UK Audit Committees. 
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4.20: Analysis for Hypothesis H 20 
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Figure 20: Comparative Figures for Mean Size of Audit Committee Meeting 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
4.8172 
4.5 
4 
1.2165 
0.08920 
United Kingdom 
117 
3.9402 
4 
4 
1.0363 
0.09581 
6.700 
274.794 
.000 
.8770 
Table 20: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for Size 
of Audit Committee Meeting 
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Hypothesis 20 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter 
of number of Audit Committee Meetings of Audit Committees of the two 
countries. The t-test, which compared the two countries with respect to their 
mean scores, was used to determine the significant or insignificant differences 
against the CG variables. After taking into consideration the data availability 
against this variable, the total number of observations against India is 186 and 
that of UK 117. The Mean score against this variable in India case is 4.8172 
and that of UK is 3.9402. T-statistics against the variable is 6.700. Positive 
value signifies that the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P 
value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the 
result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The 
result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. 
The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho20: There is no 
significant difference between the population means of India and United 
Kingdom on the matter of number of Audit Committee Meetings their 
companies conducts in a year." The final result from the analysis, therefore, is 
what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi20) assumes: "There exists significant difference 
between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of 
number of Audit Committee Meetings their companies conducts in a year." The 
statistical figures furnished as above reveals that India has an edge over UK on 
the matter of numbers of Audit Committee Meetings her corporate conducts 
with average figures of 4.8172 in case of India and 3.9402 in case of UK. 
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4.21: Analysis for Hypothesis H 21 
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Fig. 21: Comparative Mean Size of Cos. having presence of Chairman in Audit 
Committee 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
.2258 
.4192 
0.03074 
United Kingdom 
117 
0.07692 
.2676 
0.02474 
3.773 
300.924 
.000 
.1489 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for Size 
of Companies having Chairman present in Audit Committee 
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Hypothesis 21 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter 
presence of Chairman in Audit Committees. After taking into consideration the 
data availability against this variable, the total number of observations against 
India is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India 
case is 0.2258 and that of UK is 7.692E-02. T-statistics against the variable is 
3.773. Positive value signifies that the mean value against India is higher than 
that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p 
< 0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence 
interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads 
"Ho21:There is no significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of Chairman being the member of 
Audit Committee of their companies" 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(Hi21) assumes: ".There exists significant difference between the population 
means of Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of Chairman being the 
member of Audit Committee of their companies" On physical terms and what 
Figure 21 depicts above, only 7.69% of UK companies have their Chairman 
present in Audit Committees. Whereas 22.58% of Indian companies have their 
chairman in the Audit Committees which goes against India keeping in view 
increased numbers of combined roles, presence of promoter Chairman etc. 
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Figure 22: Comparative figures for Mean size of cos. having presence of Sr. 
Independent Director in Boards 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
0.02688 
.1622 
0.01189 
-56.5C 
United Kingdom 
117 
.9829 
.1302 
0.01204 
7 
283.578 
0.000 
-.9560 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for Size 
of Cos. having Sr. Independent Director in Boards 
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Hypothesis 22 was formulated to assess the relationship on the matter of mean 
number of companies having Lead Independent Director in their board. After 
taking into consideration the data availability against this variable, the total 
number of observations against India is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean 
scores against this variable in India case is 2.688E-02 and that of UK is 0.9829. 
T-statistics against the variable is -56.507. Negative value signifies that the 
mean value against India is much lower than that of UK. P value against two 
tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result shows 
significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is robust 
and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho22: There is no significant 
difference between the population means of Indian and United Kingdom on the 
matter of presence of Sr. Independent Director." 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(H|22) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population 
means of Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of presence of Sr. 
Independent Director." On physical terms and what Figure 1 depicts above, 
98.29% of UK companies have their Lead Independent Director. Whereas only 
2.69% of Indian companies have their Lead Independent Director. Thus there 
exists huge difference on the matter of companies having Sr. Independent 
Director between the two countries with India not worth comparison at all on 
this important parameters of corporate governance. 
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Figure 23: Comparative figures for Mean Size of companies having provision for 
Induction & Professional development 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
.1075 
.3106 
0.02278 
United Kingdom 
117 
.9231 
.2676 
0.02474 
-24.252 
272.985 
0.000 
-.8156 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics and t-test result for two independent samples for size 
of companies having provision for Induction & Professional development 
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Hypothesis 23 was fonnulated to assess the mean size of companies having 
provision for Induction and Professional Development for their board members 
for the two countries. A t-test, which compared the two countries with respect 
to their mean scores, was used to determine the significant or insignificant 
differences against the CG variables. After taking into consideration the data 
availability against this variable, the total number of observations against India 
is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case 
is 0.1075 and that of UK is .9231. T-statistics against the variable is -24.252. 
Negative value signifies that the mean value against India is lower than that of 
UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 
0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence 
interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads 
"Ho23: There is no significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of keeping provision for Induction 
and Professional development for their directors in their companies." The final 
result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi23) 
assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom on the matter of keeping provision for Induction 
and Professional development for their directors in their companies." As per 
sampling statistics furnished above 92.31% of UK companies keep provision 
for induction and professional development. The corresponding figure in case 
oflndia is only 10.75%. 
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Figure 24: Comparative figures for Mean Strength of Female Non-Executive 
Directors (NI & I) in Boards 
S.N. 
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Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
.3065 
0 
0 
.5479 
0.04017 
-5.571 
United Kingdom 
117 
.8120 
1 
0 
.8802 
0.08137 
172.994 
.000 
-.5055 
Table 24: Descriptive statistics and T-test result for two independent samples for 
Strength of Female Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent & Independent) in 
Boards 
195 
Hypothesis 24 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter of total 
strength of female Non-Executive Directors (NI&I). A t-test, which compared the 
two countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to determine the 
significant or insignificant differences against the CG variables. After taking into 
consideration the data availability against this variable, the total number of 
observations against India is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this 
variable in India case is 0.3065 and that of UK is .8120. T-statistics against the 
variable is -5.571. Negative value signifies that the mean value ag^nst India is lower 
than that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p 
< 0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. 
The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. 
The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho24. There is no significant 
difference between the population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter 
of strength of total female Non-Executive Directors (NI &I) in their companies." 
The final result fix)m the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi24) 
assumes: "There exists si^ificant difference between the population means of India 
and United Kingdom on the matter of strength of total female Non-Executive 
Directors (NI&I) in their companies." Thus there exists large and significant 
difference between India and UK on the matters of presence of female Non-
executives (NI&I) in their boards with India lagging far behind than UK on this 
important variable. 
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4.25: Analysis for Hypothesis H-25 
Figure 25: Comparative figures for mean strength of female Independent Directors 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
.1183 
.3238 
0.02374 
-7.49C 
United Kingdom 
117 
.6496 
.7230 
0.06684 
) 
145.668 
0.000 
-.5313 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics and t-Test results for two independent samples for 
Strength of Female Independent Director in Boards 
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Hypothesis 25 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter 
of presence of female Independent Directors in their boards. The t-test, which 
compared the two countries with respect to their mean scores, was used to 
determine the differences. The total number of observations against India is 
186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case is 
0.1183 and that of UK is .6496. T-statistics against the variable is -7.490. 
Negative value signifies that the mean value against India is lower than that of 
UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 
0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence 
interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads 
"Ho25: There is no significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom companies so far as strength of female 
Independent Directors in their company's boards are concerned." The final 
result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis (Hi 25) 
assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom companies so far as strength of female 
Independent Directors in their company's boards is concerned." Thus there 
exist significant difference between India and UK on the matter of strength of 
female Independent directors and when compared with previous results the 
margin of difference with female Independent Directors are greater than the 
total female Non-executives taken together Independent and Non-independent. 
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4.26: Analysis for Hypothesis H-26 
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Figure 26: Comparative figures for Mean Size of Companies having provision for 
Performance Evaluation 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
0.08602 
.2812 
0.02062 
United 
Kingdom 
117 
.9658 
.1825 
0.01687 
-33.027 
300.686 
.000 
-.8798 
Table: 26: Descriptive Statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for 
Size of companies having provision of Performance Evaluation 
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Hypothesis 26 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the 
matter of determination of relationship between mean size of companies 
having provision for performance evaluation. A t-test was carried out to 
determine the relationship. After taking into consideration the data 
availability against this variable, the total number of observations against India 
is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case 
is 8.602E-02 and that of UK is .9658. T-statistics against the variable is -
33.027. Negative value signifies that the mean value against India is lower than 
that of UK. P value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p 
< 0.05, the result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence 
interval. The result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% 
confidence interval. The Null Hypothesis , therefore, is rejected which reads 
"Ho26: There is no significant difference between the population means of 
Indian and United Kingdom so far as keeping provisions for performance 
evaluation for their directors in their companies are concerned." 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(H]26) assumes: "There exists significant difference between the population 
means of Indian and United Kingdom so far as keeping provisions for 
performance evaluation for their directors in their companies are concerned." 
On physical terms and what Figure 1 depicts above, 96.58% of UK companies 
have provision for performance evaluation for their board members. Whereas 
only 8.60% of Indian companies have such provisions. 
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4.27: Analysis for Hypothesis H 27 
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Figure 27: Comparative figures for Mean Size of Companies having Audit Committee 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
186 
1 
.0000 
.0000 
United Kingdom 
117 
1 
.0000 
.0000 
T cannot be computed because standard 
deviations of both groups are 0. 
— 
Table 27: Descriptive Statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for Size 
of Companies having presence of Audit Committee 
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Hypothesis 27 concerned over the matter of average presence of Audit 
Committees in Indian and UK Boards and determination of comparative figures 
for the two countries. A t-test, which compared the two countries with respect 
to their mean scores, was used to determine the significant or insignificant 
differences against the CG variables. After taking into consideration the data 
availability against this variable, the total number of observations against India 
is 186 and that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case 
is 1.000 and that of UK also 1.000. T-statistics against the variable is not 
calculated as the standard deviations of both the groups are zero. The final 
result fi-om the analysis, therefore, is: "There is no difference between the 
population means of India and United Kingdom on the matter of presence of 
Audit Committee." On physical terms and what Figure 1 depicts above, each 
UK companies and Indian companies have Audit Committee in their boards. 
Equal footings on the matter fi"om Indian side may be because of mandatory 
nature of provisions for the variable in The Revised Clause 49 which 
emphasize the importance of need for mandatory provisions in Indian condition 
and satisfactory compliance on any corporate governance parameters. 
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4.28: Analysis for Hypothesis H 28 
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Figure 28: Comparative figures for Mean Size of Companies having Promoter as 
Chairman 
S.N. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
.5217 
.5005 
0.03680 
United Kingdom 
116 
0.01724 
.1307 
0.01214 
13.227 
222.020 
.000 
.5125 
Table 28: Descriptive Statistics and t-test result for two independent samples for Size 
of Companies having Promoter as Chairman 
203 
Hypothesis 28 concerned the mean presence of company promoters as 
chairman in India and UK. The t-test, which compared the two countries with 
respect to their mean scores of companies having promoters as chairman was 
used to determine the significant or insignificant differences against the CG 
variables. After taking into consideration the data availability against this 
variable, the total number of observations against India is 185 and that of UK 
116. The Mean scores against this variable in India case is 0.5217 and that of 
UK is 1.724E-02. T-statistics against the variable is 13.227. Positive value 
signifies that the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P value 
against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the result 
shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The result is 
robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. The Null 
Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which reads "Ho28: There is no significant 
difference between the mean of India and UK on the number of promoter 
chairman in their companies." 
The final result from the analysis, therefore, is what Alternate Hypothesis 
(H,28) assumes: "There exists significant difference between India and UK on 
the number of promoter chairman in their companies." On physical terms and 
what Figure 1 depicts above, only 1.72% of UK companies have promoter 
Chairman as against 52.17% of Promoter Chairman in Indian companies. 
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4.29: Analysis for H 29 
5 7949 
2 
1 
0 
Figures: Comparative figures for Mean strength of Total Non-Executive Directors 
(Non-independent & Independent) in Board 
S.N. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Median 
Mode 
Std. Deviation 
Standard Error of Means 
t value (unequal variance) 
Degree of Freedom 
Sig (Two tailed) or, p- value 
Mean Difference 
India 
185 
7.0216 
7 
6 
2.2841 
0.1679 
United 
Kingdom 
117 
5.7949 
6 
5 
1.7789 
0.1645 
5.219 
287.178 
0.000 
1.2267 
Table 28: Descriptive Statistics and t-Test result for two independent samples for 
strength of Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent & Independent) in Board. 
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Hypothesis 29 concerned the relationship between India and UK on the matter 
of strength of total non-executive directors both independent and non-
independent. A t-test, which compared the two countries with respect to their 
mean scores, was used to determine the significant or insignificant differences 
against the CG variables. After taking into consideration the data availability 
against this variable, the total number of observations against India is 185 and 
that of UK 117. The Mean scores against this variable in India case is 7.0216 
and that of UK is 5.7949. T-statistics against the variable is 5.219. Positive 
value signifies that the mean value against India is higher than that of UK. P 
value against two tailed unequal variance comes to 0.000. Since p < 0.05, the 
result shows significant difference of Means at 95% confidence interval. The 
result is robust and significant even up to the level of 99% confidence interval. 
The Null Hypothesis, therefore, is rejected which assumes that there is no 
significant difference between India and UK on the matter of strength of total 
Non-Executive Directors (both NI& I). The statement of alternate hypothesis, 
therefore, holds true which states: "Hi29: There exists significant difference 
between India and UK on the matter of total strength of Non-Executive 
Directors (NI & I) in their corporate Boards." As per the statistical figures 
furnished above Indian Boards have increased numbers of total non-executive 
directors in their boards as compared to UK. However among the total non-
executive directors the proportion of non-independent members is greater in 
composition in India boards. 
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Chaffter'5 
CHAPTER-5 
Results and Discussions 
5.1: Discussions for H-1 (Chairman Non-executive) 
Statistical analysis resulted in significant difference between the population means of 
companies on the matter of Chairman being Non-Executive in the Indian and United 
Kingdom and the results is robust up to the significance level of 99% confidence 
interval. On the whole 62.16% of Indian companies were found to have Non-
Executive Chairman whereas 87.93% of UK companies were found to have Non-
Executive Chairman. Keeping in view the importance of outer perspective held by a 
non-executive chairman and better oversight role and independent perspectives held 
by a non-executive chairman over the management functions, the same is severely 
compromised in case of Indian Companies then their UK counterparts. The UK 
Boards may, therefore, be considered to have greater oversight functions over their 
CEO and the management functions over their Indian counterparts and UK Boards are 
better equipped to deliver their assigned functions. The need for non-executive 
chairman is emphasized by several researchers. Jensen and Fuller (2003) argue in 
USA context where the executive-chairman model prevails, "Academics and students 
of corporate governance have long debated the respective merits of executive and 
non-Executive chairman. Recent events will undoubtedly rekindle that debate and 
may decisively tip the balance in favor of the non-executive model. The attractiveness 
of that approach stems not only from the hope that non-executive chairman would 
have interdicted the cycles of managerial self-delusion, hubris and, in some cases, 
outright fraud that destroyed some prominent companies and undermined trusts in the 
capital markets, but also from pure workload considerations." They go on further, 
"Admittedly, a more informed, independent perspective might have helped prevent 
some of the abuses. But as we look to the future, the logic for a non-executive 
chairman becomes compelling..."The role of chairman, which is the head of the 
board, should be held by a Non executive and most preferably by an Independent 
Non-executive director. An outside chairman not only brings outside perspective and 
orientation but also being aloof from the executive responsibility minimizes the risk 
of concentration of powers in one individual and no single individual dominates the 
board proceedings (Combined Code). From the days of Cadbury's, forbidding 
unfettered power and authority, to all the updated Combined Code till date like that of 
1998, 2003, 2006 & 2008, UK forbids the combining the two post and posits, "A 
chief executive should not go on to be the chairman of the same company. If 
exceptionally a board decides that a chief executive should become chairman, the 
board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons to 
shareholders at the time of the appointment and in the next annual report." (A,2.2, The 
Combined Code, June 2006, UK). Reddy(2000), former secretary. Ministry of 
finance. Govt, of India and Dy. Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, writes on 
the issue "The roles of the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) should be 
separated. The chairman should ideally be a non-executive director. The appointment 
of the CEO and other whole-time director should be left to the board of directors with 
the help of a nomination committee. A nomination committee comprising of directors 
(the majority of whom shall be non-executive directors) chaired by the chairman 
should have the responsibility of proposing to the board new appointments (both 
executive and non-executive directors)." Balasubramanian (1998) suggests, 
"Chairman should preferably be an outsider, a person of standing and reputation with 
broad based experience who can bring in an independent external perspective to board 
discussions". Merson (2004) agrees on the issue of non-executive chairman, 
" many would counsel that the interests of all are best served if the chairman of the 
board is non-executive, thus ensuring that the board itself fulfills its responsibilities 
by separating board management from company management." 
5.2: Discussion for H-2 (Separation of roles i.e., Separate Chairman & CEO) 
Statistical analysis finds that there exist significant differences between the population 
means on the matter of separation of roles. Whereas only 66.13% of Indian companies 
were found to have separate Chairman and CEO, the UK companies were found to 
have in much better conditions with 96.58% of their top listed companies having 
separate Chairman and CEO, to monitor the governance and management functions 
separately. The result suggests that there still exists about 34% of the Indian 
companies, where there is combined post of Chairman and CEO. When the result is 
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clubbed with that of the result of H 1 (Non-Executive Chairman), where as much as 
38% of the Indian Chairman are executives, the composite picture yields the picture 
that not only much greater percentage of Indian companies have Executive chairman, 
but that they also combine the functions of chairman and CEO, which severely 
jeopardizes the Indian board oversight role and leads to greater concentration of 
power in an individuals which greatly differs with UK principles and corporate 
governance structure. Unseparated system suffers from all the weaioiesses of an 
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autocratic style of leadership like demotivation and demoralization of sincere 
workforce, promotions and incentives to back biters, out of turn promotions based on 
personal equations, leading to ultimate decline of the organization. Singh (2005) 
writes on the abuses of concentrated power resulting from combined role of chairman 
and CEO in his book, "During my two decades of corporate experience in different 
organizatk)ns, I myself saw patently wrong things happening in the organization with 
tacit consent and support from the Chairman-cum-CEO; the Board was taken for a 
ride and ultimately couple of active players in the scandals along with the Chairman 
had to be sacked; but only after colossal financial damage to the health and hitherto 
bright image of the institution had already been inflicted." Carver & Oliver (2002) 
posits, "The purpose and nature of board authority require that governance and 
mam^ement be treated differently. They are different roles, producing different value 
addition, requiring different skills, and addressing different levels of work. Failing to 
delineate clearly between these roles severely hinders effective governance." The 
authors fiirther ^prises us, through the result of an opinion survey in their book, "A 
McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey during the year 2000 found that investors see 
separation of the positions to be a key factor in board performance, ranking it as 
important as having a majority of outside directors." Fuller & Jensen (2003) writes, 
"For all intents and purposes, the directors at most conqianies are employees of the 
CEO. The CEO does most of the recruiting for the board and extends the offer to join 
the board. And, except in unusual cases, board members serve at the pleasure of the 
CEO. Moreover, it is rare that the board meets outside of the CEO's presence or 
without his explicit permission. Finally, virtually all information, board members 
receive from the company, originates from the CEO, except in highly controlled or 
\musual circumstances. A change in these practices will require a major change in the 
power relationship between the board and the CEO, perhaps going as far as a 
structural separatbn between the Chairman's and CEO's positions." 
There are two key tasks at the top of every public company - the running of the board 
and the executive responsibility for the nmning of the company's business. There 
should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company which will 
ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered 
powers of decision. 
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A study by Dahya et al. (1996) found in UK context that the stock market reacted 
favorably to the separation of the two posts and negatively if they were actually 
combined. In addition, companies that combined the two post and adopted duality 
performed worse in accoimting performance terms, the year after the change. The UK 
Code of Best Practice (Cadbury Committee, 1992) recommends that the positions of 
chair and CEO be held by different individuals. Jensen (1993) points out that when 
the CEO also holds the position of the chairman of the board, internal system may 
fail, as the board cannot eifectively perform its functions including those of 
evaluating and firing CEOs. Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that effective 
separation of top-level management and control means that outside directors have 
incentives to carry out their tasks and do not collude with managers to e}q)ropriate 
residual claimants. Descender (2007) mentions in his article the works of Goyal and 
Park (2000), who points out that the sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm 
performance is significantly lower for firms that vest the title of CEO and chairman in 
the same individual. 
Whereas Indian model has no reference on the issue, the UK model takes the 
following position: 
"There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of 
the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decisions" -The Combined Code 2006, A.2. The Code fiirther states, "The roles of 
chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual. The 
division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be 
clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board". - A.2.1. The code 
being based on 'comply or explain' basis, a decision to combine the posts of chairman 
and chief executive officer m one person needs to be publicly justified. UK companies 
are thus required, not only to state the departure fix)m the recommendation, but also to 
explain their choice of combining the two roles in their annual reports. Ghosh (2000) 
writes "Splitting up of the post of chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is 
the fundamental principle of the Global Advisory Board, without doing so; it may be 
normally be very difficult for the board to perform its critical oversight functions". 
Shukla, H. J., (2009), observes, "A good corporate governance principle expects that 
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there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the helm of the company. Such a 
division of responsibility would ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no 
individual has unfettered power of decision. Hence, separating the posts of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman is always advisable to have effective 
monitoring of the executive management of the company besides ensuring proper 
corporate governance practices". However the results of research on the effects of 
duality on company performance are mixed. Trojanowski and Renneboog (2003), 
through a sample of randomly drawn sample of UK firms, finds that in an insider-
dominated underperforming firm, the probability of CEO replacement is merely 
11.4% whereas it is as high as 21.3% for an outsider-dominated company indicating 
the adverse affect of the managerial entrenchment which becomes more violent when 
CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board". The result also supports the 
theory that there should be division of roles for chairman and CEO. Reddy (1998) 
addresses the issue of the necessacity of separation of roles of Chairman and Chief 
Executive when he says, "The current thinking in the UK is that a single forcefiil 
personality, no matter how talented, is likely to be a bad choice to be both Chairman 
and executive". Desender (2007) examines and reports in his paper that board 
independence alone does not induce enterprise risk management implementation. 
Only boards with a separation of CEO and Chairman, tend to favor more elaborated 
ERM. Firms with independent Board and separation of CEO and Chairman show the 
highest level of ERM. The possible explanation, as the author puts, is that CEOs do 
not favor ERM implementation and are able to withstand pressure from the board 
when they are occupying the seat of chairman. 
Cadbury (1992) Report on the Financial Aspects of the Corporate Governance first 
recommended on the issue on 4.9 of the Report "Given the importance and particular 
nature of the chairman's role, it should in principle be separate from that of the chief 
executive. If the two roles are combined in one person, it represents a considerable 
concentration of power. We recommend, therefore, that there should be a clearly 
accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, which will ensure a 
balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of 
decision. Where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that there 
should be a strong and independent element on the board." Balasubramanian (1998) 
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writes, "the related question is whether the office of the chairman of the board and 
that of the chief executive should be separated to avoid too much concentration of 
power and unequivocally feels that the two offices must be separated for the good of 
each other and more importantly, of the organization. This ensures that the views and 
inputs from all directors are taken into account and a considered view in the larger 
interests of the company is evolved". On the position of a combined chairman and 
Chief Executive role Garratt (1996) writes in his book, "The killer blow for an 
enterprise is often one person holding the very different jobs of chairman and chief 
executive, especially if this is for a sustained time, because there is no forum for 
criticism, constructive or otherwise." Merson (2004) writes in his book, "The 
expectation is also nowadays that at the very least the role of chief executive and 
chairman will be split Thus ensuring that the board itself fulfills its responsibilities 
by separatmg board management from company management This (splitting of 
roles) is a key strength of the UK corporate governance framework when contrasted 
with the UK approach." Rao (2004) writes, "There are two theories to explain the 
leadership structure of a company: the agency theory and the organization theory. 
According to the Agency Theory the boards favor non-duality, because they feel that 
duality may lead to entrenchment by the CEO The other theory is the organization 
theory, which argues that the managers expect clear lines of authority, and hence 
prefer CEO duality. This theory is based on the assumption that separate CEO will 
reduce the power of the chair of CEO and the company will not portrait itself as the 
one having a strong leader Theoretically however it is said that separate CEO 
and Chairman will enhance the performance of the company because the abuse of the 
power by the CEO in this case will be lesser than when compared to dual CEO." The 
author cites four empirical research findings where the results are mixed. The Indian 
boards on an average, therefore, suffer from many of the ills that plague because of 
lesser separation of roles and her boards are less capable of delivering the designated 
outputs as compared to United Kingdom. 
5.3: Discussion for H-3 (Size of Board) 
There exists no significant difference between the strength of board members of the 
two countries. The sampling statistics found the mean strength of Indian Boards as 
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9.4892. The mean strength of board members in case of UK is 9.1795. Statistical 
analysis did not lead to rejection of the Null Hypothesis and, therefore, the difference 
between the two means is insignificant. The Indian and UK corporate boards may be 
considered on equal footing on this variable with the average Indian Board size 
slightly larger than the UK boards. In this connection research in the area has mostly 
found that larger boards are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the 
CEO to control. Jensen (1993). Even if board capacities for monitoring increase with 
the board size, the benefits are outweighed by such costs as slower decision making, 
less candid discussion of managerial performance, and biases against risk taking. 
Lipton & Lorsch (1992). He fiirther recommends limiting the membership of boards 
to ten people with a preferred size of eight or nine. The UK board is somewhat nearer 
to the desired size of a board. The Indian position is however no worse with average 
board strength, only one above the UK, and can considered on equal footing with UK. 
The firm value depends on the quality of monitoring and decision-making by the 
board of directors, and the board size represents an important determinant of its 
performance. Jensen (1993) opines that large boards can be less effective than small 
boards. He says that when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely 
to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control. A similar view is 
advocated by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who state that the norms of behavior in most 
boardrooms are dysfunctional because directors rarely criticize the policy of top 
manners or hold candid discussions about corporate performance and these problems 
increase with the number of directors and they recommended limiting the membership 
of boards to ten people, with a preferred size of eight or nine. The idea is that when 
boards get too big, agency problems increase and the board becomes more symbolic 
and less a part of the management process. Dalton et al. (1998) studied the 
relationship between the board size and accounting measures and indicators based on 
market returns, and found a non-zero positive relationship between sizes of the 
board's and firm performance. They however note that larger boards leverage the 
advantage of board network, provide quality advice to the CEO, otherwise 
unavailable from corporate staff, address "power relationship", allowing the board, 
for example, to form coalitions that may challenge CEOs, promote diversity in 
experience, education, attitudes, and background and bring exceptional local 
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information to the board and provide a training ground through high-ranking officers 
on the board. Board strength matters. While no limit has been fixed for the number of 
members in a board. The Combined Code (2008) of UK states in supporting 
principles (A.3), "The board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board 
should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for 
the requirements of the business and that changes to the board's composition can be 
managed without undue disruption." CoUey, Doyle, Logan & Stettinius (2005) 
observes, "The typical corporate board is composed of 8 to 16 directors. Larger, more 
mature companies tend toward the higher end of the range, while smaller growing 
companies tend toward the lower end. The aim, however, is to have a breadth of 
expertise in order to deal effectively with the issues confronting the business. This 
reasoning would suggest that smaller, simpler companies would not require as many 
directors as larger, more coirqilex ones Small boards are however, more easily 
controlled by a dominant personality or clique. As boards become larger, the talent 
pool becomes deeper, but it is more difficult to keep a larger niunber of people 
involved and working together efficiently as a team." Mayur & Saravanan (2006) 
investigates the relationship between board size and performance of banks in Indian 
context. Based on data from 37 banks listed on BSE and NSE and selecting 
performance parameters as Tobin Q and Market-to-book ratio, the study finds 
correlation between board size and performance of banks as negative for both Tobin's 
Q as well as for MB ratio. Regression co-efficient does not show any contribution on 
the performance of banks. Any board which has more than ten to twelve directors 
tends to become unwieldy and inefficient. (Prasaima Chandra, Corporate Governance: 
Realities and Reforms). Naresh Chandra committee report (2002) on the issue of 
minimum size of the board opines, "The minimum board size of all listed conqjanies, 
as well as unlisted public limited companies with a paid-up share capital and free 
reserves of Rs 10 crore and above, or turnover of Rs 50 crore and above should be 
seven- of which at least four should be independent directors." 
S.4: Discussion for H-4 (Strength of Independent Directors) 
The mean figure for Independent directors in case of Indian board is 4.7838 whereas 
the same is 4.6068 in case of UK. The statistical analysis does no lead to rejection of 
Null Hypothesis at 95% confidence interval. The result, therefore, shows that there 
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exist insignificant difference between India and UK on the matter of Board 
Independent Directors. But assuming both India and UK equal on the matter of 
strength of Board Independent directors' strength will be misleadmg keeping m view 
the independence criteria, definition and implementation of independence in UK. In 
Indian Boards there exists sufficient number of Nominee directors nominated by 
lending banks or belonging to interest groups which are considered Independent, 
whereas the same are either very few and if they are present in UK boards they are not 
considered and counted as independent. Naresh Chandra Committee which has 
examined various definitions of independence has come to the conclusion that 
nominee directors should not be counted as independent directors but it has not come 
into vogue. The independence criteria for UK and the implementation through 
nomination committee and independent board are stricter than that of India. Thus in 
numerical terms though the Indian Boards seems to be more independent the reality is 
far from the truth and the reverse are truer. In this connection reference is invited from 
Balasubramanian(1998), "In the Indian situation, where members of government 
bureaucracy and controlling families are freely appointed to company boards, how 
does one ensure their independence to function as worthwhile or non-executive 
directors?." Consequently it is hard to get reliable data on the real composition of 
company boards in terms of their independence. Colley, et al. (2003) writes in his 
book, "as we move on to the mechanics of director selection and recruiting, it bears 
repeating that in order to be truly independent and to act first and last in the mterests 
of shareholders, a board must be composed of directors whose overriding loyalty is to 
the shareholders. If a board does not establish a genuinely objective selection process, 
it risks allowing a persuasive and personally dominant CEO to irresistibly wield an 
invisible hand over the nomination process. The outcome of such an occurrence 
would reveal an apparently independent majority that, in practice, takes its cue from 
senior management. The resuh is a board whose conduct is functionally that of 
insiders. Corporate governance thus may be cloaked in the appearance of 
independence, yet its substance is one of dependence, lying within the orbit of senior 
management." In absence of Nomination committee the matter of selection of 
Independent Directors is highly questionable for above reasons. India and UK though 
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seems on equal footing, but UK companies' board independence is in fact the most 
enviable one and is a world benchmark. 
The Indian listed firms have the features of concentrated shareholding and promoter 
chairman holding the post of chairman-cum-managing director is common. The 
governance matters becomes one sided if the chairman is from among the promoter 
and more worse if he happens to be the chairman-cum- managing director, when he 
commands both the executive functions and also heads the governance functions of 
the boards. Presence of Independent directors in majority is, therefore, considered 
essential in such situation in order to maintain board balance. The UK code prescribes 
that half of the board minus the Chairman, irrespective of his being 
ED/NED/Promoter, should be independent directors. The UK has undoubtedly the 
governance model that places the greatest emphasis in independence. "In view of the 
fact that in the British governance model the chairman is also independent, the British 
Boards do certainly achieve the highest standards of independence of any governing 
bodies on either side of the Atlantic", Mendez (2004). 
The Indian code (The Revised Clause 49) holds one third of its directors to be 
independent directors in case of chairman being Non-executive, and half if the 
chairman is an executive. 
L.C. Gupta (1980), based on his experience and extensive study, enumerates eight 
attributes constituting the excellence of a board. The first and foremost and forming 
the crux, is the board independence. Other board attributes matters only when the 
criteria of independence are met both in form and in spirit. Independence means 
independence from the dominance of a person, family, or group. The author argues 
that advanced countries like UK and USA have since beginning, has endeavored to 
increase independent element on the board through the route of independent sub-
committee of the board -nomination committee. He ftirther elaborates, "from the lack 
of independence arise weaknesses of boards such as not being demanding at all about 
performance, not asking all the relevant information and not insisting on proper 
preparation and procedure for holding board meetings such as sending of advance 
notice and agenda papers and fair recording of minutes." He further notes, "Other 
attributes, even if present, acquires a meaning only if independence is first ensured." 
'Ijljtoj-^ 
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CFA (Centre for Financial Market Integrity) Institute(2005) , "A Board that is not 
predominantly Independent, or a committee that is not completely Independent, may 
be nwre likely to make decisions that unfairly or improperly benefits the interests of 
management and those who have influence over management. These decisions may 
also be detrimental to the long-term interests of the Shareowners." John A. Thain(as 
cited in Coglianese, 2004), Chief Executive Officer, New York Stock Exchange, in 
his Keynote address delivered at Harvard says, "we have built a new corporate 
governance structure based on three core principles, independence, separation of key 
functions, and transparency. The first is independence. Without it, good governance is 
elusive, if not impossible." Enriques & Volpin (2007) addresses m his paper the 
problem arising out of concentrated shareholding as in continental Europe (Indian 
case similar) and advises strengthening of Internal Governance mechanisms like 
Board of Directors and regulations mandating greater independence for directors. 
Indian has the concentrated share ownership structures with dominant shareholder. 
Dominant shareholder may be Govt., Multinational companies. Promoters or 
Families. The paper advises in such case to strengthen the internal governance 
mechanisms. The paper further writes, "The board of directors is the primary 
institution of corporate governance. Its main task is to hire and monitor top 
management on behalf of shareholders, and it is best placed to screen related-party 
transactions. Whether firms are widely held or family controlled, the danger is that 
boards, rather than representing the interests of faceless shareholders, will bond with 
management, whom they interact with regularity, or with the family, who has the 
ultimate power to select and remove them. Regulations mandating greater 
independence for directors and defming the board's functions, powers, and internal 
workings may give the board of directors some power to challenge the 
dominant shareholder." 
5.5: Discussion for H 5 [Strength of Non Executive Directors (Non-independent)] 
The statistical analysis on this variable led to rejection of the Null Hypothesis which 
proves that there exist significant differences between the mean strength of non-
independent non-executive directors of both the country. The result is robust up to 
99% confidence level. The mean for India is 2.2378, whereas it is 1.1880 for UK. 
Thus the average numbers of non-executive directors in Indian Boards are almost 
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twice greater than that of UK. The reality also supports the Indian psyche where large 
number of relatives, friends, kiths and kins are given the board position by the 
concentrated shareholding promoter or dominant groups to gain controlling vote in 
case of need. Such urge in the UK case is very less because of dispersed shareholding, 
with no majority owners and the strong influence of Institutional shareholders who 
will not allow such entry into their boards. McKnight, Milonas. Travlos and Weir 
(2009) finds the existence of negative association between corporate performance and 
the proportion of non-executive directors, but a positive association between 
corporate performance and the square of the proportion of non-executive directors. 
This suggests a nonlinear association between these two variables. 'Task Force on 
Corporate Excellence' in Indian case observes the detailed circumstances under which 
non-independent Non-Executive Directors came into the Indian scene years ago at the 
very start of Corporate Governance movement in India. The Committee observes that 
whereas there is growing international trend for the Board and committee structure to 
be in binary format i.e., Executive/Independent Directors format, the Clause 49 made 
a distinction between independent and non-independent non-executive directors to 
incorporate certain family and group aspiration and also to tide over the problem on 
unavailability of Independent directors in sufficient numbers. However no time frame 
was ftimished, neither in KMB Report nor in the Listmg Agreement, for improving 
the infrastructure for Independent Directors development to address the problems for 
binary forms transformation of Indian Boards. The Task Force fiirther reveals, "Later 
on developments on the matter of creation of pool for independent directors remained 
a matter of question." 
5.6: Discussion for H 6 (Strength of Executive Directors in Boards) 
The mean figure in Indian case was found to be 2.4892, whereas it is much less, i.e., 
only 0.3879 in case of UK. The statistical analysis leads to the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis at 95% confidence interval. The result is even robust up to the level of 
99% confidence interval. Thus there exist significant differences on the matter of 
mean strength of Executive Directors in tho Boards of the two countries. The Indian 
boards, as the statistics speaks, are almost manned five times more than the UK 
boards. The results are in line with the general feelings and psyche and are on our 
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expectation level. The Indian Boards being run and influenced by major shareholding 
groups, femilies or promoters group, having preference for executive members who 
belong to salaried class depending on them for promotion and prosperity in return. 
Such influence groups are absent in UK case and therefore the number of executive 
directors are considerably less. Whatever Executive Directors are present in case of 
UK is for the sake of board balance of powers, give expert input and for training 
purpose for future leadership. The dominating presence of promoter-shareholder 
groups in India context has been summed up by Gupta (1989), "Typically, an Indian 
company, whether large or small, has a 'controlling interest', which is usually the 
promoter-shareholder group. This group almost completely dominates board 
appointments and provides top executive management." Satheesh (2008) observes, 
"Too many insiders on the board (either from the promoters or as executive directors) 
are an indication that the promoters are apathetic to independent views These 
insiders are unlikely to challenge the CEO or the Chairman since that might cost 
him/her his job Too many insiders will also result in diminished opportunities for 
getting outside expertise. And too many insiders means less debate and hence less 
opportunities to be critical of the current way of doing things. Since management has 
the control over the information, too many insiders can collude and withhold 
information from others or pass on filtered information". 
Board should have balance of Executive and Non-executive directors so that no 
individual or group dominates the decision making process. 
On the issue of number of inside (U.S usage) or Executive (U.K.usage) directors, 
Carver& Oliver (2002) narrates, "To fulfill its governance role, the board has no need 
to fill its seats with members of management.... In particular, one has to ask what 
gives them enough of these qualities to outweigh their obvious conflict of roles. 
....Further, in as much as board agendas and information are largely management-
generated in traditional governance, the influence of managers over the board is 
already significant without their being on the board as well. There must be a powerful 
influence keeping such a practice in place." 
On the maximum numbers of Executive Directors in a Boards Sahnon (2000) advises 
it to be either two or three and to include CEO, COO and CFO. He adds, "As the 
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current leaders of the corporation, the CEO and COO are there to communicate, 
explain, and justify strategic direction to the outside directors. Because the CFG 
shares fiduciary responsibilities with the directors for both the quality of the numbers 
and the financial conduct of the corporation, he or she should also have a seat. In 
smaller companies, however, the CFO might attend board meetings and provide 
information without voting." He further suggests limiting the size of the boards and 
increasing the number of outside directors on them. 
Tricker (1998) throws lights on the conflicting goals of an Executive Directors, " a 
potential problem of a board which is dominated by its executive directors is that they 
are, in effect, monitoring and supervising their own performance. ..Executive 
Directors have to wear two hats, one as the manager of a part of the business, the 
others as a director responsible for the governance of the company. The important 
thing is not to be wearing the manager's hat in the boardroom." 
5.7: Discussion for H-7 (Number of board meetings in a year) 
The Mean, Median and Mode for board meetings in India are 6.3441, 6 & 5. The 
corresponding figure in case of UK is 8.6897, 8 & 8. Thus there is a significant 
difference in the sample statistics of the two countries with UK is much ahead in this 
variable. Simply put UK conducts much more number of board meetings than India. 
The statistical analysis for the variable leads to the rejection of the Null Hypothesis at 
95 % confidence interval. The result holds true even at the 99% confidence interval. 
The average number of Board meeting in case of India is 6.3441, whereas it is 8.6897 
for UK. The United Kingdom companies, therefore, holds larger number of board 
meetings than Indian companies. The importance and authority of the board seems to 
be lesser in case of India than that of UK. The reason for lesser nimiber of board 
meetings in case of India points toward critical decisions of the board being taken in 
informal manner and more by the influence groups outside rather than within the 
board and hence lesser requirement of formal meeting. The large number of board 
meeting in case of UK is also a pointer of Board Importance and authority in UK 
context and stronger presence of Institutional shareholders and average common 
shareholders who will rarely allow such situation to prevail. Actual amount of time 
spent on each meeting can be quite informative but the figures are not available either 
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in India or UK Annual Reports. It can be fiirther recommended to increase the 
disclosure standards by revealing the actual hrs spent in each board meeting. India can 
take a lead in this direction. Mukherjee (2003) writes, "If boards are fiinctioning as 
effective decision-making bodies (and not merely rubber-stamping decisions that have 
already been made), this activity is likely to be reflected in the organization of board 
meetings. One area where this might be indicated is in the frequency of board 
meetings." 
5.8: Discussion for H-8 (Presence of Nomination Committee) 
Statistical evidence shows that there exist large and significant differences between 
the population means of presence of Nomination Committee between the two 
countries. The Null Hypothesis gets rejected even at the 99% confidence interval. The 
sampling statistics shows only 6.45% of the Indian companies having Nomination 
Committee in their boards as against 99.15% in case of UK companies. Thus almost 
all top listed companies have this governance features which ensures timely selection 
of independent and other members of the boards, the verification from time to time of 
independence of members both in and continuance of independence, requirement of 
experience gap and the timely intervention for the selection of right candidates for the 
boards etc. Since the majority of members of the Nomination Committee are 
independent members, such decisions are taken in very transparent and impartial 
maimer, which strengthen the board strong oversight role over the management. UK 
Combined Code also specifies three important pillars of good governance: 
Nomination Committee, Remuneration Committee and Audit Committee. The Indian 
Clause 49 mentions nothing about the nomination committee, neither in the 
mandatory nor in the non-mandatory clause, and there exists a strong weakness on the 
part of Indian Boards on this critical governance feature which has time and again 
been criticized by several quarters. CoUey, et al.(2003) writes, "As we move on to the 
mechanics of director selection and recruiting, it bears repeating that in order to be 
truly independent and to act first and last in the interests of shareholders, a board must 
be composed of directors whose overriding loyalty is to the shareholders. If a board 
does not establish a genuinely objective selection process, it risks allowing a 
persuasive and personally dominant CEO to irresistibly wield an invisible hand over 
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the nomination process. The outcome of such an occurrence would reveal an 
apparently independent majority that, in practice, takes its cue from senior 
management. The result is a board whose conduct is functionally that of msiders. 
Corporate governance thus may be cloaked in the appearance of independence, yet its 
substance is one of dependence, lying within the orbit of senior management. 
Consequently, the establishment of a genuinely objective selection process is critical 
for corporate boards. The nominating committee carries out the largest part of the 
selection process for most boards. Ideally, every board should have a nominating 
committee, the majority of which is composed of outside directors". Owen, G. et al. 
(2006) reports, "it is now an accepted practice to have at least three board sub-
committees focusing on audit, remuneration and appointments. Additional committees 
are added depending on the individual needs of the fu-m" Tricker (1998) throws lights 
on the resistance faced even in UK on the formation of a Nomination Committee. He 
mentions in his pocket book, "A Nomination Committee is a subcommittee of the 
main board, made up wholly, or mainly, of independent outside directors, to make 
recommendations on new appointment to the board. This is a check and balance 
mechanism designed to reduce the possibility of a dominant director, such as the 
chairman or CEO, pushing through their own candidates In the UK, although 
most of the proposals of the Cadbury Report were followed by the listed companies, 
the requirement to have a nominating committee has met with the greatest resistance." 
Bain, Neville & Band, David (1996) writes, "There is no doubt that the nominating 
committee has been one of the most significant developments in corporate governance 
in recent times. It is now widely acknowledged as the critical board committee and 
the key to sound corporate governance." Wallace, Peter & Zinkin, John (2005) 
strongly advocates the need of a Nomination Committee when they write, " .... more 
attention is now being paid to the appointment, and re-election, of suitable talent to 
run companies; hence the need for Nominating Committee. Such a committee's 
primary function is to make informed and objective recommendations on Board 
appointments and re-elections- including the appointment of Directors to the various 
Board committees. Members also review the individual contribution of each director 
and the board as a whole, and ensure that the board's independent directors are indeed 
independent. Putting in place such a committee helps to maintain a formal transparent 
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process for directorial appointments. Good corporate governance would also dictate 
that all Directors should submit themselves to their nominating committees for re-
nomination and re-election at regular intervals of at most three years". Further at 
another place Wallace & Zinkin (2005) posits, "Again, it is with objectivity in mind 
that it has been recommended that a Nominating Committee should comprise of at 
least three Directors, a majority of whom, including the chair, should be independent, 
or at least Non-executive. Pandey, N.(2009), in his investigative cover page articles 
on Indian Management by AIMA, New Delhi on the eve of Satyam Scandals quotes 
Gopalakrishnan (2009), the Infosys Chief executive and managing director speaking 
vociferously, " the definition of "independent director' in Clause 49 is broad enough. 
A more urgent need is to introduce the concept of a board nomination committee to 
the Indian corporate governance model." Gopalakrishnan points out that "globally 
there is a requirement to have a board nomination committee of the board, which is 
vested with the responsibility of selecting and nominating new board members-both 
independent and executive directors. These committees have to follow a process and 
lay down clear criteria for selecting board members. We need to have a nominating 
committee in India too." Further at another points the article echoes the views of 
Richard Rekhy, KPMG India Chief Operating officer which concurs 
Gopalakrishnan's views about conpanies establishing a nomination committee 
comprising independent directors. This committee, Rekhy adds, could scan the market 
and identify potential candidates with the help of executive search agencies, investor 
bodies and minority shareholders. Deloitte India senior director, Abhay A Gupta, also 
recommends that a nomination committee chaired by an independent director, should 
normally hire independent directors and should not only hire independent candidates 
for the board but also be made responsible to ensure "real independence" of the 
proposed appointment. UK position on the matter is quite clearly mentioned in the 
Combined Code 2008: "There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. ...A nomination committee should be 
established to make recommendations to the board on all new board appointments. A 
majority of the members of this committee ^ u l d be non-executive directors. ...The 
nomination committee should independently identify suitable candidates for 
membership on the board and its committee, and further prevent selection of new 
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members pursuing the board's interest". Diedrich Von Soosten (2002) posits, "The 
process used in selecting and nominating directors is critical to providing assurances 
of obtaining qualified as well as independent directors. The committee for selection 
should be comprised only of independent directors." 
5.9: Discussion for H-9 (Strength of members in the Remuneration Committee) 
The t-test for means of the two countries rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence interval. The result holds true even at the 99% rejection level. Thus there 
exists significant difference between the mean strength of the total number of 
directors on the Remuneration Committee. The sampling statistics measures the mean 
value of 3.3716 for India and 3.9316 in case of UK. Thus the average number of 
directors in UK remuneration committee is greater than that of Indian companies. The 
greater number of director presence in the Remuneration committee in the UK case 
reilects the importance assigned to the remuneration related decisions by UK 
companies. 
5.10: Discussion for H-10 (Strength of Independent Directors in the 
Remuneration Committee) 
The statistical analysis against this variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence level. The result is robust up to the level of 99% confidence interval. Thus 
there exists significant difference between the population means of average numbers 
of Independent Directors which is present in the Remuneration Committee. The 
sampling statistics against this variable for Indian companies is 2.6216 and in UK 
case it is 3.5043. 
Thus the presence of Independent members is more in case of UK. The lower 
presence of Independent Directors in Indian companies may be because of the wish to 
keep control of remuneration related decisions by lower presence of Independent 
Directors and increased presence of Non-executive Directors (NI) which generally 
happens to belong from dominant group of the board. Such groups are practically 
absent in UK companies boards. The present research finds that there is an elaborate 
and exhaustive arrangement for remuneration decisions taken by UK boards who 
though largely independent often take the help of outside consultants and experts for 
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taking into considerations market situations, expertise requirement for the job, labour 
market variables etc. The right remuneration levels bring more talent and right 
candidate for the job requirement which brings efficiencies in the company operation 
and governance. The Indian code of corporate governance itself assigns little 
importance on remuneration related decisions and has put the provisbn of a 
Remuneration committee under the non-mandatory clause. This speaks of the sorry 
state of affairs in such vital and critical governance factors in Indian case. A 
remuneration committee should consist of independent members to have independent 
decisions about the pay and other emolmnents based on performance. (CoUey, Doyle, 
Logan & Stettinius, 2005).The committee takes the decision after taking into accovmt 
several factors and the independent member can only take objective and neutral 
decision regarding pay packets. CFA (2005) in their manual for investors observes, 
"The existence of the committee and its independence from executive management 
bias help to ensure that the rewards and incentives offered to management are 
consistent with the best long-term interests of Shareowners. Committees that lack 
Independence could be overly pressured by management to award compensation that 
is excessive when compared with other comparably sitxiated companies, or to provide 
incentives for actions that boost short-term share prices at the expense of long-term 
profitability and value." 
Following the Greenbury recommendations, the Combined Code strongly suggested 
the constitution of a remuneration committee entirely made of independent non-
executive directors, in order to offer a fair compensation and in line with the market. 
Greenbury recommendations on the remuneration committee reads, "To avoid 
potential conflicts of interest. Boards of Directors should set up remuneration 
committees of Non-Executive Directors to determine on their behalf, and on behalf of 
the shareholders, within agreed terms of reference, the company's policy on executive 
remimeration and specific remuneration package for each of the Executive Directors, 
including pensions rights and any compensation payments (paragraphs 4.3- 4.7)". 
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5.11: Discussion for H-11 (Number of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in 
Remuneration Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence level. The results holds true even at the level of 99% confidence interval. 
Thus there is significant difference in mean strength of non-executive members (NI) 
in the Remuneration Committee of the board of the two countries. The sampling 
statistics against this variable in Indian Companies is 0.6216 whereas for the UK 
companies it is 0.4274. The non-executive (NI) in the case of Indian companies 
remuneration committees are, therefore, more than the UK companies. The result is 
expected keeping in view the average hold of dominant shareholding group in the 
corporate groups. The non-executive (NI) members mostly belong to the persons 
associated with the dominant shareholding promoter groups, dominant individuals and 
other interest groups etc and naturally the results shows greater number of these 
members in the Indian environment. As the shareholding is widely dispersed in UK 
and there is no controlling groups or individuals the number of these non-executive 
non-independent members are lesser than that of India. 
5.12: Discussion for H-12 (Strength of Executive Directors in Remuneration 
Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence interval. The result is true even to the 99% confidence interval. Thus there 
exists significant difference of the population means on the matter of number of 
executive directors in the Indian and UK remuneration committees. In fact as per the 
analysis there exist no executive members on the Remuneration Committee in case of 
UK. The result is not unexpected given the status of non-mandatory requirement of a 
remuneration committee and no exhaustive ruling or recommendations for the 
composition of the sub-committee in Indian revised Clause 49 as compared to UK and 
the influence of dominant promoter and femily groups. The UK combined code 
recommends at least three independent directors for large listed companies for their 
remuneration committee but does not rule out executive director in such committee 
but no executive members are present in any sampling companies of UK. The 
presence of executive members severely affects the functioning and independence of 
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decisions on sensitive remuneration matters in case of India which also does not seem 
to link rewards to performances. Ram Mohan (2002) quotes NYSE which approved 
the proposal that mandate that the majority of the directors on a board must be 
independent. Further, it laid down that the nomination and compensation committee 
must consist entirely of independent directors. McKnight, Milonas, Travlos and Weir 
(2009) find the presence of a key executive director in the audit and/or remuneration 
committee as negatively associated with corporate performance. 
5.13: Discussion for H-13 (Number of Remuneration Committee Meetings in a 
year) 
There exists significant difference between the means of remuneration committee 
meetings of Indian and UK companies. The statistical analysis against the variable 
rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% confidence interval. The result even holds true at 
99% confidence interval. The sampling statistics for the variable in case of India is 
1.9007 whereas the same in case of UK is 4.4872. Thus UK Remuneration Committee 
holds almost more than double number of remuneration meetings than the Indian 
corporate. The result found is not unexpected given the least importance assigned to 
the Remuneration Committee and their meetings and their decisions which are 
generally taken outside the Remuneration Committee. The UK companies assign 
maximum importance for the Remuneration Conmiittee structure, independence and 
their decisions. This is also reflected in the Combined Code of UK which is the 
guideline for listed companies. In Revised Clause the provision for Remuneration 
Committee is non-mandatory in nature and there are no rulings or guidelines on the 
nature, size or meetings of the committee. 
5.14: Discussion for H-14 (Presence of Remuneration Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at the chosen 
95% confidence interval. The result holds true and robust even up to the 99% 
confidence interval. The sampling statistics yields mean score of 0.8065 in case of 
India and 1.00 for UK companies. Thus there exists significant difference over the 
population means of presence of Remuneration Committee between India and UK. As 
per the result it can be observed that only 80.65% of the Indian companies have 
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Remuneration Committee in their boards as against all the companies (100%) in case 
of United Kingdom. Thus abnost 20% of the Indian Companies do not have 
Remuneration Committees at all. The situation in case of Indian con^anies where 
there exists Remuneration Committee also do not reveal an organised framework and 
controlled operation because of lack of guidelines for such committees. Analysis of 
the earlier hypothesis when taken together shows that wherever it exists they have 
lesser independence, more executive members, less frequencies of meetings. The 
researcher does not jfind any arranged structure and functioning on the Remuneration 
committees in case of India. UK position on the issue in the Combined Code is, 
"Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developmg 
policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remimeration pack^es of 
individual directors. No directors should be involved in deciding his or her own 
remuneration. The Remuneration committee should consist exclusively of 
independent non-executive. Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and 
retain the directors needed to run the company successfully, but conpanies should 
avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose.'The success of the organization 
in achieving good performance and good governing practice depends on its ability to 
attract quality individuals as executive and independent Directors and remuneration 
plays very important fectors. The Committee determines the remuneration packages 
of the Chairman, Executive Directors and certain other senior executives and 
therefore its presence in a board is considered essential. In Indian Code the 
requirement has been put under non-mandatory requirements. CFA , through their 
work of its Global Corporate Governance Task Force, has prepared manual for 
investors indicating the best practices in corporate governance and observes, 
"Investors should determine whether the Company has a committee of Independent 
Board Members charged with setting executive remuneration/compensation. " It 
further enlightens the investors," The Remuneration Committee is responsible for 
ensuring that compensation and other awards encourage executive management to act 
in ways that enhance the Company's long-term profitability and value. It also 
responsible for ensuring that the remuneration package offered to management is 
commensurate with the level of responsibilities of the executive, and appropriate in 
light of the Con^ny's performance." 
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5.15: Discussion for H-15 (Chairman Presence in Remuneration Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable do not rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence Interval. The sampling statistics shows the mean value of 0.3087 in case 
of India and 0.3761 in case of UK. Thus there do not exist significant difference over 
the presence of Chairman in the Remuneration Committee of both the coxmtries. The 
presence of Chairman on the Remuneration Committee is more or less the same in 
both India and United Kingdom. The situation however is not encouraging given the 
chairman status itself of both the countries. In case of UK non-executive independent 
chairman mans the boards. In Indian case executive chairman who are non-
independent are larger in numbers. Thus Chairman presence increases the 
independence of UK Remuneration Committee; in case of India the reverse is true. 
5.16: Discussion for H-16 (Strength of Audit Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable does not lead to rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis. Thus the Alternate Hypothesis is accepted which assumes that there 
exists no significant differences of population means for the variable number of 
members in the Audit Committee of the Board of the two countries. The sampling 
statistics in case of Indian corporate is 3.7189 whereas the same is 3.6239 in case of 
United Kingdom. The number of members in the Indian Audit Committee is thus 
somewhat is on higher side as compared to UK Audit committee which can be 
assumed as having an edge over that of UK so far as number is concerned. 
5.17: Discussion for H-17 (Strength of Independent Directors in Audit 
Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis at 
95% confidence interval. As the p value is 0.000 the result holds true and robust upto 
99% confidence interval. The sampling statistics for the number of Independent 
Directors in the Audit Committee is 3.0595 for Indian companies and is 3.5043 for 
United Kingdom companies. Thus there exist significant differences over the number 
of Independent Directors in the Audit Committee of the two countries. The UK audit 
committee on an average has more independent members than their Indian 
counterparts and thus it can be assumed that the UK Audit Committees are more 
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independent than that of Indian Corporate. Thus although total strength of Audit 
Committee members are more compared to UK, more needs to be done so that Indian 
Audit Committees becomes more independent from the man^ement as the Audit 
Committee functioning are critical to the transparency requirements and a lot of 
sensitive decisions like remuneration of External Audit, selection of Auditing 
companies, internal control decisions are taken in the Audit Committee and the 
independent requirement is critical one. "The primary values of an Audit Committee 
are in independence and objectivity in relation to management. Non-executive 
directors are the most suitable members of the Audit Committee because they are not 
involved in the day-to day operations of the business. Nowadays sentiment is moving 
toward the expectation that Audit Committee members are also independent as well as 
Non-executive. Blue Ribbon commission had the express requirement that Audit 
committees of larger listed companies be comprised solely of independent directors". 
Wallace & Zinkin (2006), "Audit Committee should be a minimum of three members, 
all of whom should be non-executive and independent of the company". (Cadbury, 
1992). In the Indian context the Ganguly Committee Report on Banks and Finance 
(2002), recommends, "The international best practice in this regard is to constitute 
Audit Committee with only independent/non-executive directors. The Basel 
Committee has suggested that in order to ensure its independence, the Audit 
Committee of the board should be constituted with external board members who have 
banking or financial expertise." 
5.18: Discussion for H-18 (Numbers of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in Audit 
Committee) 
There exists significant difference between India and UK on the matter of number of 
Non-Executive Directors (NI) in the Audit Committee. The statistical analysis against 
the variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% confidence interval. The result holds 
true even at the level of 99% confidence interval. The sampling statistic of means 
against the variable is 0.4649 in case of India and 0.1197 in case of UK. In physical 
terms the Indian corporate have on an average four times higher number of Non-
Executive (non-independent) directors in their Audit Committees as compared to that 
of UK. The UK Audit Committee, as the result suggests, have much lesser number of 
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Non-Executive Directors (NI) in their Audit Committee. Good corporate governance 
requirement is that the majority of directors should be independent and should contain 
lesser number of non-executive especially the non-independent ones. As discussed 
earlier these non-executive (Non-independent) members especially belong to the 
promoters' femily and friends and different interest groups. The greater presence of 
these non-independent non-executives in the Audit committee of the board greatly 
jeopardizes the independence of this important sub-committee of the board in case of 
India. Prof Ashish K. Bhattacharyya (1998) posits, "In a situation where the 
independence of external auditors is suspect because of increasing closeness with the 
management, the chances of impairment of independence of those members who are 
in employment are quite high. This problem is addressed by forming audit committees 
which can act independently, objectively and with integrity. It is desirable that an 
audit committee should be formed only with non-executive directors of the Board." 
S.19: Discussion for H-19 (Numbers of Executive Directors in Audit Committees) 
The statistical euialysis for this variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% confidence 
interval. The Null Hypothesis even gets rejected at 99% confidence interval. Thus 
there exists significant difference of mean presence of executive directors in Audit 
Committee for the two countries. The sampling mean statistic is 0.1935 in case of 
India and 0.0000 in case of UK. Thus it can be observed that there remain no 
executive members in the Audit committee of any company of UK under study. 
Whereas Indian companies Audit Committee have the presence of Executive 
members.. As per the UK standards the Executive members' presence in Audit 
Committee are not desirable features for good corporate governance as they can 
hampers the independent decision making process. Biased decisions may creep into as 
a result of ED presence. In this connection a reference is made from Sir Robert Smith, 
Audit Committees, Combined Code Guidance, January 2003, "While all directors 
have a duty to act in the interest of the company, the Audit Committee has a particular 
role, acting independently from the Executive, to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal 
control". McKnight, Milonas, Travlos and Weir (2009) fmd the presence of a key 
232 
executive director in the audit and/or remuneration committee negatively associated 
with corporate performance. 
5.20: Discussion for H-20 (No. of Audit Committee Meetings in a year) 
The statistical analysis against the variable leads to rejection of the Null Hypothesis at 
predetermined 95% confidence interval. In fact the rejection holds true even to the 
99% confidence interval. There exist significant difference between India and UK on 
the matter of number of Audit Committee Meetings their companies conducts in a 
year. The sampling statistic of mean is 4.8172 in case of Indian companies and 
3.9402 in case of UK conpanies. Thus average number of Audit Committee meeting 
in case of India is higher than that of UK which is a good sign of governance in Indian 
corporate and is an indicator for UK corporate to improve for. The variables are 
among the few other which can be considered as strength of Indian corporate 
governance when compared to UK company practices. However given the higher 
presence of Executives, Non-executives (non-independent) and lesser Independent 
members the decision taken by the Indian Audit committee is worth questionable and 
the edge over the UK corporate over the variables of number of Audit Committee 
meetings gets neutralized over the better audit committee composition like no 
executive members, higher presence of independent members, better selection of 
independent members through nomination committee, lesser presence of non-
executive members which neutralizes the effect of lesser number of Audit Committee 
meetings of UK in comparison to India. 
5.21: Discussion for H-21 (Chairman Member of Audit Committee) 
The statistical analysis against the variable leads to rejection of the hypothesis with 
95% confidence interval. The result is robust even up to 99% confidence interval. The 
sampling statistics obtained for Indian corporate is 0.2258 as against 0.07692 in case 
of United Kingdom. On an average 22.58% of the Indian companies have chairman 
present in the Audit Committee as members. Whereas the corresponding figures in 
case of UK is only 7.69%. Thus there exists significant difference over the matter of 
presence of Chairman in the Audit Committee of the two countries. The fact that most 
UK chairman position are held by non-executives and Independent directors and 
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Indian companies chairman are held nnostly by promoters and executives, the 
relatively stronger presence of chairman in the Indian Audit committee may be a 
cause of concern in comparison to UK where their chairman presence may leads to 
better independence and transparency of decisions. 
5.22: Discussion for H-22 (Presence of Lead Independent Director) 
Null Hypothesis against the variable has been rejected based on statistical analysis at 
95% signiiicance level. The rejection holds true even at the 99% confidence level. 
The result, therefore, is that there is significant difference between the population 
means of Lead Independent Director presence between the Indian and Corporate 
boards. The sampling statistics reflects very poor reflection on this count in case of 
India. The presence of Lead Independent Director is a very good governance features 
which strengthen the Independent elements inside the board. Almost all the UK 
boards have the presence of Lead Independent Director (also called Sr. Independent 
Director). The Sr. Independent Director position not only binds the Independent 
Directors as a coherent group but also acts as a substitute mechanism for expressing 
any unresolved grievance redressal by raising voice through him in the board when 
the same is failed through the chairman and CEO. In Indian system the other duty of a 
Lead Independent Directors can be on such matters as: consultation by the board 
chairman on matters such as selection of members of different board committees, 
agenda of meetings, and adequacy of information provided to directors etc.etc. In 
Indian case only few companies like Tata Group and Reliance Group or Infosys 
Technologies have Sr. Independent Director in their board with explicit roles and 
defined responsibilities. 
The senior independent Director, also called Lead Independent Director, provides an 
alternative to the Chairman as a Board-level contact for shareholders. The presence of 
a nominated Sr. Independent Director from among the Independent Directors is good 
governance features which requires neither extra independent directors nor extra cost 
but it immensely binds the independent elements into one coherent unit and provides 
extra teeth and muscle to the independent element of the boards and helps board 
balance which is essentially required in Indian boards because of the concentrated 
shareholders dominance and influence. In UK the Sr. Independent Director's 
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responsibilities include the provision of an additional channel of communication 
between the chairman and the Non-executive Director. He also provides another point 
of contact for sha|;eholders if they have concerns which communication through the 
normal channels of chairman. Chief Executive or Chief Financial Officer has failed to 
resolve, or where these contacts are inappropriate. The combined Code of UK 
recommends, "The board should appoint one of the mdependent non-executive 
directors to be the senior independent director. The senior independent director should 
be available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact through the normal 
channels of chairman, chief executive or finance director has failed to resolve or for 
which such cont^t is inappropriate". The Indian Code (Clause 49) is silent on the 
issue but UK Combined Code explicitly prescribes the nomination of one Sr. 
Independent Director from among the Independent Directors present in the board. 
UK position on the need for a Sr. Independent Director can be summarized as 
,"Whether the posts (Chairman and CEO) are held by different people or by the same 
person, there should be a strong and independent non-executive element on the board, 
with a recognized senior member other than the chairman to whom concerns can be 
conveyed". 
The concept of introduction of a formally appointed senior non-executive director was 
one of the new recommendations of the Hampel Committee. Hampel strongly 
emphasized the necessity of an active dialogue with shareholders. In first instance, 
shareholders should convey their concerns about any aspects of the company to the 
chairman. However, if this channel of communication fails, shareholders should 
contact not a general senior member of the board, but a specific appointed one. 
Wallace and Zinkin (2005) writes," In cases where companies elect to keep the roles 
of Chair and CEO in the hands of one person, "leading practice" recommends that 
there should be a Lead Independent Director who is responsible for the CG process. 
Some codes expect the appointment of a Lead Independent Director, even if the roles 
of CEO and Chair are kept separate. Indeed, it is a recommendation of the Higgs 
Report that such a Lead Director be appointed. The authors further continue, "As a 
matter of course, the Lead Director is expected to attend meetings with shareholders, 
as well as the chair, and to report back to the Non-Executive Directors on the 
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concerns and priorities of investors. In emergencies, when the combined Chair-CEO 
is failing to perform, it is the role of the Lead Director to act on behalf of the 
shareholders to ensure that the Non-Executives are agreed that there is a problem, take 
action by persuading the Chair-CEO to resign and fmd a replacement. In other words, 
a Lead Independent Director is expected to act like an independent and separate chair 
in dealing with a problem. In addition, the Lead Director is expected to chair meetings 
between non-executive directors in the absence of the independent chair. He or she 
would also be available to shareholders, if they are concerned that contact through the 
normal channels of Chair or CEO is not working effectively." 
Satheesh Kumar T N (2008) observes on the role and responsibilities of a Sr. 
Independent director, "A recent innovation in the board related matters is to have a 
lead director from among the independent directors who is expected to chair the 
meetings of independent directors if they want to meet separately. It is also seen as a 
way to balance a domineering CEO (Shultz, 2001). While the lead director's 
relevance and role may be limited in a company, where CEO and Chair posts are split 
and the Chair belongs to independent category, one should look at the lead director as 
a role rather than a position (Lorsch, 1989). Having a lead director can help in 
presiding over independent directors' meetings, ensuring that there is an adequate and 
timely flow of information to independent directors, liaising between Chairman and 
CEO, the top management and the independent directors; presiding over meetings of 
the board and shareholders when the Chair is not present or where the Chairman is an 
interested party, helping the Chairman draw meetings agendas and meeting schedules, 
etc." Shukla (2009) observes, "As per the international standard of corporate 
governance, it is a good governance practice that irrespective of whether the posts of 
Chairman and CEO are held by different persons or by the same individuals, there 
should be a strong and independent non-executive element on the board as lead 
independent director, to whom the concerns can be conveyed. It is the responsibility 
of the lead independent director to act as a spokesperson for the independent directors 
as a group, work closely with the Chairman/CEO, and take a lead role in the board 
evaluation process, apart from other important board functions. A lead independent 
director should be identified in the atmual report." 
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5.23: Discussion for H-23 (Induction and Professional development) 
The statistical analysis against the variables leads to rejection of the hypothesis at 
predetermined 95% confidence interval. Since the p-value is 0.000 the hypothesis gets 
rejected even at 99% confidence interval. The sampling statistics of mean presence 
for provision for induction and professional development obtained in the sampled 
companies are 0.1075 for India and 0.9231 for UK. Thus there exists a very large and 
significant difference of means for the provision of Induction and Professional 
development in companies for the two covmtries. In physical terms only 10.75% of the 
Indian companies have kept provisions for Induction and Professional development 
for their directors. In comparison to Indian practices over the matter, the UK 
corporate has kept such provisions in 92.31% of their companies. Very poor statistics 
in Indian case is worth attention as there is strong need to strengthen the directors' 
skills level in contemporary governance which till date has been considered as the 
person of reserve categories like retired bureaucrats, military officers, and person of 
eminence or having respectable position in societies. The researcher noticed several 
remarks in the annual reports where the statements like, "since the present directors 
belong to respected person from the society, and having considerable experience, 
there is no need of training as such..." On the question of Induction and training, 
Bansal (1989) had pointed out thirty years ago, "The absence of training arrangements 
for directors is serious lacunae in our corporate governance practice. We can learn 
from the British experience in this regard For securing better contribution from 
directors, they must be allowed to have direct access to the management subordinates, 
unhindered by formal chain of command restraints. In addition directors should be 
given the facility of visiting plants and offices of the company in order to develop a 
better acquaintance with the functioning of the company." Whereas the British system 
have improved on the points and strengthened it further, the Indian system has lagged 
behind by at least thirty years from UK in this area. 
The Company should have a policy and programme for induction and continuing 
professional development, which should be reviewed armually. On appointment, each 
director should take part in a comprehensive induction programme where they 
receive information about the Group in the form of presentations by executives from 
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all parts of the business and on the regulatory environment; meet representatives of 
the Company's key advisers, such as the Company's auditors, brokers and solicitors; 
receive information about the role of the Board and the matters reserved for its 
decision, the terms of reference and membership of board committees and the powers 
delegated to those committees; receive information about the Company's corporate 
governance practices and procedures and the latest fmancial information about the 
group, duties and obligations as a director of a listed company. The above should be 
supplemented by visits to key locations, including regional sites, and meetings with 
key senior executives and with major shareholders where appropriate (Higgs 
suggestions for Good practice). The above is more important in case of India because 
of presence of majority groups in Indiem Boards and the need for strengthening the 
independent elements to avoid misappropriation of shareholders money. 6"" 
International conference on Corporate Governance declaration held by WCFG says, 
"The most important ingredients for improving the quality of boards and corporate 
governance decision making process is a strong commitment to continual education 
and training. This should not be restricted to just board members but also made 
available for investors and other stakeholders. There needs to be proper education and 
study of financial statements and identification of fi-auds before they occur." Satheesh 
(2006) emphasizes on the need for director induction and training when he says, "The 
one major area where we have a lot of ground to cover and which needs immediate 
attention is director development activity. While making it mandatory may not be in 
the best interest of the process, the companies and institution shall form a body to 
continuously impart training and development programme to improve the quality of 
directors and the board processes and practice." It is worth noting that while Indian 
corporate complain of shortage of right quality independent directors, very little 
initiatives has been taken in this regard by them to encourage and train independent 
directors. They become satisfied while selecting select few famous personalities 
which can better be called "trophy directors' in order to appease certain section or 
groups or femily fi-iends for certain evil design as has been observed in Satyam case 
in India recently. UK companies not only has well documented Induction process for 
a new directors but that there is system of continuing development later on with 
trainings, visits etc. Indian companies, and most of them, note their remarks on the 
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need for training and development "these directors comes from important position 
having considerable experience in their fields, from respectable societal position and 
having respectable status and hence trainings are not required". "The essential point is 
that directors must be given the right 'equipment' and get the right preparation to do 
their jobs and discharge their duties. For all directors, the right equipment includes 
accurate, timely and clear information." Webster (2006). Bansal (1989) highlighted 
almost twenty years ago," In spite of Indian companies Act being modeled on the 
British pattern, our corporate sector has lagged behind its British counterpart by at 
least 25 to 30 years in so &r as adoption of certain progressive measures (training to 
directors) are concerned In the longer run, it would add to the governance skills 
and con^tence and ultimately to still higher level of success." Balasubramanian 
(1998), "How do companies ensure proper training, development and rewarding of 
their directors? There is a general agreement among the participants that the directors, 
both mtemal and external, need a continuing programme of training and development. 
.... The key, of course, is to help the person to continue to be effective and not just 
rest on his past laurels." On the question of training needs for directors, especially the 
Independent Directors, Garratt (1996), writes in his book, "Most Independent 
Directors say the same. They see themselves brought into the board because of the 
different experience and outside connections they can bring with them. Again, they 
feel constrained, as any human being does, not to ask probing questions in case they 
should look rude, inexperienced, foolish or naive. This is understandable but not 
forgivable in a director. A director needs to use 'intelligent naivety' as a key tool of 
the job. It is the chairman's role to see that proper induction, inclusion and training to 
competence is carried out for the board 'as an effective working group', and for each 
director in it. In India, the Ganguly Committee Report (2002), RBI, on Banks and 
Financial Institutions has also recommended training for directors in Banks and states, 
"The Group is of the view that the directors could be made more responsible to their 
organization by exposing them to need-based training programme/seminars/ 
workshops to acquamt them with the emerging developments/challenges feeing the 
banking sector. The directors could be exposed to the latest management techniques, 
technological developments, innovation in fmancial markets, risk management and 
other area of interest to the organization to discharge their duties to the best of their 
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abilities. The Group is of the view that such investment would be of great value to the 
financial system". The same reasoning as above also holds true in the corporate non-
financial sectors. Bansal (1989) writes in his book, " it is surprising that there has 
been a singular lack of awareness regarding the need for special training for directors. 
England has however taken a lead in this regard by opening an 'Institute of Directors' 
concerned with conducting various types of training programmes for directors. Public 
speaking, language programme, refresher courses in accounting and finance, public 
relations etc. are some of the various training courses run for incumbent directors," 
5.24: Discussion for H-24 (Strength of female Non-Executive Directors) 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the hypothesis at 95% confidence 
interval. As the p value is 0.000 the hypothesis gets rejected even at 99% confidence 
interval. The mean sampling statistics for the strength of female non-executive 
Directors (NI«fcI) comes to 0.3065 in Indian corporate and 0.8120 in case of UK. Thus 
there exists significant difference over the strength of Female non-executive directors 
between India and UK. The presence of female directors are more in case of United 
Kingdom as expected, given the society perceptions and skill and knowledge level 
among the UK females. The female non-executive director strength however does not 
yield us the picture of how many females belong to independent category and how 
many belong to non-independent category. In Indian case female non-independent 
directors are mostly expected from the promoter's relatives and kith and kins. The 
female NED (both dependent and independent) percentage in terms of total board 
members comes to 3.23% in case of India whereas the corresponding figure in UK 
case is 8.84%. Mehra (2005) encloses 'The London Declaration' at 6* International 
conference on corporate governance on 12-13 May 2005, in his compilation 'Making 
Corporate Governance work for the poor' which declares among others, "Diversity in 
the composition of the board is imperative not only to give representation to different 
constituencies but is vital to improve quality of decision making. It was Darwin who 
said in 1859 that variety improves crops. It has been recognized that inclusion of 
diverse groups, minorities, women and young people in the board will help boards 
become more performance oriented, competitive and innovative." Institute Of 
Directors, lOD (2005) apprises us on the Australian opinion on the board diversity 
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which says "A well constituted board should reflect diversity through a broad matrix 
of gender, skills, age and experience.... The challenge is to find the right balance 
between diversity and collegiality so as to maximize the performance of the board." 
The Tyson Report (2003) on the Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive 
Directors notes, "Diversity in the background, skills, and experiences of NEDs 
enhances board effectiveness by bringing a wider range of perspectives and 
knowledge to bear on issues of company performance, strategy and risk. Board 
diversity can also send a positive and motivating signal to customers, shareholders 
and employees, and can contribute to a better understanding by the con^any's 
leadership of the diverse constituency that affects its success". 
5.25: Discussion for H-25 (Strength of Female Independent Directors) 
As discussed above another hypothesis has been formed to assess what percentage of 
female non-executive directors actually belong to independent members firom among 
the total female non-executives. The statistical analysis against the variable of total 
strength of female ID rejects the Null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence. Since 
the p value is 0.000 the Null hypothesis gets rejected even at 99% confidence interval. 
The sampling statistics for mean presence of female mdependent directors in case of 
India is 0.1183 whereas it is 0.6496 in case of UK. Thus there exists significant 
difference over the mean strength of female Independent Directors between the two 
countries. The percentage figure of presence of ID Female is even more contrasting 
than the female NED (Dependent and Independent combined). Whereas the female 
NED(both dependent and independent) percentage in the Indian board comes to 
3.23% and the corresponding figures in UK case is 8.84%, the female ID figures in 
case of India is 1.2% and 7.07% in case of UK. This confu-ms that not only UK has 
greater numbers of female NED but among its female NED larger number constitutes 
ID. The comparative result fi-om the above two hypothesis indicates that the 
proportion of Independent female members in the Indian corporate is lesser than that 
of UK signifying the greater number of female in Indian boards comprise non-
executive directors and these increased non-independent group of female constitutes 
wives, daughters, mothers etc of dominant group implanted to remain in majority and 
keep control over the company. Bansal (1989) observation in this regard in Indian 
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boards is worth noting, "Female representation on the boards of corporate leaders has 
been found to be almost negligible. There were only 7 females amongst a total of 688 
directors, constituting about 1% of the total directorial strength of the Corporate 
Leaders. Almost all of them have ascended to these posts by virtue of their 
relationship with the traditional business families." Increased female presence is 
desirable because of the special quality of honesty, less prone to corruption, good 
listening capacity and a good motivator also, India needs a greater pool of women 
Independent directors from which larger number can be inducted into boards as in 
case of UK. (Kesho Prasad, 2006). 
London Declaration 2005 taken at 6* International Conference on Corporate 
Governance held on 12-13 May 2005 at London and attended by 33 countries 
including India includes among its 10 step action plan, "Diversity in the composition 
of the board is imperative not only to give representation to different constituencies 
but is vital to improve quality of decision making.... The inclusion of diverse groups, 
minorities, women and young people in the board will help boards become more 
performance oriented, competitive and innovative." As Prasad (2006) discusses in his 
book, corporate governance, 'Recent research shows that women tend to have more 
values which contribute to good governance. Women in business are not prone to pay 
bribes, since they are ethical by nature. A higher proportion of females as compared to 
males believe that a corrupt act cannot be justified. They are good listeners and 
motivators. (Source; Economic Times, Calcutta edition dtd. 21.01.03: Gender for 
Governance)". 
5.26: Discussion for H-26 (Performance Evaluation) 
UK corporate governance practices give much importance for keeping provisions for 
performance evaluation system. The performance evaluation system encompasses not 
only independent and non-executive directors but also for executive and the chairman. 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the Null hypothesis at 95% 
confidence interval. The result is even more robust and the Null hypothesis gets 
rejected at 99% confidence interval. Thus there exists significant difference between 
India and UK on the matter of provision for Performance evaluation. The sampling 
statistics of mean of companies having provision for performance evaluation system 
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is 0.08602 for Indian companies and that of 0.9658 for UK companies. Thus on an 
average 96.58% of UK companies have provisions for performance evaluation system 
tor their board members. Whereas only 8.60 % of the Indian companies have such 
provision. 
There is a need to install the system of performance evaluation. Bain, N & Band, D 
(1996) says in this regard, "There is no denying that performance evaluation is a 
difficult process to install into board practice. Nor is it easy to estabUsh and maintain 
its objectivity and effectiveness. However, it is vital to the long-term successful 
performance of a board of directors- especially in today's business climate, 
characterized by increasingly rapid change and ever closer scrutiny". 
The board is responsible for its own evaluation as well as individual directors from 
time to time. "The board should disclose whether it has a performance evaluation 
process in place, either for the board as a whole or for individual members. Disclosure 
should be made of how the board has evaluated its performance and how the results of 
the appraisals are being used", United Nations (2006). 
The performance evaluation process looks at how individual directors and the Board's 
committees have performed. Boards should have performance evaluation system not 
only for its NED but also the chairman, committee, ED and others and should take it 
as the basis for continuous improvement. The establishment of such system improves 
the board functioning and efficiencies of independent decision taking. UK code lays 
emphasis on the performance evaluation system of all the board member. Ghosh 
(2000) writes, "Boardroom self evaluation schemes under which the competence of 
the directors is reviewed annually by fellow board members are making rapid 
headway in the US. There should be a process of self-evaluation by the board and the 
establishment of standards of performance". On the matter of conducting board 
performance evaluation Demb and Neubauer writes, "The key is to create a process 
that allows board members to explicitly discuss board effectiveness and to implement 
whatever changes are deemed necessary." (Demb and Neubauer). Bain & Band 
(1996), writes, "Performance evaluation is a flexible, dynamic process that includes 
the act of setting goals and standards of performance. These goals need to be 
measurable and achievable. After this is completed, a system that allows regular 
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evaluation of these criteria for each director and the board as a whole should be 
developed and implemented." At another points in the book (p-60) they stress, "When 
evaluating, it is not just the board that needs to be considered. There are several 
elements in addition to the full board that require attention: individual directors, the 
chairman and the CEO. Bain and David (1996) further sums up his chapters, on page 
67, by highlighting, "There is no denying that performance evaluation is a difficult 
process to install into board practice. Nor it is easy to establish and maintain its 
objectivity and effectiveness. However, it is vital to the long-term successful 
performance of a board of directors-especially in today's business climate, 
characterized by increasingly rapid change and ever closer scrutiny Evaluation 
... is useful for ensuring a feedback cycle that aids continuous improvement of 
performance." Diedrich Von Soosten (2002) suggests, "The Nominating committee 
should be delegated the additional responsibility of evaluating the performance of 
individual directors. This evaluation should include the basics, such as attendance at 
both board and committee meetings. It should also include a more substantive 
evaluation of performance as well. The more substantive evaluation criteria might 
include among other things, an assessment of the director's knowledge of the issues. 
Independence of thought, communication and negotiating skills as well as his or her 
perceived dedication to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders". The 
Business Roundtable (2002) holds the view, "The board should have an effective 
mechanism for evaluating performance on a continuing basis". ICSI (2006) mentions 
the stipulations of Calpers and NYSE on board performance evaluation: CalPERS, the 
largest US pension fund in the world, felt that an important part of core principles and 
guidelines on corporate governance woukl be an effective means of evaluating 
individual director performance. With this view, CalPERS recommended that each 
Board should establish performance criteria not only for self but also for individual 
directors. NYSE in its listing agreement stipulates that the Board should conduct a 
self-evaluation at least annually, determining whether it and its committees are 
functioning effectively. Conger et al. (2000) on the issue of performance evaluation 
cautions, "No one can evaluate a board but the board itself Nevertheless, self-
evaluation need not be self-serving evaluations". The author fiirther notes on the 
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issue, "The knowledge and experience of the board members absolutely must match 
the strategic demands facing the company." 
5.27: Discussion for H-27 (Presence of Audit Committee) 
The sampling statistic of mean size of companies having presence of Audit committee 
in Indian and UK corporate yields 1.00 for each country. The statistical test yields no 
result because of any deviation. Thus there exist no difference of mean and all the 
companies of both the country have Audit Committee in their boards. Owen, 
Kirchmaier and Grant (2005) make a reference about the importance of the audit sub-
committee when they write, "It is now an accepted policy to have at least three board 
sub-committees focusing on audit, remuneration and appointment. Additional 
committees are added depending upon the individual needs of the firm. Of particular 
importance is the audit committee. This committee comprises of outside directors, and 
is charged with hiring of auditors. Auditing is the essential input factors for effective 
governance, as it provides the information on which market participants base their 
decisions". CIFA (Centre for Financial Market Integrity) Institute, in their instruction 
manual to investors, remarks, "Investors should determine whether the Board has 
established a committee of independent Board Members, including those with recent 
and relevant experience of financing and accounting, to oversee the audit of the 
Company's financial reports." CIFA fiirther puts, "the audit committee's primary 
objective is to ensure that the fmancial information reported by the Company to 
Shareowners is complete, accurate, reliable, relevant and timely." 
5.28: Discussion for H-28 (Promoter holding the post of Chairman) 
The statistical analysis against the variable rejects the Null Hypothesis at 95% 
confidence interval. Since the p value comes to 0.000 the Null hypothesis gets 
rejected at 99% confidence interval. The sampling statistics for mean of number of 
companies in which chairman is Promoter comes to 0.5297 in case of India and only 
0.01724 in case of UK. Thus there exists significant difference over the mean number 
of companies having chairman as promoter. In physical terms only 1.7245 of the UK 
companies have chairman as its promoters whereas the corresponding promoter as 
chairman India case is as high as 52.97%. The result shows the large scale dominating 
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effect of promoters on company management and governance. The result also shows 
practically no presence of promoters on company governance or management in case 
of UK. Large scale presence of Chairman from promoter's side in case of India may 
severely unbalance the board which presses the need for still larger percentage than 
the existing maximvun provision of 50% of independent Directors in Clause 49 and 
ensurance of strong presence of components of Independent Directors Enabling 
Model as prescribed by the researcher at chapter 7 of the thesis. In this connection 
Khan (2005) observes in the Indian context, " The promoter becoming dominant 
shareholders may indulge themselves in election of board members packing the board 
with their kith and kin in order to ensure their support and prove their point". 
5.29: Discussion for H-29 (Strength of Total Non-Executive Directors (NI & I) 
The statistical analysis finds that there is a large and significant difference between 
India and UK on the matter of total strength of Non-Executive Directors (NI&I) 
present in their board. The results further reveal that the average size of Indian board 
has larger number of Non-Executive Directors than that of UK as the statistics for 
mean, median and mode in case of India is 7.0216, 7 & 6 and that of UK is 5.7949, 6 
& 5. The result is robust up to 99% significance level as the p value for t-test comes to 
0.000. NED has two categories, Independent directors and non-independent Directors. 
The previous non-rejection of the hypotheses on Independent Directors (Ho4) 
signified no significant difference on the strength of independent directors between 
India and UK. The present result of rejection of null hypothesis on Non-Executive 
Directors (NI & I) therefore goes on the part of increased presence of non-
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Figure-5.2: Dominant stockholder (India) and Diffuse 
Ownership (UK), Source: Mark 7, Roe 
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independent non-executive directors in Indian boards. The result is thus in agreement 
with the previous findings of Hypothesis-5.The result obtained is in agreement with 
the general attitudes and feelings and psyche of dominant shareholding group 
influence in company governance structure. Merson (2004) emphasizing on the role 
and importance of a Non-Executive Directors writes, "Directors (executive) , far 
from paying insufficient attention to their responsibility to shareholders, often fail to 
separate shareholder issue from operational issues and allow the former to get in the 
way of the latter. An experienced non-executive will help an inexperienced 
management team ensure that shareholder issues and operational issues are discussed 
separately, using separate process." 
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Chapter'6 
C H A P T E R - 6 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
This Chapter summarizes the research, includes the conclusions, and provides the 
recommendations. Other issues such as Implication for policy and practices, limitations 
etc. have been discussed here. 
6.1: Summary 
As the process of globalization and the economic activities gathers momentum 
companies, especially the listed ones, will have increased pressure from the gtobal 
community to enhance their corporate governance standards equivalent to that of 
international level in onier to attract and retain investors. Acquiring capitals, deploying 
them in responsible investment in transparent way, will be the key objective of a nation. 
The enhancement of corporate governance standards has become a key issue. 
The overall purpose of the research was to compare corporate governance practices of 
bidia and UK, keeping UK as benchmark, to find out the areas of significant deviations 
from that of UK corporate, and bring out suggestions for improvement of our system. 
Some key parameters of corporate governance, where UK place great emphases and 
place them in priority (figure-1.4, chapter-1) were identified and hypotheses were framed 
to test empirically for significant differences on these parameters of Indian top listed 
companies fix>m that of UK top listed companies. Accordingly, the research Hypotheses 
were formulated on the matters of, Chairman being Executive or Non-Executive , 
Separation of roles of Chairman & CEO , Board Size , Six hypotheses on corporate 
Board structures: Strength of Independent Directors in the Boards , Strength of Non-
Executive Directors (NI)„ Strength of Executive Directors , Board meeting fiiequencies , 
Strength of Total Non-Executive Directors, one hypotheses on presence of Nomination 
Committee , seven hypotheses on Remuneration Committee: Size of Remuneration 
Committee, Strength of Independent Directors in Remuneration Committee, Strength of 
NED (NI) in Remuneration Committee, Strength of Executive Directors in Remuneration 
Committee, Frequencies of Remuneration Committee meeting. Presence of Remuneration 
Committee, Presence of Chairman in Remuneration Committee, Seven Hypotheses on 
Audit Committee: Size of Audit Committee, Strength of Independent Directors in Audit 
Committee, Strength of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in Audit Committee, Strength of 
Executive Directors in Audit Committee, Strength of Audit Committee Meeting, 
Chairman presence in Audit Committee, Presence of Audit Committee, Presence of Sr. 
Independent Director, companies provision for Induction and Professional Development, 
Two hypotheses on Strength of Female Independent Directors and Presence of Female 
NED (NI&l) , one number hypothesis each on companies Provision for Performance 
Evaluation & Presence of Promoter as Chairman in companies Board. 
The study particularly focused on top listed non-financial corporate of India and UK and 
the comparative mean figures and their significant deviations based on means on the 
identified parameters were analyzed with the help of SPSS. In Indian case, the Govt, 
listed companies (PSUs) and financials companies had been excluded. AIM listed and 
smaller companies (below FTSE 350) and financials companies of UK case were also 
excluded fi-om the current research purview. The sample for the study was drawn through 
systematic random sampling methods. In all 117 companies from UK and 186 companies 
from Indian corporate were the subjects of the study. The secondary data from Annual 
Reports for the financial year 2007-08, in case of India, and for the financial year 2008, 
in case of UK has been utilized for the empirical analysis. Out of the 29 hypotheses 24 
were rejected and five were not rejected. The hypotheses which were rejected and which 
were not rejected have been furnished. The summary of results obtained from the 
empirical analysis is fumished below: 
Table 7.1: List of Null Hypotheses which were not rejected 
List of Null 
Hypothesis 
Statement: There 
is no significant 
difference 
between India 
and UK on the 
matter of 
Means 
India UK 
t-value 
(unequal 
variance) 
p 
value 
(two 
tailed) 
p value 
higher or 
lower than 
0.05 
(significance 
at 5% level) 
Result 
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Ho3 
Ho4 
Hoi 5 
Hoi 6 
Ho27 
... size of Board 
...strength of 
independent 
directors in their 
Board. 
....presence of 
chairman in their 
Remuneration 
Committee 
...strength of 
members in the 
Audit 
Committee 
...mean 
presence of 
Audit 
Committee 
9.4892 
4.7838 
0.3087 
3.7189 
1.000 
9.1795 
4.6068 
0.3761 
3.6239 
1.000 
1.052 
0.921 
-1.144 
0.901 
— 
0294 
0.358 
0.254 
0.369 
— 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
— 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null 
not 
rejected 
Null not 
rejected 
Table 12: List of Null Hypotheses which were rejected 
List of Null 
Hypothesis 
Hoi 
Ho2 
Ho5 
Ho6 
Statement: There 
is no significant 
difference 
between India 
and UK on the 
matter of. 
...Chairman 
being Non-
Executive. 
...separation of 
roles, i.e., 
Chairman & 
CEO separate. 
... strength of 
Non Executive 
Directors (NI) in 
their companies 
Board. 
... strength of 
Means 
India 
0.6216 
0.6613 
22378 
2.4892 
UK 
0.8793 
0.9658 
1.1880 
03879 
t-value 
(unequal 
variance) 
-5.493 
-7.785 
6.861 
18.115 
P 
value 
(two 
tailed) 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
p value 
higher or 
lower than 
0.05(95% 
confidence 
level) 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
Result 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
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Ho7 
Ho8 
Ho9 
HolO 
Holl 
Hol2 
Hoi 3 
Hoi 4 
Hoi 7 
Hoi 8 
Executive 
Directors in their 
Board. 
....frequencies of 
Board Meetings 
...presence of 
Nomination 
Committee in 
their Board. 
...size of the 
remuneration 
committee. 
... .strength of 
Independent 
Directors in the 
Remuneration 
Committee 
....strength of 
Non-Executive 
Directors (NI) in 
Remuneration 
Committee 
....strength of 
Executive 
Directors in their 
Remuneration 
Committee 
...frequencies of 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Meetings 
...presence of 
Remuneration 
Committee in 
their Corporate 
Boards. 
...strength of 
independent 
directors in the 
audit committee 
...strength of 
63441 
0.0645 
3.3716 
2.6216 
0.6216 
0.1342 
1.9007 
0.8065 
3.0595 
8.6897 
0.9915 
3.9316 
3.5043 
0.4274 
0.0000 
4.4872 
1.0000 
3.5043 
0.1197 
-7.579 
-46.388 
-5.088 
-7.492 
2.343 
4.317 
-12.157 
-6.663 
-4.027 
5.674 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.020 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
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Hoi 9 
Ho20 
Ho21 
Ho22 
Ho23 
Ho24 
Ho25 
Ho26 
Non-Executive 
Directors (NI) in 
Audit 
Committee. 
...strength of 
Executive 
Directors in 
Audit 
Committees. 
...frequencies of 
Audit Committee 
Meetings 
.... presence of 
Chairman as 
member of Audit 
Committee. 
....mean size, of 
companies 
having Lead 
Independent 
Director in their 
Boards. 
....mean size of 
companies 
having provision 
for Induction and 
Professional 
Development 
...size of female 
non-executive 
directors (NI & I) 
in their 
companies. 
...strength of 
Female 
Independent 
Directors in their 
company's 
Boards. 
...companies 
having provisions 
for Performance 
0.4649 
0.1935 
4.8172 
02258 
0.0269 
0.1075 
0.3065 
0.1183 
0.0860 
0.0000 
3.9402 
0.0769 
0.9829 
0.9231 
0.8120 
0.6496 
0.9658 
6.663 
6.700 
3.773 
-56.507 
-24.252 
-5.571 
-7.490 
-33.027 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
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Ho28 
Ho29 
Evaluation for 
their Directors. 
.... Promoters 
holding the post 
of chairman in 
their company 
...strength of 
total non-
executive (Nl&i) 
Directors. 
0.5297 
7.0216 
0.0172 
5.7949 
13.227 
5.219 
0.000 
0.000 
<0.05 
<0.05 
Null 
rejected 
Null 
rejected 
On the matter of chairman belonging from non-executive, there exists a significant 
difference between India and UK. There were large and significant difference on tfie 
strength of Non-Executive Chairman between India and UK with UK Boards to be in 
much better condition with much greater number of non-executive chairman.UK Board 
may be considered to possess much better equipped with greater outer perspectives which 
a non-executive chairman brings in, apart from their role in board balance and better 
oversight functions over its CEO and management functions and other associated 
characteristics. 
On the matter of separation of roles for governance and management i.e., separation of 
Chairman & CEO posts, the empirical test found large and significant differences 
between India and UK with United Kingdom in much better position with much larger 
numbers of companies having separate Chairman & CEO which provides an edge over 
India on the matter of board governance associated with separate post for governance and 
associated benefits of better monitoring of the management functions and better 
recognition of role of board as custodian of equity holder interests. 
On the matter of strength of board members, empirical results found no significant 
difference between India and UK. Sampling statistic of Mean for Indian Board is 9.4892 
and tiiat of UK is 9.1795. Indian boards, however, appear to be slightly lai]ger than their 
UK counterparts. Larger board brings in co-ordination problem and is easier for CEO to 
control. 
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On the question of strength of Independent Directors, the empirical analysis found no 
significant difference between India and UK. The mean figure for Independent directors 
in case of Indian board is 4.7838 whereas the corresponding figure in UK case is 4.6068. 
The numerical figures places the two countries on almost equal footings but board 
independence in spirit may ,however, differ greatly between the two countries with India 
in suspect condition because of lack of nomination committee in most Indian corporate 
boards and without undergoing the strict and independent formal selection, recruitment 
and maintenance process for independent directors by the nomination committee, apart 
ftx)m other shortcomings like poor definition and implementation of independence, 
counting of large number of nominee director as indep)endent etc. 
On the question of strength of Non Executive Directors (Non-independent) empirical 
analysis found large and significant differences between India and UK. The mean figure 
for India is 2.2378, whereas it is 1.1880 for UK. Thus Indian Boards, in general, have 
twice the number of non-executive directors (Nl) than their UK counterparts. The 
presence of Non Executive Directors (NI) is not considered a desirable feature globally as 
these mostly constitutes interested and self seeking elements and the current thrust 
globally is to have widely held company and to have a board composed solely of 
independent directors other than the CEO. (Newquist & Russel, 2004). "There is a 
growing international trend towards independent non-executive boards" (Report of the 
Task Force on Corporate Excellence, Department of Company Affairs, p.23). "Elsewhere 
in the developed world, non-executive directors, largely, are by definition also 
independent but the Listing Agreements (KMB Report) make a distinction between 
independent and non-independent non-executive directors." (The Report of Task Force 
on Corporate Excellence, p.23).The UK seems to be nearer to the above stated objectives 
whereas India is far behind on the matter. 
On the issue of size of Executive Directors in Boards, the analysis revealed that there 
exists large and significant differences between India and UK. The mean figure in Indian 
case was found to be 2.4892, whereas it is much less, i.e., only 0.3879 in case of UK. The 
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Indian boards, as the result speaks, are manned almost five times more with executive 
directors than the UK boards. 
On the matter of number of Board Meetings in a year, there exists significant difference 
between the two countries with UK much ahead in this statistics. The Mean, Median and 
Mode for board meetings in India are 6.34, 6 & 5. The corresponding figure in case of 
UK is 8.69, 8 & 8. Thus UK corporate boards, in general, conduct much more number of 
board meetings than India. The resuU is not surprising keeping in view the UK stress on 
formal mechanism of decision making in the board. Indian boards being dominated by 
controlling group feel lesser need of formal board meetings pointing towards lesser 
emphasis on formal decision making in a board and greater nos. of informal decisions 
behind the scene. 
On the matter of presence of Nomination Committee, the empirical analysis findings 
revealed that there existed large and significant differences between India and UK. In fact 
India seems to be nowhere as the sampling statistics shows only 6.45% of the Indian 
companies having Nomination Committee in their boards as against 99.15% in case of 
UK companies. Thus UK is much ahead with almost all companies having Nomination 
Committees and almost reverse is the case with India. The cause of extremely low 
compliance rate in respect of adoption of Nomination committee may be reasoned on two 
counts. First it is not a mandatory code in the listing agreement and the second is the 
average apathy of concentrated shareholders group to reserve the sensitive and important 
issue of nomination decision of CEO and directors close to their chest and under their 
discretion. Other reasons may be because of lesser cross listing with such stock exchange 
in LSE, NYSE where fulfillment of this requirement is a must. 
On the issue of strength of directors in the Remuneration Committee there existed 
significant difference between India and UK however the difference is smaller in the 
Means. The mean value for the parameters in case of India is 3.3716 whereas the 
corresponding figure is 3.9316 for UK. Thus the average strength of directors in UK 
remuneration committees is slightly greater than that of Indian counterparts. The lesser 
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number of directors in case of India as compared with UK is not surprising given the least 
emphasis on the remuneration related decisions through formal decisions of the board. 
On the question of strength of Independent Directors in the Remuneration Committee 
there exists significant difference between India and UK. The sampling statistics against 
this variable for Indian companies is 2.6216 whereas the same is 3.5043 in case of UK. 
Thus the presence of Independent members is significantly more in case of UK's 
Remuneration Committee when compared with Indian corporate practice. 
On the issue of number of Non-Executive Directors (Non Independent) in Remuneration 
Committee, there is significant difference between India and UK on the matter. The 
sampling statistics against this variable in Indian Companies is 0.6216 whereas for the 
UK companies it is 0.4274. The number of non-executive (NI) directors in case of Indian 
remuneration committees is more than that of the UK companies. In Indian condition 
NED (NI) generally forms the interest groups or fiiends, spouse or relatives of dominant 
controlling groups which are aligned more with the controlling group and management 
and helps preserve their interest. 
On the matter of number of Executive Directors in Remuneration Committee there exists 
significant difference between India and United Kingdom. In fact as per the empirical 
result there exist no executive members on the Remuneration Committee in British 
companies. The result fixim empirical analysis is not surprising because of the dominating 
group influence and the ability of their implanted salaried executive directors, which can 
be influenced more easily in preserving their interests on sensitive issues like 
remuneration. When seen with earlier findings on increased number of Non-Executive 
Directors (Non-independent) and lesser number of Independent Directors it is observed 
that while numbers of Independent directors are lesser. Executive Directors and NED 
(Non-independent) are larger in numbers in Remuneration Committee in India which 
reinforces the above conclusions of dominance of concentrated shareholding groups in 
Indian Boards. 
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On the issue of number of Remuneration Committee Meetings, there exists large and 
significant difference between India and United Kingdom. The mean sampling statistics 
in case of India is 1.9007 whereas the same in case of UK is 4.4872. Thus UK top listed 
corporate holds almost more than double the number of remuneration committee 
meetings than their Indian counterparts. The result obtained in case of India is not 
unexpected given the least importance assigned to the Remuneration Committee and 
their meetings and their decisions which are generally taken not by the Remuneration 
Committees but by the dominant and controlling interest groups. 
On the matter of presence of Remuneration Committee there exists large and significant 
difference between India and UK. The research finds that 20% of the Indian Companies 
do not have Remuneration Committees at all whereas all top listed UK corporate have 
Remuneration Committee. The poor compliance rate in respect of Remuneration 
Committee may be because of its provision being non-mandatory in nature in The 
Revised Clause-49 and the average apathy of the dominant controlling groups to retain 
control over such decision within them. 
On the issue of chairman presence in Remuneration Committee there exist no significant 
difference between India and United Kingdom. The presence of Chairman in the 
Remuneration Committee is more or less the same in both India and United Kingdom. In 
case of United Kingdom, however, large presence of non-executive independent 
chairman means that the remuneration related decisions is not controlled by management 
group and the decisions taken are independent, whereas in Indian case, executive 
chairman who mostly belongs fi"om executive, are non-independent and are larger in 
numbers. Thus Chairman presence increases the independence of UK Remuneration 
Committee; in case of India the reverse is true. 
On the question of strength of Audit Committee there exists no significant difference 
between India and UK. The sampling statistics in case of Indian corporate is 3.7189 
whereas the same is 3.6239 in case of United Kingdom. Thus average strength of 
members in the Indian Audit Committee is on higher side as compared to UK Audit 
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committee. Indian Audit Committee, as the statistical results speaks, has an edge over 
British Board on this variable, so far as the numerical figure is concerned. 
On the issue of strength of hidependent Directors in Audit Committee, there exist 
significant differences between the two countries. The mean figure in case of India is 
3.0595 whereas the same is 3.5043 in case of UK. The UK audit committee on an 
average, therefore, has more independent members than their Indian counterparts and 
thus it can be assumed tiiat the UK Audit Committees are slightly more independent than 
that of Indian Corporate. The conclusion so derived need to be taken with caution 
because though in numerical terms there is little difference, on actual counts and taken in 
true spirit of independence, the Indian Audit Committee may differ widely from United 
Kingdom audit committee, when other parameters are taken into consideration. 
On the issue of number of Non-Executive Directors (NI) in Audit Committee there exists 
significant difference. The sampling statistk: of means against the variable is 0.4649 in 
case of India and 0.1197 in case of UK. Thus the Indian corporate have on an average 
four times greater number of Non-Executive (non-independent) directors in their Audit 
Committees as compared to that of UK. The result reinforces the dominant influence of 
controlling groups in such important board committees as Audit Committee. These non-
executive directors generally forms friends, relatives, spouse and other interested groups 
and mostly are not independent from management or controlling interests. 
On the question of strength of Executive Directors in Audit Committees there exist 
significant difference between India and UK. The mean sampling statistic in case of India 
is 0.1935 and 0.0000 in case of UK. Thus it can be observed that there is virtually no 
executive member in the Audit committee of any company of UK under study. Whereas 
Indian companies Audit Committee have the presence of Executive members which 
impairs independent functioning of the Audit Committee in Indian condition. UK Audit 
Committee can be considered a benchmaric on this aspect. 
On the matter of Audit Committee Meetings held in a year, there exist significant 
difference between India and UK. The sampling statistic of mean is 4.8172 in case of 
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Indian companies and 3.9402 in case of UK companies. Thus average number of Audit 
Committee meeting in case of India is higher than that of UK which is a good feature and 
goes in fevor of India. Thus Indian corporate may be considered to have an edge over 
their UK counterparts on the issue of number of Audit Committee held in a year. The 
disclosure on length and time of Audit Committee is required which is not observed in 
either country Annual Reports. The same is suggested to be incorporate. India can take 
the lead in this regard. 
On the issue of chairman being the member of Audit Committee, there exist significant 
difference between India and UK. The sampling statistics obtained for Indian corporate is 
0.2258 as against 0.07692 in case of United Kingdom. On an average 22.58% of the 
Indian companies have chairman present in the Audit Committee as member. Whereas 
the corresponding figures in case of UK is 7.69%. Given that Indian companies have 
larger number of promoter chairman as well as combined post of CEO and Chairman 
(Executive chairman), the chairman presence in India Audit Committee may help 
unbalance the Audit Committee and the decision of Audit Committees might goes in 
favor of dominant and controlling group. Reverse is the case with UK corporate where 
not only 7.69% of the companies have chairman in audit committees but the post of 
chairman and CEO is separate, is mostly non-executive and independent at the time of 
joining and nominated through independent nomination committee selection process. 
On the issue of presence of Lead Independent Director, there exist large and significant 
difference between India and UK. In feet India can be compared to be nowhere against 
United Kingdom on this important parameters of corporate governance. Whereas almost 
all the UK boards have the presence of Lead Independent Director (also called Sr. 
Independent Director), in India companies it is virtually non-existent. 
On the issue of provision for Induction and Professional Development there exist very 
large and significant differences between the two countries. Sampling statistics reveal 
only 10.75% of the Indian companies have kept provisions for Induction and Professional 
development for their directors. In comparison 92.31% of UK corporate has been found 
to keep such provisions for board improvements. The UK boards have, therefore, 
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considerable edge over the Indian boards on this score. The Indian board satisfies itself 
by appointing well known, reputed and celebrity professionals, who rely more on their 
past laurels ratfier than the immediate business needs as a company director. 
On the matter of size of Female Non-Executive Directors (NI & I), the empirical research 
finds significant difference between India and UK. The mean sampling statistics for the 
presence of female non-executive Directors (both independent and non-independent) is 
0.3065 in Indian corporate and 0.8120 in case of UK. Thus UK has more number of 
female directors compared to India. 
On the issue of strength of Female Independent Directors, there exist significant 
differences between the two countries. The presence of Female Independent Directors is 
even more contrasting than the female NED (Dependent and Independent combined) in 
Indian Condition. Whereas the female NED (both dependent and independent) 
percentage in the Indian board comes to 323% and the corresponding figures in UK case 
is 8.84%, the female ID figures in case of India is 1.2% and 7.07% in case of UK which 
confirms that not only UK has greater numbers of female NED (NI & I) but larger 
number of it constitutes independent directors which helps board balance and 
independence. The comparative result from the above two hypothesis indicates that the 
proportion of Independent female members in the Indian corporate is lesser than that of 
UK signifying greater number of female in Indian boards comprising non-executive 
directors (NI) who belongs to the non-independent group and constitutes promoter or 
higher management wives, daughters, mothers or other female relatives implanted to 
keep control over the company. The same is a matter of further research in Indian 
condition. 
On the matter of keeping provision for Performance Evaluation, the finding shows 
significant difference between India and United Kingdom. The sampling statistics of 
mean of companies having provision for performance evaluation system is 0.086 for 
Indian companies and that of 0.9658 for UK companies. Thus on an average 96.58% of 
UK companies have provisions for performance evaluation system for their board 
members. As s^ainst this, only 8.60 % of the Indian companies have such provisions. 
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On the issue of presence of Audit Committee there exist no difference and all companies 
of both countries have Audit Committee in their boards. The equal footing of Indian 
companies witii that of UK on Audit Committee may be because of the mandatoiy nature 
of requirements for such committee in The Revised Clause 49. The phenomenon of 100 
% compliance in respect of Audit Committee stresses the importance of mandatory 
provisions for better compliance rate for any provision. The compliance with 
Remuneration Committee and Nomination Committee can be bettered by putting these 
provisions against mandatory side of compliance. However this also holds true for other 
compliances. 
On the matter of presence of chairman from promoter group, there exists significant 
difference between India and UK. In physical terms only 1.72% of the UK companies 
have chairman as its promoters whereas the corresponding figure in India case is 52.97%. 
The result shows the large presence and influence of promoters on company management 
and governance in case of India, which is not considered desirable, and do not serve the 
purpose of reducing the phenomenon of what Sir Adrian Cadbury of United Kingdom has 
termed "unfettered power and authority" by a single person or group. 
On the matter of total strength of Non-Executive Directors (NI&I) there exists large and 
significant difference between India and UK with Indian statistics on the higher side than 
United Kingdom. The result is on the part of increased presence of Non-independent 
portion of non-executive directors who has increased presence because of the influence of 
dominant and controlling shareholding groups in the board. 
6.2: Findings 
The study finds India far behind UK on the matter of board governance, both in practice 
and theory. On the whole it has no policy and rulings on Remuneration committee. 
Nomination Committee, which are the two most important committee out of the three 
(last being Audit Committee), Lead Independent Director, Meeting without management. 
Induction and continuing Professional Development, Performance Evaluation, 
Appointment to the Board, The hidian governance code is not specific on the parameters 
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of 'Independent Director System Enabling Models' the current research evolves, to stress 
on the otherwise neglected but important enabling parameters for Independent Directors. 
The broad findings are as follows: 
Board balance: There is large and significant difference between India and United 
Kingdom on the matters of presence of non-executive chairman and separation of roles 
for chairman and chief executive officer. India is far behind on these matters when 
compared with benchmark practice of United Kingdom. 
Board Structure: Board size of India is comparatively a bit larger than UK, but no 
significant difference is observed in the statistical results with mean figures of 9.4892 in 
case of India and 9.1795 in case of UK. The Indian board has larger number of NED 
(Non-independent) and Executive Directors than UK which might help board unbalance-
There is no significant difference between number of Independent members in Indian and 
British Boards. The mean strength of Independent Directors in case of India is 4.7838 and 
4.6068 in case of UK. Thus Indian boards on an average have more number of 
Independent Directors compared to UK so far as the numerical strength of Independent 
Directors is concerned. The reality may however differ on the matter of compliance of 
independence in terms of spirit. The frequency of board meeting in Indian corporate is 
lesser than its British counterparts. 
Bio-Diversity: There is less presence of female members as corporate directors and even 
lesser with female Independent Directors in Indian case, which also point towards greater 
presence of female kith and kins of controlling groups in Indian corporate compared to 
United Kingdom. 
Audit Committee: The total strength of Audit Committee in case of India is greater 
compared to United Kingdom. However larger numbers of directors in Indian Audit 
Committee constitutes non-independent Non-Executive Directors which is almost four 
times than that of UK and increased presence Executive Directors. UK corporate does not 
accommodate any Executive members in its Audit Committee. The strength of 
Independent Directors in Indian Audit Committee was found to be lesser than UK. There 
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were equal presences of Audit Committees in botih the countries with all corporate of the 
two countries having Audit Committees. However Indian Corporate were found to hold 
increased number of Audit Committee Meetings compared to UK. Chairman presence in 
Audit Committee was found to be considerably more in Indian Audit Committee. Given 
the larger presence of promoter chairman, increased presence of Executive chairman and 
lesser separation of roles, the influence of controlling groups and management over the 
functioning of such critical committee of boards as Audit Committee seems to be 
considerably more compared to United Kingdom. 
Remoneration Committee: The presence of Remuneration Committee in Indian case is 
significantly lower than UK. Whereas all UK corporate have Remuneration Committees, 
approximately 20% of Indian corporate was not found to have Remuneration Committee. 
The results find lesser strength of members in Remuneration Committees, greater 
presence of NED(NI), greater presence of Executive Directors (In UK case it is Nil) and 
lesser presence of Independent Directors in Indian Remuneration Committee compared to 
United Kingdom. The frequencies of meetings of Remuneration Committee was found to 
be lesser compared to United Kingdom. On the question of Chairman Presence in 
Remuneration Committee there were no significant difference and chairman presence in 
the committee were found to be almost equal. The overall picture reveals greater presence 
and influence of management and controlling or promoter group and lesser independence 
of Remuneration Committees and according lesser importance of Remuneration 
Committee in case of India. 
Nomination Committee: On the question of Nomination Committee presence there were 
huge and significant differences between India and UK. Whereas almost Briti^ corporate 
was found to have Nomination Committee, in India case only 6.45% of them was found 
to have Nomination Committee. The research does not found any rulings on the matters 
of Nomination Committee in The revised Clause-49, either in mandatory or non-
mandatory sections. In The Combined Code of UK there is elaborate discussion and 
guidance over formation, functioning and maintenance of the Remuneration Committee. 
The findings again show considerable influence of controlling and interested groups 
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whose interests seem to be best served in maintain the status quo in terms of such critical 
committee as Nomination Committee. 
Board enabling parameters: On the question of provision for 'Induction and 
Professional development' and 'Performance Evaluation System' there were huge 
difference between India and UK, with India lagging far behind UK over these board 
enabling parameters. 
6.3: Conclusions 
Numerically India as a whole seems to be ahead with UK on such matters as strength of 
members in audit committee, frequency of Audit Committee Meeting in a year. Board 
Size and numerical strength of its Independent Directors in her Boards. 
India is at par with United Kingdom on such matters as: Chairman Presence in Audit 
Committee, presence of Audit Committees in their Boards. 
India is lagging far behind United Kingdom on the matters of chairman being non-
executive, separation of roles of governance and management, excessive presence of 
executive directors in boards, number of Board Meetings in a year. Remuneration 
Committee strength, strength of independent members in remuneration committee, 
excessive nos. of non-executive directors in remuneration committee, excessive presence 
of executive directors in remuneration committee, lesser number of remuneration 
committee meetings, lesser presence of remuneration committees, lesser strength of 
Independent Directors in Audit committees, excessive number of non-independent non-
executive directors in Audit Committees, excessive number of executive directors in 
Audit committees, higher executive and promoter chairman presence in Audit 
committee, less female NED(NI&I) and even lesser female Independent Directors, 
greater presence of promoters as chairman. Improvement in these areas is suggested in 
line with UK corporate practices. 
India position is no where when compared on the matters of presence of Nomination 
Committee, Lead independent director. Meeting without management. Induction and 
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professional development. Performance Evaluation. These require immediate attention. 
Most of these factors constitute important enabling and empowering factors for 
Independent directors, the lack of which render independent director ineffective to a 
considerable extent.(Figure-7.1 & 7.2). 
The overall findings reveal large and significant difference between India and UK on the 
researched parameters leading to poor corporate governance practices compared to 
United Kingdom and points towards stronger presence and dominance of controlling 
block holders and other dominant interest groups in India which have considerable 
influence over constituting board and their committee and also over their functioning. 
6.4: Suggestions 
I. Nomination Committee: Almost all codes have Nomination Committee including 
UK, which deals with the selection and other vital function on behalf of the board. It is 
strongly recommended that the requirement of a Nomination Committee be introduced in 
the Indian Model as early as possible in the mandatory category. The nomination 
committee should evaluate balance of skills, knowledge, and experience on the board and 
utilize this when preparing a candidate profile for new appointments. The nomination 
committee should throw their net as wide as possible in the search of suitable candidate. 
Selection of right and functional directors is the need of the hour as the current study with 
that of UK system suggests. A recent from Kaushik(2009) on the Satyam scandals are 
very important in this regard which highlights the absence of independent nomination 
committee in India case, "The Satyam episode is not an aberration, but an accurate 
reflection of what routinely and pervasively passes for corporate governance in India. 
Individuals who are either cronies or have ornamental value are invited to join a 
company's board to lend stature, creditability, respectability and marketability to the 
management and also satisfy statutoiy directives on corporate governance. These 
individuals have neither the time nor the inclination to get deeply engaged with the 
company whose stewardship is entrusted with them. Their preeminence and fungible 
value to a promoter resides in the success they have achieved in their chosen field." The 
Report on Corporate Excellence in its recommendations relating to corporate governance 
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matters furnishes on si. No. (BP) (17), p.l7, part IV, "Every listed Company shall 
constitute a Nomination Committee consisting wholly of at least three independent non-
executive directors, charged with the responsibility of scanning on a regular basis for 
potential candidates to be appointed to the Board, both in executive and non-executive 
positions, should an opportunity arise for additions or replacements on the Board." 
2. Remuneration Committee: Currently the provision for Remuneration committee 
exists in non-mandatory category of The Revised Clause 49. Keeping in view the vital 
functions of the Remuneration Committee its provision should be made in the mandatory 
and not in non-mandatory category. 
3. Lead Independent Director: Keeping in view the role and importance of the Lead 
Independent and for the sake of unity and better information flow among the board of 
directors, especially the Independent Directors, the concept of Lead Independent Director 
should be introduced at the earliest in the Indian Model which will also bind the 
independent group cohesively and improve the level of governance. In absence of Sr. 
Independent Director the entire group of Independent Director looks like headless heard 
whose voice can be deferred. 
4. Induction and Professional development: India is way behind on these parameters 
compared to UK. The requirement of bduction and Professional Development should be 
introduced in the Indian Model for each board members especially Independent Directors 
and rigorously followed. The provision should be in the mandatory section instead of 
non-mandatory. 
5. Performance evaluation: The concepts need to be introduced and maintained in our 
model of corporate governance at the earliest: mandatory or non-mandatory. 
6. Meeting without Management: All the Independent Directors should meet on regular 
basis and at least once a year only among themselves without the presence of their 
executive colleagues and it is strongly recommended that a provision in the Indian Model 
should be introduced at the earliest. The concept is rationally related to the Independence, 
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as how independent directors can functions independently if they could not meet 
separately from the main board. 
7. Nominee Directors should not be counted as Independent Directors as in United 
Kingdom and as recommended by Naresh Chandra Report. There is a gradual trend 
toward more independence of the board. The strength of the independent members should 
be increased to 60% for all cases, be the Chairman Non Executive Director or Executive 
Director. 
8. Disclosure on length or time of Board and Committee Meeting: Disclosure should 
be made regarding the Length (or duration) and time of each board and committee 
meeting. This is a potential important indicator of responsible and effective decision 
making. If board is functioning as effective decision makers and not as a rubber stamp 
(decisions already taken in advance) this variable reflects the state of healthiness of the 
boards. Current disclosure is limited to the number of board and committee meetings held 
in a year which do not portray the actual hours devoted in governance matter 
deliberations. UK Company's annual report also does not divulge this detail. India can 
take lead in this regard. 
9. Set-up of self regulatory bodies like 'The Institute of Directors': On the pattern of 
United Kingdom such institution is required to be set up in Indian context to nurture, 
promote and regulate the profession of independent directors. 
10. Different layers for Corporate Governance: Institute Of Directors, UK (2005) 
specifies, "While the major principles of good governance are of relevance to all 
companies, it would be a mistake to believe that every aspect of the detail of what is 
promulgated for large listed companies is relevant across the corporate spectrum. In order 
to achieve acceptance and eventually enthusiasm for corporate governance, the principles 
must be relevant to the size, structure and nature of business entity." The present Indian 
corporate governance standards for compliance are uniform for all type and sizes of 
companies whether it is large listed, smaller listed, growing companies or tiny listed 
companies. Whereas UK code provision are at different levels: the strictest for largest 
272 
companies, relaxed standards for smaller companies (companies below FTSE 350) and 
exempt for Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies which is meant for growing 
companies in UK. The system provides die highest benchmark standards for top listed 
ones for odier lower placed to know and emulate over time. This type of arrangement in 
scales and scope can be resorted to, i.e., highest standards for largest listed companies, 
relaxed for smaller companies and so on. The top listed companies may mandatorily be 
complied with all the stringent standards comparable to diat of UK with committee 
including Nomination and Remuneration Committee widi highest standards for 
Independence and for others to act as guiding factors. This arrangement will lead to faster 
improvement of corporate governance standards in India. The Report of Task Force on 
Corporate Excellence (2000), constituted by DCA, GOI recommends, Part 
IV,General,4.6 (E),p.l4 "Make the most rigorous governance standards applicable to 
Listed and large unlisted companies, apply less rigorous but basic minimum governance 
standards to smaller Listed and Unlisted public limited companies." 
12. Two layered Directors models for Indian Boards: UK corporate is constituted 
mainly on two types of directors: the executive directors and the Independent Directors. 
The Indian boards, on the other hands are constituted on three types of directors: the 
executive directors, independent non-executive directors (called Independent directors) 
and non-independent non-executive directors. The literature reviews shows that the non-
independent directors was inducted at the time of induction of clause 49 to overcome the 
shortage of independent directors as well as to accommodate the interest of promoters 
and families at that time, but with the hope and expectation that the same will be done 
away with over time. The three directors model persist even today whereas there is 
increased global trends of dual type directors' models with no non-independent non-
executive directors, lesser number of executive directors and increased presence of 
independent directors. The UK is now a role model in this regard as the current analytical 
studies over the parameters have shown that there is very less presence of executive 
directors, increased presence of independent directors and its chairmen are not only non-
executive but meets the criteria of independence at the very time of appointment. Thus 
UK's boards sometimes are even up to 60-70% independent directors' strength. There 
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should be dual layered director's constituents (binary format) in Indian boards to get 
increased faith in our system throughout the world, increased FDI inflow, and economic 
boost post liberalization and globalization. 
6.5: Limitations 
1. Remuneration aspect has not been taken into consideration in the current study. 
2. The present research gives a broad comparative picture of corporate governance 
practices and system prevailing in India and United Kingdom. More specific research on 
any particular area is further required to come to any definite conclusions. 
3. The findings are based on the data of large listed companies and do not consider 
financials and smaller listed corporate of the two countries along with PSU in Indian 
condition and AIM companies in UK context. 
4. The analytical study, comparisons and findings are limited to common data availability 
in the annual reports of the two countries. 
5. Data for one year has been taken for study. 
6. Secondary data handpicked from Annual Reports has been used for the analytical 
purpose. Some data may have the chance of not being picked up. 
7. The current study takes into consideration the corporate governance practices of Stock 
Exchange largest Listed companies and do not include smaller companies as well as 
other business forms. Corporate governance is all pervasive and is equally important in 
Govt. Sector, Financial companies, and other business forms including non-profit sectors. 
8. The present findings on corporate governance are based on the structural aspects of 
boards and sub-committees. The actual compliance in spirit may however differ widely 
from what is seen from the compliance in letter, and what the figures suggests, especially 
in matters like independence of board and sub committees. 
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6.6: Direction for Future Research 
1. Current shareholding in the Indian scenario is concentrated though there is attempt to 
disperse the same. The future research is required in this direction as to whether and to 
what extent the shareholding had dispersed in the Indian corporate. 
2. Comparative study on remuneration aspects has not been considered. Keeping in view 
the difference components mix of remuneration like cash compensation, share options, 
pensionary benefits, deferred schemes etc. this requires a separate study. Future 
comparative research can be conducted in this direction. 
3. Non-Executive Directors (Non-independent) generally forms the interested and other 
implanted groups in Indian Boards which impairs the independent functioning of the 
boards and committees and are required to be kept to the minimum in strength on this 
parameters. The present research finds them in greater numbers in boards and sub-
committees vis-a-vis that of United Kingdom. Future research may be conducted on the 
issue of numbers, nature, composition and trends in Non Executive Director (Non-
independent) in bdian Boards. 
4. Future research can be undertaken on other parameters like disclosure pattern, 
appointment of new directors on the board, succession planning of the board, role and 
efficiency of company secretary which is considered a key position in UK with lots of 
responsibility towards transmittal of timely information and the like. In UK removal of 
Company's Secretary is a matter of Board as a whole. 
5. Future research can be undertaken on Family Managed Corporations and Govt, owned 
business, as these form significant proportion of corporate business. Non-listed 
corporations can also be researched upon, as matter of good governance is also applicable 
to them. 
6. Whereas the CG codes needs to be updated on regular basis and the same is observed 
in case of UK, the revision in case of Clause 49 is few and far between and is irregular in 
nature. The Combined Code of UK which came into picture in the year 1998 and 
275 
incorporates major guidelines of corporate governance in United Kingdom has been 
revised three times at regular interval, in the year 2003, 2006 and the current 2009. The 
routine and regular nature of revisions in case of UK Combined Code can be gauged 
from the fact that the Combined Code mentions the duration up to which it will remain 
applicable and the next schedule of revision month and year wise on its very initial pages. 
The Revised Clause 49 which has been updated from the previous Clause 49 includes no 
such reference like period of its operation and the date from the next revision will be 
carried out and its next implementation afterwards. We can derive a cue from the UK 
system on the matter. The probable influencing factors in maintaining the status quo, if 
any, in this direction can be researched upon in Indian Case on the line of UK study by 
Jones & Pollitt(2001), "Who Influences debates in Business ethics? An investigation into 
the development of Corporate Governance in the UK since 1990." 
7. Independent Directors in required quantity and qualities are often cited as the 
impediments towards manning the board position and for better governance and exactly 
this is the reason for bringing in the concept of non-independent non-executive directors. 
Future research can be undertaken to find out the efforts undertaken on the matter of 
development of Independent director system, infrastructure developed and institutions 
formed toward betterment of Independent Director System. The factors to be considered 
may be the composite mix of factors as visualized in the Model provided for 
enhancement of the system in the next chapter:"Independent Directors Enabling Model." 
(Figure-7.2). 
8. Independent directors are required to take the thrust and load to keep board balanced 
and independent functioning of the board against considerable influence from entrenched 
controlling groups but least seems to have been done toward arming them with such 
enabling system like accurate and timely receipt of information, proper induction and 
continuous development, performance evaluation system, lead independent directors, 
insurance protection against legal suites, meeting without management etc as portrayed in 
the "independent director enabling system model' furnished in the dissertation(figure-7.I 
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& 7.2). The extent and effectiveness may be researched vis-a-vis UK or other advanced 
nations. 
9. In case of UK, AIM listed companies are exempt from corporate governance 
compliance standards, as these markets have been formed for small and growing 
companies. However the present research finds that there are sufficient numbers of UK 
companies, in the top 500 list by market capitalization, and the same cannot be termed as 
smaller companies by any standards. Research can be undertaken in respect of 
compliance standards of these AIM listed companies vis-a-vis larger companies of 
United Kingdom or with other countries. 
10. Corporate govemance compliance in spirit rather than substance matters most. Most 
of the corporate govemance research including the present one is based on compliance on 
paper and in figures and not against spirit of compliance. Research can be undertaken as 
how and to what extent the same has been complied with the actual spirit of good 
corporate govemance. However this is a difficult job. 
11. Provision for internal control is much talked and discussed issue in UK or USA. 
'Sarbanes-Oxley Act' on the matter of Corporate Govemance in USA emphasizes the 
matters most. The matter finds its place in UK annual reports. The same seems to be a 
matter of least importance and finds almost no mention in Indian annual reports. The 
extent of presence of Intemal control system and related issue and their comparative 
study against advanced nation like UK or USA can be undertaken. Disclosure on this on 
the scale and scope of UK companies are suggested and be subject to further research. 
6.7: Implication for policy and practices 
Broad findings of the comparative research, with the benchmark practices of UK top 
companies, provided useful direction and brought out several shortcomings on major 
aspects of corporate govemance of our system which requires immediate attention of 
policy makers. Department of Company affairs, GOI, SEBl and other regulatory agencies 
for further specific detailed studies and incorporation into our system based on specific 
recommendations. The study provides broad guidance to decision makers on the factors 
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of critical issues of corporate governance and the areas of significant variations with 
corporate practices of United Kingdom. The current research also identifies several other 
good features like 'meeting without management' and others which has hitfierto been 
unknown and the advanced countries like UK has been practicing for a long time, and 
calls upon the agencies of interest and business associations, including GOI to have a 
considered look. 
278 
Reference: 
Institute of Directors UK (2005), the handbook of international corporate governance: a 
definitive guide, an Institute of Directors publication, Kogan page, London and 
Sterling, VA„p.l54. 
Newquist, S.C., & Russell, M.B. (2004), Corporate Governance: putting investors first, 
Bloomberg press, Jaico publishing house, p. 172. 
Report of the Task Force on Corporate Excellence through Governance, Department 
of Company Affairs (Nov 20,2000), pp. 23,14 &17(part IV). 
Jones, I.W., & Pollitt, M.G. (2001), Who influences debates in business ethics? An 
investigation into the development of corporate governance in the UK since 1990, 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working paper 
no. 221,1-77. 
279 
Chapter' 7 
CHAPTER-7 
Independent Director System Enabling Model 
The role and importance of Independent directors in a unitary board structure is 
unquestionable and almost there is global convergence on this point. Gupta (1988) 
has remarked, "There can be no denying the fact that excellence in board functioning 
cannot be secured without first ensuring its Independence from the dominance of one 
person, a family or group. Other attributes will come into play only if independence is 
first ensured." Goplasamy (2006) on this point writes, "An active and involved board 
consisting of professional and truly independent directors plays an important role in 
creating trust between a company and its investors, and is the best guarantor of good 
corporate governance". 
The present study reveals that UK has not only ensured majority presence of (more 
than 60%) Independent Directors in their boards but also ensured the presence and 
compliance of associated erwibling factors to strengthen its Independent Directors 
system in each board. The resultant output from the UK independent director system 
is, therefore, very effective in avoiding board unbalance and the situation of any one 
group having unfettered control and power over the board decisions. As a result of the 
benchmarked standards on the matter of board independence UK is now is in position 
to pull its corporate governance to still greater heights even without the presence of a 
mandatory corporate governance provisions. 
The importance of Independent Directors in the Indian context is much more than that 
of UK because of the concentrated shareholding structure with dominant group, 
multinationals, GOI, family or promoter group having the direct influence over the 
top management of a corporation even bypassing the board. (Figure-7.3). The average 
Indian boards as a result are severely unbalanced. The large and significant difference 
on most of the parameters empirically studied showing presence of larger numbers of 
executive chairman, lesser separation of roles between chairman and CEO, larger 
presence of promoter chairman, greater presence of Executive directors in boards, 
absence of nomination committee, faint presence of other enabling factors also point 
toward the same. In this situation the maximum 50% stipulation of independent 
directors as per The Revised Clause 49 are not enough unless they are given the tools 
and enabling and empowering tools and tackles to deal with the unbalance (Figure-
7.1). In this situation the individual directors need to be enabled and empowered. 
Indian corporate governance system has till date not given much emphasis on these 
enablers. The same is also revealed when the structural components of Combined 
Code and the Revised Clause is studied in minute detail. (Figure-1.4, 1.5,1.6 & 1.7). 
Iyer, L.V.V. (2008) writes in Economic Times, Calcutta edition, dtd. 2 P 
March'2009 on the backdrop of Satyam Fraud, "It is self evident that the institution of 
independent directors and audit are the pillars of corporate governance without which 
corporate governance becomes a sham- an edifice m quicksand. Clause 49 of the 
Listing Agreement has no doubt brought about a conceptual primacy in this regard. 
However, in practice these two institutions have been rendered a farce of sorts."The 
independent directors are inducted in the board based on fulfilling the criteria of 
definition of independence as per the Revised Clause-49. These Independent 
Directors are supposed to take the decisions in an objective and impartial manner 
independent from management but has few resources at his/her command to make 
independent assessment of topics under consideration. 
It is in this context of the need for strengthening of the Independent Directors in India 
and based on current comparative corporate governance practices between India and 
governance practices of UK companies, I offer a model to which I call 'Independent 
Director Enabling System Model' which seeks to emphasize that there is need to 
change our perceptions of board independence and not to confine it within the 
periphery of just fulfilling the numerical strength of individual Independent Directors 
as per The Revised Clause. There is urgent need to install the strong presence of such 
enablers as depicted in the Independent Director System. (Figure-7.1). A figurative 
sketch (Figure-7.1) of the Independent Director System with individual directors at its 
centre and other enabling factors has been shown. The 'Independent director system 
enabling model' conceived in wheel and spike shape in another figure (Figure-7.2) 
visualize the reasoning that only when all factors forming the independent director 
system are strengthened, which can be done by putting provisions of each fectors 
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against mandatory side of the Revised Clause 49 and ensuring strict conqjliance of the 
same, that the independent directors will be enabled and empowered and the problem 
of board unbalance and unfettered power and control over the board of one group will 
be avoided. A unified approach is, therefore, required to make the independent 
directors enabled and empowered with the presence and strengthening of such above 
factors. Lorsch (2000) writes in terms the benefits of an enabled and empowered 
board, in USA context, which holds true for every other country and addresses to 
CEO, "empowered directors can help them (CEO) and their companies, and if they 
encourage this trend, board empowerment can be achieved with minimal fuss and 
maximum benefit to CEOs, shareholders, and the US economy". The current study 
further calls for fiirther research to add fiirther other enabling factor which is helpful 
in Indian condition. But the key concept is that when we talk of Independent directors 
and their effectiveness in a board we should take other enabling parameters and their 
simultaneous presence in the board. The study, therefore, suggest that each of the 
factors as mentioned in the model envisaged above should be incorporated into our 
corporate governance system (more specifically into mandatory section of the Revised 
Clause 49). The factors recommended in the Model aloi^ with the position held on 
the issue by reputed organi2ations, codes, guidelines and researchers has already been 
discussed in the earlier chapters. Factors which the current 'Independent Director 
System Model' (Figure-7.2) seeks to enforce by incorporating into the mandatory 
section of The Revised Clause 49 have been depicted in the Figure 7.1 and the same 
are discussed below. 
1. Nomination Comnnittee: The maimer of selection of independent directors is key 
area which needs immediate improvement. A professional approach where right and 
functional candidates The Satyam case in India might invoke criticism on role and 
fiinction of independent directors in India but the real culprit seems to be the lack of 
independent selection process and the absence of effective enabler of the independent 
director system as pointed out in the model. 
2. Lead Independent Director: In Indian condition the Lead Independent Directors 
iqpart from other important roles can play helpful role in Board agenda taking into 
accounts views of other Independent Directors of the board. The group of 
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Independent Directors can be effectively sidelined for want of an effective unifier like 
Lead Independent Director. Bansal (1989) writes," Many of the evils afflicting the 
boards are due to the feet that the directors have little participation in the formulation 
of agenda and minutes of the board. Consequently, agenda items reflect the 
proclivities of the Chief Executive Officer and his close aides." 
3. Meeting without management: There should be an opportunity for the 
Independent directors to meet periodically (at least armually) outside the presence of 
the CEO and other inside directors as well as non-independent executive directors. 
The purpose is to give them an opportimity to discuss in private in order to foster 
better communication and inquiry. NYSE on the issue notes, "Board must convene 
regular sessions (at least once a year) in which the non-management directors meet 
without management. The Business Roundtable (2002), which is an association of 
CEO in USA, carries the view "Independent Directors should have the opportunity to 
meet outside the presence of the CEO and any other management directors". Salmon 
(2000) on the need of the meeting without management writes, "For one thing, 
chances are that their outside members don't know each other well. They fail to 
develop confidence and trusts in each other and a resulting sense of cohesiveness. For 
that reason alone, I believe it's imperative that outside directors meet from time to 
time without management." 
4. Induction and continuous development: While agreeing on the issue Iyer, L.V. 
(2009) writes in the backdrop of Satyam Scandals, "Continuing education for 
independent directors would be highly desirable. The corporate governance report 
should give details of such management development programmes attended by the 
independent directors of the company." WCFG (2005) in its London Declaration 
2005, taken at 6* International Conference on Corporate Governance, held on 12-13, 
May 2005, at London and attended by 33 countries mcluding India includes among its 
10 step action plan the provision for education and training and stated, "The most 
important ingredient for improving the quality of boards and corporate governance 
decision making process is a strong commitment to continual education and 
training.... There needs to be proper education and study of financial statements and 
identification of frauds before they occur." 
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Bansal writes on the issue by comparing with that of UK, ". ... it is surprising that 
there has been a singular lack of awareness regarding the need for special training for 
directors. England has however taken a lead in this regard by opening an Institute of 
Directors concerned with conducting various types of training programmes for 
directors." In Indian context not enough unified efforts seems to be visible on the 
scale and dimensions as is present in UK. 
5. Performance Evaluation: Current Indian practices are mainly limited to CEO 
which is required to be extended to each members of the boards including the 
Chairman and the board as a whole as is present in UK companies. The provision for 
the same is required to be kept among mandatory/non-mandatory provisions of The 
Revised Clause-49. 
6. Poor definition of independence and enforcement- The definition of 
Independence which takes care of Indian conditions of caste, creed, region, religions 
etc are required to be adopted to avoid wrong selection. "Bob Garratt writes in his 
book. The Fish rots from the Head, "I realize that at present many 'independent' 
directors are not truly independent. It is a key challenge for corporate governance in 
the twenty-first century to ensure that they become so". 
7. Safeguard Provisions: Almost all UK companies Annual Reports mentions about 
the provision. In Indian Annual reports it does not find any place. Safeguard on the 
line of UK pattern is required. 
8. Information Receipt: The board must be given sufficient information to exercise 
fully its governance functions. Disclosure on this important area is largely observed in 
UK annual reports which are not seen in Indian annual reports and are desirable. The 
information receipt should be accurate, relevant and timely (ART) and there should be 
provision of personal liability from the Chairman and Company Secretary. Generally 
board members should receive information prior to board meetings so they will have 
an opportunity to reflect properly on the items to be considered at the meeting. 
Bansal(1989) discusses in details and writes. If anything goes wrong owning to 
absence of information etc, the board cannot escapes liability by pleading such an 
alibi. It is thus incumbent on directors to have up-to-date information regarding the 
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progress of the company so as to be able to effectively discharge their obligations." 
OECD (1999) suggests, "Non-Executive board members do not typically have the 
same access to information as key mangers to the company. In order to fiilfiU their 
responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information". The Ganguly Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions (2002) 
speaks on the matter, "The Group notes that the effectiveness of the Boards largely 
depends upon the flow of information to and from the board. The information 
furnished to the board should be wholesome and complete and should be adequate to 
take meaningful decisions." In this regard we require to take a lesson from UK 
practice where not only timely information is ensured but one single individual, the 
company secretary is held responsible for the same. It is worth noting that the 
removal of company secretary is a matter of board as a whole and UK guidelines is 
specific over this point. 
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Figure 7.1: Independent Director System 
286 
Figure 7.2: Independent Director System Enabling Model 
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Annemre* 1 
Annexure-I 
SN Scrip Name MktCap 
1 Reliance Industries l id 250,676.87 
2 Infosys Technologies Ud. 81,326.96 
3 Hindustan Unilever Ud. 52,482.36 
4 Reilanoe Petroleum Ltd. 48,510.00 
5 Reliance Communication Ltd. 44,035.44 
6 WiproLtd. 41,360.45 
7 Cairn India Ltd. 38,721.13 
8 Steriite Industries (India) Ud. 27,188.69 
9 Maruti Suzuld India Ltd. 24,601.28 
10 Sun Phamiaoeuticals Industries Ud. 23,066.80 
11 Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 21,521.67 
12 Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 20,111.63 
13 TATA Power Company Ud. 19,357.60 
14 TATA Iron 8i Steel Co. Ud. 17,721.90 
15 Reliance inlirastmcturs Ltd. 15,447.00 
16 Idea Cellular Ud 14,547.41 
17 Jaipralosti Associates Ud. 12,423.76 
18 Mahindra 8i Mahindra Ud. 11,039.30 
19 ABB Ud. 9,578.94 
20 GlaxoSmittikline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 9,216.21 
21 Dr.Reddy Laboratories Ltd. 8,756.49 
22 TATA Motors Ud. 8,569.66 
23 HCL Technologies Ud. 8,268.39 
24 Dabur India Ud. 8,117.28 
25 Rant}axy Latxxatories Ud. 7,861.48 
26 Asian Paints Ud. 7,480.20 
27 Hindaico Indusbles Ud. 7,141.72 
28 Ultra Tech Cement Ud. 6,772.80 
29 Oracle Financial Sen/ices Software Ltd. 6,493.86 
30 Divi's Lat)oratories Ud. 5,987.77 
31 Zee Entertainment Enterprise Ltd. 5,285.58 
32 Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. 5,055.91 
33 Crompton Greaves Ud. 4679.01 
34 Mphasis Ud. 4,216.65 
35 SesaGoaUd. 4,191.84 
36 Exide Indusbles Ltd. 3,960.00 
37 Educomp Solutions Ud. 3,891.20 
38 Tech Mahindra Ud. 3,834.42 
39 Aloruti CHy Ud. 3,817.57 
40 GVK Power 8i Infrasbucture Ud. 3,718.34 
41 TATA Chemicals Ltd. 3,635.19 
42 Cadila Healthcare Ud. 3,517.43 
43 PunJ LJoyd Ud. 3,476.96 
44 Indian Hotels Company Ltd. 3,468.70 
45 Satyam Computer Services Ud. 3020.6 
46 Great Eastern Shipping Co Ltd. 2,911.21 
47 Bharat Forge Ltd. 2,830.52 
48 Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. 2,733.75 
49 Asholc Leyland Ltd. 2.587.43 
50 Proctor & Gamble Hygiene & Healthcare Ltd. 2,563.60 
51 Shree Cements Ltd. 2,542.14 
52 Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd. 2,493.38 
53 Gillette India Ltd. 2,337.42 
54 Appollo Hospital Enterprises Ltd. 2,326.28 
55 Pidilite Industries Ltd. 2.324.72 
56 GTL Infrastructure Ltd. 2,294.69 
57 Godrej Industries Ltd. 2,195.43 
58 IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 2,063.24 
59 Aventis Pharma Ltd. 2048.5 
60 Patni Computer Systems Ltd. 1,883.07 
61 VoltasLtd. 1,816.64 
62 Pfizer Ltd.. 1,790.24 
63 Jagran Prakashan Ltd. 1,774.07 
64 Bhusan Steel Ltd. 1,699.79 
65 Ispat Industries Ltd. 1,677.13 
66 NirmaLtd. 1,645.89 
67 Jubilant Organosys Ltd. 1,618.43 
68 Anant Raj Industries Ltd. 1,612.72 
69 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. 1,585.38 
70 Welspun -Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 1,575.31 
71 Blue Star Ltd. 1,555.27 
72 Fortis Healthcare Ltd. 1,546.09 
73 Biria Corporation Ltd. 1,509.20 
74 HCL Infosystems Ltd. 1,465.47 
75 Info Edge (India) Ltd. 1,443.76 
76 koutons Retail India Ltd. 1,402.70 
77 AIA Engineering Ltd. 1,385.56 
78 BF Utilities Ltd. 1,379.25 
79 AstraZeneca Pharma India Ltd. 1368 
80 Triveni Engineering 8i Industries Ltd. 1,355.26 
81 Asian Star Company Ltd. 1,337.50 
82 Dish TV India Umited 1.288.88 
83 Kansai Nerolac Paints 1278.42 
84 Amtek Auto Ltd. 1,250.67 
85 Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. 1,191.10 
86 Nav Bharat Ventures Ltd. 1,179.02 
87 Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 1,178.06 
88 Phoenix Mills Ltd. 1,167.02 
89 Sun Pharma Advanced Research Company Ltd 1,146.78 
90 Monsanto India Ltd, 1,136.19 
91 3M India Ltd. 1,093.84 
92 Great Offshore Ltd. 1,084.33 
93 IBN18 Broadcast Ltd. 1.060.78 
94 Blue Dart Express Ltd. 1058.56 
95 Hindustan Oil Exploration Ltd. 1,054.44 
96 Moser Baer (India) Ltd. 1,027.84 
97 Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd. 1,020.20 
98 Nagarjuna Fertilisers 8i Chemicals Ltd. 995.56 
99 Wyeth Ltd. 9W 37 
100 Television Eighteen India Ltd. 947.23 
101 Bannari Anoman Sugars Ltd. 944.95 
102 Baliarpur Industries Ltd. 934.35 
103 Madras Alluminium Co. Ltd. 932.36 
104 Redington (India) Ltd. 921.17 
105 ADLAB RLMS Ltd. 91393 
106 Wockhardt Ltd. 908.02 
107 Godfrey Philip India Ud. 899.6 
108 Gammon Infrastructure Projects Ltd. 896.21 
109 Madras Cements Ltd. 880.6 
110 Ingersol Rand (India) Ltd. 864.58 
111 MRF Ltd. 860.79 
112 Honeywell Automation (India) Ltd. 853.51 
113 Hotel Leeia Venture Ltd. 846.27 
114 SKF India Ltd. 841.62 
115 Peninsula Land Ltd. 832.02 
116 Gujarat N RE Coke Ltd. 820.6 
117 Cartwrundum Universal Ltd. 803.24 
118 Cambridge Solutions Ltd. 788.16 
119 Mercator Unes Ltd. 770.47 
120 Usha Martin Ltd. 763.11 
121 Lakshmi Machine Worio Ltd. 757.27 
122 Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. 726.8 
123 McLeod Russel India Ltd. 721.28 
124 Gateway Distriparks Ltd. 708.59 
125 Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. 706.2 
126 Varun Shipping Company Ltd. 684.75 
127 Mahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd. 675.04 
128 Asahi India Glass Ltd. 671.58 
129 UTV Software Communications Ltd. 647.65 
130 Geodesic Information Systems Ltd. 643.56 
131 Trent Ltd. 635.8 
132 Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 602.33 
133 Lakshmi Energy & Foods Ltd 598.5 
134 Unichem Laboratories Ltd. 590.4 
135 Tube Investments of India Ltd. 580.27 
136 TVS Motor Ltd. 571.19 
137 Abbott India Ltd. 569.65 
138 TexmacoLtd. 568.15 
139 Cranes Software International Ltd. 564.9 
140 Eicher Motors Ltd. 555.54 
141 SRF Ltd. 554.74 
142 DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. 548.3 
143 Time Technoplast Ltd. 543.13 
144 Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemicals Ltd. 538.9 
145 King Fisher Airlines 534.09 
146 Orient Paper 8i Industries Ltd. 520.83 
147 Infotech Enterprises Ltd. 515.97 
148 Sterttng Technologies Ltd. 512.45 
149 Grindweil Norton Ltd. 501.65 
150 DCM Sriram Industries Ltd. 498.53 
151 FAG Bearings India Ltd. 494.68 
TTl 
152 Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. 489.94 
153 Clanant Chemicals (India) Ltd. 487.01 
154 ESS DEE Aluminium Ltd. 486.78 
155 31 Infotech 484.53 
156 Shiv-Vani Oil Exploration Services Ltd. 466.92 
157 Supreme Industries Ltd. 464.37 
158 Uflex Ltd. 460.52 
159 TV Today Network Ltd. 434.42 
160 NESCO Ltd. 433.68 
161 Graphite India Ltd. 423.84 
162 Hexaware Technologies Ltd. 416.01 
163 Sadbhav Engineering Ltd. 412.5 
164 Indo Rama Synthetics (India) Ltd. 408.34 
165 Panacea Biotech Ltd. 405.48 
166 Himachal Futuristic Communication Ltd. 403.83 
167 Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. 401.27 
168 Nirr Ltd. 397.51 
169 Micro Inks 395.91 
170 Provogue (India) Ltd. 392.5 
171 Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. 390.32 
172 Bajaj Electricals Ltd. 387.17 
173 I.C.S.A. (India) Ltd. 381.1 
174 OCL India Ltd. 377.25 
175 Amtek India Ltd. 375.31 
176 SpicejetLtd. 371.88 
177 Sanghi Industries Ltd. 364.15 
178 Ansal Properties 8i Infrastructure Ltd. 361.5 
179 Taj GVK Hotels & Resorts Ltd. 354.26 
180 Balkrishna Industries Ltd. 352.22 
181 JK Cements Ltd. 349.15 
182 Greaves Cotton Ltd. 347.46 
183 ISMT Ltd. 345.74 
184 GHCL Ltd. 342 
185 B L Kashyap and Sons Ltd 330.46 
186 Glodyne Tecnoserve Ltd. 328.09 
IV 
Annexure-ll 
Annexnre-H 
SN Scrip Name 
1 Reliance Industries Ltd. 
2 NTPCLTD. 
3 INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 
4 BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. 
5 STATE BANK OF INDIA LTD. 
6 Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
7 Reliance Petroleum Limited 
8 STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTt>. 
9 RELIANCE COMMUNICATION LTD. 
10 WIPRO LTD. 
11 Calm India Limited 
12 Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
13 MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA LTD. 
14 HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. 
15 SUN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES LTD. 
16 HEROHONDA MOTORS LTD. 
17 Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
18 TATA POWER LTD. 
19 TATA lORN AND STEEL COMPANY LTD. 
20 Power Rnance Corporation Ltd. 
21 AXIS BANK LTD. 
22 Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
23 NEYVEU QGNITE CORPORATION 
24 Idea Cellular Ltd. 
25 PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD. 
26 Jaiprakash Associates Limited 
27 BANK OF INDIA LTD. 
28 REUANCE CAPITAL LTD. 
29 MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA LTD. 
30 ABB Ltd. 
31 COI^ "^AIN CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 
32 GlaxoSmithldine Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
33 MANGALORE REHNERIES 8i PETT^ O LTD. 
34 HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORP LTD. 
35 DR.REDDY'S LABORATORIES LTD. 
36 TATA MOTORS LTD. 
37 HCL TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 
38 DABUR INDIA LTD. 
39 Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
40 ASIAN PAINTS LTD. 
41 Hindakx) Industries Ltd. 
42 ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD. 
43 Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd. 
44 Sliree Global Tradefin Ltd. 
45 Dim's Laboratories Ltd. 
46 KSK Energy Ventures Ltd. 
Current MM. Cap 
250,676.87 
162,230.21 
81.326.96 
74989.57 
70,985.52 
52,482.36 
48,510.00 
45,723.53 
44,035.44 
41,360.45 
38,721.13 
27,188.69 
24,601.28 
23,483.87 
23,066.80 
21,521.67 
20,111.63 
19,357.60 
17,721.90 
16,115.11 
15,876.51 
15,447.00 
15,141.24 
14,547.41 
14,145.93 
12,423.76 
12,050.71 
11,152.70 
11,039.30 
9,578.94 
9,263.15 
9,216.21 
8,966.08 
8,911,95 
8,756.49 
8,569.66 
8,268.39 
8,117.28 
7,861.48 
7,480.20 
7,141.72 
6,772.80 
6,493.86 
6220.3 
5,987.77 
5,589.80 
47 ZEE ENTERTAINMENT ENTERPRISES LTD. 5,285.58 
48 Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. 5,055.91 
49 Spice Communicatons Limited 4,812 05 
50 Crompton Greaves Ltd. 4679.01 
51 MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. 4,523 40 
52 MPHASIS LTD. 4,216.65 
53 SESAGOALTD. 4,191.84 
54 Exide Industries Ltd. 3,960.00 
55 Educomp Solutions Ltd. 3,891.20 
56 Tech Mahindra Umited 3,834.42 
57 AKRUTI CITY LTD. 3,817.57 
58 SHRIRAM TRANSPORT RNANCE CO LTD. 3,742 12 
59 GVK Power & Infrastructure Ltd. 3,718.34 
60 TATA CHEMICAL LTD. 3,635.19 
61 CADILA HEALTHCARE LTD. 3,517.43 
62 Purij LLoyd Ltd. 3,476.96 
63 Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 3,468 70 
64 IRB Infrastructure Developers Limited 3393 8 
65 HMT LTD. 3307.74 
66 ENGINERS INDIA LTD. 3,182 33 
67 Bajaj Holdings & Investments Ltd 3,137 71 
68 RNANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (INDIA) LTD. 3,065 43 
69 SATYAM COMPUTER SERVICES LTD. 3020.6 
70 ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 2,950 89 
71 Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. 2,911.21 
72 Bharat Forge Ltd. 2,830.52 
73 Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. 2,733 75 
74 CORPORATION BANK 2,71313 
75 FEDERAL BANK LTD. 2,681 28 
76 ASHOK LEYLAND LTD. 2,587 43 
77 PROCTOR & GAMBLE HYGIENE & HEALTHCARE LTD. 2,563.60 
78 SHREE CEMENTS LTD. 2,542.14 
79 Housing Development &. Infrastructure Ltd. 2,493.38 
80 Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd. 2,469 62 
81 Mahindra 8i Mahindra Rnancial Services Ltd. 2,442 85 
82 SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 2,409 43 
83 Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. 2,391 31 
84 GILLETTE INDIA LTD. 2,337.42 
85 APOLLO HOSPITAL ENTERPRISES LTD. 2,326.28 
86 PIdlllte Industries Ltd. 2,324.72 
87 6 R Infrastructure Umited 2,294.69 
88 Godrej Industries Ltd. 2,195.43 
89 India Infbline Ltd. 2,115 56 
90 IVRCL Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 2,063.24 
91 AVENTIS PHARMA LTD. 2048.5 
92 ALUHABAD BANK 2,025 78 
93 NATIONAL FERTIUSERS & CHEMICALS LTD. 2004.1 
94 CHENNAI PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. 1,970 71 
95 Patnl Computer Systems Ltd. 1,883.07 
% VoltasLtd. 1,816.64 
97 PFIZER LTD. 1,790.24 
98 Jagran Prakashan Limited 1,774.07 
99 IFQ LTD. 1,749 71 
VI 
100 Yes Bank Ltd. 1,736.35 
101 BHUS STEEL LTD. 1,699.79 
102 Ispat Industries Ltd. 1,677.13 
103 ALFA LAVAL (INDIA) LTD. 1,665.12 
104 NirmaLtd. 1,645.89 
105 Jubilant Organosys Ltd. 1,618.43 
106 Anant Raj Industries Ltd. 1,612.72 
107 Bah-ampur Ghini Mills Ltd. 1,585.38 
108 Welspun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren ltd. 1,575.31 
109 Blue Star Ltd. 1,555.27 
110 RDRTIS HEALTHCARE LIMITED 1,546.09 
111 BIRLA CORPORATION LTD. 1,509.20 
112 HCL Infbsystems Ltd. 1,465.47 
113 Info Edge (India) Ltd. 1,443.76 
114 koutons Retail India Umited 1,402.70 
115 AIA Engineering Ltd. 1,385.56 
116 BF UTILITIES LTD. 1,379.25 
117 AstraZeneca Pharma India Ltd. 1368 
118 Triveni Engineering 8i Industries Ltd. 1,355.26 
119 ASIAN STAR COMPANY LTD. 1,337.50 
120 Dish TV India Umited 1.288.88 
121 KANSAINEROLAC PAINTS 1278.42 
122 AMTEK AUTO LTD. 1,250.67 
123 BOSCH CHASIS SYSTEM INDIA LTD. 1239.38 
124 Motilal Oswal financial Services Umited 1,214.10 
125 Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. 1,191.10 
126 NAV BHAR VENTURES LTD. 1,179.02 
127 Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 1,178.06 
128 Phoenix Mills Ltd. 1,167.02 
129 Sun Pharma AdvarKed Research Company Ltd. 1,146.78 
130 MONSANTO INDIA LTD. 1,136.19 
131 ATUS COPCO (INDIA) LTD. 1,097.23 
132 3M INDIA LTD. 1,093.84 
133 GREAT OFFSHORE LIMITED 1,084.33 
134 IBN 18 Broadcast Ltd. 1,060.76 
135 BLUE DART EXPRESS LTD. 1058.56 
136 HINDUSTAN OIL EXPLORATION LTD. 1,054.44 
137 MOSER BAER INDIA LTD. \ ,027.84 
138 Gujarat Huorochemicals Ltd. 1,020.20 
139 DENABANK 1,003.80 
140 NAGARJUNA FERTILISERS & CHEMICALS LTD. 995.56 
141 WYETH LTD. 994.37 
142 BANK OF MAHARASA LTD. 981.54 
143 Television Eighteen India Ltd. 947.23 
144 Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. 944.95 
145 Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 934.35 
146 MADRAS ALUMINIUM COMPANY LTD. 932.36 
147 Redington (India) Ltd. 921.17 
148 ADLABS FILMS LTD. 913.93 
149 WOCKHAROT LTD. 908.02 
150 GODFREY PHIUPS INDIA LTD. 899.6 
151 Gammon Infrastructure Projects Ltd. 896.21 
152 MADRAS CEMENT LTD. 880.6 
VII 
153 STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 870.3 
154 INGERSOL RAND (INDIA) LTD. 864.58 
155 MRF LTD. 860.79 
156 HONEYWEL AUTOMATION (INDIA) LTD. 853.51 
157 Hotel Leela Venture Ltd. 846.27 
158 SKF INDIA LTD. 841.62 
159 Peninsula Land Limited 832.02 
160 GUJARA NRE COKE LTD. 820.6 
161 GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL POWER CO. LTD. 812.48 
162 Carborundum Universal Ltd. 803.24 
163 ADVANTA INDIA UI^ITED 789.52 
164 CAMBRIDGE SOLUTIONS LTD. 788.16 
165 Mercator Unes Ltd. 770.47 
166 Usha Martin Ltd. 763.11 
167 Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. 757.27 
168 BATA INDIA LTD. 753.92 
169 DREDG CORPORA OF INDIA LTD. 748.72 
170 Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. 734.58 
171 Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. 726.8 
172 McLeod Russellndia Limited 721.28 
173 JM RNANCIALS LTD. 715.5 
174 GATEWAY OISTRIPARKS LTD. 708.59 
175 Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. 706.2 
176 m UMITED 688.32 
177 VARUN SHIPPNG COMPANY LTD. 684.75 
178 MAHINDRA UFESPACE DEVELOPERS LTD. 675.04 
179 ASAHI INDIA GLASS LTD. 671.58 
180 UTV Software Communications Ltd. 647.65 
181 Geodesic Information Systems Ltd. 643.56 
182 TRENT LTD. 635.8 
183 Fresenius KabI Oncology Ltd (Fkonco) 607.21 
184 ORCHID CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. 602.33 
185 Lakshmi Energy & Foods Ltd. 598.5 
186 UNICHEM LABORATORIES LTD. 590.4 
187 Tube Investments of India Ltd. 580.27 
188 MERCATOR LINES LTD. 575.78 
189 TVS MOTOR LTD. 571.19 
190 Abbott India Ltd. 569.65 
191 TEXMACOLTD. 568.15 
192 Cranes Software International Ltd. 564.9 
193 Eicher Motors Ltd. 555.54 
194 SRF Ltd. 554.74 
195 DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. 548.3 
196 GUJARAT ALKAUES & CHEMICALS LTD. 543.89 
197 Time Technoplast Limited 543.13 
198 DEEPAK FERTILISERS & PETROCHEMICALS CORP LTD. 538.9 
199 King Fisher Airlines 534.09 
200 Geojit Rnancial Services Ltd. 531.9 
201 Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. 520.83 
202 Infotech Enterprises Ltd. 515.97 
203 STER TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 512.45 
204 SOUTH INDIA BANK Ltd. 508.95 
205 Grindwell Norton Ltd. 501.65 
VIII 
206 DCM SHRIRAM CONSOUDATED LTD. 498.53 
207 FAG BEARINGS INDIA LTD. 494.68 
208 Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. 489.94 
209 CLARIANT CHEMICALS (INDIA) LTD. 487.01 
210 ESS DEE Aluminium Umited 486.78 
211 31INFOTECH LTD. 484.53 
212 City Union Banic Ltd. 472.64 
213 Shree Precoated Steels Ltd. 470.17 
214 SHIV-VANI OIL EXPLORATION SERVICES LTD. 466.92 
215 SUPREM INDUSTRIES LTD. 464.37 
216 UFLEX LTD. 460.52 
217 TV Today Networi( Ltd. 434.42 
218 NESCO LIMITD 433.68 
219 DEWAN HOUSING HNANCIAL CORPORATION LTD. 428.34 
220 Graphite India Ltd. 423.84 
221 liexaware Technologies Ltd. 416.01 
222 Sadbhav Engineering Ltd. 412.5 
223 INDO RAMA SYNTHETICS (INDIA) LTD. 408.34 
224 PANACEA BIOTEC LTD. 405.48 
225 CALS REHNERIES QMITED 404.94 
226 HIMACHAL FUTURISTIC COMMUNICATION LTD. 403.83 
227 Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. 401.27 
228 NITT Ltd. 397.51 
229 MICRO INKS 395.91 
230 Provogue (India) Ltd. 392.5 
231 ZANOU PHARMACEUTICALS WORKS LTD. 390.32 
232 SRB INFRASTRUCTURE HNANCE LTD. 387.77 
233 BA3A3ELECTRICALSLTO. 387.17 
234 I.C.S.A. (India) Ltd. 381.1 
235 OCL India Ltd. 377.25 
236 Amtek India Ltd. 375.31 
237 ARSHYIA INTERNATIONAL LTD. 374.21 
238 SPICEJETLTD. 371.88 
239 Sanghi Industries Ltd. 364.15 
240 GRUH RNANCE LTD. 361.74 
241 Ansal Properties &. Infrastructure Ltd. 361.5 
242 Taj GVK Hotels 8i Resorts Ltd. 354.26 
243 BALKRBHNA INDUSTRIES LTD. 352.22 
244 J.K. CEMENT LTD. 349.15 
245 GREAVES COTTON LTD. 347.46 
246 ISMT Ltd. 345.74 
247 GHCL LTD. 342 
248 NUT TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 331.95 
249 B L Kashyap and Sons Ltd. 330.46 
250 GLODYNE TECHNOSERVE LTD. 328.09 
IX 
Annexure'Ui 
Annexttre-HI 
SN Scrip Name 
1 Reliance Industries Ltd. 
2 O N G C Ltd. 
3 N T P C LTD. 
4 BHARTl TH£SERVICES LTD. 
5 INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 
6 M M T C LTD. 
7 Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
8 mCLtd. 
9 STATE BANK OF INDIA LTD. 
10 TCS LTD. 
11 Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
12 INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 
13 Reliance Petroleuni Limited 
14 HOUSING DEVE 
15 STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. 
16 HDFC BANK LTD. 
17 RELIANCE COMMUNICATION LTD. 
18 l a a BANK LTD. 
19 WIPRO LTD. 
20 POWER GRID CORPORATION OF INDIA UMITED 
21 Cairn India Limited 
22 DLF UMITED 
23 Stertite Industries (India) Ltd. 
24 Reliance Power Limited 
25 MARUTI SUZUKI INDIA LTD. 
26 LARSEN & TOUBRO LTD. 
27 HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. 
28 GAIL INDIA 
29 SUN PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES LTD. 
30 NMDC LTD. 
31 HEROHONDA MOTORS LTD. 
32 HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD. 
33 Jlndal Steel & Power Ltd. 
34 GMR Infrastructure Limited 
35 TATA POWER LTD. 
36 CIpla Ltd. 
37 TATA lORN AND STEEL COMPANY LTD. 
38 NATIONAL ALLUMINIUM COMPANY LTD. 
39 Power Finance Corporation Ltd. 
40 TATA COMM 
41 AXIS BANK LTD. 
42 NESTLE LTD. 
43 Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
44 ESSAROILLTD. 
45 NEYVEU LIGNITE CORPORATION 
MkbCap 
250,676.87 
1,89,450.41 
162.230.21 
125,821.28 
81,326.96 
79,687.50 
74989.57 
71,528.03 
70,985.52 
59,185.73 
52,482.36 
50.098.69 
48,510.00 
47,058.00 
45,723.53 
45190.26 
44,035.44 
41,898.72 
41,360.45 
40,930.58 
38,721.13 
36,141.76 
27,188.69 
26,860.10 
24,601.28 
23576.92 
23,483.87 
23,311.72 
23,066.80 
22,685.26 
21,521.67 
20,408.86 
20,111.63 
19,781.91 
19,357.60 
18,021.70 
17,721.90 
16,207.37 
16,115.11 
16,081.12 
15,876.51 
15,705.01 
15,447.00 
15,165.50 
15,141.24 
X 
46 Mundra Pott and Special Economic Zone L 14,683.65 
47 Idea Cellular Ltd. 14,547.41 
48 GRASIMINDUSTIES LTD. 14,344.17 
49 PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 14,145.93 
50 BHARATPEmO 13,849.06 
51 Jaiprakash Associates Limited 12,423.76 
52 KOTAKBANK 12,419.54 
53 BANK OF INDIA LTD. 12,050.71 
54 AMBUJA CEME^ •^ 11,541.31 
55 RELIANCE CAPITAL LTD. 11,152.70 
56 ASSOCIATED C 11,095.89 
57 Maliindra & Mahindra Ud. 11,039.30 
58 BOSCH LTD. 9,792.00 
59 ABB Ud. 9,578.94 
60 Siemens Ltd. 9,488.81 
61 CONTAINER CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 9,263.15 
62 BAJA3AUT0 9,241.99 
63 GlaxoSmithMlne Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 9,216.21 
64 Reliance Natural Resources Limited 9,014.71 
65 MANGALORE RERNERIES & PETRO LTD. 8,966.08 
66 BANK OF BARODA LTD. 8,941.96 
67 HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORP LTD. 8,911.95 
68 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT RNANCE COMPA 8,768.88 
69 DR-REDDrS LABORATORIES LTD. 8,756.49 
70 SUZLON ENERGY LTD. 8,696.99 
71 TATA MOTORS LTD. 8,569.66 
72 Rural Electrification Corporation Limited 8,522.60 
73 HCL TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 8,268.39 
74 ADANI ENTER 8,152.99 
75 DABUR INDIA LTD. 8,117.28 
76 UNION BANK 8,038.67 
77 Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 7,861.48 
78 SUN TV NETWORK UMITTO 7,493.81 
79 ASIAN PAINTS LTD. 7,480.20 
80 BHARAT ELfCT 7,469.20 
81 Hindalco Industries Ltd. 7,141.72 
82 UNITDSPR 6,836.14 
83 ULTRATECH CEMENT LTD. 6,772.80 
84 CANARA BANK 6,721.95 
85 Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd. 6,493.86 
86 Unitech Ltd. 6,388.08 
87 Shree Global Tradefin Ltd. 6220.3 
88 Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd. 6.069.00 
89 Divi's Laboratories Ltd. 5,987.77 
90 JSWSL 5,716.59 
91 KSK Energy Ventures Ltd. 5,589.80 
92 LUPIN LTD. 5,364.82 
93 ZEE ENTERPRISE LTD. 5.285.58 
94 AREVA 5,207.60 
95 Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. 5,055.91 
96 ADITYA BIRLA NUVO LTD. 4,935.72 
97 Spice Omnnunications Limited 4,812.05 
98 Piramal Healtcare Ltd. 4,805.95 
XI 
99 Crompton Greaves Ltd. 4679.01 
100 EIH Ltd. 4657.05 
101 MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD. 4,523.40 
102 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 4,503.96 
103 MPHASIS LTD. 4,216.65 
104 CASmOL INDIA LTD. 4,203.64 
105 SESA GOA LTD. 4,191.84 
106 TITAN INDUSTRIES LTD. 4,016.42 
107 Exide Industries Ltd. 3,960.00 
108 TORRENT POWER UMITED 3,958.71 
109 Educomp Solutions Ltd. 3,891.20 
110 IDBI LTD. 3,877.68 
111 Tech Mahindra Umited 3,834.42 
112 LANCO INFRATECH LTD. 3,821.94 
113 AKRUTI CITY LTD. 3,817.57 
114 Indian Bank 3,814.48 
115 SHRIRAM TRANSPORT FINANCE CO LTD. 3,742.12 
116 Marico Umited 3,727.08 
117 GVK Power 8i Infrastructure Ltd. 3,718.34 
118 TATA TEA LTD. 3,661.65 
119 TATA CHEMICALS LTD. 3,635.19 
120 BRTTANIAINDUSHES LTD. 3611.29 
121 CADILA HEALTHCARE LTD. 3,517.43 
122 PETRONET LNG 3,487.50 
123 Punj LLoyd Ltd. 3,476.96 
124 Sterling International Enterprises Ltd. 3,476.35 
125 Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 3,468.70 
126 Sterling Biotech Ltd. 3,424.09 
127 IRB Infrastructure Developers Limited 3393.8 
128 Godrej Consumer Products Ltd. 3365.62 
129 HMT LTD. 3307.74 
130 INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 3,301.49 
131 ENGINERS INDIA LTD. 3,182.33 
132 INDIA CEMENT 3,165.74 
133 Bajaj Holdings & Investments Lid. 3,137.71 
134 Indiabulls Real Estate Limited 3,095.48 
135 RNANC TECHNOLOGIES (INDIA) LTD. 3,065.43 
136 JAIN IRRI SY 3,064.97 
137 SATYAM COMPUTER SERVICES LTD. 3020.6 
138 GLAXOSMICON 2,981.10 
139 ORIENTAL BANK LTD. 2,950.89 
140 CESC LTD. 2,949.51 
141 Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. 2,911.21 
142 SYNDICATE 2,831.85 
143 Bharat Forge Ltd. 2,830.52 
144 RELAGROQM 2,817.94 
145 Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd. 2,733.75 
146 Bajaj Finserve Ltd. 2726.87 
147 CORPORATION BANK 2,713.13 
148 Pantaloon Retail (India) Ltd. 2,692.17 
149 FEDERAL BANK LTD. 2,681.28 
150 United Breweries Ltd. 2,632.80 
151 ASHOK LEYLAND LTD. 2,587.43 
XII 
152 ANDHRA BANK LTD. 2,577.78 
153 PROCTOR & GAMBLE HYGIENE & HEALTHCARE LTD. 2.563.60 
154 Thermax Ltd. 2,543.73 
155 SHREE CEMENTS LTD. 2,542.14 
156 GTL UMITED 2,500.38 
157 Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd. 2,493.38 
158 Religare Enterprises Ltd. 2,472.87 
159 Motherson Sumi Systems Ltd. 2,469.62 
160 Indiabulls Rnancial Services Ltd. 2,464.02 
161 Mahindra & Mahlndra Financial Services LTD. 2,442.85 
162 Max India Ltd. 2,442.03 
163 SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 2,409.43 
164 VIDEOCON INDUSTRIES LTD. 2,391.39 
165 Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. 2,391.31 
166 United Phosphorus Ltd. 2.345.33 
167 GILLETTE INDIA LTD. 2,337.42 
168 RASHTRIYA CM 2.336.45 
169 APOLLO HOS ENTERPRISES LTD. 2.326.28 
170 Edelweiss Capital Umited 2,324.90 
171 Pidilite Industries Ltd. 2,324.72 
172 Matrix Laboratories Ltd. 2,302.77 
173 GTL Infrasbucture Umited 2.294.69 
174 UCO BANK 2,234.32 
175 Godrej Indusbies Ltd. 2,195.43 
176 UCH. HNAN 2,125.90 
177 India Infoline Ltd. 2,115.56 
178 CRISILLTD. 2,102.40 
179 IVRCL Infrasfructures & Projects Ltd. 2.063.24 
180 ALSTOM POWER 2,060.25 
181 AVENTB PHARMA LTD. 2048.5 
182 CENTURY TEXT 2,040.88 
183 ALLAHABAD BANK LTD. 2,025.78 
184 Jai Corporation Umited 2,024.60 
185 NATIONAL FERTILISERS & CHEMICALS LTD. 2004.1 
186 CHAMBAL PERT 1997.76 
187 CHENNAI PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. " 1,970.71 
188 BEML LTD. 1926.08 
189 Patni Computer Systems Ltd. 1.883.07 
190 OnMobile Global Ltd. 1,818.43 
191 VoltasLtd. 1,816.64 
192 Jet Airways (India) Ltd. 1,804.96 
193 PFIZER LTD. 1,790.24 
194 ESSARSHIP 1,789.62 
195 Jagran Prakashan Umited 1,774.07 
196 Allcargo Global Logistics Ltd. 1,769.15 
197 IFCILTD. 1,749.71 
198 Gujarat Gas Co. Ltd. 1739.67 
199 Yes Bank Ltd. 1,736.35 
200 Jaiprakash Hydro-Power Ltd. 1,720.96 
201 BHUS STEEL LTD. 1.699.79 
202 l a India Ltd. 1,684.42 
203 Ispat Industries Ltd. 1,677.13 
204 PTC INDIA 1,675.94 
XIII 
205 ALFA UVAL (INDIA) LTD. 1.665.12 
206 JSiKBANK 1,657.49 
207 NirmaLtd. 1,645.89 
208 ABAN0FF5H0 1,642.98 
209 Jubilant Organosys Ltd. 1,618.43 
210 Nagarjuna Construction Co. Ltd. 1615.33 
211 Anant Raj Industries Ltd. 1.612.72 
212 Sintex Industries Ltd. 1,605.24 
213 Balrampur ChinI Mills Ltd. 1,585.38 
214 Central Bank of India 1,578.01 
215 Welspun -Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 1,575.31 
216 BIOCON LTD. 1,573.00 
217 Blue Star Ltd. 1,555.27 
218 ICS.OiisUd. 1,552.31 
219 FORTIS HEALTHCARE LIMITED 1,546.09 
220 Indraprashta Gas Ltd. 1,531.60 
221 BIRU CORPORATION LTD. 1,509.20 
222 E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd. 1,474.48 
223 HCL Infbsystems Ltd. 1,465.47 
224 Coromandel Fertilisers Ltd. 1,464.75 
225 mfo Edge (India) Ltd. 1,443.76 
226 Everest Kanto Cylinders Ltd. 1,405.16 
227 koutons Retail India Umited 1,402.70 
228 hfT Media Ltd. 1,397.00 
229 AIA Engineering Ltd. 1,385.56 
230 EMAMIUMITE 1381.72 
231 BF UTILinES LTD. 1,379.25 
232 ING VYSYA BK 1,373.50 
233 AstraZeneca Phanria India Ltd. 1368 
234 Shriram-City Union Rnance Ltd. 1359.6 
235 TrivenI Engineering & Industries Ltd. 1,355.26 
236 BOC INDIA LTD. 1,339.21 
237 ASIAN STAR COMPANY LTD. 1,337.50 
238 Deccan Ciironide Holdings Ltd. 1,335.93 
239 Dish TV India Limited 1,288.88 
240 Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. 1,282.28 
241 KANSAINEROLAC PAINTS 1278.42 
242 Tulip n Services Ltd.CTulip Telecom Ltd) 1,258.46 
243 AMTEK AUTO LTD. 1,250.67 
244 Praj Industries Ltd. 1,246.93 
245 BOSCH CHASIS SYSTEM INDIA LTD. 1239.38 
246 RELIANCE INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 1,237.44 
247 Motilal Oswal Rnandal Services Limited 1,214.10 
248 INDUS INDBK 1,207.25 
249 Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. 1,191.10 
250 Berger Paints India Ltd. 1,183.12 
251 NAV BHAR VENTURES LTD. 1,179.02 
252 BGR ENERGY SYSTEMS UMITED 1,178.28 
253 Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 1,178.06 
254 NOVARTISIND 1,177.76 
255 Phoenix MiHs Ltd. 1,167.02 
256 ROLTAIND 1,151.59 
257 Sun Pharma Advanced Research Company Ltd. 1,146.78 
XIV 
258 VDAYA BANK LTD. 1.137.94 
259 MONSANTO INDIA LTD. 1,136.19 
260 Kirioskar Oil Engines Ltd. 1,115.68 
261 ATLAS COPCO (INDIA) LTD. 1,097.23 
262 JINDALSAW 1,096.18 
263 3M INDIA LTD. 1,093.84 
264 CEr^ TRUM CAPITAL LTD. 1088 
265 GREAT OFFSHORE LIMITED 1,084.33 
266 OPTO CIRCUIT 1,066.82 
267 IBN 18 Broadcast Ltd. 1.060.78 
268 AUROBINDOPH 1,059.05 
269 BLUE DART EXPRESS LTD. 1058.56 
270 GUJNARMADA 1,058.27 
271 HINDUSTAN OIL EXPLORATION LTD. 1,054.44 
272 Kirioskar Brothers Ltd. 1,052.71 
273 MOSER BAER INDIA LTD. 1,027.84 
274 KALPAT POW T 1,025.55 
275 Gujarat Ruorochemicals Ltd. 1,020.20 
276 Jindal Drilling 8i Industries Ltd. 1007.94 
277 DENA BANK LTD. 1,003.80 
278 Puravankara Projects Limited 999.78 
279 NAGAR]UNA FERTILISER AND CHEMICAL LTD. 995.56 
280 Bombay Rayon Fashions Ltd. 994.45 
281 WYETH LTD. 994.37 
282 Apollo Tyres Ltd. 981.68 
283 BANK OF MAHARASTRA LTD. 981.54 
284 PATEL ENGINR 973.11 
285 Television Eighteen India Ltd. 947.23 
286 HAVELL INDIA 946.66 
287 Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. 944.95 
288 OMAXE UMITED 944.38 
289 Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 934.35 
290 Bayer CropSdence Limited. 932.99 
291 MADRAS ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. (MALCO) 932.36 
292 MINDTREE CONSULTING UMITED 932.34 
293 Redington (India) Ltd. 921.17 
294 MONNEISPAT 918.96 
295 ADLABS FILMS LTD. 913.93 
296 Karnataka Bank Ltd. 909.75 
297 WOCKHARDT LTD. 908.02 
298 IPCA LAB LTD. 902.72 
299 GODFREY PHIUPS INDIA LTD. 899.6 
300 TATA INV COR 898.72 
301 Gammon Infrastructure Projects Ltd. 896.21 
302 KEC International Ltd. (fbrmerty known a 887.4 
303 MADRAS CEMENT LTD. 880.6 
304 BONGAIGAON RERNERY AND PETROCHEMICALS LTD. 879.12 
305 STATE TRADING CORPORATION LTD. 870.3 
306 BAJAJHIND LTD. 865.37 
307 INGERSOL RAND LTD. 864.58 
308 Simplex Infrastructures Limited 863.53 
309 MRF LTD. 860.79 
310 Zee News Limited 858.48 
XV 
311 HONEYWELAUTOMATION (INDIA) LTD. 853.51 
312 Dishman Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals Ltd. 847 61 
313 Hotel Leela Venture Ltd. 846.27 
314 Andrew Yule 8i Company Ltd. 843.41 
315 SKF INDIA LTD. 841.62 
316 SHRISn INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMBfTCORPO 832.5 
317 Peninsula Land Umlted 832.02 
318 Parsvnath Developers Ltd. 821 92 
319 GUJARA NRE COKE LTD. 820.6 
320 GUJARAT STAT 818 12 
321 GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL POWER CO. LTD. 812.48 
322 ERA INFRA 811 96 
323 Cartrarundum Universal Ltd. 803.24 
324 Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. 800 01 
325 ADVANTA INDIA LIMITED 789.52 
326 JINDAL POLFM 788.2 
327 CAMBRIDGE SOLUTIONS LTD. 788.16 
328 UNITED BREWRERIES(Holding) Ltd. 772 88 
329 Mercator Unes Ltd. 770.47 
330 KSL AND INDUSTRIES LTD. 768.73 
331 Usha Martin Ltd. 763.11 
332 PRISM CEMENT 75917 
333 Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. 757.27 
334 JINDAL STAIN 756 01 
335 BATA INDIA LTD. 753.92 
336 Gitanjali Gems Ltd. 748.88 
337 DREDGING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 748.72 
338 Rrstsource Solutions Ltd. 739 23 
339 Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. 734.58 
340 PARRY AGRO I 730.36 
341 Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. 726.8 
342 KESORAM IND 723 66 
343 McLeod Russel India Limited 721.28 
344 SHAW WALLACE 719 52 
345 JM FINANCIAL LTD. 715.5 
346 Binani Cement Ltd. 713 9 
347 GATEWAY DISTRIPARKS LTD. 708.59 
348 BOMBAY DYEING LTD. 708 12 
349 Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. 706.2 
350 Gammon India Ltd. 688 62 
351 m LIMITED 688.32 
352 Sobha Developers Ltd. 685 62 
353 VARUN SHIPPING COMPANY LTD. 684.75 
354 Rajesh Exports Ltd. 681 73 
355 MAHINDRA LIFESPACE DEVELOPERS LTD. 675.04 
356 Prakash Industries Ltd. 671 63 
357 ASAHI INDIA GLASS LTD. 671.58 
358 Radico Khaitan Ltd. 652 72 
359 UTV Software Communications Ltd. 647.65 
360 ABG Shipyard Ltd. 645 41 
361 Geodesic Information Systems Ltd. 643.56 
362 FDC UMITED 643.44 
363 TRENT LTD. 635.8 
XVI 
364 NDTV LTD. 620 37 
365 Fresenius Kabi Oncology Ltd (Fkonco) 607.21 
366 BANK OF RA3AST>HAN 604.58 
367 ORCHID CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. 602.33 
368 Ram Commodities Ltd. 598 97 
369 Lakshmi Energy & Foods Ltd 598.5 
370 Matiarashtra Elecktrosmelt Ltd. 591.6 
371 UNICHEM LABORATORIES LTD. 590.4 
372 PUNJAB TKACr 584.29 
373 Tube Investments of India Ltd. 580.27 
374 Core Projects & Technologies Ltd. 577 4 
375 MERCATORS LINES LTD. 575.78 
376 Jyob Structures Uri. 574 08 
377 TVS MOTOR LTD. 571.19 
378 Shnram EPC Umited 570 57 
379 Abbott India Ltd. 569.65 
380 DEEPAK NITRT 568.45 
381 TEXMACOLTD. 568.15 
382 Techno Electric 8i Engg. Co. Ltd. 565.29 
383 Cranes Software International Ltd. 564.9 
384 BILCARE LT 558 69 
385 Eicher Motors Ltd. 555.54 
386 CMC LTD. 55495 
387 SRF Ltd. 554.74 
388 BASF INDIA 548 35 
389 DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd. 548.3 
390 POLARIS LAB 545 81 
391 GUJ ALKALIES & CHEMICALS LTD. 543.89 
392 Modem India Ltd. 543.19 
393 Time Technoplast Limited 543.13 
394 Shree Ashtavinayak One Vision Ltd. 541.35 
395 DEEPAK FERTILISER LTD. 538.9 
396 IL&PS Investsmart Umited 537.46 
397 King Fisher Airlines 534.09 
398 RAYMOND LTD. 532 34 
399 Geojlt Financial Services Ltd. 531.9 
400 ICRA Umited 530 
401 Onent Paper & Industries Ltd. 520.83 
402 S.KUMAR NAT 517 65 
403 Infotech Enterprises Ltd. 515.97 
404 ASIAN HOTELS 512 77 
405 STERUNG TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 512.45 
406 ZUARI INDUSTRIES LTD. 512 
407 SOUTH INDIA BANK Ltd. 508.95 
408 NOIDATOLBR 506 46 
409 Grindwell Norton Ltd. 501.65 
410 Electrosteel Castings Ltd. 501 25 
411 DCM SHRIRAM CONSOLIDATED LTD. 498.53 
412 APTKH LTD. 497 09 
413 FAG BEARING LTD. 494.68 
414 HEGUMrTHD 489 96 
415 Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. 489.94 
416 BALMER UWRIE 8i CO Ltd. 488.1 
XVII 
417 CLARIANT CHEMICALS (INDIA) LTD. 487.01 
418 Bngade Enterpnses Umited 486 82 
419 ESS DEE Aluminium Umited 486.78 
420 Navneet Publications (India) Ltd 485 55 
421 31INFOTECH 484.53 
422 f^TWK MED INV 474.32 
423 City Union Bank Ltd. 472.64 
424 Page Industnes Ltd. 470.4 
425 Shree Precoated Steels Ltd. 470.17 
426 Alembic Ltd. 46813 
427 SHIV-VANI OIL EXPLORATION SERVICES LTD. 466.92 
428 FORBES 8i CO 465.69 
429 SUPREM INDUSTRIES LTD. 464.37 
430 Plettiico Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 463.59 
431 UFLEX LTD. 460.52 
432 Development Credit Bank Ltd. 441 85 
433 TV Today Network Ltd. 434.42 
434 TAMILNADU NE 433 88 
435 NESCO LIMITD 433 68 
436 VOLTAMP TRANSFORMERS UMITED 430 26 
437 DEWAN HOUSING FINANCIAL CORPORATION LTD. 428.34 
438 Sundram Fasteners Ltd. 426 5 
439 Graphite India Ltd. 423.84 
440 Tania Solutions Ltd. 421 
441 Hexaware Technologies Ltd. 416.01 
442 Network 18 Media & Investments Ltd 412 52 
443 Sadbhav Engineering Ltd. 412.5 
444 Whirlpool of India Ltd. 411 69 
445 INDO RAMA SYNTHETICS (INDIA) LTD. 408.34 
446 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 406.69 
447 PANACEA BIOTEC LTD. 405.48 
448 NILKAMAL L 405.03 
449 CALS REFINERIES LIMITED 404.94 
450 ELDER PHARMA 4042 
451 HIMACHAL FUTURISTIC COMMUNICATIONS LTD. 403 83 
452 Gab Limited 401.48 
453 Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. 401.27 
454 Sanghvi Movers Ltd. 400.53 
455 NITT Ltd. 397 51 
456 VSTINDUSTRI 396.16 
457 MICRO INKS 395.9I 
458 STRIDES ARCO 394 33 
459 Provogue (India) Ltd. 392.5 
460 HNOLEXIND 39I 34 
461 ZANDU PHARMACEUTICALS WORKS LTD. 39O.32 
462 MAS SHR FIN 388 04 
463 SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LTD. 387 77 
464 ESCORTS LTD. 337 29 
465 BA]AJ ELECTRICALS LTD. 387.17 
466 Shopper's Stop Ltd. 383.73 
467 I.C.S.A. (India) Ltd. 381.1 
468 MASTEK 37748 
469 OCL India Ltd. 377 25 
XVIII 
470 PSL QMITED 376.61 
471 Amtek India Ltd. 375.31 
472 KENNAMETALW 375.1 
473 ARSHYIA INTERNATIONAL LTD. 374.21 
474 Rnolex Cables Ltd. 373.32 
475 SPICEJETLTD. 371.88 
476 Sanwaria Agro Oils Ltd. 369.75 
477 Sanghi Industries Ltd. 364.15 
478 Allied Digital Services Limited 363.99 
479 GRUH FINANCE LTD. 361.74 
480 Oscar Investments Ud. 361.57 
481 Ansal Properties 8i Infrastructure Ltd. 361.5 
482 Elecon Engineering Co.Ltd. 360.53 
483 Taj GVK Hotels & Resorts Ltd. 354.26 
484 LTTTAM GALVA 352.83 
485 BALKRISHNA INDUSTRIES LTD. 352.22 
486 ARVIND MILLS 351.06 
487 J.K. CEMENT LTD. 349.15 
488 Titagarh Wagons Ltd. 347.85 
489 GREAVES COTTON LTD. 347.46 
490 Take Solutions Ltd. 347.4 
491 ISMT Ltd. 345.74 
492 MYSORE CEMENT LTD. 342.86 
493 GHCL LTD. 342 
494 TORErn" CABLE 339.72 
495 NIIT TECHNOLOGIES LTD. 331.95 
496 Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. 331.5 
497 B L Kashyap and Sons Ltd. 330.46 
498 Adiiunik Metaliks Ltd. 328.78 
499 GLODYNE TECHNOSERVE LTD. 328.09 
500 Transport Corporation of India Ltd. 327.7 
XIX 
Annexure'W 
Annexure-IV 
SN 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Company 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 
VODAFONE GROUP 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
BG GROUP 
TESCO 
DIAGEO 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP 
NATIONAL GRID 
BAE SYSTEMS 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY 
CADBURY PLC 
XSTRATA PLC 
SAINSBURY(J) 
ROLLS ROYCE GROUP 
Shire 
ANTOFAGASTA 
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES 
SMITHS GROUP 
KINGFISHER 
AUTONOMY CORP 
G4S PLC 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC 
FRESNILLO PLC 
NEXT 
SAGE GROUP 
COBHAM 
HOME RETAIL GROUP PLC 
AMEC PLC 
HAMMERSON PLC 
PETROFAC 
Country of 
Incorporati 
on 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
MM. Cap 
£in 
95,125.08 
65.891.81 
56,020.23 
33,860.67 
26,225.62 
20,628.28 
17,080.36 
15,334.61 
13,099.48 
10,967.74 
7,301.87 
6,757.94 
5,475.75 
' 5,294.73 
4,662.12 
4,359.95 
4,140.71 
3,536.96 
3,226.11 
2,963.08 
2.880.58 
2,624.87 
2,558.05 
2,506.47 
2,309.32 
2,233.79 
2,190.79 
1,860.77 
1,806.82 
1,691.84 
1,617.07 
XX 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
LONMIN 
VEDANTA RESOURCES 
PENNON GROUP 
KAZAKHMYS 
INTERTEK GROUP 
FIRSTGROUP 
INVENSYS PLC 
ARM HLDGS 
WOLSELEY 
BURBERRY GROUP 
LOGICA PLC 
HAYS 
LADBROKES 
BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP 
SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC 
DE LA RUE 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE GROUP 
ITV 
INFORMA 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL 
VT GROUP 
IMI 
STAGECOACH GROUP 
AEGIS GROUP 
31 GROUP 
BELLWAY 
Charter International 
HOCHSCHILO MINING PLC 
HOMESERVE 
ROTORK 
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING 
DERWENT LONDON PLC 
MISYS 
MITIE GROUP 
MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL 
MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTELS 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
1,582.10 
1,521.91 
1,515.38 
1,399.65 
1,301.52 
1,295.68 
1,218.02 
1,209.32 
1,173.77 
1,111.77 
1,094.25 
1,059.25 
1,043.65 
1,039.06 
1,015.38 
992.84 
964.48 
962.56 
903.97 
890.41 
863.41 
846.59 
826.48 
787.41 
765.45 
722.94 
692.31 
676.17 
648.52 
618.34 
607.24 
599.89 
592.00 
571.28 
569.14 
565.69 
XXI 
68 HUNTING 
69 HMV GROUP 
70 WETHERSPOON(J.D.) 
71 ELECTROCOMPONENTS 
72 GAME GROUP PLC 
73 SPECTRIS 
74 BRITVIC 
75 BOVIS HOMES GROUP 
76 ATKINS(WS) 
77 WELLSTREAM HLDGS PLC 
78 PREMIER FARNELL 
79 GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES PLC 
80 TRAVIS PERKINS 
81 DIGNITY PLC 
82 SAVILLS 
83 GENUS 
84 KELLER GROUP 
85 FORTH PORTS 
86 DSG INTERNATIONAL 
87 NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP 
88 EAGA PLC 
89 CHLORIDE GROUP 
90 FERREXPO PLC 
91 BSS GROUP 
92 DEBENHAMS PLC 
93 MOTHERCARE 
94 MELROSE 
95 DAIRY CREST GROUP 
96 AVEVA GROUP 
97 MARSTON'S PLC 
98 SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS 
99 BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC 
100 BBA AVIATION PLC 
101 DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS 
102 RPS GROUP 
103 FIDESSA GROUP PLC 
104 CSRPLC 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
548.62 
542.17 
534.62 
531.65 
504.37 
495.80 
494.00 
467.71 
460.34 
455.33 
446.18 
416.35 
399.67 
391.73 
384.35 
381.87 
374.54 
367.25 
360.67 
357.38 
353.39 
341.67 
339.93 
337.40 
332.41 
331.49 
328.41 
324.28 
322.88 
314.90 
300.76 
296.29 
288.21 
277.69 
275.94 
272.84 
263.19 
XXII 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
PAYPOINT 
ENTERPRISE INNS 
MORGAN SINDALL 
REDROW 
M0NEYSUPERMARKET.COM GROUP PLC 
BIG YELLOW GROUP 
SYNERGY HEALTH PLC 
INTERSERVE 
MELROSE RESOURCES 
EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
HAMPSON INDUSTRIES 
FENNER PLC 
GRAINGER PLC 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
259.74 
250.18 
234.33 
225.77 
217.56 
214.71 
210.09 
203.43 
199.33 
196.23 
128.58 
120.59 
111.35 
XXIII 
AnneKure-V 
Annexure-V 
SN 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Company 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 
VODAFONE GROUP 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
BG GROUP 
TESCO 
DIAGEO 
RIO TINTO 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP 
NATIONAL GRID 
BAE SYSTEMS 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC 
BARCLAYS 
CADBURY PLC 
PRUDENTIAL 
XSTRATA PLC 
REED ELSEVIER 
SAINSBURY(J) 
ROLLS ROYCE GROUP 
Shire 
RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC 
ANTOFAGASTA 
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 
STANDARD LIFE PLC 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES 
SMITHS GROUP 
KINGFISHER 
AUTONOMY CORP 
G4S PLC 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC 
FRESNILLO PLC 
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP 
NEXT 
SAGE GROUP 
COBHAM 
SCHRODERS 
BUNZL 
HOME RETAIL GROUP PLC 
AMEC PLC 
HAMMERSON PLC 
ALLIANCE TRUST 
PETROFAC 
LONMIN 
VEDANTA RESOURCES 
Country of 
IncorporatI 
on 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main M«1cet 
MM. Cap £n 
95,125.08 
65,891.81 
56.020.23 
33,860.67 
26,225.62 
20,628.28 
18,036 86 
17,080.36 
15,334.61 
13,099.48 
10.967.74 
9,206 22 
7,818 00 
7,301.87 
6,982 33 
6,757.94 
5,782 68 
5,475.75 
5,294.73 
4,662.12 
4,558 38 
4,359.95 
4,140.71 
3,78819 
3,536.96 
3,226.11 
2,963.08 
2,880.58 
2,624.87 
2,558.05 
2.506.47 
2,356 32 
2.309.32 
2,233.79 
2,190.79 
2,041 23 
1,906 43 
1,860.77 
1,806.82 
1,691.84 
1,652 90 
1,617.07 
1.582.10 
1.521.91 
XXIV 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76-
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
PENNON GROUP 
KAZAKHMYS 
FOREIGN & COL INVESTM TRUST 
INTERTEK GROUP 
FIRSTGROUP 
RIT CAPITAL PARTNERS 
INVENSYS PLC 
ARM HLDGS 
WOLSELEY 
BURBERRY GROUP 
LOGICA PLC 
HAYS 
LAOBROKES 
BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP 
SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC 
DE LA RUE 
JARDINE LLOYD THOMPSON GROUP 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE GROUP 
ITV 
HARGREAVES LANSDOWN PLC 
ST JAMES'S PLACE 
INFORMA 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTEC (PLC) 
VT GROUP 
ASHMORE GROUP PLC 
IMI 
STAGECOACH GROUP 
TEMPLETON EMERG MARK INVESTM 
TRUST 
AEGIS GROUP 
31 GROUP 
ULTRA ELECTRONICS HLDGS 
BELLWAY 
CLOSE BROS GROUP 
Charter International 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC 
CALEDONIA INVESTMENTS 
HOMESERVE 
ROTORK 
BH Global 
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING 
DERWENT LONDON PLC 
MISYS 
MITIE GROUP 
MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL 
MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTELS 
HUNTING 
HMV GROUP 
WETHERSPOON(J.D.) 
ELECTROCOMPON ENTS 
MONKS INVESTMENT TRUST 
GAME GROUP PLC 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
1,515.38 
1,399.65 
1,329.51 
1,301.52 
1.295.68 
1,272.22 
1,218.02 
1,209.32 
1,173.77 
1,111.77 
1.094.25 
1,059.25 
1,043.65 
1,039.06 
1,015.38 
992.84 
972.87 
964.48 
962.56 
948.64 
911.15 
903.97 
890.41 
866.38 
863.41 
858.53 
846.59 
826.48 
820.57 
787.41 
765.45 
751.52 
722.94 
708.92 
692.31 
676.17 
669.91 
648.52 
618.34 
609.46 
607.24 
599.89 
592.00 
571.28 
569.14 
565.69 
548.62 
542.17 
534.62 
531.65 
520.43 
504.37 
XXV 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
SPECTRIS 
BRITVIC 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP 
Reg us 
ATKINS(WS) 
WELLSTREAM HLDGS PLC 
PREMIER FARNELL 
SCOTTISH INVESTMENT TRUST 
GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES PLC 
TRAVIS PERKINS 
DIGNITY PLC 
CITY OF LONDON INVESTMENT TRUST 
SAVILLS 
GENUS 
KELLER GROUP 
HSBC Infrastructure Company 
FORTH PORTS 
BEAZLEY GROUP 
DSG INTERNATIONAL 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP 
ABERFORTH SMALLER COMPANIES TRUST 
EAGA PLC 
CHLORIDE GROUP 
FERREXPO PLC 
BSS GROUP 
ARICOM PLC 
DEBENHAMS PLC 
MOTHERCARE 
MELROSE 
DAIRY CREST GROUP 
AVEVA GROUP 
TR PROPERTY INVESTMENT TRUST 
MARSTON'S PLC 
JPMORGAN EMERGING MKTS INV TRUST 
SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC 
GENESIS EMERGING MARKETS FUND 
BBA AVIATION PLC 
DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS 
RPS GROUP 
FIDESSA GROUP PLC 
CSR PLC 
PAYPOINT 
MERCHANTS TRUST 
EDINBURGH DRAGON TRUST 
ENTERPRISE INNS 
Absolute Return Trust 
ASOS 
JPMORGAN AMERICAN IT 
STOBART GROUP LTD 
LAW DEBENTURE CORP 
MORGAN SINDALL 
BRITISH ASSETS TRUST 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
495.80 
494.00 
467.71 
46627 
460.34 
455.33 
44618 
43619 
416 35 
399.67 
391.73 
390 45 
384.35 
381.87 
374.54 
37198 
367.25 
363 72 
360.67 
357.38 
355 71 
353 39 
341.67 
339 93 
337 40 
333 83 
332.41 
33149 
328.41 
324.28 
322.88 
318 23 
314 90 
307 75 
300.76 
296.29 
292 83 
288.21 
277 69 
275 94 
272.84 
26319 
259.74 
25499 
252 90 
250.18 
242 42 
240 29 
237 51 
236 53 
23485 
234 33 
231 16 
XXVI 
150 IMPAX ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS PLC 
151 EVOLUTION GROUP 
152 REDROW 
153 INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP 
154 NOVAE GROUP 
155 ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
156 M0NEYSUPERMARKET.COM GROUP PLC 
157 BIG YELLOW GROUP 
158 STHREEPLC 
159 SYNERGY HEALTH PLC 
160 COMPUTACENTER 
161 INTERSERVE 
162 MELROSE RESOURCES 
163 YOUNG & CO'S BREWERY 
164 EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
165 JAMES HALSTEAD 
166 JUST RETIREMENT(HLDGS)PLC 
167 SPORTINGBET PLC 
168 JPMORGAN ASIAN INV TRUST 
169 TRADING EMISSIONS 
170 MEARS GROUP 
171 JPMORGAN ELECT 
172 ELECTRIC4GENERAL INV TST 
173 CLSHLDGS 
174 PACE PLC 
175 HIGHLAND GOLD MINING 
176 CARE UK 
177 ANTISOMA 
178 HG CAPITAL TRUST 
179 SCHRODER ASIA PACIFIC FUND 
180 GULFSANDS PETROLEUM 
181 ADVANCE DEVELOPING MARKETS TRUST 
182 RENSBURG SHEPPARDS 
183 PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST 
184 SCOTTISH AMERICAN INVESTMENT CO 
185 DEVRO 
186 COLLINS STEWART PLC 
187 CAMELLIA 
188 AXIS-SHIELD 
189 DELTA 
190 PROSTRAKAN GROUP 
191 CARETECH HLDGS PLC 
192 GALLIFORD TRY 
193 MUCKLOW(A & J )GROUP 
194 HARGREAVES SERVICES 
195 COSTAIN GROUP 
196 PARAGON GROUP OF COMPANIES 
197 HENDERSON TR PACIFIC INV TRUST 
198 BLACKROCK LATIN AMERICAN INV TRUST 
199 JD SPORTS FASHION PLC 
200 INVESTORS CAPITAL TRUST PLC 
201 CHESNARA 
202 PANTHEON INTERNAT PARTICIPATIONS 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
228 57 
226 96 
225.77 
223 86 
223 33 
218 62 
217.56 
214.71 
212 41 
210.09 
206 58 
203.43 
199.33 
196 84 
196.23 
194 54 
192 84 
189 05 
185 75 
18441 
182 39 
18107 
178 05 
177 90 
175 94 
173 34 
170 88 
168 72 
167 37 
165 94 
165 04 
164 71 
162 80 
161 23 
159 98 
158 75 
157 73 
156 31 
154 57 
152 81 
15194 
149 65 
149 57 
146 98 
14189 
140 59 
140 28 
138 65 
136 68 
135 62 
134 54 
133 09 
131 13 
XXVII 
203 HAMPSON INDUSTRIES 
204 UAIRD PLC 
205 SEVERFIELD-ROWEN 
206 DIPLOMA 
207 ACCSYS TECHNOLOGIES 
208 LONDON SECURITY PLC 
209 HILL & SMITH HLDGS 
210 CONSORT MEDICAL PLC 
211 FENNERPLC 
212 SVM GLOBAL FUND 
213 F&C CAPITAL & INCOME INV TST 
214 GOLDSHIELD GROUP 
215 AERO INVENTORY 
216 ANGLO PACIFIC GROUP 
217 GRAINGER PLC 
218 HARDY OILS GAS 
219 NCC GROUP 
220 INVISTA REAL ESTATE INV MNGMT HLDGS 
221 CLIPPER WINDPOWER 
222 LONDON CAPITAL GROUP HLDGS PLC 
223 RWS HLDGS 
224 SMITHS NEWS PLC 
225 BRIXTON PLC 
226 SAFESTOR E H LDGS P LC 
227 ST MODWEN PROPERTIES 
228 DEXION EQUITY ALTERNATIVE 
229 ATLANTIS JAPAN GROWTH FUND 
230 ARK WERAPEUTICS GROU P 
231 SCHRODER INCOME GROWTH FUND 
232 MARSHALLS 
233 JPMORGAN RUSSIAN SECURITIES 
234 BEGBIES TRAYNOR GROUP PLC 
235 BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING 
236 SCHRODER UK GROWTH FUND 
237 ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTATIONS 
238 MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP 
239 CONCATENO PLC 
240 BOOT(HENRY) 
241 AVOCET MINING 
242 CLARKSON 
243 IP GROUP 
244 INTEC TELECOM SYSTEMS 
245 GARTMORE GLOBAL TRUST 
246 UMECO 
247 TENON GROUP 
BLACKROCK SMALLER COMPANIES TST 
248 PLC 
249 WILMINGTON GROUP 
250 HAMWORTHY 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
AIM 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
128.58 
127 44 
125 82 
124 56 
123 68 
122 82 
122 37 
120 84 
120.59 
119 93 
11890 
11603 
11486 
11302 
111.35 
11083 
11021 
109 21 
108 07 
106 87 
106 67 
106 09 
10510 
102 90 
101 17 
100 70 
99 90 
99 37 
98 57 
97 77 
97 44 
9714 
96 70 
95 79 
94 78 
94 56 
94 23 
93 00 
91 10 
89 66 
88 85 
88 48 
87 75 
87 70 
86 46 
8611 
84 89 
8469 
XXVIII 
Annexure-Vi 
Annexure-VI 
SN 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Company 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 
BP 
VODAFONE GROUP 
HSBC HLDGS 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 
BG GROUP 
ASTRAZENECA PLC 
TESCO 
BHP BILLITON 
DIAGEO 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC 
RIOTINTO 
UNILEVER 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP 
SABMILLER 
NATIONAL GRID 
ANGLO AMERICAN 
BAE SYSTEMS 
STANDARD CHARTERED 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC 
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GROUP 
BARCLAYS 
AVIVA 
CADBURY PLC 
BT GROUP 
PRUDENTIAL 
MORRISON(WM )SUPERMARKETS 
XSTRATA PLC 
TULLOW OIL PLC 
REED ELSEVIER 
COMPASS GROUP 
SAINSBURY(J) 
PEARSON 
ROLLS ROYCE GROUP 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS 
Shire 
WPP 
RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC 
SMITH & NEPHEW 
ANTOFAGASTA 
Country 
of Incorp-
oration 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
MM. Cap tm 
95,125.08 
84,462 28 
65,891.81 
58,973 05 
56,020.23 
35,877 80 
33,860.67 
32,733 93 
26,225.62 
24,409 50 
20,628.28 
19,083 19 
18,036.86 
17,574 21 
17,080.36 
16,020 60 
15,334.61 
13,272 80 
13,099.48 
12,539 68 
10,967.74 
9,52400 
9,206.22 
8,242 74 
7,818.00 
7,678 69 
7,301.87 
7,013 86 
6,982.33 
6,791 28 
6,757.94 
5,834 97 
5,782.68 
5,755 44 
5.475.75 
5,305 76 
5,294.73 
5,155 92 
4,662.12 
4.599 81 
4,558.38 
4.418 43 
4,359.95 
XXIX 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES CORP 
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 
CAPITA GROUP 
STANDARD LIFE PLC 
INTERNATIONAL POWER 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES 
CABLE & WIRELESS 
SMITHS GROUP 
CARNIVAL 
KINGFISHER 
MAN GROUP 
AUTONOMY CORP 
THOMSON REUTERS PLC 
G4S PLC 
SEVERN TRENT 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC 
LAND SECURITIES GROUP PLC 
FRESNILLO PLC 
TUI TRAVEL PLC 
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP 
BRITISH LAND CO PLC 
NEXT 
ADMIRAL GROUP 
SAGE GROUP 
OLD MUTUAL 
COBHAM 
JOHNSON MATTHEY 
SCHRODERS 
INMARSAT 
BUNZL 
SERCO GROUP 
HOME RETAIL GROUP PLC 
THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC 
AMEC PLC 
DRAX GROUP 
HAMMERSON PLC 
REXAM 
ALLIANCE TRUST 
FRIENDS PROVIDENT 
PETROFAC 
AMLIN 
LONMIN 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 
VEDANTA RESOURCES 
BALFOUR BEATTY 
PENNON GROUP 
ICAP 
KAZAKHMYS 
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP 
FOREIGN & COL INVESTM TRUST 
WHITBREAD 
INTERTEK GROUP 
EASYJET 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
4,29143 
4,140.71 
4,090 20 
3,78819 
3,610 75 
3,536.96 
3,456 32 
3,226.11 
3,03715 
2,963.08 
2,935 67 
2,880.58 
2,62513 
2,624.87 
2,562 57 
2,558.05 
2,55416 
2,506.47 
2,473 60 
2,356 32 
2,341 48 
2,309.32 
2,261 83 
2,233 79 
2,20713 
2,190.79 
2,105 97 
2,041.23 
1,971 76 
1,906.43 
1,873 65 
1,860.77 
1,832 46 
1,806 82 
1,764 84 
1,691 84 
1,683 39 
1,652.90 
1,644 77 
1,617 07 
1,60480 
1,582.10 
1,577 75 
1,521.91 
1,51540 
1,515 38 
1,513 01 
1,399 65 
1,38416 
1,329 51 
1,31166 
1,301.52 
1,30014 
XXX 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
FIRSTGROUP 
IMPERIAL ENERGY CORP 
RIT CAPITAL PARTNERS 
LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL PLC 
INVENSYS PLC 
TATE & LYLE 
ARM HLDGS 
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP 
WOLSELEY 
NORTHUMBRIAN WATER GROUP PLC 
BURBERRY GROUP 
Dexion Absolute Ltd 
LOGICA PLC 
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL 
HAYS 
BERKELEY GROUP HLDGS 
LADBROKES 
PERSIMMON 
BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP 
WOOD GROUP(JOHN) 
SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC 
United Business Media 
DE LA RUE 
TOMKINS 
JARDINE LLOYD THOMPSON GROUP 
AGGREKO 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE GROUP 
IG GROUP HLDGS 
ITV 
DAILY MAIL & GENERAL TRUST 
HARGREAVES LANSDOWN PLC 
ABERDEEN ASSET MANAGEMENT 
ST JAMES'S PLACE 
QINETIQ GROUP 
INFORMA 
MITCHELLS & BUTLERS 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL 
CARILLION PLC 
INVESTEC (PLC) 
DANA PETROLEUM PLC 
VTGROUP 
RENTOKIL INITIAL 
ASHMORE GROUP PLC 
ARRIVA 
IMI 
MEGGITT 
STAGECOACH GROUP 
WILLIAM HILL PLC 
TEMPLETON EMERG MARK INVESTM TRUST 
SCOTTISH MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TST 
AEGIS GROUP 
CHEMRING GROUP 
31 GROUP 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
1,295.68 
1,283 62 
1,272.22 
1.25157 
1,218.02 
1,210 83 
1,209.32 
1,182 91 
1,173.77 
1,147 46 
1,111.77 
1,10317 
1,094.25 
1,074 94 
1,059.25 
1,046 00 
1,043.65 
1,040 53 
1,039.06 
1,022 68 
1,015.38 
1,01169 
992.84 
991 23 
972.87 
968 74 
964.48 
963 58 
962.56 
952 48 
94864 
945 50 
911.15 
907 53 
903.97 
899 67 
890.41 
868 77 
866.38 
864 78 
863.41 
859 81 
858.53 
858 42 
846.59 
833 66 
826.48 
823 56 
820.57 
794 99 
787.41 
770 99 
765.45 
XXXI 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
202 
VENTURE PRODUCTION 
ULTRA ELECTRONICS HLDGS 
WEIR GROUP 
BELLWAY 
PZ CUSSONS 
CLOSE BROS GROUP 
HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS 
Charter International 
MICHAEL PAGE INTERNATIONAL PLC 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC 
SIBIR ENERGY 
CALEDONIA INVESTMENTS 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL PLC 
HOMESERVE 
WITAN INVESTMENT TRUST 
ROTORK 
EDINBURGH INVESTMENT TRUST 
BH Global 
PREMIER OIL 
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING 
DIMENSION DATA HLDGS PLC 
DERWENT LONDON PLC 
BRIT INSURANCE HOLDINGS PLC 
MISYS 
HALMA 
MITIE GROUP 
MERCANTILE INVESTMENT TST PLCfTHE) 
MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL 
GREENE KING 
MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTELS 
KESA ELECTRICALS 
HUNTING 
HALFORDS GROUP 
HMVGROUP 
BROWN(N )GROUP 
WETHERSPOON(J.D.) 
GKN 
ELECTROCOMPONENTS 
WH SMITH PLC 
MONKS INVESTMENT TRUST 
BRITISH EMPIRE SEC & GENERAL TRUST 
GAME GROUP PLC 
BLACKROCK WORLD MINING TRUST PLC 
SPECTRIS 
MURRAY INTERNATIONAL TRUST 
BRITVIC 
ECOFIN WATER & POWER OPPORTUNITIES 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP 
PETER HAMBRO MINING PLC 
Regus 
SEGRO PLC 
ATKINS(WS) 
FIDELITY EUROPEAN VALUES 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
JE 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
763 68 
751.52 
728 68 
722.94 
716 04 
708.92 
708 90 
692.31 
687 51 
676.17 
675 52 
669.91 
669 05 
648.52 
642 70 
618.34 
610 67 
609.46 
608 39 
607.24 
605 70 
599.89 
599 38 
592.00 
589 05 
571.28 
570 94 
569.14 
565 76 
565.69 
56133 
548.62 
546 49 
542.17 
541 93 
534.62 
533 61 
53165 
529 37 
520.43 
507 45 
504.37 
502 07 
495.80 
49515 
494 00 
483 02 
467.71 
467 29 
466.27 
464 34 
460.34 
456 79 
XXXII 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
243 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
249 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
WELLSTREAM HLDGS PLC 
MONDI PLC 
PREMIER FARNELL 
XCHANGING PLC 
SCOTTISH INVESTMENT TRUST 
F&C COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TRUST 
GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES PLC 
CONNAUGHT 
TRAVIS PERKINS 
VICTREX 
DIGNITY PLC 
GO-AHEAD GROUP 
CITY OF LONDON INVESTMENT TRUST 
DAVIS SERVICE GROUP 
SAVILLS 
GREGGS 
GENUS 
F&C ASSET MANAGEMENT 
KELLER GROUP 
PERPETUAL INCOME&GROWTH INVESTM 
TR 
HSBC Infrastructure Company 
DUNELM GROUP PLC 
FORTH PORTS 
MOUCHEL GROUP PLC 
BEAZLEY GROUP 
SHAFTESBURY PLC 
DSG INTERNATIONAL 
COOKSON GROUP 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP 
TELECITY GROUP 
ABERFORTH SMALLER COMPANIES TRUST 
PV CRYSTALOX SOLAR PLC 
EAGA PLC 
BTG 
CHLORIDE GROUP 
DOMINO'S PIZZA UK& IRL 
FERREXPO PLC 
BOOKER GROUP PLC 
BSS GROUP 
SPORTS DIRECT INTL PLC 
ARICOM PLC 
BANKERS INVESTMENT TRUST 
DEBENHAMS PLC 
KIER GROUP 
MOTHERCARE 
CLIMATE EXCHANGE 
MELROSE 
RATHBONE BROS 
DAIRY CREST GROUP 
JKXOILS GAS 
AVEVA GROUP 
DAEJAN HLDGS 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Majn Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Matn Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
455.33 
453 54 
446.18 
445 52 
436.19 
430 97 
416.35 
41410 
399.67 
398 52 
391.73 
391 37 
390.45 
389 98 
384.35 
382 68 
381.87 
377 03 
374.54 
372 80 
371.98 
370 00 
367.25 
366 81 
363.72 
361 67 
360.67 
359 25 
357.38 
356 57 
355.71 
355 26 
353.39 
346 71 
341.67 
340 37 
339.93 
338 61 
337.40 
333 87 
333.83 
333 73 
332.41 
33191 
331.49 
329 08 
328.41 
324 63 
324.28 
32404 
322.88 
31915 
xxxin 
255 
256 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 
264 
265 
266 
267 
268 
269 
270 
271 
272 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
298 
299 
300 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
306 
307 
TR PROPERTY INVESTMENT TRUST 
TEMPLE BAR INVESTMENT TRUST 
MARSTON'S PLC 
HELICAL BAR PLC 
JPMORGAN EMERGING MKTSINV TRUST 
CARPETRIGHT 
SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS 
CRANSWICK 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC 
GUINNESS PEAT GROUP 
GENESIS EMERGING MARKETS FUND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL FINANCE PLC 
BBAAVIATtONPLC 
SVG CAPITAL 
DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS 
TULLETT PREBON PLC 
RPS GROUP 
SMITH(DS) 
FIDESSA GROUP PLC 
RIGHTMOVE PLC 
CSR PLC 
MURRAY INCOME TRUST 
PAYPOINT 
EMERALD ENERGY 
MERCHANTS TRUST 
PREMIER FOODS PLC 
EDINBURGH DRAGON TRUST 
ELECTRA PRIVATE EQUITY 
ENTERPRISE INNS 
BARR(A G) 
Absolute Return Trust 
BREWIN DOLPHIN HLDGS 
ASOS 
ROBERT WISEMAN DAIRIES PLC 
JPMORGAN AMERICAN IT 
MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO 
STOBART GROUP LTD 
FILTRONA 
U W DEBENTURE CORP 
CHAUCER HOLDINGS 
MORGAN SINDALL 
FINSBURY WORLDWIDE PHARM TRUST 
BRITISH ASSETS TRUST 
RANK GROUP 
IMPAX ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS PLC 
JPMORGAN INDIAN INV TRUST 
EVOLUTION GROUP 
SDL 
REDROW 
RENISHAW 
INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP 
RESTAURANT GROUP PLC 
NOVAE GROUP 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
318.23 
315 04 
314.90 
31429 
307.75 
303 39 
300.76 
296 37 
296.29 
293 46 
292.83 
290 66 
288.21 
28613 
277.69 
277 65 
275.94 
27316 
272.84 
264.48 
263.19 
262 65 
259.74 
256 25 
254.99 
25317 
252.90 
25192 
250.18 
243 47 
242.42 
240 34 
240.29 
24012 
237.51 
237 08 
236.53 
236 51 
234.85 
234 45 
234.33 
233 06 
231.16 
229 51 
228.67 
227 50 
226.96 
226 35 
225.77 
224 22 
223.86 
223 45 
223.33 
XXXIV 
308 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
332 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
349 
350 
351 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
NORTHERN FOODS 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
TELECOM PLUS 
M0NEYSUPERMARKET.COM GROUP PLC 
JPMORGAN EUR FLEDGELING INVTST PLC 
BIG YELLOW GROUP 
DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES 
STHREE PLC 
JP MORGAN JAPANESE INVESTMENT 
TRUST 
SYNERGY HEALTH PLC 
DATACASH GROUP PLC 
COMPUTACENTER 
INCHCAPE 
INTERSERVE 
MCBRIDE 
MELROSE RESOURCES 
DUNEDIN INCOME GROWTH INVEST 
TRUST 
YOUNG & GO'S BREWERY 
FIDELITY SPECIAL VALUES 
EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC 
JAMES HALSTEAD 
IMPERIAL INNOVATIONS GROUP 
JUST RETIREMENT(HLDGS)PLC 
VECTURA GROUP 
SPORTINGBET PLC 
JPMORGAN EUROPEAN INVESTMENT 
TRUST 
JPMORGAN ASIAN INV TRUST 
ABCAM 
TRADING EMISSIONS 
EDINBURGH UK TRACKER TRUST 
MEARS GROUP 
BLUEBAY ASSET MANAGEMENT PLC 
JPMORGAN ELECT 
HUNTSWORTH 
ELECTRIC&GENERAL INV TST 
POLAR CAPITAL TECHNOLOGY TRUST 
CLS HLDGS 
SOUTHERN CROSS HEALTHCARE GROUP 
PLC 
PACE PLC 
SIG 
HIGHLAND GOLD MINING 
JPMORGAN CLAVERHOUSE IT PLC 
CARE UK 
HEADLAM GROUP 
ANTISOMA 
UK COAL 
HG CAPITAL TRUST 
CINEWORLD GROUP 
SCHRODER ASIA PACIFIC FUND 
EDINBURGH US TRACKER TRUST 
GB 
GG 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
21910 
218.62 
21814 
217.56 
215 72 
214.71 
212 72 
212.41 
211 17 
210.09 
209 60 
206.58 
204 41 
203.43 
20190 
199.33 
198 90 
196.84 
196 24 
196.23 
195 28 
194.54 
193 06 
192.84 
19011 
189.05 
187 80 
185.75 
18513 
184 41 
183 51 
182.39 
182 20 
181.07 
179 32 
178.05 
177 95 
177 90 
176 31 
175.94 
17411 
173 34 
172 85 
170.88 
168 74 
168.72 
167 69 
167 37 
166 52 
165.94 
165 58 
XXXV 
359 
360 
361 
362 
363 
364 
365 
366 
367 
368 
369 
370 
371 
372 
373 
374 
375 
376 
377 
378 
379 
380 
381 
382 
383 
384 
385 
386 
387 
388 
389 
390 
391 
392 
393 
394 
395 
396 
397 
398 
399 
400 
401 
402 
403 
404 
405 
406 
407 
408 
409 
410 
411 
GULFSANDS PETROLEUM 
FOREIGN & COLONIAL EUROTRUST 
ADVANCE DEVELOPING MARKETS TRUST 
ASHTEAD GROUP 
RENSBURG SHEPPARDS 
TR EUROPEAN GROWTH TRUST 
PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST 
YELL GROUP 
SCOTTISH AMERICAN INVESTMENT CO 
BPP HLDGS 
DEVRO 
HERALD INVESTMENT TRUST 
COLLINS STEWART PLC 
RMPLC 
CAMELLIA 
ELEMENTIS 
AXIS-SHIELD 
SAUMANDER ENERGY PLC 
DELTA 
FISHER(JAMES)& SONS PLC 
PROSTRAKAN GROUP 
NUMIS CORP 
CARETECH HLDGS PLC 
BUSINESS POST GROUP 
GALLIFORD TRY 
WINCANTON 
MUCKLOW(A.& J.)GROUP 
IMAGINATION TECHNOLOGIES GROUP 
HARGREAVES SERVICES 
RECORD PLC 
COSTAIN GROUP 
M&G HIGH INCOME INVESTMENT TRUST 
PARAGON GROUP OF COMPANIES 
TED BAKER 
HENDERSON TR PACIFIC INV TRUST 
SHANKS GROUP 
BLACKROCK LATIN AMERICAN INV TRUST 
SPICE PLC 
JD SPORTS FASHION PLC 
LMS CAPITAL PLC 
INVESTORS CAPITAL TRUST PLC 
INVESCO PERPETUAL SELECT TRUST PLC 
CHESNARA 
PHOENIX IT GROUP 
PANTHEON INTERNAT PARTICIPATIONS 
KALAHARI MINERALS 
HAMPSON INDUSTRIES 
RPC GROUP 
LAIRD PLC 
HANSA TRUST 
SEVERFIELD-ROWEN 
HEALTHCARE LOCUMS PLC 
DIPLOMA 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
165.04 
164 99 
164.71 
163 92 
162.80 
162 37 
161.23 
160 77 
159 98 
15910 
158.75 
158 06 
157.73 
15712 
156.31 
156 25 
154.57 
15316 
152.81 
152 08 
151.94 
150 82 
149.65 
149 59 
149.57 
14925 
146.98 
143 88 
141.89 
14168 
140.59 
140 50 
140.28 
14012 
138.65 
136 83 
136.68 
13613 
135.62 
135 07 
134.54 
13411 
133.09 
132 64 
131.13 
13016 
128.58 
128.52 
127 44 
126 48 
125.82 
124.61 
124.56 
XXXVI 
412 MP EVANS GROUP 
413 ACCSYS TECHNOLOGIES 
414 BLACKROCK GREATER EUROPE INVTST 
415 LONDON SECURITY PLC 
416 ITE GROUP 
417 HILL & SMITH HLDGS 
418 BARING EMERGING EUROPE PLC 
419 CONSORT MEDICAL PLC 
420 GRAPHITE ENTERPRISE TRUST 
421 FENNER PLC 
GARTMORE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT 
422 TRUST 
423 SVM GLOBAL FUND 
424 BRUNNER INVESTMENT TRUST 
425 F4C CAPITAL & INCOME INV TST 
426 KEYSTONE INVESTMENT TRUST 
427 GOLDSHIELD GROUP 
428 FULLER SMITH & TURNER 
429 AERO INVENTORY 
430 FORTUNE OIL 
431 ANGLO PACIFIC GROUP 
432 HSBC GLOBAL ABSOLUTE 
433 GRAINGER PLC 
434 MARTIN CURRIE PORTFOLIO INV TRUST 
435 HARDY OIL & GAS 
436 JPMORGAN OVERSEAS INV TST PLC 
437 NCC GROUP 
438 ALBEMARLE & BOND HLDGS 
439 INVISTA REAL ESTATE INV MNGMT HLDGS 
440 PRODESSE INVESTMENT 
441 CLIPPER WINDPOWER 
442 LOWLAND INVESTMENT CO 
443 LONDON CAPITAL GROUP HLDGS PLC 
444 WSP GROUP 
445 RWS HLDGS 
446 EROS INTERNATIONAL 
447 SMITHS NEWS PLC 
448 F&C GLOBAL SMALLER COMPANIES 
449 BRIXTON PLC 
450 WORKSPACE GROUP PLC 
451 SAFESTORE HLDGS PLC 
462 HANSTEEN HLDGS 
453 ST.MODWEN PROPERTIES 
454 SCHRODER ORIENTAL INCOME FUND 
455 DEXION EQUITY ALTERNATIVE 
456 PUNCH TAVERNS 
457 ATLANTIS JAPAN GROWTH FUND 
458 ABERDEEN ASIAN INCOME FUND 
459 ARK THERAPEUTICS GROUP 
460 MAY GURNEY INTEGRATED SERVICES 
461 SCHRODER INCOME GROWTH FUND 
462 KOFAX PLC 
463 MARSHALLS 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
AIM ^^ 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
12417 
123.68 
123 07 
122.82 
122 71 
122.37 
122 02 
120.84 
120 70 
120.59 
120 41 
119.93 
11974 
118.90 
11841 
116.03 
11600 
114.86 
11434 
113.02 
11210 
111.35 
111 11 
110.83 
11062 
110.21 
11010 
109.21 
108 44 
108.07 
106 99 
106.87 
106 73 
106.67 
106 63 
106.09 
105 39 
105.10 
104 52 
102.90 
1 0 2 1 5 ^ - -
101.17 
101 14 
100.70 
100 62 
99.90 
99 72 
99.37 
99 03 
98.57 
97 98 
97.77 
XXXVII 
464 
465 
466 
467 
468 
469 
470 
471 
472 
473 
474 
475 
476 
477 
478 
479 
480 
481 
482 
483 
484 
485 
486 
487 
488 
489 
490 
491 
492 
493 
494 
495 
496 
497 
498 
499 
500 
SENIOR PLC 
JPMORGAN RUSSIAN SECURITIES 
TRADER MEDIA EAST 
BEGBIES TRAYNOR GROUP PLC 
DEVELOPMENT SECURITIES 
BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING 
TRIBAL GROUP 
SCHRODER UK GROWTH FUND 
MAJESTIC WINE PLC 
ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTATIONS 
HILTON FOOD GROUP PLC 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP 
HOUOAYBREAK 
CONCATENO PLC 
GALIFORM PLC 
BOOT(HENRY) 
HENDERSON SMALLER COS INVTST 
AVOCET MINING 
PRIMARY HEALTH PROPERTIES 
CLARKSON 
HENDERSON EUROTRUST 
IP GROUP 
WOLFSON MICROELECTRONICS 
INTEC TELECOM SYSTEMS 
MIDAS INCOME & GROWTH TRUST 
GARTMORE GLOBAL TRUST 
MOUNTVIEW ESTATES 
UMECO 
ANITE PLC 
TENON GROUP 
ABERDEEN NEW DAWN INVESTMENT TST 
BLACKROCK SMALLER COMPANIES TST 
PLC 
DTZ HLDGS 
WILMINGTON GROUP 
FINSBURY GROWTH & INCOME TRUST 
HAMWORTHY 
EIDOS PLC 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
GB 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Main Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
UK Main Market 
UK Mam Market 
AIM 
UK Mam Market 
97 59 
97.44 
97 20 
97.14 
96 89 
96.70 
96 39 
95.79 
95 30 
94.78 
94 73 
94.56 
9452 
94.23 
93 44 
93.00 
91 49 
91.10 
90.69 
89.66 
89 50 
88.85 
88 78 
88.48 
8817 
87.75 
87 73 
87.70 
86 60 
86.46 
86 31 
86.11 
85 31 
84.89 
84 84 
84.69 
84 35 
XXXVIII 
